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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1:
(1) Non-academic contexts ranged from science- or discipline-oriented contexts like the National
Radio Astronomy Laboratory, the National Centre for Atmospheric Research - often situated in or
adjacent to universities - to more mission-oriented contexts like the National Institutes of Health,
the National Aeronautics & Space Agency, and occasionally technology-oriented contexts like the
Livermore Radiation Laboratory (Brooks, 1968). Some of these should be regarded as quasi-
academic contexts, since it is reported that many of the federal contract research laboratories are a
legal fiction; they are, in fact, owned and financed by universities/consortia of universities - and in
some instances, by industry (Greenberg, 1971).
(2) The concept of federal funding had been such an anathema prior to the second world war that
the National Academy of Sciences had established a National Research Fund to attract private
funding for science research (Price, 1968).
(3) Eg. the Department of the Interior, responsible for geological research and the management of
natural resources.
(4) In the USSR, for instance, basic research was primarily conducted in separate research
institutes, while even in the UK and Canada universities received a smaller share of the
government's total research expenditure) (Price, 1978).
(5) The concept was introduced in a statement issued by the President's Science Advisory
Committee in 1960 (the Seaborg Report), which observed that there were only 15-20 centres of
excellence in the US.
(6) The OECD recommended this should be done in focussed fields rather than dispersed over
every field; moreover, efforts should be made to do this on a co-operative basis rather than the
fragmented, sometimes competitive approach usually taken in Europe (Ben-David, 1968).
(7) eg. the Centre for Advanced Manufacturing Technology at Warwick University (Williams,
1985a).
(8) These included the Engineering Design Research Centre in Glasgow, the Surface Science
Research Centre at Liverpool, etc etc.
(9) The SERC had already started this process in 1969 with the introduction of CASE studentships.
In 1978 it introduced the Co-operative Grant Scheme. In 1979 the SERC and the DTI jointly
introduced the Teaching Company Scheme in an effort to mimic the role played in medical
disciplines by teaching hospitals (Williams, 1985a). The Integrated Graduate Development Scheme
was also introduced. The SERC's Engineering Board introduced the concept of research
directorates (eg. polymer engineering, marine technology, biotechnology, information technology
etc); each research directorate established joint research programmes between universities and
companies in which the movement of research personnel between the collaborating universities and
companies was a key feature - on the basis that this should stimulate technology transfer.
One of the most ambitious collaborative funding programmes in the UK was the Alvey Programme,
introduced in 1982. Under this programme universities, government laboratories and industrial
companies collaborated to conduct advanced, pre-competitive research in information technology.
In the early 1980s the DTI funded applied research and development in specially targetted areas
jointly with companies which banded together in "clubs". In 1988 the DTI introduced the LINK
scheme, which was designed to persuade SMEs to collaborate with academia on pre-competitive
projects.
(10) For instance, the EC's ESPRIT Programme where the priority was to get to know your
partners before submitting research proposals.
(11) For instance, the Research Corporation was founded in 1912, while the Battelle Memorial
Institute was founded prior to the second world war, expressly to progress technology transfer
where organisations generating the IP were not in a position or did not wish to assume
responsibility for technology transfer themselves. MIT's Industrial Liaison Programme (a
misleading name in view of subsequent developments; industrial "club" is a more appropriate
descriptor) dates back to 1948 (Allen, 1984), and Queens University, Belfast, has been engaged in
industrial liaison since the immediate postwar period (Joyce & Woods, 1986).
(12) In 1980, for instance, the SERC introduced its Regional Broker scheme. Brokers were set up
in each major region with the remit of concentrating on SMEs which had little or no experience of
the resources which could be provided by universities, and which had neither the knowledge nor
the resources to make contact on their own initiative (Bragg, 1986). In Scotland the Scottish
Development Agency set up a special division to act as intermediaries in the technology transfer
process (Faulkner, O'Conner et al, 1988). The US Research Corporation set up a UK division in
the 1980s, which was subsequently taken over by 3i. Numerous small, private sector brokers were
also established during this period (eg. Technology Brokers Ltd).
(13) Between 1967 and 1974 the University Grants Committee (UGC) gave pump-priming
assistance to university-industry collaboration schemes in the form of grants for the introduction of
11 industrial liaison offices and 10 research and consulting schemes (Williams, 1985b).
(14) In 1992, under the DTI's Innovation Programme, partial funding was provided on a
competitive basis to HEIs which did not have an "industrial unit" or which wished to strengthen
their existing "industrial unit".
(15) In Sweden industrial liaison offices were established in universities in 1969 by the National
Board of Technical Development (O'hEocha & Watson, 1984). By 1987 76 per cent of West
Germany's 64 universities had instituted either an industrial liaison office or some kind of
technology transfer unit (Allesch, 1987).
(16) In 1986, for instance, the DTI provided pump-priming funding for a network of regional
technology centres whose remit included eliciting and disseminating information from HEIs about
the services they could offer, research results etc.
(17) The Royal Society's Industrial Fellowship Scheme, for instance.
(18) MIT's Polymer Processing Lab and Cornell's Submicron Facility were early examples.
(19) The Wolfson Technological Projects Scheme was launched in 1968. Over the years it made
around £20m available to support the establishment of over 100 such centres/units in UK
universities (DesForges, 1986).
(20) In Norway, for instance, the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
set up the Central Institute for Industrial Research in 1950; this consisted of 12 institutes adjacent to
the University of Oslo campus which provided a comprehensive applied research service to
industry. A further 16 specialist research institutes were later founded to complement the first
twelve (Sanengen, 1971).
(21) In Sweden dedicated technology transfer offfices were set up in at least four Swedish
universities during the 1980s (O'hEocha & Watson, 1984).
(22) In the 1980s, imaginative collaborative ventures entailing funding from federal and state
governments, industry and universities led to the establishment of centres specifically to help
transfer biotechnology from academia into industry, for instance (eg. Penn State Biotechnology
Institute, North Carolina Biotechnology Center etc) (Dibner, 1985).
(23) The first innovation centre in West Germany was founded in 1983 by the Technical University
of Berlin, which relinquished control of it in 1986 by which time 33 new technology-based firms
had been set up there.
(24) In 1967-68 the Ministry of Technology provided funding to assist the creation of "university
industrial units" at the Universities of Bangor, Leeds, Newcastle upon Tyne, Salford, Strathclyde,
Swansea plus Cranfield Institute of Technology (Macrossan, 1981). By and large, these were
intended to provide a practical, in-house means of converting ideas developed in these universities
into marketable products.
(25) Guidelines for Exploitation (ref. P/DF/30, F/TA/49), SERC, July 1986.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2:
(1) During the 1960s many prominent US universities eschewed defence research projects because
of their condition of secrecy. MIT went so far as to divest itself of the Draper Laboratory, as
Stanford had the Stanford Research Institute, because of the secret work which these institutions
were prepared to undertake (Omenn, 1982).
(2) Information provided by Mr T Lemon of the Advisory Service, the Patent Office, London.
(3) It seems unlikely, where there is no guaranteed income to offset the costs, that universities with
no legal rights would set up a unit dedicated to intellectual property matters. However, this is a
remit which might justifiably be given to, say, a university-wide director of research. Researchers
could at least be alerted to the possible consequences of exploiting their discoveries intellectually,
through publication or through informal disclosure to colleagues, before filing a patent application,
where appropriate. They could also be directed to sources of professional assistance.
(4) I am grateful to Dr J Pennock of the University of Liverpool's Biochemistry Department for
this information.
(5) In 1965, for example, the University of Florida decided against filing a patent on the work of
faculty scientist Robert Cade but gave him no formal waiver. Cade subsequently exploited his
research findings by marketing "Gatorade", a highly successful high-energy drink, through a
private company. By 1972 his income from royalties amounted to $600,000 and the university sued
him. After a case which dragged on for several years, he agreed to assign 20 per cent of net
royalties to the university. Following this debacle, the university was forced to amend its patenting
policy (Omenn, 1982).
(6) Source: The Patent Office Roadshow, Glasgow, 1990.
(7) It was this policy which enabled Stanford to apply for patents on the "gene-splitting" techniques
of researchers Cohen and Boyer, whose work was supported by the NIH and the NSF. In the mid-
1970s, Stanford appears to have represented the exception, rather than the rule, however.
(8) Personal communication from the President, Katherine Ku, January, 1989.
(9) Under a statute adopted in 1934, Harvard forebade its faculty to enrich themselves or the
university through patenting discoveries relating to health care, unless the patent was "dedicated to
the public". Harvard shared this policy with many other American universities and did not revoke it
until 1974, when the university received $23m for biomedical research from Monsanto in exchange
for exclusive rights to the resulting patents.
At Columbia, this policy resulted in a significant loss of income. A microbiologist developed a
powerful technique for making antibodies to steroids - a technique which is now commonly used
for a variety of purposes (eg. controlling animal litter size, testing human hormonal disorders). The
Dean of Columbia's Medical School refused to countenance a patent being taken out on the grounds
that it was unethical to patent biomedical material (Source: The Scientist, November 28, 1988).
(10) In this same year, for example, the UNCTAD Code on the Transfer of Technology proscribed
technologies relating to food and medicine from patent protection (Evenson &Putnam,1987) echoing
the British medical establishment's views on the patenting of penicillin.
(11) I am grateful to Kathleen Terry of the University of Minnesota's Office of Patents and
Licensing for providing this information.
(12) University plant breeders in the US have begun to routinely patent new breeds, motivated by
the need for exclusivity. Increasingly their non-exclusive field crop releases are losing out to
heavily promoted commercially-bred releases. The profit margins on certified public varieties of
field crops are very small, with the result that seed retailers promote varieties introduced by the
private sector, even though they are technically inferior.
(13) If the departments of education, medicine and architecture were included in the UMIST
calculation, the figure dropped to 60 inventions per year. NB Norris's paper was circulated in the
1970s by the University Directors of Industrial Liaison. It was unpublished, as far as can be
determined, and bears no date.
(14) Academics entrepreneurs they studied were patenting at a rate which was equivalent to around
5 inventions per academic career; one would question, however, whether extrapolation from
academic entrepreneurs to academics in general is acceptable.
(15) In some disciplines, the requirements of national and supra-national organisations conflict with
the requirements of the Patent Act. In the early 1980s, for example, the UK Genetic Manipulation
Advisory Group demanded that research proposals and techniques be disclosed to it in advance.
The Spinks Report observed that a proposed EEC directive on genetic manipulation could have the
same effect (Spinks, 1980).
(16) In view of the fact that the commercialisation of innovations in biotechnology has involved
considerable use of trade secrets and proprietary information (Daly, 1985), it is likely that some
academics made an even bigger attitudinal leap than this.
(17) Using the PCT has the advantage of deferring individual national applications until the result
of an international novelty search is known; it also enables an application to be filed in London at
the last minute, if there is no time to arrange translations (Powell, 1987).
(18) Royalty income from WARF's first patent, dated 1925, totalled around $8 million net; their
second patent delivered $4 million net. By 1975 WARP had accumulated income from 42 patents,
and it is estimated that between 1928 and 1982 WARP generated $100 million for the University of
Wisconsin. Other examples include Indiana University Foundation, which received $3 million from
the discovery of stannous fluoride, the vital ingredient of "Crest" toothpaste; MIT received $1
million per year in royalties from the patent on its magnetic-core memory, the industry standard for
the first generation of computers; the drink "Gatorade" netted the University of Florida over $0.5
million (Omenn, 1982). However, by 1989 "Gatorade" had netted the University of Florida $9.1m,
still a minimal sum compared to the $55m received by Michigan State University for cisplatin, a
cancer drug licensed to Bristol-Myers; moreover, the patent has eight years left to run and royalties
are expected to continue at a rate of $10m p.a. (Source: The Scientist, November 28, 1988).
(19) Statistics made available to Manchester Business School's Academic Front-Shop Training
Programme, 1992.
(20) Spinks was apparently unaware that in the UK the provisions of the 1977 Patent Act proscribe
researchers from making a personal application for a patent unless the employer formally waives
his rights to the invention.
(21) Once again, I am grateful to Kathleen Terry of the University of Minnesota Office of Patents
& Licensing for making all this information available.
(22) Source: Information provided by Mr C Dale, representing the BTG in its Edinburgh office.
(23) In the course of this study, the investigator came into contact with several such agencies; none
of them routinely contacted UK universities, though one was in contact with a number of
universities in mainland Europe.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3:
(1) Whilst an agent would admittedly shoulder many of these burdens, a licensee makes a greater
commitment to the product/process than an agent.
(2) When cardiolipin was discovered in a New York State health department laboratory, the need to
control the quality of conunercial preparations dictated that a process patent should be obtained. But
royalties were seen as incompatible with medical ethics, even though this left no funds to off-set the
cost and management of the patent. When nystatin was discovered shortly afterwards in the same
laboratory, the complexities of weighing the fact that nobody would risk the necessary investment
to develop bulk production without a patent against the desire to prevent private companies making
undue profit from the public interest led to a more sophisticated solution. The inventors assigned
their patent rights to the Research Corporation, which exploited the discovery. The resulting
royalties were used to support research.
(3) This entitled the government to a non-exclusive, non-assignable, royalty-free licence to use the
invention for the duration of the patent.
(4) During the course of Harvard's attempt to set up a joint venture with a faculty biology
professor and venture capitalists, for example, the resulting company was widely seen as a
"university company", even though Harvard's share of the equity would only have amounted to 10
per cent.
(5) The investigator made every effort to obtain a copy, but the CVCP refused to provide one and
the author (J. Lowe) refused even to acknowledge requests for further information, let alone
provide it.
(6) Eg. Vuman Computer Systems Ltd and Medeval Ltd at the University of Manchester.
(7) For example, Computer Applications Services was founded by Heriot-Watt University in 1969
with the possibly unique assistance of a grant from the UGC; the Institute of Offshore Engineering
was founded in 1972 by Heriot-Watt with support from the Wolfson Foundation. Inmap was
founded by the Wolfson Microelectronics Institute of Edinburgh and Heriot-Watt Universities with
government backing.
(8) Loughborough Consultants Ltd was founded in 1969 by Loughborough University with the aid
of a large bank loan guaranteed by the university (MacKenzie & Rhys-Jones, 1985).
(9) It was estimated in 1980 that a minimal research operation for a fledgling rDNA company
would require $6-7m in its first 2-3 years of operation; a more viable operation would require
20,000 sq ft, 25 PhDs at a cost over the first 2-3 years of $10-12m. A hybridoma-based venture
would be a little less expensive at $3.5-4m for the first 3 years for a minimal operation. To set up
a company developing human diagnostics products would require a minimal investment of $18m+
over 2-3 years (details quoted in Kenney, 1986).
(10) Imperial College founded Imperial Biotechnology Ltd in 1985 with nominal capital of £1.5m
and a staff of 25; the university contributed no capital at all, but has equity in recognition of its
central role in the enterprise. In the same year the university founded Imperial Software
Engineering with nominal capital of £0.5m and a staff of 15; in this case, the university itself put
up 20 per cent of the start-up capital. At Aberdeen University the holding company AURIS
attracted £0.5m from the Scottish Development Agency and £1.25m from Prutec for a number of
joint ventures.
(11) Visual Machines Ltd was founded to market computerised image recognition systems by
Vuman Ltd at Manchester University with investment from the American Robot Corporation and
Rediffusion.
(12) Several universities have complemented their traditional investment activities with projects
which are more akin to venture capital transactions. The biotechnology company Hybritech
received second-round funding from the University of California and Rochester University, in a
private stock offering (Kenney, 1986); Columbia has looked into the possibility of providing
venture capital from its endowment and Wesleyan University provided start-up capital for the Zygo
Corporation, an industrial spin-off co-founded by an ex-doctoral student (Etzkowitz, 1983).
(13) For instance, together with the Scottish Development Agency, the Universities of Glasgow and
Strathclyde have jointly formed a venture capital company, Kelvin Technology Developments Ltd
(KTDL). Primarily designed to support the commercialisation of research conducted in the two
universities, KTDL plans to cast its net somewhat wider, providing venture capital for the
exploitation of technology originating elsewhere. Liverpool University has subscribed to the CLM
Unit Trust, a development capital fund designed to provide investment finance for SMEs in the
region.
(14) At Columbia, interestingly, faculty entrepreneurs took the opposite view, fearing that a
university company would "crowd them out" as entrepreneurs; they also felt that the university's
participation in private business infringed their academic freedom (Etzkowitz, 1983).
(15) Congress recommended mechanisms such as the North Carolina Biotechnology Foundation,
established by the state to exploit university research.
(16) Williams quotes the dean of Carnegie Institute of Technology: "... the bottom line is that we
must maintain a research climate on our campuses that permits the full intellectual talent of our
faculty to be invested in the creation of knowledge ... A highly structured, short-term pay-off
climate tends to stifle the creativity which has been the hallmark of academic research".
(17) It is seldom made clear in the literature whether equity participation in start-up companies
exploiting university research discoveries refers to the university buying in or simply accepting
equity on a "droit de seigneur" basis.
(18) By 1984 the University of Bath had an equity share in at least six spin-off companies (Cerych,
1985); the University of Strasbourg holds equity in Transgene, together with the Institut Pasteur
(Davis, 1981) etc.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4:
(1) The particular problems which confront student entrepreneurs (technical and non-technical) have
received considerable attention in both north America and the UK. Solutions to these problems have
been devised and students have been actively encouraged by targetted programmes such as the
Graduate Enterprise Programme to form a business after graduation. These and other programmes
are increasingly being networked to Europe and Australia. Evaluation of these programmes has
indicated further problems and issues which are' now being addressed in turn.
(2) According to McClelland, nAch was low in Britain between 1700 and 1750, and so was the
country's economic growth; in 1925, in contrast, Britain's nAch ranked 5th out of 25 countries
studied, but by 1950 it had dropped sharply, ranking 26th out of 39 countries. In contrast, nAch
remained considerably higher in the US following the second world war.
(3) Riggs characterised restrictive communities as "fused" and supportive communities as
"diffracted"; communities which encourage entrepreneurship but leave the entrepreneur in the
insecure position of depending on continued support he referred to as "prismatic". In the prismatic
community, for example, the social status of entrepreneurs is low and their social and economic
reward is less than optimal. Few enterprises are founded; potential entrepreneurs leave the
community in pursuit of a more positive environment or switch to other activities which are
approved of and supported by the community.
(4) See note (3).
(5) This is considerably shorter than the 3, 5 and 7-year contracts which are available at UK
universities following the abolition of tenure.
(6) Some researchers would be very sceptical of this remark. Several studies have shown that
companies started by academics - particularly manufacturing businesses - grow less fast than their
non-academic counterparts, particularly if the academics remain on the staff of their university (see,
for instance, Doutriaux, 1987). This has been attributed to weak business skills, among other things
- by Lamont himself (Lamont, 1972a).
(7) In Sweden academics do not attain the status of faculty members - and with it job security -
until they are 35 (McQueen & Wallmark, 1982a).
(8) Cooper comments on the fact that Hewlett Packard (HP), a student spin-off from Stanford, has
not incubated many spin-offs, despite placing an advertisement in Scientific American announcing
its interest in helping employees found companies. Significantly, perhaps, "HP" is said in the
business to stand for "Happy People".
(9) Cooper generally defined this as the total number of spin-off companies during a given time
period, divided by the average number of employees in the incubator organisation during the same
period. To be defined as a spin-off, companies must have had at least one full-time founder who
went directly from the university to the company; he excluded companies engaged solely in
management consulting, software or retail services, a judgement which he would probably not
make today in view of the growth of the service sector in general and computing services in
particular.
(10) Etzlcowitz (1983) has a more sinister explanation for this phenomenon: scientists working in
these laboratories/institutes have no tenure and take their place in a marked hierarchy. They are
often closer in role to scientists employed in industry than to traditional academic scientists, though
few conceive of themselves that way. Many lower and middle-level scientists in these hybrid
institutions have little choice in their research topics; academic freedom has no relevance to their
working lives.
(11) Examples include Pickel, Tromsdorff, Hermbstaedt, Erdmann and Liebig.
(12) They omit to mention that Einstein was originally a patent officer by profession!
(13) This is a constantly recurring theme in the US. For example, Noble (1982) argued strongly
that the resources and reputation of an institution like MIT have been created largely at public
expense - and asked whether they were really MIT's to sell to Edwin Whitehead. Until the advent
of the Whitehead Institute in December 1981, the biology department, for example, had been
sustained over two decades by federal funds and contributions from philanthropic foundations and
members of the public, rather than by contributions from industry.
(14) This may explain why researchers found it so hard to identify academics who had set up
companies when conducting pioneering studies of academic entrepreneurship (Roberts, 1972).
(15) This discrepancy may be a function of job security. Roberts' studies at MIT indicate that
where tenured academics had formed spin-off companies, less than 10 per cent left to become full-
time businessmen; most non-tenured staff opted to leave MIT (Roberts, 1972).
(16) Whilst graduate students have always been exploited intellectually by their supervisors
(Conrad, 1982), dossiers compiled by graduate student associations at Stanford and the University
of California (Davies) indicate that they are now exploiting them financially, too. They cite the case
of a doctoral student whose supervisor told the company for whom he consulted of her approach to
the solution of a particular problem. The company's research team used her approach to solve the
problem, obliging the student to begin a new project from scratch (Kenney, 1986).
(17) In a period still characterised by cut-backs in the level of funding, some administrators are
said to be unduly influenced by the research funds which the entrepreneurs have at their disposal.
(18) According to the Solicitor-General, Gilbert "is hardly an impartial observer in the debate over
the biohazards associated with genetic engineering developments".
(19) I am indebted to Dr C Pamplin, Editor of the UK Register of Expert Witnesses, for providing
this information during the course of a telephone conversation on 20 November, 1990.
(20) NASA invested a lot of money in traditional, formal mechanisms for the transfer of its
technology to the civilian sector, like information retrieval systems, publications and dedicated
"tech briefs". In the event, the level of technology transfer stimulated by the written word was
negligible, whereas "a vast amount of technology was informally transferred by the movement of
people" - through spin-off companies.
(21) This resulted from the transfer of the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research,
previously the Microbiological Research Establishment at Porton Down, to the Public Health
Laboratory Service in the 1970s; the Centre ceased supplying restriction enzymes.
(22) The company, New England Biolabs, was founded in 1974 by Dr. Donald Comb and his wife;
by the mid-1980s it had 22 employees and was still wholly owned by the founders.
(23) Personal communication from Mr C Dale, representing the Edinburgh office of the BTG,
dated 2 May 1989.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
(1) The Prime Minister announced the Government's intention to remove the BTG's right of first
refusal at a science seminar at Lancaster House in September, 1983. The announcement received
widespread coverage in the press at the time.
(2) Source: Minutes of the UDIL meeting of April 1982; the BTG operated under the aegis of the
Dol.
(3) The CVCP working party transmitted its comments on the proposed new arrangements to the
DES at the end of June, 1984.
(4) In November 1985, a representative of the CVCP reported to the Conference of Registrars &
Secretaries' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial Activities that 29 universities had replied
to the Kingman letter. However, only three responses were acceptable; many universities had failed
to address all eleven points which the Kingman letter indicated should be addressed; others had not
addressed certain points in the manner in which it was indicated that they should (Source: Minutes
of the Meeting of the Forum on University Industrial/Commercial Activities, 28 November, 1985).
(5) Reports of Government-commissioned enquiries, such as ACARD (1981) and ACARD/ABRC
(1983), had encouraged broad changes of policy for a number of years, but none went into detail
about how those policy objectives might be achieved.
(6) Source: CVCP (1978).
(7) Source: UDIL's founding constitution.
(8) Source: "Patenting/Exploitation Procedures in "D.I.L." Universities", UDIL, September 1974.
(9) The Working Party was chaired by the Vice-Chancellor of Hull; the Principal of Heriot-Watt,
the Director of Administration at Bristol and the Secretary and Registrar of Southampton made up
the other members.
(10) The penultimate paragraph noted that the law on copyright and designs had been the subject of
the Whitford Report, published in March 1977. Since it was unclear at the end of 1977 whether
this would lead to new legislation, the Working Party felt unable to give any guidance in relation to
computer software, books, articles etc.
(11) These nine criteria, many of which were derived from the 1977 Patent Act, were as follows:
(a) whether the invention was made in the course of his normal duties or of duties
specifically assigned to him (sic);
(b) whether the circumstances were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to
result from the carrying out of his duties;
(c) whether, because of his special responsibilities, he had a special obligation to further
the interests of the university;
(d) the nature of his duties and the remuneration and other advantages which he derives or
has derived from his position within the university;
(e) the effort and skill which he has devoted to making the invention;
(f) the extent to which the invention was made jointly by him with any other person and
the effort and skill which such other person has devoted to the invention;
(g) the extent of the advice and assistance contributed by any other member of the
university who is not a joint inventor of the invention;
(h) the contribution made by the university to the making, developing and working of the
invention by the provision of advice, facilities and other assistance and by its managerial
skill and activities;
(i) the extent of the return and other benefits derived from the invention.
(12) I am indebted to Dr. Jeremy Phillips, Research Fellow at the Intellectual Property Law Unit,
Queen Mary College, for this information.
(13) "Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation" (Cmnd. 9117), HMSO.
(14) Source: Chitty on Contracts, 24th edition, specific contracts paragraph 3558.
(15) Source: Letter to Secretaries of Local Associations headed "Patents and Inventions" (ref.
LA/2512), AUT, November 1984.
(16) Source: The Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions (ref. LAl2690), AUT, July
1985.
(17) Source: Letter from the Assistant General Secretary of the AUT to Sir John Kingman, 11 July
1985.
(18) Source: Letter from the Secretary of the SERC to the Assistant General Secretary of the AUT
(ref. F/TA/49), 31 July 1985.
(19) There is no evidence that the AUT was called upon to elucidate, or that the points made in this
letter were taken into account when formulating the new arrangements to come into effect following
the removal of the BTG's right of first refusal.
(20) Source: Letter to Secretaries of Local Associations headed "The Exploitation of Research
Council Funded Inventions" from the Assistant General Secretary and Convenor of the IPR
Working Party (ref. LA/2690), AUT, July 1985.
(21) Source: "The Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions: Five Principles" (ref.
LA/2690a), AUT, July 1985.
(22) Source: The Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions (ref. LA/2690b), AUT, July
1985
(23) Source: The AUT's response (ref. CS1285) to the Green Paper "Intellectual Property Rights
and Innovation" (Cmnd. 9117), submitted via the TUC in July 1984.
(24) Source: Minutes of the IPR Working Party meeting, 23 April 1985.
(25) The University in question was Birmingham (Source: Minutes of the IPR Working Party
meeting, 26 September 1985).
(26) Minutes of the IPR Working Party meeting of 26 September 1985 state "... it was agreed that
AUT should not harp too much on the ownership issue but more argue along the lines that if SERC
and the Government really wanted people to go ahead, the incentives must be given to them. This
was the whole point of the new policy".
(27) Source: Minutes of the IPR Working Party meeting of 26 September, 1985.
(28) The AUT had already decided that the increasing use of university-owned companies presented
a new range of problems for its members and sought talks with the CVCP about it (Source:
Minutes of the IPR Working Party meeting of 18 July, 1984).
(29) Source: Minutes of the IPR Working Party meeting of 26 September, 1985.
(30) Source: "Five Principles", circulated by the AUT to local associations together with LA/2690,
July 1985.
(31) In mid-1981 the ILO of Edinburgh University paid a visit to DG XXIII to discuss the
possibility of the EC funding the training of technology transfer intermediaries (Source: Minutes of
the autumn meeting of UDIL, October 1981). By spring 1982 he had become chairman of a
committee examining the training needs of such intermediaries (Source: Minutes of the spring
meeting of UDIL, April 1982). In due course, an association of European technology transfer
intermediaries was established under the aegis of the OECD.
(32) The Working Party on IP was composed of the UDIL members of Sheffield, Bradford and
Warwick universities, plus UMIST and University College/Wales; it was chaired by the LTDIL
member for Birmingham (Source: Minutes of the spring UDIL meeting, April 1985).
(33) Source: Minutes of the autumn UDIL meeting, September 1982.
(34) Source: Minutes of UDIL's autumn meeting, April 1985.
(35) Source: Letter from the Registrar of Warwick University to fellow Registrars, dated 15 June,
1984 (ref. MLS/sfe).
(36) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities, 20 September, 1984.
(37) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities, 14 March, 1985.
(38) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities Registrars & Secretaries, 20 September, 1985.
(39) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities, 9 May, 1985.
(40) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities, 14 March, 1985.
(41) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities, 14 March, 1985.
(42) Source: Minutes of a Special Meeting of the CRS' Forum on University Industrial/Commercial
Activities, 20 September, 1985.
(43) At the end of the 1960s, for instance, the CVCP had co-operated with the CBI in a study of
contemporary university/industry relations, culminating in the publication of the Docksey Report
(CBI, 1970). In November 1981, the CVCP had organised a major conference on universities and
industrial collaboration and published a booklet entitled "Universities and Industry".
(44) Chaired by the Chairman of the CVCP, ACI members included a number of "senior
industrialists", such as Sir Austin Bide and Lord Caldecote.
(45) Exploitation of Inventions, Office Note (ref. VC/84/73) 29 June, 1984.
(46) Exploitation of Inventions, Office Note (ref. VC/84/89), 18 September, 1984.
(47) "A Review of Academic/Industrial Co-operation", presented to the Advisory Committee on
Industry by Dr. J. D. Burnett in June 1985.
(48) The paper indicated, for example, that long-range and fundamental research had a high risk of
failure, from the point of view of knowledge and ideas which might be commercially exploitable.
Moreover, even if such IP emerged, exploitation might take as long as 20 years in some cases.
Short-range research, on the other hand, has a lower risk of failure, and commercial exploitation
might be expected within 2-10 years.
(49) "University-Based Companies and Science Parks" (ref. VC/87/83), CVCP, June 1987.
(50) A 5-page document concluded that universities would not be liable to lose their charitable
status provided any commercial or trading activities were peripheral to their teaching and research
activities. It indicated that universities could reduce any tax liability arising out of regular trading in
competion with other traders by establishing limited liability companies; the Memorandum of
Association should include amongst its purposes the making of covenanted contributions to charity -
ie. back to the university. The document warned universities that although wholly-owned companies
which got into financial difficulties were legally liable to do no more than pay back share-capital,
morally, they would be under considerable pressure to pay up, in order to protect their "good
name". Finally, it alerted universities to the fact that if they appointed members of staff as non-
executive directors, these members of staff cannot contract out of the duties imposed on company
directors if the company gets into difficulties; it drew universities' attention to the provisions of the
1985 Companies Act (sections 630 and 727) and the Insolvency Bill which was then going through
Parliament (Source: University Companies: Copy of a Paper Prepared by Alsop Stevens Bateson
Lane-Smith, Legal Advisors to the Committee, Regarding 'Universities, University Companies,
Charitable Status and Tax' (ref. 15/7/1, P/dp), 22 May, 1985).
(51) The group consisted of the Vice-Chancellors of Aston, Sheffield, Wales, Nottingham and
Sussex, the Principal of Stirling, the Provost of University College and a member of the Registry
of Cambridge University; it was chaired by the Vice-Chancellor of Manchester University (Source:
Exploitation of Inventions: Note to Members of the Committee's Group (ref. R9/9/4), 21 May,
1985).
(52) The 4-page note observed that while the Research Councils wished the rights and
responsibilities for exploitation to rest firmly with the institution in receipt of the grant, the
Government was encouraging universities to give researchers the fullest opportunity and scope to
assume responsibility for exploiting their discoveries; the position of the DES appeared to be
somewhere inbetween these two extremes - viz, that universities would give researchers the right of
first refusal to exploit their discoveries "within the framework of the university's agreed
arrangements".
(53) The 4-page note to the advisory group observed that the DES was in favour of "hard but fair
bargains with companies" but against wide variations in practice.
(54) I am indebted to Michael Powell, Senior Administrative Officer of the CVCP and a member
of the Exploitation Scrutiny Group, for this information.
(55) More recently, the Cabinet Office, the PCFC and the CDP have also been given representation
on the ESG.
(56) I am indebted to Michael Powell, Senior Administrative Officer of the CVCP and a member
of the Exploitation Scrutiny Group, for this information.
(57) The NRDC was originally created by an Act of Parliament expressly to exploit "inventions"
arising from publicly-funded research. In 1950, those Research Councils which existed at the time
voluntarily agreed to observe the provisions of Treasury Circular 5/1950, according to which they,
too, would offer the NRDC first refusal on any "inventions" arising out of research which they
funded (Source: Notes to Editors, DES Press Notice 112/85, "New Opportunities for Exploiting
Research", 14 May 1985).
(58) I am indebted to Colin Dale, representative of the BTG in Edinburgh, for this information.
(59) See, for example, the pamphlet "SERC Research Grants", 1984, p29, GC13(i).
(60) Once again, I am indebted to Colin Dale, representative of the BTG in Edinburgh, for this
information.
(61) "The Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions", written answer given by Sir Keith
Joseph, Secretary of State for Education and Science, in the House of Commons on 14 May, 1985,
recorded in the House of Commons Official Report: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), vol. 79 no.
116, cols. 97-100 (reproduced in full in Appendix A).
(62) "Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation" (Cmnd. 9117), HMSO, 1984.
(63) I am indebted to Dr. Roland Whaite of the Patent Office's publicity section for this
information.
(64) Source: Letter from C. S. Richenberg, Head of Publicity at the Patent Office, to 1LOs in 57
universities, 22 July 1985.
(65) The Secretary of the ESG is Mrs. M. Veal, who is also Head of the Research Grants Section
within the Finance Division of the SERC.
(66) "Guidelines for Exploitation" (ref. P/DF/30, F/TA/49), SERC, July 1986.
(67) Letter from the Finance Division of the SERC to Registrars, Secretaries and Administrators at
Universities, Polytechnics and other similar institutions (ref. F/TA/49, F/GA/91), 2 September
1986.
(68) Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office Note, (ref. VC/85/117), 14 November 1985.
(69) Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office Note, (ref. N/86/26), 14 February 1986.
(70) Detailed notes of this talk were later circulated to university administrators under the heading
"Conference of University Administrators: Seminar on Commercial Exploitation of Research,
University of Durham, 11 October 1990".
(71) Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office Note on Developments (ref. VC/86/93), 17 July,
1986.
(72) Performance Indicators in Universities: A Second Statement by the Joint CVCP/UGC Working
Group (ref. VC/87/78), 1 July 1987.
(73) See: The Foreword to the 1990 edition of "University Management Statistics and Performance
Indicators in the UK", issued by the CVCP/UFC Performance Indicators Committee, October
1990.
(74) I am indebted to Michael Powell, Senior Administrative Officer, CVCP, for this information
(Source: private communication, 6 February, 1991, ref. R9/1914).
(75) "University-Based Companies and Science Parks" (ref. VC/87/83), CVCP, June 1987.
(76) See, for instance, the Minutes of the Forum on University Industrial/Commercial Activities'
meeting of 9 January, 1987, which record that "disappointment in varying but strong terms was
expressed that the report had, in fact, not turned out to be the manual of assistance in establishing
and managing science parks, companies etc which ... the Forum had had in mind as desirable ...•
(77) A copy of the report was sent to members in December 1988 with a request for comments by
the end of February 1989 (Source: Note to Vice-Chancellors & Principals (refs. 15/812, R9/17/2,
N/88/159), 5 December 1988).
(78) A copy of the report was sent to members in March 1989, together with a resume of the
CVCP's views and a request for comments by mid-April. The accompanying circular noted that the
CBI, the Chartered Institute of Patent Agents, the UGC, the PCFC, the Advisory Council on
Science & Technology and the Standing Advisory Committee on Industrial Property were also
being asked by the DTI to comment (Source: Note to Vice-Chancellors & Principals (refs.
R9/17/2, N189141), 3 March 1989.
(79) The workshop "Patenting and the Strategic Use of IP" took place at UDIL's spring meeting in
April, 1986, and was attended by 35 ILOs (Source: Agenda).
(80) Source: "The Role and Functions of UDIL and University Industrial Liaison Services", draft
dated 12 March 1986, presented to the UDIL meeting of April 1986 for consideration.
(81) Source: Agenda of the UDIL meeting of September 19$6.
(82) "Report on University Intellectual Property: Its Management and Commercial Exploitation",
UDIL, 1988.
(83) "University Intellectual Property: Its Management and Commercial Exploitation", part 2:
"Examples of Current Practice", UDIL, 1989.
(84) Source: Agenda of the UDIL meeting of April 1986.
(86) For instance, York University hosted one of the Yorkshire "Patent Roadshows" during
1989/90.
(87) Source: Minutes of the spring UDIL meeting, April 1989.
(88) The first two which were aimed at HEIs were: "Policy & Strategy for Higher Education" and
"Organisation & Management in Higher Education".
(89) "University Links with Industry", Draft Report, National Audit Office, 1989.
(90) Computer software became available as a commodity separate from hardware from 1969, as a
result of IBM's decision to "unbundle" the two
(91) Source: SERC Research Grants, 1984, p29, GC13(i).
(92) Source: Minutes of the autumn UDIL meeting, September 1984.
(93) Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office Note, (ref. VC/85/117), 14 November 1985.
(94) Some of the 38 - we have no indication of how many - offered only an interim indication that
they wished to assume the rights to and responsibilities for exploitation. Others had registered their
policies and procedures with the ESG by this time, however; in due course the ESG contacted
several of these to follow up or clarify particular issues (Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office
Note, (ref. VC/85/117), 14 November 1985). In the end the ESG did not hold its first meeting to
formally decide which replies passed muster until 1 July 1986; that meeting dealt with every
complete response which had been received by 30 June 1986 (Source: Exploitation of Inventions:
Office Note on Developments (ref. VC/86/93), 17 July 1986).
(95) Source: Minutes of the meeting of the AUT's IPR Working Party, 18 July, 1984.
(96) Although the creator of a work is generally deemed to be the first owner of the copyright in it,
section 5(b) of the Copyright Act of 1911 and section 4(4) of the 1956 Copyright Act both carved
out exceptions for works created within the employer-employee relationship - and for certain types
of commissioned works. In these situations, the first owner of the copyright was the
employer/commissioner of works. Section 11 of the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act
confirmed that the employer is the first owner of works created by employees in the "course of
employment" but removed the right of commissioning parties to first ownership of copyright in the
resulting works.
The 1988 Act does not define "course of employment"; nor did the two previous Acts define what
they meant by works created under a "contract of services". Legal precedent suggests that direct
employer control over the creation of the work by the employee is not required; rather, the test is
whether the organisation could be said to exercise control over the work of the person. However,
such control cannot be regarded as the sole determining factor; other factors which may be of
importance are such matters as whether the person provides his own equipment, whether he hires
his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility for investment
and management he has and whether and how far he as an opportunity of profiting from sound
management in the performance of his task. (Source: Wilkof, 1991). In practice, this may mean
that in some instances, the employer-employee relationship may not be held to exist where
academics are concerned.
(97) In the UK and Europe, material protectable by copyright is deemed to be covered by copyright
automatically, whether or not the copyright sign is employed; in the United States, this is not the
case.
(98) The new design right is primarily concerned with protecting three-dimensional, useful articles;
previously these attracted copyright protection on the basis of two dimensional drawings.
(99) I am indebted to the Trade Marks Registry for confirming that universities may apply for trade
marks, provided they are a legal entity. By definition, a legal entity can be an individual, a
company or a partnership. In Scotland the partnership itself is the legal entity. In the rest of
Britain, it is the sum of the partners which constitutes the legal entity. UK universities are not only
allowed to apply for Trade Marks - several already have (Source: private correspondence with the
Trade Marks Registry, London, 31 January, 1991).
(100) Under section 215(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of 1988, an unregistered
design created by an employee cannot be the subject of a contrary agreement by the parties; that is
to say, an agreement between a university and its employees which stated that employees were the
first owner of an unregistered design would be illegal. An employee may become the subsequent
owner, if the university formally assigns its rights.
In contrast, section 11 of the 1988 Act allows for a contrary agreement; that is to say, even if an
employer-employee relationship exists, the parties can, by agreement, provide that the employee
and not the employer is the first owner of the copyright in his work (Source: Wilkof, 1991).
(101) Source: "Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions: Position of Research Council
Funded Institutions as at September 1989", CVCP.
(102) Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office Note, (ref. VC/851117), CVCP, 14 November
1985.
(103) Source: Exploitation of Inventions: Office Note, (ref. N/86/26), 14 February 1986.
(104) Source: "Guidelines for Exploitation" (ref. P/DF/30, F/TA/49), SERC, July 1986.
(105) The Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions (ref. LA/2690b), AUT, July 1985.
(106) "Guidelines for Exploitation" (ref. P/DF/30, F/TA/49), SERC, July 1986.
(107) For instance, on a net income of £30,000, the SERC's "typical" formula would give £24,000
to the inventor; one of the AUT's commended formulae would yield the inventor £19,500 and the
other £22,500 on the gross income. On a net income of £500,000, the SERC's formula would give
£259,000 to the inventor; one of the AUT's commended formulae would yield the inventor
£189,833 and the other £262,500 on the gross income.
(108) The terms of the 1977 Patent Act do not oblige employers to give employee inventors a
direct financial reward, such as a share of the profits derived from their invention; employers are
free to reward such employees "in kind", by giving them extra holiday time, for example.
(109) I am indebted to Dr. Jeremy Phillips, Research Fellow at the Intellectual Property Law Unit,
Queen Mary College, for this information.
(110) In paragraph 3 the DES statement read: "... to increase the incentive for researchers and
their establishments by enabling them and the work they do to benefit from increased exploitation;
.... to see and share in the benefits of exploitation both for their own establishments and more
widely in the national interest". Paragraph 6 added: "... with a commensurate share in the benefits;
... because public funds are involved, the university should share in royalties". There was no
further reference to the rewards which academics could expect for inventions successfully
exploited.
(111) Source: Personal, confidential notes circulated to members by UDIL's Deputy Chairman in
March, 1979, following a meeting of ILOs from universities and polytechnics with representatives
of the SRC to discuss its proposed regional brokerage scheme.
(112) Source: Minutes of UDIL's autumn meeting, October 1981.
(113) Source: "The Role and Functions of UDIL and University Industrial Liaison Services", draft
dated 12 March 1986, presented to the UDIL meeting of April 1986 for consideration.
(114) Source: Minutes of UDIL's autumn meeting, October 1981. In July 1982, UDIL did indeed
meet with the CVCP - and the DoI, the DES and the SERC - at the offices of the BTG to discuss
university/industry collaboration.
(115) This letter was occasioned by the fact that the New Technology Group, newly created by
Lord Mottistone, had been making separate approaches to IL0s, Vice-Chancellors and academics.
(116) Source: Newsletter from the Chairman of UDIL to members, February 1984.
(117) Source: the Minutes of UDIL's spring meeting, April 1985.
(118) A letter from the Secretary General of the CVCP to the Deputy Chairman of UDIL,
summarising a meeting between the two, recorded his "understanding of the way forward". It
stated: "As you know, our particular concern was that the UDIL group should not in any way be
establishing a constitutional position which sets itself apart from and independent of the universities
collectively" (Source: Letter from the Secretary General of the CVCP, to the Deputy Chairman of
UDIL (ref. 15/8/1), 25 July 1985).
(119) UDIL may have learned from this the value of liaising with university-related organisations.
It was agreed in 1985 that CRS and UDIL would keep each other informed about future agenda
items. In 1986 UDIL made contact with the Conference of University Administrators and the
Finance Officers' Conference. Moreover, from September 1985 it became customary for UDIL
meetings to devote part of the agenda to reports on its relations with an ever-growing variety of
organisations, including a wide range of technology transfer brokers/agencies. Curiously, there is
no indication that UDIL has ever made - or even thought of making - contact with the AUT.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6:
(1) Operational similarities have increased markedly during the course of the 20th century, for
instance: in the period after the second world war, every UK university became almost totally
dependent on the recurrent Treasury grant for its income; with the exception of the private
University of Buckingham, every UK university is still largely dependent on this annual grant.
During the 1980s that dependence led to every one being obliged to conform largely to the views of
the UGC/UFC in relation to subject reviews, the viability of departments (as measured by numbers
of UGC/UFC-funded academic staff), the research performance of departments (as measured by the
two research selectivity exercises) etc.
(2) While size is now determined to a large extent by the UGC/UFC, universities founded before
the early 20th century were free initially to determine their own size, constrained only by market
forces and the scale of their endowment.
(3) eg. Allison, 1971.
(4) In her previous incarnation the investigator spent over ten years interviewing an extremely
diverse range of informants in the course of her work as journalist, writer and freelance researcher.
(5) This was, of course, before the scrapping of the binary divide.
(6) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, Universities Statistical Record,
September 1986.
(7) In the early 1980s the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) recommended that
universities should be divided into the following three types:
Type R: offering undergraduate and postgraduate teaching and substantial research activity
across the range of fields (known colloquially as "research universities");
Type X: offering teaching across a broad range of fields and substantial research activity
in particular fields, in some cases in collaboration with others (known colloquially as
"mixed universities");
Type T: offering undergraduate and MSc teaching with associated scholarship and research
activity but without advanced research activities (known colloquially as "teaching
universities") (Source: ABRC, 1987)
(8) In the event, all the universities selected had been authorised by the Research Councils to
assume the rights and responsibilities previously enjoyed by the BTG vis-a-vis the exploitation of
IP. In April 1990 the CVCP made the relevant information available to the investigator. It
transpired that the only universities wishing to continue dealing with the BTG were the Universities
of Aberdeen and East Anglia, plus the Open University. Six London colleges/schools also wished
to pursue this strategy. Four institutions had not responded to the letter from the Chairman of the
SERC, two (including the London School of Economics) were still considering their position and
three institutions' proposals were still being considered.
I am indebted to Mr A M A Powell, Senior Administrative Officer of the CVCP, for providing this
information.
(9) The UK's archetypal ancient universities are, of course, Oxford and Cambridge, founded
around the late 12th and early 13th centuries respectively. Four of Scotland's universities - St.
Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh - are indisputably ancient, too, having been founded
in 1450, 1451, 1494 and 1583 respectively (Silver & Teague, 1970). Prior to the Act of Union in
1707, the foundation of universities in Scotland was not inhibited by the English tradition that a
centre of scholarship could only be called a university if it was granted a royal charter. The next
universities to be granted a royal charter - St. David's, Lampeter (1822), King's College, London
(1829), Durham (1832) and the University of London (1836) - are not generally classed as
"ancient". However, there is a common thread linking universities which were regarded for the
purposes of this study as "ancient": with the notable exception of Edinburgh, which was founded
following Acts of the Town Council, all of these universities were founded upon the initiative of or
under the patronage of the established church **• Indeed, apart from breaking with tradition by
dispensing with religious tests, still imposed at Oxford and Cambridge, Durham University was
consciously modelled on Oxbridge, both philosophically and organisationally, in terms of a
collegiate system (Beloff, 1968). Moreover, for many years Durham preserved a form of
government peculiar to Oxford and Cambridge, long after those two institutions had been forcibly
reformed (Green, 1969). For these reasons, Durham University was classified as "ancient" for the
purposes of this study.
**	 Oxford's patron was the Bishop of Lincoln, while Cambridge's was the Bishop of Ely. St.
Andrews acquired the patronage of Bishop Wardlaw, while Glasgow was founded by Bishop
Turnbull and Aberdeen by Bishop Elphinstone. Several attempts to found a university at Durham
failed, but success was finally achieved when the last Prince Bishop of Durham and the chapter of
Durham Cathedral took the initiative. St. David's College, Lampeter, was founded by Bishop
Burgess. In contrast, University College, London, was founded - like many civic universities - due
to the efforts of dissenters, secularists and radicals (Green, 1969). King's College, London, was
founded by supporters of the established church - ranging from three archbishops, seven bishops
and 88 clergymen to the Duke of Wellington and like-minded lay people (Green, 1969) -as a
reaction to the creation of University College. However, it was not long before both institutions
became part of the University of London, commonly regarded as a civic institution.
(10) There appears to be no uniformly accepted definition of what constitutes a small, medium-
sized or large university. For the purposes of this study, therefore, an arbitrary definition was
employed. It was couched in terms of student FTEs, in view of the fact that during the 1980s the
UGC consistently used student FTEs as the main basis for calculating the size of the recurrent
Treasury grant and other resource-related data, as does the UFC. Furthermore, the definition was
based on student FTEs for 1984/85, since this was the session in which universities were asked to
outline their policy with regard to the identification, evaluation, protection and exploitation of IP.
(11) The source for the results of the first research selectivity exercise was "The Strengths and
Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986. The source for the results of
the second research selectivity exercise was "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education
Supplement, 1 September, 1989.
(12) The exclusion of the federal universities ruled out the participation of any Welsh university;
since Storey's Regional Index did not encompass Northern Ireland, those universities were also
excluded.
(13) There was no obvious way of guaranteeing anonymity to unique functionaries such as
registrars/secretaries or industrial liaison officers and this was made clear at the outset.
(14) Since the Questionnaires were highly structured, employing "either/or" options where it was
felt to be appropriate, no informant was asked the complete set of questions listed in the
Questionnaires. However, if spontaneous, supplementary questions are taken into account,
informants responding to Questionnaires A-C answered many more questions than this.
(15) The investigator spent over ten years soliciting co-operation and conducting interviews by
telephone in the course of her work as journalist, writer and freelance researcher.
(16) Notwithstanding a typing speed of 70 words per minute.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
(1) However, all University officers and unestablished research workers are required to sign an
undertaking when they accept an offer of a Research Council grant or an offer of appointment
supported by such a grant. The undertaking states that they will consult the Wolfson Cambridge
Industrial Unit regarding the possibility of exploiting their invention before disclosing it and, if
requested, assign their rights in such IP to the University's nominee in return for an "equitable
share" of the proceeds. The nominee is usually Lynxvale Ltd, a company wholly-owned by the
Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge, which covenants its profits to
the University (Source: Cambridge University Reporter, 18 March 1987, p440). Thus, IF arising
out of Research Council-funded projects is assigned by the University to the inventor/creator, who
is subsequently obliged to assign it to Lynxvale Ltd. By this means, Cambridge tries to fulfil the
responsibilities it assumed in October 1985 when it, too, received authorisation from the Research
Councils.
Apparently, other categories of staff are not obliged to assign rights to IP which they generated to
Lynxvale Ltd; for them, use of the University's company is on an entirely voluntary basis.
(2) Although the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act provides for first ownership of copyright
to reside automatically with the employer where work subject to copyright was created in the
course of employment, section 11 permits a contrary agreement. That is to say, even if an
employer-employee relationship exists, the two parties can, by agreement, provide for the
employee, not the employer, to be first owner of the copyright. This agreement need not be in
writing, although the burden on the employee of proving an oral agreement argues in favour of
there being a written agreement.
(3) Under the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, where it can be demonstrated that an invention was
made by an employee in the course of his duties, first ownership resides automatically with the
employer. Although the 1977 Patent Act came into force in 1978, some universities did not
immediately exercise those rights.
(4) The word "yield" is not a bona fide term in intellectual property law. It is a convenient word
which covers two different legal situations: if they do not want the rights which the 1977 Act
confers upon them, employers can either "waive" their rights in inventions or they can "assign"
them.
They can, as a matter of policy, waive their rights in favour of the employee as soon as they are
notified of an invention. In order to do this, they need to reach a collective agreement with their
employees; this agreement might be embodied in the contract of employment, an agreement with
the union etc. In this situation, the employee becomes the first owner of his invention (or joint first
owner, depending on the nature of the waiver), notwithstanding the 1977 Act.
Alternatively employers can, as a matter of policy, assign their rights to the employee(s) in
question. In this situation, the employer accepts that he is the first owner, but immediately makes
the employee(s) the second owner(s).
(5) Liverpool does not seem to have asserted first ownership of computer software in the same,
formal way that it set about asserting first ownership of employee inventions; certainly, it cannot
trace a date upon which it did so. Strathclyde did not assert first ownership of either type of IP by
means of a formal decision or a formal procedure.
(6) Quoted from the Final Report, Working Party on Costing, Price & Income Targets for Schools,
Hull University, 1990, and the Intellectual Property Regulations, York University, 1990.
(7) Quoted from the Code of Practice Relating to Intellectual Property, City University, 3 July,
1989.
(8) Quoted from the Commercial Policy Statements (Research Contracts & Consultancies,
Intellectual Property), Glasgow University, September 1989.
(9) Quoted from the Standard Terms & Conditions of Appointment to Lectureships in Durham
[University], (ref. T.3.1). The Standard Terms & Conditions for Research Assistants (ref. T.7.1)
contain the same clauses.
(10) Quoted from the Standing Orders of Council Governing the Appointment of Full-Time
Members of the Non-Professorial Academic Staff, Bristol University, March 1989.
(11) Quoted from Strathclyde's staff handbook (draft, 1990 edition).
(12) Quoted from Liverpool's staff handbook (1990 edition).
(13) As note (4) explained, there are two mechanisms which employers can use to yield their rights
to IP. The policies of the participating universities are seldom couched in terms which make it clear
which mechanism is employed. This is something which can sometimes be resolved only by an
expert in IP law examining policy statements, contracts of employment, union agreements,
domestic regulations of the university etc.
(14) By attempting to assert first ownership of copyright in works specifically commissioned by the
University, York may well be in breach of the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act
of 1988. In principle, first ownership of copyright resides with the creator of the work. Previous
Copyright Acts allowed three exceptions to this basic principle - work created within the employer-
employee relationship, work created by journalists and work specifically commissioned from a third
party. The 1988 Act removed two of these exceptions, leaving only the employer-employee
relationship as the exception to the basic principle.
(15) Under the terms of the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act, first ownership of the new
design right resides automatically with the employer where an unregistered design was created in
the course of employment. Unlike the copyright provisions, which permit a contrary agreement
favouring either the employee - or the employer, in the case of work created outside the employer-
employee relationship, an unregistered design cannot be the subject of a contrary agreement by the
parties. That is to say, if an employer wishes an employee to acquire sole/joint rights to his
unregistered design, it must assign those rights to the researcher, who becomes second owner.
The implications of this law for academic employees are as opaque as the implications of the 1977
Patent Act, in so far as section 215 (2) states that "the conunissioning party" of such a design is the
first owner of the design right. This throws up questions about whether a university could be said
to have commissioned a design from its employees, questions which are parallel to those about an
academic's duty to invent.
(16) Unlike the other Acts dealing with IP law, neither the Registered Designs Act of 1949 nor the
amendments to that Act provided for by the 1988 Copyright, Designs and Patent Act make any
reference to the employer-employee relationship. Ownership of IP covered by registered designs is
vested in the commissioning party. Where academics are concerned, once again this throws up
questions about whether a university could be said to have commissioned such IP from its
employees.
(17) In practice, Durham does not exercise any rights it might have to ownership of books,
lectures, articles etc; this appears to be the result of a tacit rather than an explicit waiver, however.
(18) Since 1985 one patent at Hull has been jointly vested in the university and the inventor. This
occurred because the academic concerned took the trouble to seek out a copy of the university's
policy and, having read it, insisted on it being implemented.
(19) Prior to the adoption of this policy in June 1990, the ILO tended to assign IP to third parties
rather than license it, however; there is no evidence, though, that York assigned ownership to
companies started by academics - either independently or in a joint venture with the university.
(20) By 1989/90, when the fieldwork was conducted, none of the participating universities had had
any meaningful contact with this organisation since having signed a non-exclusive co-operation
agreement; for this reason alone, the following discussion centres on the BTG.
(21) During the course of interviewing the administrator in question, a graduate student came to
notify him of a device which he felt was patentable and exploitable. Within a few minutes, without,
apparently, investigating in any depth either the technology involved or the likely market, the
administrator pronounced that it should be offered to the BTG to exploit.
(22) The administrator concerned was relatively young and therefore unlikely to retire. Moreover,
his strategy has apparently been endorsed by the ESG, which has given Durham indefinite
authority to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects.
(23) A possible exception to this is the "murky" boundary between a work protected by copyright
and that which is subject to the new design right; since the case law clarifying the issue is only now
emerging, this may take some time to resolve (Source: Wilkof, 1991).
(24) The provisions of the 1977 Patent Act oblige an employer to reward an employee for an
invention which is successfully exploited; they say nothing about rewarding employees for
inventions which are successfully exploited but not patented, or patented but not exploited.
(25) Once the applicant for a patent has paid a Search Fee and filed claims which define the
invention, the Patent Office examiner will conduct a search to ascertain whether the invention
fulfils all the criteria. The resulting Search Report may oblige applicants to file amendments to the
description of the invention and/or the claims made about it. As long as the application is not
withdrawn following receipt of the Search Report, it will be published in the original/revised form
and copies will be made available to anyone who wishes to inspect or purchase the published
version. This is known as the "A" publication.
(26) In order to be granted a patent, samples of cell lines must be deposited in a national cell
respository. Since cell lines can be "cloned" overnight, this makes security of paramount
importance. Strathclyde does not feel that it is possible to guarantee security.
(27) Judgement of this complex issue depends on a number of factors. These include whether the IP
in question was created by researchers in the course of employment and, in the case of patentable
IP, whether it could have been expected to have resulted from their duties. If not, first ownership
of the IP would reside with the academic and these regulations/agreements would be infringing
their rights. If so, it would still be relevant to ask whether universities partially waive their rights,
thereby making researchers joint first owners of the IP, or whether they partially assign their
rights, making researchers joint second owners. The wording of contracts and agreements etc is
crucial in judging this issue.
(28) In Durham, the relevant authority is the Vice-Chancellor. In the other seven universities, the
relevant authorities are firstly the HoD, then - provided the HoD endorses the application - the
committee which deals with applications for outside work.
(29) An explicit statement to this effect was incorporated in the Final Report of the Working Party
on Costing, Price and Income Targets for Schools, circulated in June 1990. This aspect of the
Report's recommendations were accepted by Council in time to come into effect at the beginning of
the 1990/91 session.
(30) At Glasgow, the Guidelines on Inventions, Licence Agreements, Consultancies, Research
Contracts, Computer Software, Audio-Visual Materials, Publications and Outside Work, issued in
1982 and in force until September 1989, devoted paragraph 6 to "Businesses carried on by
members of star. Applications to do outside work were submitted on Form B; would-be academic
entrepreneurs were required to give details including the registered name and address of the
business and address for correspondence, the nature of the business, the names and addresses of the
directors/partners, together with details of shareholding or profit-sharing ratios.
At Strathclyde, earlier editions of the staff handbook (eg. 1978) stated that undertaking
employment via private practice and/or participation in a commercial or professional enterprise
should not be undertaken until full particulars had been supplied to the Principal in writing and the
Principal had duly given permission.
(31) City, for instance, tries to place limits on "exclusive" licences by geographical, sectoral and
also time constraints; it tries to impose a time limit of 5-10 years after handing over a prototype, or
3 years maximum after the development work has been completed.
(32) In City's case, these "circumstances" could include the fact that refusing some sort of
exclusivity might lead to no deal at all.
(33) Liverpool feels that since its IL office in its present incarnation is new and it is important for
it to gain the confidence of the academic community, it is more important at the moment to secure
some deal than no deal at all. It also feels that until every other UK university takes a strong line
on limiting exclusivity, it is difficult for it to do so.
(34) Glasgow discovered, to its cost, that the clauses in the Treaty of Rome which relate to
competition impose restrictions on granting licences which allow geographic exclusivity within the
EC - eg. a an exclusive licence to manufacture/market a product/process in, say, France but not
Germany.
(35) In the case of research paid for by industry/commerce, or jointly paid for by
industry/commerce and public funds, this may have been laid down in detail in the initial research
contract. This section deals with situations where there is no obligation, ie. chiefly with IP arising
out of projects funded by the Research Councils, charities, or possibly the EC.
(36) Large up-front payments are usually gained at the expense of reduced royalty payments: the
percentage due on actual sales is usually considerably lower in such circumstances.
(37) There is more than one "dimension" to this conflict of interests. Not only is the researcher
torn between the interests of his research, his department, his University and his company; he may
also be torn between personal financial gain - through his share of royalties based on a high
percentage of sales, and the financial success of the company - which would increase as a result of
royalties based on a low percentage of sales.
(38) Until recently, Kent has not been involved in any licence agreements at all; this, and also,
perhaps, the fact that the person now responsible for IP is a career administrator with no
experience in industry, means that Kent has no experience on which to base a general approach.
York has a better record, but for years negotiations have been conducted by the individual
researchers involved, with no guidance from the centre; nor does the centre appear to have
debriefed them afterwards. This means that York has not harnessed its experience to form the basis
of a general approach. Now, a career academic with no experience of industry is in charge of rp,
but he currently delegates the right to negotiate the terms of licence/assignment agreements to the
reseachers.
(39) One of the most obvious difficulties would be selecting a representative sample. Reliance on
universities to provide lists of potential respondents would be liable to exclude precisely those
researchers who avoid coming to their institution's notice for fear of being forced to have their IF
exploited in a way which they would not wish.
(40) See, eg. point (2) of the standard letter of authorisation sent to universities by the Chairman of
the NERC on behalf of the five Research Councils (ref. F/TA/49, July 1986 etc etc).
(41) In 1988, Glasgow made its year-old, ad hoc Commercial Policy Review Group into a standing
Commercial Policy Review Committee, whose members include the Vice-Principal (Industrial
Liaison) and a lay member of Court; the policy-implementer is also a member.
(42) This earlier, unofficial group consisted of the Principal, the Vice-Principal (Industrial Liaison)
and a number of senior officers.
(43) Kent's new Industrial & Commercial Policy Board was established in 1988. It reports to the
Finance Committee and its members include the Vice-Chancellor, the Deans of Faculty, the
Registrar and a lay member of Council and two other lay members, appointed by Council.
(44) Hull's Sub-Committee on Patents was established in 1983/84 and reported to the Personnel
Committee. It consisted of the Personnel Officer, the Registrar, three HoDs and three other
Professors, with assistance from the Financial Secretary.
(45) In 1988 the Registrar put together an informal group consisting of the newly-appointed ILO, a
Professor from the Chemistry Department, the former Finance Officer, the Registrar and an ex-
consultant being employed by the administration at the time.
(46) In 1989/1990 Hull's IP policy was extended by the formally constituted Working Party on
Costing, Pricing and Income Targets for Schools, set up by the Policy & Resources Committee in
the wake of the Hanham Report. Members included the Registrar, the Academic Registrar, the
Financial Secretary, the ILO, a Pro-Vice-Chancellor, a former Dean and a current Dean.
(47) The individual in question is the University Secretary.
(48) In the mid-1980s, the Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar and several Pro-Vice-Chancellors - in
their capacity as members of (the forerunner of) the senior management team - made certain policy
decisions, based on a paper commissioned by the Academic Secretary; the paper in question was
produced by Liverpool's then policy-implementers, who was one of the policy informants. His
suggestions were duly amended and ratified by the Research Committee and Senate in turn.
(49) For instance, one or two key decisions were taken in 1984/85 by a Joint Committee of Senate
and Council, comprising the Acting Vice-Chancellor, a lay member of Council, the Deans of
Science and Engineering, a Professor, the Information Officer - and the Deputy Secretary, as
observer. These included the decision to develop the university's relations with industry, principally
with a view to increasing "soft" revenue, and to appoint an ILO to co-ordinate that development.
(50) Reporting to Senate and Council, Durham's working party consisted of the Vice-Chancellor,
the Treasurer, the Deputy Secretary, two lay members of Council and roughly an equal number of
academics, including an IP expert from the Law Department.
(51) York did not make its final response to the ESG until 1986/87 and City did not do so until
1988/89, but the same situation applied.
(52) The response to the Kingman letter was drafted by the following officers:
Bristol - the Committee of Deans
City - the Secretary
Durham - the Deputy Secretary, the Treasurer
Glasgow - the Vice-Principal (Industrial Liaison)
Hull - the Personnel Officer, in consultation with the Registrar, the Financial Secretary,
three HoDs and three Professors
Kent - the Registrar, in consultation with the Vice-Chancellor, two Pro-Vice-Chancellors
and the Academic Secretary
Liverpool - an Assistant Registrar (now Senior Assistant Registrar)
Strathclyde - the ILO, with the approval of the Joint Management Committee
York - the Finance Officer, two lay members of Court and one Professor, with assistance
from at least two HoDs.
(53) As indicated in note (52), Bristol's response to the ESG was drafted by the then Committee of
Deans; their names and current whereabouts did not prove easy to track down.
(54) City first committed its IP policy to paper in 1989, but this was based on custom and practice
which had been evolving since the mid-late 1970s.
(55) In its reply to the Kingman letter (numbered paragraph 10), Liverpool wrote:
"The provisions of the Patent Act 1977 are interpreted by the University in accordance
with the advice given by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals in the final
report of the Working Party on Patents and the Commercial Exploitation of Research
Results (November 1977) and are taken to apply to all types of intellectual property. The
terms and conditions of employment of academic, research and technical staff thus provide
that discoveries and inventions made in the course of that employment shall be the property
of the University (added emphasis)." 	 ,
(56) In Durham's response to the Kingman letter, paragraph 3 (v) noted:
"For exploitable work funded by public bodies such as the Research Councils, the
University expects to be initial Joint owner, with the inventor or inventors, of any patents
[added emphasis] and to receive the collaboration of the inventor(s) in the exploitation of
the discovery ..."
Paragraph 3 (x) noted:
"We are currently negotiating changes to the standard terms and conditions of academic
staff designed to provide the basic framework of provisions for exploitation of work with
commercial potential, viz ... assignment of interest to the University [added emphasis] ..."
Paragraph 3 (iv) noted:
"... Our own proposed revised terms and conditions of appointment contain provisions for
... staff to make over their interest in such rights to the University [added emphasis] ..."
When the SERC wrote (on behalf of the ESG) requesting further details, section (x) of Durham's
follow-up letter of 25 July, 1986 noted:
"... an addition to terms and conditions of appointment which contained a general duty to
... assign the individual's interest to Council (in exchange for a revenue-sharing
agreement), again if necessary [added emphasis] ..."
In practice, ownership of all three of the patents which Durham itself has taken out has been
vested in the university alone, which appears to contravene the university's policy, as specified to
the ESG. This indicates that researchers should be joint owners initially and should only assign
their interest - to the university or the exploiting agency - at the point that a deal to exploit that IP
is being concluded - if necessary. In point of fact, this policy may well be untenable in law. Patent
law overrides contract law, and since the university appears to have granted researchers joint
ownership of inventions which they generate, it is questionable whether they can then use contract
law to oblige researchers to assign those rights.
(57) We should not attach too much weight to the impact of policy-makers' career backgrounds on
policy, though: at Glasgow, Strathclyde and York, the decision to vest ownership of IP
exclusively in the university was taken by groups composed principally or entirely of senior
academic and administrative officers.
(58) When the CII was responsible for the exploitation of IP at Strathclyde, it either accepted
responsibility for a given piece of IP or, if it was unable to accommodate more work, rejected it.
Strathclyde now believes that in the first situation, researchers perceived their IP to have been
taken away from them, to have lost their moral ownership of it and to have no control over what
happened to it; in the second situation, researchers seem to have been left to their own devices
entirely and to have received no guidance or support at all.
(59) Although it is not City's avowed wish to "skill" the academic community in such matters, one
would imagine this is likely to be an inevitable by-product of the university's partnership approach
to the exploitation of IP.
(60) In the course of a radio interview the ILO remarked that Glasgow had well over 100 patents;
in fact, Glasgow had relatively few patents but closer to 100 licensees.
(61) Glasgow's policy-implementer is an accountant whose career has been spent partly in a private
sector accountancy firm and, more recently, in university administration.
(62) Glasgow provided a copy of the relevant correspondence in confidence; it is not possible,
therefore, to quote directly from it.
(63) Source: Letter from the Acting Vice-Chancellor, Liverpool University, to Sir John Kingman,
3 October 1985.
(64) Source: Letter from the Vice-Chancellor, Liverpool University, to Dr. J. A. Catterall,
Secretary of the SERC, 19 June, 1986 (ref. GJD/BH/PB).
(65) The university in question was Durham, where the policy-implementer refers this question to
the Treasurer. Two more universities thought along those lines originally: Hull intended its Sub-
Committee on Patents to become a standing committee and to advise on how to proceed in each
case; in practice, the policy-implementer has never called on it and, if it still exists, it has not
noticed this omission. In the early 1980s Kent established an Industry, Research & Development
Committee which might have been intended to perform this function; in practice, it has not met
since early 1986, let alone considered such questions, and has now been wound up. It was replaced
in 1988/89 by an Industrial & Commercial Policy Board, which, by mid-1990, had made no contact
at all with the administrator whose had assumed responsibility for IP.
(66) Source: The Commercial Exploitation of Intellectual Property: A Statement of Policy,
University of Liverpool, written by the Ex-Acting Vice-Chancellor in April 1989.
(67) Three policy-implementers have commercial experience which they regard as relevant,
however - those at Durham, Glasgow and Hull. Curiously, only four policy-implementers have
joined the Licensing Executives' Society in order to improve their skills - those at Bristol,
Glasgow, Liverpool and York. It is worth noting that Strathclyde's policy-implementer has
neither previous experience, nor has he joined the LES.
(68) On this occasion, Liverpool's urge to retain full control paid off handsomely, however.
(69) The Committee of Deans is Bristol's equivalent of a policy & resources committee.
(70) See, for instance, Section 8, paragraphs (a)-(h), entitled "Staff Inventions and Discoveries -
from the Manual of Financial & Related Procedures", Durham University, November 1986.
(71) As noted in the case study presented in Appendix F, Durham felt it was politically advisable
to accept the Research Councils' offer, embodied in the Kingman letter.
(72) Durham made very little reference to the role of the researcher in the exploitation process in
its initial response to the Kingman letter. The SERC wrote (on behalf of the ESG) requesting
further details about assessing the potential of IP, securing exploitation, royalty-sharing and terms
and conditions of employment, but Durham's reply gives little away beyond the comment that "the
staff concerned were closely involved in the negotiations" leading to a number of commercial
agreements made to date (Source: Letter from the Vice-Chancellor, University of Durham, to the
Secretary of the SERC, 25 July, 1986 (ref. F/TA/49C1 P/DF/30).
(73) Report to the Scrutiny Group on Exploitation Arrangements, Durham University, January
1989.
(75) Until recently, Kent has not been involved in any licence agreements at all; this, and also,
perhaps, the fact that the person now responsible for IP is a career administrator with no
experience in industry, means that Kent has no experience on which to base a general approach
York has a better record, but for years negotiations have been conducted by the individual
researchers involved, with no guidance from the centre; nor does the centre appear to have
debriefed them afterwards. This means that York has not harnessed its experience to form the basis
of a general approach. Now, a career academic with no experience of industry is in charge of IP,
but he currently delegates the right to negotiate the terms of licence/assignment agreements to the
reseachers.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
(1) See, for instance, Letter No. RG 10/86, sent to universities and polytechnics by the SERC's
Finance Division on 2 September, 1986.
(2) The only other way for them to have learned about this was through the media, which
concentrated on the removal of the BTG's monopoly, but were less interested in the details of the
arrangements put in its place.
(3) The so-called "new blood lecturers" scheme was announced by the Secretary of State for
Education and Science on 16 December 1982. It provided additional funding for 230 new lecturers
nation-wide, to be appointed in 1983/84; 200 of these were to be in natural sciences disciplines, 30
in arts disciplines.
(4) Mark II of the UGC's Severance and Early Retirement Scheme - whereby the UGC paid the
cost of buying out academic's pensions, rather than the university - was introduced early in 1987
and wound up in 1989.
(5) The New Academic Appointments Scheme was effectively mark II of the "new blood" scheme
introduced in the mid-1980s; it commenced on 1 August 1989 and is due to end on 31 July 1994.
(6) It is possible, of course, that the administration did send the editor the relevant information, but
for one reason or another, the editor excluded it.
(7) Bristol's Committee of Deans functioned as the university's Policy & Resources Committee at
the time.
(8) As the case study in Appendix F described, Kent's current policy-implementer drafted a 3-page
policy statement in 1989, but he was prevented from circulating it after being outvoted by the other
members of an informal group which meets periodically to discuss research grants etc - on the
grounds that it was not "punchy" enough.
(9) Source: Paragraph 6 of the Kingman letter, 14 May, 1985.
(10) I am indebted to Ms. Anne Rees of the SERC's Exploitation Scrutiny Group Secretariat for
this information.
(11) On the basis that it would be reasonable to expect each institution to disseminate each piece of
information at least once, universities were allocated 1 point each in respect of measures (a)-(c), 1
point in respect of measure (d) - but no points in respect of any of these measures if they did not
disseminate the relevant piece of information at all. This gave a maximum score of 3 each for
measures (a)-(c) and a maximum score of 1 for measure (d). Since some universities disseminated
the same information more than once, usually using an alternative mechanism, this was regarded as
reinforcing the information and worthy of an extra point for each occasion. This is why some
universities scored >100%. (NB This "reinforcement" is quite separate from the reminders
detailed in Figures 23-24.
(12) Universities were allocated 2 points if they informed the the academic community, but only 1
point if they informed only selected academics and 0 points if they did not formally inform anyone;
this gave a maximum score of 6 points for measures (a)-(c) and 2 points for measure (d). Where
universities disseminated the same information more than once, they only scored once, since
thoroughness was scored in the preceding table; however, if they informed only selected academics
the first time, but the academic community the second time - or vice versa - they received 2 points,
rather than 1.
(13) Universities were allocated 4 points if they disseminated each piece of information within 6
months, 3 points within 12 months, 2 points within 18 months, 1 point if they did so within 24
months and 0 points if they did not disseminate a piece of information. This gave a maximum score
of 12 points in respect of measures (a)-(c) and 4 points in respect of measure (d). Where
universities disseminated the same information again in a subsequent six-month period, they only
scored once, since thoroughness was scored in the first table.
(14) LA/2690, AUT, July 1985.
(15) One point was allocated for each of the two mechanisms; this gave a maximum score of 2
each for measures (e) and (0. Points actually scored were then expressed as a percentage of the
maximum possible score.
(16) Universities were expected to start informing new members of staff in the same session as they
informed existing members of staff - their individual baseline year. Accordingly, they scored 1
point for each year that reminders have been issued, upto and including 1989/90; this figure was
worked out as a percentage of the points they should have got, taking into account their individual
baseline years.
(17) Bristol's ILO does not know whether the Vice-Chancellor first circulated a memo on this
subject to the academic community - or selected members of it - in 1986 or 1987; if it was 1986,
then 1987 was the first year in which the Vice-Chancellor is believed to have sent a reminder.
(18) One point was allocated for each of the three mechanisms; this gave a maximum score of 3
each for measures (g) and (h).
(19) For the two types of written reminder, 2 points were allocated for universities which informed
the whole academic community but 1 point for universities which informed only selected
academics; only 1 point was allocated for face-to-face reminders since, by definition, these target
selected academics, not the whole community. This gave a maximum score of 5 each for measures
(g) and (h). In practice, three universities received half-scores in respect of measure (h) because
presented the information less explicitly and every case except Strathclyde, the opportunities
presented were less open-ended than the government probably intended.
(20) Seven universities were expected to start issuing "trigger" reminders on an annual basis from
1987/88; accordingly, they scored 1 point for each year that reminders have been issued, upto and
including 1989/90. They were expected to issue an "ongoing" reminder from 1987/88, too;
accordingly they scored 1 point for the year the ongoing reminders were introduced and each year
since, upto and including 1989/90. This gave a maximum score of 6 each for measures (g) and (h).
York was expected to start issuing reminders from 1988/89, in view of the fact that it was
authorised one year later than the other seven; City was not expected to have issued any reminders,
in view of the fact that it was not authorised by the Research Councils until 1989.
(21) Source: Paragraph 6, The Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions, LA/2690b,
AUT, July 1985.
(22) The scoring system underlying the scores shown in Evaluation 8.9 took the year in which
each university was authorised by the Research Councils as their individual baseline. It assumed
that the seven universities authorised in 1986 should have issued a one-off, trigger policy statement
that same year, perhaps at the same time as publicising the fact that they had been authorised by the
Research Councils, and that they should have provided an ongoing policy statement from the same
time. Those who actually did this in 1986 should attract a score of 5, those doing so in 1987 a
score of 4 and so on; those which had not done so at all by the end of the 1989/90 session would
score zero. Similarly, those which relied on one-off, trigger policy statements or ongoing
statements issued before 1986 should score 4 for 1985, 3 for 1984 and so on.
Since York was not authorised until a year later, it should attract a score of 5 for issuing these two
forms of policy statement in 1987, a score of 4 for doing so in 1988 and so on; similarly, if it
relied on one-off trigger policy statements or ongoing statements issued before 1987, it should score
4 for 1986, 3 for 1985 and so on. Since City was not authorised until 1989, it should attract a
score of 5 for publicising its revenue-sharing formula in 1989, 4 for publicising it in 1990 and so
on; similarly, if it relied on one-off trigger policy statements or ongoing statements issued before
1989, it should score 4 for 1988, 3 for 1987 and so on.
(23) The scoring system underlying the scores shown in Evaluation 8.10 assumed that a neutral
policy statement, which makes no reference to the exploitation process or the respective roles of the
university and the researcher, has the same impact as no policy statement at all; accordingly, both
situations attracted a zero score. It assumed that a fairly positive policy statement should score +1,
a very positive statement +2, a fairly negative policy statement should score -1 and a very negative
statement -2.
(24) The score for the combined effect of the content and timing of IP statements was calculated by
multiplying together the scores achieved under the two headings in Evaluations 8.9 and 8.10.
(25) The publicity items detailed in Figures 27-31 are derived exclusively from each institution's
newsletter, because it was felt that this was the only vehicle for publicity which every member of
staff would have an equal chance of seeing. It was recognised that there could be other, one-off or
occasional vehicles for publicity, but it was not certain that every member of staff would have an
equal chance of seeing them; moreover, identifying publicity vehicles of this nature and monitoring
them presented operational difficulties for this study.
(26) The science park which Glasgow and Strathclyde share incorporates the phrase "science
park" in its name, whereas Hull has chosen to call its project a "high technology park" and
Durham settled on "research centre". Liverpool and City have "innovation centres" and Kent a
"research and development centre". In addition, Strathclyde has a separate "incubator unit".
York does not seem to have settled on a title for its development yet, referring to it variously as a
"science park", "research park" and "technology-related park". It is not clear yet exactly what
Bristol will call its science park, either.
(27) The two-site science park which Glasgow and Strathclyde share covers a total of 62 acres,
which had some 80,000 sq.ft. of building space at the end of 1989. By the same time, Hull's
science park had approx. 37,500 sq.ft. of building space. Durham's was comparable at this time,
with 35,000 sq.ft. of lettable floorspace. Kent's science park offers just 12,000 sq.ft. of
laboratories and offices, Liverpool's just 11,000 sq.ft. of 'enable space; no figures are available for
City. Strathclyde' incubator unit offers 30,000 sq.ft. of accommodation.
**When it is finished, Bristol's will may well be the most extensive science park in Britain,
exceeding the size of Cambridge's. York's proposed science park will cover 21 acres, providing
30,000 sq.ft. of building space.
(28) Liverpool's science park opened for business in 1982. Glasgow's/Strathclyde's dates from
1983 originally, Hull's from 1985 and Durham's from 1986. City's opened for business in 1988
and Kent's ca. 1988/89. Strathclyde' incubator unit opened in 1990.
(29) Provision: Universities which had set up a dedicated IL office by the year they were
authorised by the Research Councils were allocated one point, plus one extra point for each year
since that they have had a dedicated IL office. The resulting score was divided by 5 (Bristol,
Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathdyde) or 4 (York) or 2 (City) - ie. the
number of years between being authorised and 1990 (inclusive) - and expressed as a percentage.
Publicity: Universities were allocated a point for each publicity item in the newsletter
relating to the IL office during the period 1985-90 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent,
Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-90 (York) and 1988-90 (City); these periods take in one year
before the universities listed in the following brackets were authorised by the Research Councils, to
take account of advance publicity about the setting up of the IL office, where appropriate. An
average of one publicity item a year during the period in question was seen as a reasonable
minimum expectation. The resulting score was therefore divided by 6 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow,
Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde) or 5 (York) or 3 (City) - ie. the minimum number of
publicity items for the period - and expressed as a percentage.
(30) Provision: Universities are not obliged to operate by means of a holding company; they
may opt to found university companies/joint ventures directly, rather than indirectly, via a holding
company; accordingly, they were not scored for whether they have a holding company.
Publicity: On the other hand, if they do/did have one, they were expected to publicise its
existence and function. The publicity period was defined as starting in the year before they founded
the company, to allow for advance publicity, and ending in 1990/the year the holding company was
wound up, if earlier. An average of one publicity item a year during the period in question was
seen as a reasonable minimum expectation. Universities were allocated a score of 0 if they achieved
this; if not, they were allocated a minus score equivalent to the shortfall. The resulting score was
divided by 7 (Hull and Liverpool) or 5 (Bristol) or 4 (Durham) - ie. the minimum expectation of
one publicity item for each "qualifying" year - and expressed as a percentage.
(31) Approval-in-Principle: Universities were allocated one point if they approve of joint
ventures with members of staff in principle, 0.5 points if they are hesitant but do not rule it out,
and 0 points if they are not prepared to enter into joint ventures with members of staff. Universities
were not penalised for not having translated approval-in-principle of joint ventures with members of
staff into practice.
Publicity: However, they were penalised if they did not publicise their approval-in-
principle. An average of one publicity item per year during the period 1985-90 (Bristol, Durham,
Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-90 (York) and 1988-90 (City) - ie. the
year before they received their letter of authorisation from the Research Councils - was seen as a
reasonable minimum expectation. Universities were awarded a point for each publicity item in the
newsletter relating to the concept of joint ventures during the relevant period. This was translated
into a score of 0 if the number of points received was equivalent to the requisite number of
publicity items for this period; this score was converted in turn to 0 per cent. If the number of
points was not equivalent, universities were allocated a minus score equivalent to the shortfall; the
resulting score was divided by 6 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and
Strathclyde) or 5 (York) or 3 (City) - ie. the requisite number of publicity items for the period -
and expressed as a percentage. Universities which are hesitant, but do not rule out the possibility of
joint ventures with members of staff, were not expected to have publicised the idea. Where
universities had eventually entered into joint ventures with members of staff, they were scored in
the above fashion for publicising approval-in-principle until such time as they had actual examples
of joint ventures to publicise.
Thereafter, they were assessed on the basis of actual joint ventures, rather than approval-in-
principle. Universities were expected to publicise the setting up of each joint venture during the
period 1985-90 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-90
(York) and 1988-90 (City) - ie. from the year before they received their letter of authorisation
from the Research Councils; furthermore, they were expected to report on the progress of each
joint venture at least once a year, once it had been set up. Universities were awarded a point for
each publicity item about joint ventures in the newsletter during the relevant period. This was
translated into a score of 0 if the number of points was equivalent to the requisite number of
publicity items and converted in turn to 0 per cent. If not, they were allocated a minus score
equivalent to the shortfall; the resulting score was divided by the requisite number of publicity
items and expressed as a percentage.
(32) Approval-in-Principle: Universities were allocated one point if they approve of university
companies in principle, 0.5 points if they are hesitant but do not rule it out, and 0 points if they
have no interest in setting up university companies. Universities were not penalised for not having
translated approval-in-principle of university companies into practice.
Publicity: However, they were penalised if they did not publicise their approval-in-principle. An
average of one publicity item per year during the period 1985-90 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow,
Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-90 (York) and 1988-90 (City) - ie. the year before
they received their letter of authorisation from the Research Councils - was seen as a reasonable
minimum expectation. Universities were awarded a point for each publicity item in the newsletter
relating to the concept of university companies during the relevant period. This was translated into
a score of 0 if the number of points received was equivalent to the requisite number of publicity
items for this period; this score was converted in turn to 0 per cent. If the number of points was
not equivalent, universities were allocated a minus score equivalent to the shortfall; the resulting
score was divided by 6 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde) or 5
(York) or 3 (City) - ie. the requisite number of publicity items for the period - and expressed as a
percentage. Universities which are hesitant, but do not rule out the possibility of university
companies were not expected to have publicised the idea. Nor were universities which do not
approve in principle expected to publicise the idea. Where universities had eventually set up
university companies, they were scored in the above fashion for publicising approval-in-principle
until such time as they had actual examples of university companies to publicise.
Thereafter, they were assessed on the basis of actual university companies rather than approval-in-
principle. Universities were expected to publicise the setting up of each university company during
the period 1985-90 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-
90 (York) and 1988-90 (City) - ie. from the year before they received their letter of authorisation
from the Research Councils; furthermore, they were expected to report on the progress of each
university company at least once a year, once it had been set up. Universities were awarded a point
for each publicity item about their companies in the newsletter during the relevant period. This was
translated into a score of 0 if the number of points was equivalent to the requisite number of
publicity items and converted in turn to 0 per cent. If not, they were allocated a minus score
equivalent to the shortfall; the resulting score was divided by the requisite number of publicity
items and expressed as a percentage.
(33) Approval-in-Principle: Universities were allocated one point if they approve in principle of
having a science park, 0.5 points if they are hesitant but do not rule it out, and 0 points if they do
not approve in principle of having a science park. Universities were not penalised for not having
translated approval-in-principle of having a science park into practice.
Publicity: However, they were penalised if they did not publicise their approval-in-
principle. An average of one publicity item per year during the period 1985-90 (Bristol, Durham,
Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-90 (York) and 1988-90 (City) - ie. the
year before they received their letter of authorisation from the Research Councils - was seen as a
reasonable minimum expectation. Universities were awarded a point for each publicity item in the
newsletter relating to the concept of having a science park during the relevant period. This was
translated into a score of 0 if the number of points received was equivalent to the requisite number
of publicity items for this period; this score was converted in turn to 0 per cent. If the number of
points was not equivalent, universities were allocated a minus score equivalent to the shortfall; the
resulting score was divided by 6 (Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and
Strathclyde) or 5 (York) or 3 (City) - ie. the requisite number of publicity items for the period -
and expressed as a percentage. Universities which are hesitant, but do not rule out the possibility of
having a science park were not expected to have publicised the idea. Where universities had
eventually created a science park, they were scored in the above fashion for publicising approval-
in-principle until such time as they had an actual example to publicise.
Thereafter, they were assessed on the basis of their actual science park, rather than approval-in-
principle. Universities were expected to publicise the science park from the year in which it was
created to 1990 (City, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Kent, Liverpool and Strathclyde), 1986-90
(York). Furthermore, they were expected to report on the progress of the science park at least once
a year, once it had been set up. Universities were awarded a point for each publicity item about the
science park in the newsletter during the relevant period. This was translated into a score of 0 if the
number of points was equivalent to the requisite number of publicity items and converted in turn to
0 per cent. If not, they were allocated a minus score equivalent to the shortfall; the resulting score
was divided by the requisite number of publicity items and expressed as a percentage.
(34) Where discoveries are exploited by the BTG or the Research Corporation Ltd, this is liable to
differ. Under the BTG's standard revenue-sharing agreement, the first owner(s) of the IF being
exploited receive the first £5,000 gross. They then receive 20 per cent of the gross income until the
BTG has covered its costs; thereafter, the income is split 50:50 between the first owner(s) and the
BTG. Under the Research Corporation's standard revenue-sharing agreement, the institution which
generated the IP receives 60 per cent of the gross, with costs being met out of the 40 per cent
which the Research Corporation retains.
(35) In fact, there is no evidence that Hull has ever remembered to do this, in practice; moreover,
this provision is missing from Hull's latest policy statement.
(36) Account is taken of the number of researchers only if an external sponsor pays the costs of
protecting their discovery.
(37) Hull's complex, algebraic formula is reproduced in Appendix I.
(38) This was calculated for each income bracket by dividing the standard deviation by the average
for these universities, as a group, and expressing it as a percentage.
(39) The nine participating universities were ranked in order of generosity for each of the seven
income bands; the most generous - those in the top position - scored 10, the second most
generous - those in the next position - scored 9 and so on, yielding a maximum score of 70, once
the seven scores were aggregated.
(40) This was calculated by subtracting the CVCP's suggested figure from the average for the
participating universities, dividing it by the CVCP's suggested figure and multiplying the result by
100.
(41) These figures are derived from the annual rate of inflation for the intervening years, namely:
1987: 4.2 per cent;
1988: 4.9 per cent;
1989: 7.8 per cent;
1990: 9.5 per cent.
(42) This was calculated by subtracting the average of the AUT's two suggested figures from the
average for the participating universities, dividing it,by the average of the AUT's suggested figures
and multiplying the result by 100.
(43) City does not return a fixed percentage to the department in question; it returns somewhere
between 60 and 75 per cent of the residue to the department. The sums quoted in Figures 37 and
39 represent the most which the centre would take and the least which a department would
receive - ie. they are calculated on the basis of the centre returning just 60 per cent of the residue
to the department. Calculating on the basis of returning 75 per cent, departments would receive the
following sums:
£10K
	 £30K	 £50K	 £100K
	 £500K	 Elm
937	 4687	 8437	 27187	 25218	 7533437
(44) Prior to 1990, Strathclyde had a binary administrative structure, headed by the Registrar and
the Bursar respectively. It now has a unitary administrative structure, headed by a
Registrar/Secretary.
(45) As indicated in chapter 5, in the first stage of the fieldwork, universities were asked to
nominate someone who could provide information on the institution's policy on the exploitation of
IP, and someone who could provide information on the manner in which that policy was
implemented. Thus, these respondents were selected by the participating universities, not by the
researcher.
(46) This "tax" is generally supposed to apply to days devoted to such activities between Monday
and Friday, inclusive; in some quarters of the university there is some debate about this, however,
on the basis that the university "owns" academics 365 days per year, 24 hours per day.
(47) It was assumed that the seven universities authorised in 1986 should have disseminated details
of their revenue-sharing formulae to existing staff that same year, at the same time as publicising
the fact that they had been authorised by the Research Councils; those disseminating details in 1986
would attract a score of 5, those disseminating details in 1987 a score of 4 and so on; those which
had not publicised this at all by the end of the 1989/90 session would score zero. Since York was
not authorised until a year later, it could attract a score of 5 for publicising its revenue-sharing
formula in 1987, a score of 4 for publicising this in 1988 and so on. Since City was not authorised
until 1989, it could attract a score of 5 for publicising its revenue-sharing formula in 1989, 4 for
publicising it in 1990 and so on.
(48) Universities were expected to have disseminated details of their revenue-sharing formulae in
both ways - "trigger" and "ongoing"; those which did so scored 2; those which disseminated either
"trigger" or "ongoing" information scored 1; those which did not disseminate details by either
method scored 0.
(49) It was assumed that the seven universities authorised in 1986 should have disseminated details
of their revenue-sharing formulae to new staff from that same year, at the same time as publicising
the fact that they had been authorised by the Research Councils; those disseminating details in 1986
would attract a score of 5, those disseminating details in 1987 a score of 4 and so on; those which
had not publicised this at all by the end of the 1989/90 session would score zero. Since York was
not authorised until a year later, it could attract a score of 5 for publicising its revenue-sharing
formula in 1987, a score of 4 for publicising this in 1988 and so on. Since City was not authorised
until 1989, it could attract a score of 5 for publicising its revenue-sharing formula in 1989, 4 for
publicising it in 1990 and so on.
(50) Universities disseminating details of their revenue-sharing formulae in a dedicated IP document
scored 3 for prominence; those doing so in another, short document scored 2 for prominence; those
including this information in a large, compendious document containing all sorts of other
information scored 1 for prominence.
(51) However, in June 1989 a senior member of Kent's administration drafted a paper entitled
"Research Contracts, Academic Services and Consultancies" (ref. HRC/SBH39/19.6.89) which
affirmed the university's interest in increasing its income from these sources. It was noted:
"If the university wished to expand its contract work appreciably, it will have to accept that
there is a potential conflict between it and more traditional academic work It may be
possible to mitigate this by ... accepting that in terms of career development, the successful
completion of research contracts and consultancies (including obtaining licences and
patents) will be given equal credit to grants and publications ..."
However, it is not clear how wide a circulation this paper had. Nor is it clear whether these
proposals were subsequently accepted in their entirety by Senate and Council and duly incorporated
into the promotions material; Kent was unwilling to make available a copy of the latest promotions
criteria. Instead, the informant concerned read out what he described as the relevant sections; they
did not appear to include statements to the above effect.
(52) The City University Bureau for Industrial Research.
(53) Source: City University Newsletter, no. 20, 25 March, 1985.
(54) Source: Note 8, Minutes of the AUT's IPR Working Party, 23 April 1985.
(55) The UGC has dreamt up a number of incentives to encourage departments to generate an
income from external sources. Since the mid-1980s, only 60 per cent (approx) of a university's
block recurrent grant has been determined by the number of student FTEs; the remaining 40 per
cent or so is divided into four components. The "SR" component - the UFC's contribution to the
dual support research funding system, is calculated on basis of the number of staff and research
students. The "DR" component, distributed two years in arrears, is calculated on the basis of
income from the Research Councils and charities. The "CR" component, also distributed two years
in arrears, is calculated on the basis of income from research contracts. The "JR" component is
selectively distributed in accordance with each university's performance in the most recent research
selectivity exercise; universities are supposed in turn to selectively distribute this according to the
individual departments' performance in the research selectivity exercise; there is increasing
evidence that they are not doing this, however.
(56) "University companies" should be interpreted in the widest possible sense here, not in the
narrow sense defined for the purposes of this study (see section 8.4 (k)(iv).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9:
(1) eg. an unsympathetic attitude to academia on the part of messengers with an industrial
background. Personal characteristics such as a lack of interpersonal skills or a bad presentation
style might also be diluted in impact in this manner.
(2) It is evident that in this respect the expectations of the ESG and the Research Councils may
differ from those of the CVCP and the UFC. Although it was originally envisaged that patents
would constitute one of the UFC's performance indicators, the CVCP and the UFC came to the
view that using any quantitative measure of patents as a performance indicator could be very
misleading "because the purpose of much research is not primarily to produce commercially
exploitable results" - and because patents are not the only route for exploitation (Source of quote:
personal letter to investigator from Mr A M A Powell, Senior Administrative Officer, Committee
of Vice-Chancellors & Principals (ref. R9/19/4), 6 February, 1991).
(3) Universities were expected to start informing the academic community about the importance of
notifying the relevant authorities about potentially exploitable IP before disclosing research findings
in the year in which they were authorised by the Research Councils. In that year and every
subsequent year, they were expected to have targetted the whole academic community at least once,
at least one cross-section of the academic community and at least one vertical section. They scored
3 points for each year they achieved this (1 for targetting the whole academic community, 1 for
targetting a cross-section, 1 for targetting a vertical section), giving an "expected score" of 15 in
Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Liverpool and Strathclyde, but only 12 in York, which was
not authorised until 1987, and only 6 in City, which was not authorised until 1989. If any
university employed more than one strategem per year, it scored an extra point per stratagem under
the appropriate heading - cross-section, vertical section or the entire academic community The
points actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of their "expected
score". (Note: In Figures 42 and 43, target audiences B-F represent cross-sections of the academic
community, whereas G-I represent vertical sections. Strategies to target single individuals were not
scored)
(4) Universities were expected to deliver this message in at least one non-IP-specific context
annually, as well as two IP-specific contexts, from the year that they were authorised by the
Research Councils. They scored 3 points for each year they achieved this (1 for using a non-IP-
specific context and 2 for two IP-specific contexts), giving an "expected score" of 15 in Bristol,
Durham, Glasgow, Hull, Liverpool and Strathclyde, but only 12 in York, which was not
authorised until 1987, and only 6 in City, which was not authorised until 1989. If any university
delivered its message in more than one non-IP-specific context per year, it scored an extra point; if
any university delivered its message in more than two IP-specific contexts per year, it scored an
extra point. The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of
their "expected score". (Note: In Figures 42-43, the non-IP-specific contexts were judged to be
A2, A3, A7, A8, B10, F9, H10; the rest were judged to be IP-specific contexts. Strategies to
target single individuals were not scored).
(5) Universities were expected to use both written and verbal media to disseminate this message
each year; furthermore, they were expected to provide ongoing written information from the year
they were authorised by the Research Councils, and to complement this with "trigger" information
to at least one segment of the academic community each year. They scored 3 points for each year
they achieved this (1 for using a verbal medium, 1 for written, "trigger" information, 1 for ongoing
written information), giving an "expected score" of of 15 in Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull,
Liverpool and Strathclyde, but only 12 in York, which was not authorised until 1987, and only 6
in City, which was not authorised until 1989. If any university used any of these media more than
once per year, it scored an extra point per medium under the appropriate heading - verbal, written
(trigger) or written (ongoing). The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as
a percentage of their "expected score". (Note: In Figure 42-43, manifestations 1-7 represent
writen, "trigger" information, manifestation 8 represents ongoing written information, and
manifestations 9-14 represent verbal manifestations)
(6) Universities were expected to use at least one external agent to deliver this message annually, as
well as two internal agents, from the year that they were authorised by the Research Councils.
They scored 3 points for each year they achieved this (1 for using an external agent, 2 for using
two internal agents), giving an "expected score" of 15 in Bristol, Durham, Glasgow, Hull,
Liverpool and Strathdyde, but only 12 in York, which was not authorised until 1987, and only 6
in City, which was not authorised until 1989. If any university used an external agent to deliver
this message more than once in a year, it scored an extra point; if any university used an internal
agent to deliver this message more than twice in a year, it scored an extra point. The points
actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of their "expected score".
(7) The Patent Office estimates that around 80 per cent of patents granted do not get exploited
(Source: Patent Office Roadshow, Glasgow, 1 November 1990).
(8) The Patent Office has granted patents on literally dozens of schemes for better mousetraps, at
least one of which offers the option of multiple forms of execution (poisoning, drowning etc) for
mice which are successfully lured inside (Source: Patent Office Roadshow, Glasgow, 1 November
1990).
(9) From the year that each university was authorised by the Research Councils - upto and
including 1990, the policy-implementer was expected to have a grasp of all three forms of
evaluation: scientific, technical and market. Universities scored 3 points for each year they
achieved this (1 for recognising the need for a scientific evaluation, 1 for recognising the need for a
technical evaluation and 1 for a market evaluation), giving a maximum of 6 points for City, 12
points for York and 15 points for the other seven universities. The points scored by each university
were then expressed as a percentage of their maximum possible score.
(10) From the year that each university was authorised by the Research Councils - upto and
including 1990, the policy-implementer was expected to communicate his grasp of the principles,
such as it was, to academics with IP to exploit. Universities were allocated one point for each form
of evaluation which policy-implementers communicated to academics, giving a maximum score of 2
or 3 per year, depending on the score which they achieved in Evaluation 9.5; in other words,
policy-implementers were expected to communicate their grasp of the principles to academics but
were not penalised for not communicating information which they themselves did not appear to
possess in the first place. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage
of their maximum possible score.
(11) From the year that each university was authorised by the Research Councils - upto and
including 1990, universities were allocated one point for each form of evaluation which they
allowed academics themselves to undertake, if they wished to; if they did not allow academics to
undertake any particular form of evaluation themselves, but allowed them to have some say in the
choice of organisation to which this task is delegated, they were allocated half a point. This gave a
maximum score of 2 or 3 per year, depending on the score which they achieved in Evaluation 9.6;
in other words, universities were only penalised in this evaluation if they appeared to allow
academics neither to undertake those forms of evaluation which policy-implementers had explained
to them were necessary nor to have a say in the choice of organisation to which this task is
delegated. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of their
maximum possible score.
(12) This needs to be done whether the IP requires to be protected by a patent or a registered
design; the Patent Office concedes that its name is misleading in this respect.
(13) Each university was expected to provide academics with information about the different types
of IP which IP law distinguishes and the way(s) in which each may be protected. It was regarded as
immaterial whether they provided this information directly - via the policy-implementer, or
indirectly - via a patent agent or some other external agent. However, each was expected to provide
the relevant information, directly or indirectly, from the year in which it was authorised by the
Research Councils. Universities were allocated one point for that year and each year since, upto
and including 1990, giving a maximum of 2 points for City, 4 points for York and 5 points for the
other seven universities. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage
of its maximum possible score.
(14) Each university was expected to provide academics with information about the procedures and
costs entailed in different types of IP protection. Again, it was regarded as immaterial whether they
provided this information directly - via the policy-implementer, or indirectly - via a patent agent or
some other external agent. However, each was expected to provide the relevant information,
directly or indirectly, from the year in which it was authorised by the Research Councils.
Universities were allocated one point for that year and each year since, upto and including 1990,
giving a maximum of 2 points for City, 4 points for York and 5 points for the other seven
universities. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of its
maximum possible score.
(15) Again, each university was expected to provide academics with information about the
conventions of drafting patent/design specifications. It was regarded as immaterial whether they
provided this information directly - via the policy-implementer, or indirectly - via a patent agent or
some other external agent. However, each was expected to provide the relevant information,
directly or indirectly, from the year in which it was authorised by the Research Councils.
Universities were allocated one point for that year and each year since, upto and including 1990,
giving a maximum of 2 points for City, 4 points for York and 5 points for the other seven
universities. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of its
maximum possible score.
(16) Technique 1, reliance on patent office publications only, is a purely reactive technique,
whereas the other 19 entail proactive strategies on the part of the policy-implementer/the academic
with IP to exploit/a broker.
(17) Each university's score for the range of techniques employed to locate potential
licencees/assignees was calculated by adding up the number of techniques listed in Figure 50,
excluding technique no. 1; this was then expressed as a percentage of 20.
(18) Of the techniques listed in Figure 50, techniques 2-7 inclusive were defined for the purposes
of this study as novel to most academics; techniques 8-16 inclusive were defined as intermediate
and techniques 17-20 inclusive as familiar. The techniques most commonly employed by each
university, identified in Figure 50, were characterised according to this scheme, added up and then
expressed as a percentage of the total number of techniques commonly employed.
(19) Once again, techniques 2-7 inclusive were defined for the purposes of this study as novel to
most academics; techniques 8-16 inclusive were defined as intermediate and techniques 17-20
inclusive as familiar. All the techniques which policy-implementers in each university reported
having used/considered using were characterised according to this scheme; the numbers were added
up and then expressed as a percentage of the total number of techniques reportedly
employed/considered.
(20) Universities were expected to have provided guidance concerning the importance of
approaching potential licencees/assignees armed with a confidentiality agreement from the year in
which they were authorised by the Research Councils upto and including 1990. They were allocated
one point for each year that they have provided this information, giving a maximum of 2 points for
City, 4 points for York and 5 points for the other seven universities. They were also expected to
have provided guidance to academics who themselves wished to draw up a confidentiality
agreement appropriate to their circumstances, rather than necessarily use one provided by the
university. This was scored on exactly the same basis. In both cases, the points scored by each
university were then expressed as a percentage of the two maximum possible scores.
(21) Universities were expected to have offered would-be academic entrepreneurs guidance in
relation to writing business plans - or referred them to sources of external advice - from the year in
which they were authorised by the Research Councils upto and including 1990. They were allocated
one point for each year that they have provided this information, giving a maximum of 2 points for
City, 4 points for York and 5 points for the other seven universities. The points scored by each
university were then expressed as a percentage of its maximum possible score.
(22) Source: The Sunday Times (p20), 16 June, 1991.
(23) At the end of the 1980s, it was decided to privatise the British Technology Group. Various
privatisation schemes were mooted in the course of 1991; in March 1992 the BTG was finally
acquired by a consortium led by BTG's own management and staff.
(24) The information provided by policy-makers and policy-implemementers was checked by
contacting economic development officers in the releyant city councils and county councils/districts
and regions. In Scotland, it was also checked by contacting the SDA.
(25) Universities were expected to take the view that they should give would-be academic
entrepreneurs guidance/refer them to external sources of advice for guidance in relation to other
aspects of business start-up. They were expected to have adopted this view from the year in which
they were authorised by the Research Councils - upto and including 1990. They were allocated 2
points for each year that they have accepted full responsibility, 1 point for each year that they have
accepted some responsibility and 0 points for years in which they have accepted no responsibility.
This gave a maximum of 4 points for City, 8 points for York and 10 points for the other seven
universities. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of its
maximum possible score.
(26) From the year that they were authorised by the Research Councils - upto and including 1990,
universities scored 3 points for each year that they gave extensive, hands-on, company-specific
advice (A in Figure 55), 2 points for fairly extensive, hands-on, company-specific advice or buying
in such advice (B or C in Figure 55), 1 point for limited advice (D or E in Figure 55) and 0 points
for giving no advice at all (F in Figure 55). If they imposed any conditions on who might receive
this advice (eg. not academics founding independent spin-off companies), their score was halved.
This gave a maximum of 6 points for City, 12 points for York and 15 points for the other seven
universities. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of its
maximum possible score.
(27) Similarly, from the year that they were authorised by the Research Councils - upto and
including 1990, universities were expected to develop knowledge of and contact with the six
different sources of external advice indicated in Figure 56 (Types 1-6 in Figure 55 , in so far as
each type was available locally, and with any other appropriate source (Type 7 in Figure 55).
Universities scored one point for each source of advice with which they had developed contact,
giving a maximum of 35 points for Durham, Glasgow and Strathclyde, 30 points for Bristol,
Hull, Kent and Liverpool, 24 points for York and 14 points for City. The points scored by each
university were then expressed as a percentage of its maximum possible score.
(28) For instance, the Black & Decker "Workmate" is protected by some 45 patents, a registered
design and a trademark (Source: The Patent Office Roadshow, Glasgow, 1 November, 1990).
(29) Figure 59 relates to situations where the university itself pays initially for the services of a
patent agent - until it can recoup the cost from a licencee/assignee; in situations where other
organisations (eg. the BTG or a company) pay for a patent agent, the relative contributions made
by academics and patent agents may be quite different.
(30) Universities were expected to generate strong patent/registered design specifications - and to
have done so from the year in which they were authorised by the Research Councils, upto and
including 1990. They were deemed to generate strong specifications where these are drafted by the
patent agent after preliminary discussion with the academic(s) concerned, or where the academic(s)
concerned draft the specifications following preliminary discussion with a patent agent - and the
patent agent refines the resulting specification before filing it (1 and/or 2, 4 or 1, 3, 5 in Figure
59). They were deemed to generate specifications of medium strength where these are drafted by
the academic(s) concerned after preliminary discussions with a patent agent (1, 3 in Figure 59).
They were deemed to generate specifications of low strength where they are drafted by the
academic(s) concerned without guidance from a patent agent, but refined by a patent agent before
submission (3, 5 in Figure 59). They were deemed to generate potentially weak specifications
where they are drafted by the academic(s) concerned without reference to a patent agent (3 in
Figure 59).
Universities scored 4 points for each year that they have enabled strong specifications to be
generated, 3 points for each year they have enabled specifications of medium strength to be
generated, 2 points for each year they have enabled specifications of low strength to be generated
and just 1 point for each year they have enabled potentially weak specifications to be generated.
This gave a maximum of 8 points for City, 16 points for York and 20 points for the other seven
universities. The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of
its maximum possible score.
(31) Universities were expected to fund an expert and independent market evaluation whenever
necessary. They were expected to have done this from the year in which they were authorised by
the Research Councils, upto and including 1990. They were allocated 2 points for each year they
have been prepared to fund a market evaluation whenever necessary, 1 point if they have only
occasionally been prepared to fund one, 0 points for each year they have not been prepared to fund
a market evaluation at all. This gave a maximum of 4 points for City, 8 points for York and 10
points for the other seven universities. The points actually scored by each university were then
expressed as a percentage of its maximum possible score.
(32) Universities were expected to centrally fund* the cost of acquiring patents/registered designs.
They were expected to have centrally funded this from the year in which they were authorised by
the Research Councils - upto and including 1990. They were allocated 2 points for each year that
they have done so, 1 point for each year that they have first directed academics to make a first call
upon their department and 0 points for years in which they have not funded the cost at all. This
gave a maximum of 4 points for City, 8 points for York and 10 points for the other seven
universities. The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of
its maximum possible score.
* NB Funding the cost of a patent agent via a company such as KSIP was treated as central funding
for the purposes of this study.
(33) Expenditure relative to the size of the university was calculated by dividing expenditure for
1989/90 by the number of staff FTEs in the science base (based on the figures for 1988/89 quoted
in the case studies presented in Appendx F); this was felt to be fairer than calculating it on the
basis of the total number of staff FTEs, including those in arts and social sciences.
Since there is no known way of calculating the appropriate level of expenditure on acquiring
patents/registered designs in a given university, scores were allocated on the following basis. The
nine universities were ranked in descending order according to their per capita expenditure. The
institution(s) ranked 1st scored 9 points, the institution(s) ranked 2nd scored 8 points and so on.
The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of the maximum
possible score - ie. 9; theoretically, if their per capita expenditure was very similar, all nine
universities could be ranked 1st.
(34) Universities were expected to have a dedicated budget to cover the cost of a patent agent
providing advice - or assistance with a patent/registered design specification, where appropriate.
They were expected to have had a dedicated budget from the year in which they were authorised by
the Research Councils - upto and including 1990. They were allocated 1 point for each year that
they have had a dedicated budget, 0 points for each year that have not had a dedicated budget. This
gave a maximum of 2 points for City, 4 points for York and 5 points for the other seven
universities. The points scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage of its
maximum possible score.
(35) Universities which have a dedicated budget were expected to be flexible about it, using the
limit as a notional guide rather than an absolute limit, if the situation warranted it. They were
expected to adopt this approach since they were authorised by the Research Councils and every
year since - upto and including 1990. Those which are not prepared to be flexible, eg. via virement
from other budget headings, an end-of-year top-up or a carrying-over facility, scored -1 point for
every year that they adopted this approach; those prepared to be flexible scored 0 points for every
year they adopted this approach. The points actually scored by each university were then expressed
as a negative percentage or zero, as appropriate.
(36) Some of the participating universities - most notably Strathclyde - have clearly thought about
this subject and were able to give coherent answers. Others - most notably Liverpool - have not
thought much about it; nor, apparently, have they had occasion to reach an ad hoc decision.
Accordingly, it was necessary to try to establish hypothetically whether academics would be granted
partial or full leave of absence in order to start up a company.
(37) There are six possible frameworks within which academics could legitimately become involved
in university companies/joint ventures/independent spin-off companies exploiting their IP:
• evenings and/or weekends
• consultancy time
• informal rescheduling of an academic's workload
• part-time employment
• sabbatical
• complete leave of absence
Universities were allocated 1 point for each framework which the centre is prepared, in principle,
to countenance. The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as a percentage
of its maximum possible.
(38) Consultancy The information presented in Figure 62 was translated into days per year. ("No
limit" was interpreted as being equivalent to 52 days per year on the basis that nobody at either
Kent* or York does anywhere near that amount of consultancy; this probably explains the lack of
limit) This gave a maximum of 52 days; in universities which allow less time than this, the score
was equivalent to the number of days per year allowed; this was then expressed as a percentage of
52.
Part-Time Contract "No fixed limit" in Figure 66 was interpreted arbitrarily as giving a maximum
of 5 years; in universities which allow less time than this, the score was equivalent to the number
of years allowed; this was then expressed as a percentage of 5 years. Universities which do not
grant a part-time contract to academics wishing to become involved in a university company/joint
venture/independent spin-off company exploiting their research discoveries scored 0 points.
Sabbatical Aggregating 3 sabbatical terms to make up a year scored 3 points; aggregating 2 scored
2 points; granting one term alone scored 1 point; universities unwilling to grant a sabbatical to
academics wishing to become involved in a university company/joint venture/independent spin-off
company exploiting their research discoveries scored 0 points. The points scored by each university
were then expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible score - ie. 3.
Leave of Absence "No fixed limit" in Figure 66 was interpreted arbitrarily as giving a maximum
of 5 years; in universities which allow less time than this, the score was equivalent to the number
of years allowed; this was then expressed as a percentage of 5 years.
* Note: Kent has allowed one academic to do consultancy full-time over a 3-year period, in
preference to his normal academic workload; this is a one-off arrangement which is unlikely to be
repeated due to unforseen difficulties.
(39) Where extending a previously agreed period of leave of absence is concerned, "no fixed limit"
in Figure 66 was interpreted arbitrarily as giving a maximum of 5 years; in universities which
allow less time than this, the score was equivalent to the number of years allowed; this was then
expressed as a percentage of 5 years. Universities which are unlikely to grant an extension scored 0
points.
(40) Universities were expected to have set up - provisionally at least - the six financial support
mechanisms shown in Figure 67a-67b. They were expected to have set these up by the year in
which they were authorised by the Research Councils and to have maintained them upto and
including 1990. Each university was allocated 1 point for each financial support mechanism
established; this was then multiplied by the number of years the support mechanism has been
available, dating from the year the university was authorised. This gave a maximum of 12 points
for City, 24 points for York and 30 points for the other seven universities. The points scored by
each university were then expressed as a percentage of its maximum possible score.
(41) Universities were expected to take a positive attitude to academic entrepreneurs using each of
the five types of physical and human resource listed in Figure 68, demand permitting. They scored
2 points if they took a positive attitude, 1 point if they were reluctant to allow use of any resource
but nonetheless allowed use of it on occasion, and 0 points if they did not allow use of any type of
resource under any circumstances. Universities which imposed conditions on the entrepreneurial
contexts in which any resource could be used had their due score halved. This gave a maximum of
10 points for each university. The points actually scored by each university were then expressed as
a percentage of the maximum possible score.
(42) Start-Up Phase: Universities were allocated 1 point for each of the charge systems they are
prepared to countenance in relation to those types of physical and human resource which they allow
academic entrepreneurs to use, demand permitting; if the set of charge systems countenanced for
any one resource included charge system E, F or G, their score was doubled. This gave a
maximum of 30 points for Bristol, Durham, Kent, Liverpool and York, a maximum of 24 points
for City and Glasgow and a maximum of just 18 points for Hull. The points actually scored by
each university were then expressed as a percentage of their maximum possible score (since none
of the participating universities seems prepared to countenance more than three different charge
systems for any one resource, this was treated as the maximum to be expected, yielding a
maximum of 6 points, if the set of charge systems included E, F or G).
Development/Consolidation Phase: was scored in exactly the same way as the start-up phase.
(43) The decision-making process in relation to academic entrepreneurs using those types of
physical and human resource generally allowed in each university was scored in the following way:
universities scored 1 point for each resource where the decision-making process involved the centre
and the HoD working in tandem, 0 points where the centre/the HoD alone makes the decision. This
gave a maximum of 5 points for Bristol, Durham, Kent, Liverpool and York, a maximum of 4
points for City and Glasgow and a maximum of 3 points for Hull. The points actually scored by
each university were then expressed as a percentage of their maximum possible score.
(44) The Commercial Exploitation of IF: A Statement of Policy, University of Liverpool, April
1989.
(45) eg. Patent Office training course for university IL0s, as held at Washington, County Durham,
29 November 1990.
(46) In 1991 Liverpool found an alternative interim solution: it invited NIIVITECH, the North
West's Regional Technology Centre, to conduct a pilot technology audit in a few departments. It is
believed that the cost was covered by DTI funding which NIMTECH had been awarded under an
appropriate initiative.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10:
(1) If interviewees volunteered the information that the awareness of their staff rated "five on a
scale often", or simply "aware", this was interpreted as "3". Terms like "unaware" or "ignorant"
were interpreted as a "1". Phrases like "vaguely aware" were interpreted as a "2", while phrases
like "pretty aware" were interpreted as a "4" and "very aware" or "very widely known" were
interpreted as a "5".
(2) The same caveats apply to mapping the interviewees' responses against this five-point scale as
applied to the previous five-point scale.
(3) The category ignorance of objections was not felt to fit easily into this categorisation scheme.
(4) The only difference is that York did not provide professional indemnity cover.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11:
(1) Very reluctantly, in view of the wealth of data, it was decided not to include mini "case studies
within case studies" as the third section of the case study narratives in Appendix F, as originally
planned. Academic entrepreneurs were guaranteed anonymity - with one or two exceptions, where
permission was explicitly obtained to use material notwithstanding the impossibility of disguising
the identity of the informant. In the light of the guarantee they were given, many academic
entrepreneurs were very outspoken; moreover, some were in business illicitly. The investigator had
to honour that guarantee and could find no way of using the data elicited in a meaningful way
without effectively reneging on it.
(2) It is worth noting that two of the interviewees were associated with the same enterprise, while
one interviewee was associated with two different enterprises.
(3) The nature of this informant's research was such that grants tended to be large and infrequent,
with the result that he used his staff to do private contract research in order to retain them as a
resource until the next grant arrived. On occasion, he asked the university to bear the cost of
keeping them on.
(4) The investigator took the precaution of checking how these items had come to be in the
university newsletter - ie. at whose initiative - and was informed that the initiative for such items
almost invariably came from the entrepreneurs themselves.
(5) Two of the interviewees were entrepreneurially involved with the same company; thus only five
enterprises are characterised here, rather than six.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13:
(1) In chapter 5 this was attributed largely to woolly thinking and/or poor writing on the part of the
authors. Another possible interpretation is that these documents were deliberately woolly and
ambiguous, that they were drafted in a manner which allowed the ESG - and therefore UK
universities, too - to deviate to a considerable extent from Margaret Thatcher's personal, specific,
dogma-driven "solution" to the problems associated with the BTG. This interpretation has a certain
appeal; it goes some way to explaining why the ESG, having quizzed several of the participating
universities about the role of the researcher in the exploitation process, authorised these universities
notwithstanding ambiguous responses to their enquiries and even responses which, it could be
argued, overtly denied researchers anything more than a supporting as opposed to a starring role
when it came to the exploitation of their findings and ideas. If this is a correct interpretation, then
both the ESG and - wittingly or unwittingly - many of the participating universities have been
engaged in a charade. This might, in turn, account for the ESG's unwillingness to identify its
members by name, its preference for meeting behind closed doors and its habit of communicating
via the Research Councils and the CVCP, instead of directly. The tensions identified by the CVCP
in the wake of the removal of the BTG's monopoly could be adduced to support this interpretation,
too. It is possible that the views of the Prime Minister, the DES, the Research Councils, the CVCP
et al were so divergent that the woolly, ambiguous wording employed was the only wording which
could accommodate every constituency's view. An alternative interpretation is that the Kingman
letter and the DES statement exhibited genuinely woolly thinking, that the ESG did not attempt to
recommend good, let alone best practice because its members had no clear idea what the Prime
Minister's wishes might actually entail in practice. In other words, they were not upto the task of
figuring out the algorithm of the identification, evaluation, protection and exploitation process and
examining the implications of the Prime Minister's wishes - or even their own interpretation of her
wishes - for each step in the algorithm. If this is the case, it is a classic example of the blind
leading the blind.
(2) ie. those which existed prior to the abolition of the binary divide.
Case Study Narrative: Bristol University
(1) This is clearly how the University saw itself, too, for in the job specification for the head of the
new Industrial Liaison Office, prepared by the Finance Office in September 1986, Bristol is
described as "a medium-sized University" (ref. RS/31/015).
(2) In the 1988/89 session, Bristol had 7,513 student FTEs, compared to 7,125 in 1980/81, an
increase of 5 per cent.
In 1988/89 there were 6,328 undergraduate FTEs, 562 taught postgraduate FTEs and 623 research
student FTEs (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September
1990).
In 1980/81 there were 6,149 undergraduate FTEs, 461 taught postgraduate FTEs and 515 research
student FTEs (Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September
1981).
(3) According to Bristol's USR Correspondent, the introduction of devolved budgets in the mid-
1980s had the effect of freezing existing student numbers. This was later recognised and the 1989
Academic Plan provided for a 50 per cent, global expansion in student numbers by 1999.
(4) In the 1988/89 session, Bristol had a total of 1,411 full-time academic/academic-related staff,
plus 132 part-timers; this compares with 1328 full-time academic/academic-related staff and 41
part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1980/81 there were 1,127 full-time academic staff and 160 full-time academic-related staff.
(Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1981). It is no
longer clear what proportion of the full-time academic staff was UGC-funded and what proportion
was funded by other sources. Academic-related staff represented 12% of Bristol's total
academic/academic-related staff.
In 1988/89, 1,247 (59%) of full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC; 507 (41%) were
funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Once again, academic-
related staff represented 12% of Bristol's academic/ academic-related staff.
(5) The Department of Architecture was closed completely once its existing students had graduated.
The Department of Education was reduced in size by around 50 per cent and the History of Art
Department became a service Department, no longer offering Honours courses.
(6) In 1988/89 Bristol's science base comprised the Departments of:
Anaesthesia, Anatomy, Child Health, Epidemiology & Community Medicine, Medicine, Mental
Health, Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Opthalmology, Otorhinolaryngology, Pathology, Pharmacology,
Physiology, Radiodiagnosis, Radiotherapy, Surgery;
Biochemistry, Botany, Inorganic Chemistry, Organic Chemistry, Physical Chemistry, Theoretical
Chemistry, Physics, Geography, Geology, Psychology and Zoology;
Aerospace Engineering, Civil Engineering, Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Mechanical
Engineering, Computer Science and Engineering Mathematics;
Agricultural Sciences, Animal Husbandry, Veterinary Medicine and Veterinary Surgery;
Child Dental Health, Conservative Dentistry, Prosthetic Dentistry & Dental Care of the Elderly,
Oral Medicine, Surgery & Pathology.
(7) Source: "Trouble in the Ranks", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(8) Ratings by subject area were:
Outstanding:	 Veterinary Medicine, Chemistry, Civil Engineering,
Geography
Above Average: Clinical Medicine, Anatomy, Physiology, Pharmacology,
Biochemistry, Zoology, Veterinary Anatomy, Veterinary
Pathology, Veterinary Pharmacology, Animal Husbandry,
Physics, Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering
Average:	 Clinical Dentistry, Psychology, Botany, Veterinary
Surgery, Mathematics, Electrical & Electronic
Engineering
Below Average: Other Physical Sciences, Computer Sciences, General
Engineering.
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(9) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(10) Ratings by "unit of assessment" were:
Pharmacology, Chemistry, Physics, Civil Engineering, Geography
	
4:	 Anatomy & Physiology, Biochemistry, Veterinary Science,
Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering
	
3:	 Clinical Medicine, Clinical Dentistry, Psychology, Other
Biological Sciences, Other Physical Sciences, Mathematics,
Computer Science, General Engineering
	
2:	 Electrical & Electronic Engineering
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September, 1989.
(11) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(12) The science base contributed 94 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 90 per cent from charities, 100 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 65 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations. (Source: Figures derived from Form 3 (p2), Table 3
of the statistical data prepared by Bristol University for the UGC and USR for 1984/85).
These figures err on the side of being conservative. They exclude the research grant and contract
income of the Departments of Psychology and Geography, since it is beyond the scope of this study
to apportion this income between the Faculties of Science and Social Sciences.
(13) The science base contributed 93 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 87 per cent from charities, 99 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce, and, once again, 65 per cent of its combined income from central
government, local authorities and various overseas organisations. (Source: Figures derived from
Form 3 (p2), Table 3 of the statistical data prepared by Bristol University for the UGC and USR in
1988/89).
(14) In the early 1970s, a Professor of Physics presented a paper to the Committee of Deans,
arguing for the establishment of an IL office. His proposal was rejected:
"... There was a culture gap. It was because the University was so successful at bidding
(for money from] the Research Councils. We didn't need to worry. We were still on the
upswing ..."
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Dean of Engineering and the Information Officer tried to
compensate for the absence of an ILO by trying to market the University's skills more efficiently.
They produced a draft prospectus outlining the resources of various Departments. The project
ground to a halt when personal circumstances obliged the Dean to leave the University.
(15) Professor Rawlcliffe of the Electrical Engineering Department invented the PAM (Pole
Amplitude Modulation) motor which was assigned to the NRDC in 1960. It was licensed all around
the world, making it the University's most successful exploitation to date - and one of the NRDC's
more successful, too.
(16) An officer from the University of Bristol's branch of the Association of University Teachers
stated this during a telephone conversation with the investigator in October 1989.
(17) It has been suggested that if the Dean of Engineering had not departed when he did (see (14)),
he might have given the necessary impetus to ensure an ILO was appointed in the wake of the 1981
cuts. In the event, when this was suggested by the working party examining ways to generate
external revenue, there was insufficient support for the idea in Senate.
(18) At this point in time, Deputy Secretary was not a particularly senior position in the
administration. The Director of Administration - a post since abolished - ranked immediately below
the Vice-Chancellor in seniority. Below him, theoretically of equal status, were the Finance
Officer, the Bursar, the Personnel Officer and the Registrar/Secretary. In 1988/89 this last post was
split into two.
(19) It was suspected that 3i might be an alternative to the BTG, but no attempt was made to
contact 3i to confirm this. The University also felt there must be other alternatives, if they cared to
look for them - but in the event, they did not.
(20) Track Analysis Systems Ltd was founded by a group of physicists in the mid-1980s to exploit
a material for detecting radiation. In this case, since they had published their research findings, the
material concerned was in the public domain and could not be patented. Accordingly, the company
did not need to acquire a license. It exploits the material and the academics' expertise without
having to pay royalties, but pays the University a small fee in recognition of its rights over the IP.
(21) An ILO was seen as a prerequisite if universities were to increase the level of funding they
received from industry. The UGC's views on this had just been expressed in "A Strategy for
Higher Education into the 1990s" (HMSO, September 1984, pp. 35-38). The UGC recommended
that the Government should provide additional funds for the establishment of an industrial seedcom
fund as an incentive to universities to seek further links with industry and commerce.
(22) The CVCP's working party on science parks was due to report late in 1985, for example.
(23) Sir Alec Merrison had retired as Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University in 1984. His chosen
successor, Sir John Kingman, was at that time finishing his period as Chairman of the SERC. For
the 1984/85 session, an Acting Vice-Chancellor was appointed from within the academic
community Given that he had only one year in which to achieve anything, Professor Hackett chose
to concentrate on the University's relations with industry. His fellow committee members were the
Deans of Science and Engineering, the Information Officer and a lay member of Council. The
Deputy Secretary participated as an observer.
(24) The committee reported its wideranging findings and its recommendations to Senate in May
1985. The report was reproduced in full (excluding appendices) in the Supplement to the
"Newsletter" on 16 May 1985, "so that the debate on the issues raised [could] be as widespread as
possible".
(25) The bonus was to be calculated on the basis of 5 per cent of the net income to the University
derived from new business generated by the ILO, after deduction of direct costs, upto a maximum
of 50 per cent of the basic salary.
(26) Despite the committee's recommendations, the office was subsequently called the Industrial
Liaison Office (ILO) and rather than becoming Director of Industrial and Commercial Affairs, the
person appointed is referred to as the Head of the ILO. There was a general concensus, on
reflection, that the title "Director" suggested the direction of the academic community Since this
was unwelcome and unwarranted, the recommendation was scrapped.
(27) This quote is taken from the job specification for the Head of Industrial Liaison, reference:
RS/31/015, 12 September 1986.
(28) The ILO took care to involve members of the administration, the University's lawyers, the
AUT and even the academic community in its deliberations, wherever possible.
(29) He sees the research activities of the Departments of Electrical Engineering, Physical
Chemistry, Pharmacology and the Veterinary School as particularly likely sources of IP.
(30) This quote is taken from the Conclusions of the Senate committee's report, printed in the
Supplement to the "Newsletter", 16 May, 1985.
(31) This quote is taken from the job specification for the Head of Industrial Liaison, reference:
RS/31/015, 12 September 1986.
(32) The terms and conditions of appointment indicate that each case will need to be considered in
the light of individual circumstances. The University will take into account the balance between
University time and resources used and those privately invested by the individual concerned.
(33) Bristol has confronted the fact that some Departments regularly end the year with a surplus,
whilst others end it with a deficit. A policy decision has been taken to redistribute some of the
surplus to offset the deficits. Accordingly, Departments which end the year with a surplus of more
than £50,000 are taxed. In 1989/90 the tax amounted to 49 per cent of the residue, though this
varies from year to year.
Since it is impossible to separate out that portion of the surplus which arises from IP as opposed to
other sources, some Departments - most notably Departments in the Faculty of Engineering - could
find their income from IP being taxed. This acts as a major incentive to spend the income from IP
at once.
(34) Memorandum to Heads of Departments, Procedure Relating to Staff Appointments,
Promotions and Salary Increments, 2 November, 1989.
(35) Bristol's induction course tends to deal with matters which affect everybody, irrespective of
discipline or status; the ILO recognises that it might be difficult to put together a presentation
which was equally relevant to everyone.
(36) This information was buried on the third page of a 5-page report of the findings and
recommendations of the Senate committee investigating how the University should improve its
relations with industry, which was printed in a Supplement to the "Newsletter", 16 May 1985.
(37) In mitigation, the editor of the "Newsletter" pointed out that in 1985/86 the University was
preoccupied with the arrival of the new Vice-Chancellor, the University's response to the Jarratt
Report and the new Academic Plan.
(38) It is not clear from the file which the ILO inherited whether members of staff were informed
about the University's authorisation in 1986, but there is evidence that a memo was sent out by the
Vice-Chancellor's office in 1987 and/or 1988. It is less clear who received these memos. Various
options were considered, ranging from notifying all members of staff throughout the University to
notifying key HoDs. The final decision is not on file and the ILO does not know what the Vice-
Chancellor's practice is.
(39) In 1987/88 the ILO organised a day-long seminar which dealt with IP issues in the broadest
sense. Open to all members of staff in all faculties, some 40 people attended. In 1988/89 the ILO
arranged gave a series of seminars on identification, protection and exploitation which were
specifically geared to Bristol's situation. Apart from one open seminar, most were given in the
context of specific Departments or faculties, taking into account local needs and interests.
(40) The panel is an ad hoc group set up by the ILO. It is not a formally constituted University
committee. During its first meeting, it established its remit and modus operandi and considered in
the broadest terms whether the University's patent "policy" is the correct one. It was planned to
continue this discussion at the next meeting, and only then to begin assessing the market value of
particular discoveries.
(41) If a researcher is about to give a conference paper, the ILO makes every effort to protect his
discoveries beforehand by a speedy initial registration. There have been occasions where the
conference was only a week or so away.
(42) Bristol tries to get its IP protected in Europe, north America, Japan etc, despite the far greater
cost:
"... The idea of the UK only, bearing in mind the mobility of technology and the ways one
can get around a UK patent, means that it is becoming less interesting ..."
The ILO generally employs patenting routes which may cost more eventually, but where the initial
expenditure is slower.
(43) There is no formal policy as to who has the final right of decision. The ILO describes the
situation as "a bit nebulous" and recognises that it is difficult to proceed effectively without the
academic's co-operation.
(44) This is the reason that the University received around 5 per cent of the revenue from the
"Rawlcliffe plugs" - see (15).
(45) This might include, for example, a joint venture between the University and the researcher(s),
between the University and industry, between the University and the public sector, or joint ventures
encompassing several or all of these parties.
(46) The plan was to set up a holding company after at least two of the commercial arms of
Departments had been transformed into wholly-owned companies, which could then function as
subsidiaries. At that point in time, two candidates had been identified and the imminent
transformation into a limited company of the first, the Institute of Grinding Technology, had been
announced. However, the academic who was due to become the managing director subsequently
accepted a Chair at an American University. In 1989/90 the Institute was led by an academic with
considerable scientific and technical skills, but insufficient managerial or marketing skills. Until
such time as an academic emerges who has both sets of skills, or the University can identify a
suitable entrepreneur to put in place as managing director, the Institute has retained its previous,
arms' length quasi-academic status.
The first candidate for subsidiary status is therefore the wholly-owned Bristol Earthquake &
Engineering Laboratory (BEELAB Ltd), in which the University has £.100 share capital. The
company was founded to exploit a wide range of equipment, including an earthquake simulator,
which the Department of Civil Engineering has at its disposal.
There are currently at least four other institutes/centres/units which are virtually or completely self-
funding (ie. they do not rely on grants from Research Councils or charities for their existence). In
time, these may also be converted into limited companies, and thence into subsidiaries of the
University holding company. The initiative for this will generally come from the academics
involved, but the ILO will draw up the necessary business plans to assess the viability of their
proposals.
(47) Licensing and even assigning to existing companies with a track record will continue to be part
of the ILO's game plan for many years:
"... It is important to have a sort of unit trust arangement where there's quite a wide
spread of fairly predictable income, rather than very erratic and potentially very high
reward but high risk [income
(48) The one exception is a biotechnology company which was founded at the end of 1989 by two
members of the academic staff, one with tenure and one non-UFC-funded, to exploit techniques
which they developed relating to monoclonal antibodies. In this particular case, there was no
immediately obvious market for the IP. A niche market was subsequently identified as a result of
the academics themselves having the energy and commitment to their discovery to do market
research which led to the identification of future customers. A spin-off company with an exclusive
license was seen as particularly appropriate in this situation, since their competitors were large
companies which would probably want to suppress the discovery.
(49) When the ILO shifts his attention to this part of the exploitation process, he anticipates that a
number of marketing tactics are likely to prove useful. These include tapping the Alumnae
Association, making greater use of large and small companies with which the University has an
existing contact, and placing strategic articles in the trade press and the media. Towards the end of
the 1980s an academic who took the trouble to place an article about his research discoveries in an
unrefereed journal (for which he got little academic credit) attracted the attention of Boeing, which
expressed an interest in becoming a licensee.
(50) One respondent made the analogy of the first garage in an area to give Green Shield stamps ...
the others soon feel under pressure to follow suite. He felt that Bristol arrived at its view of
academic entrepreneurship in much the same way.
(51) As one respondent put it:
"... Entrepreneurship is part of generating funds. Generating funds is, in a way, accepting
the government's policy, which is that we will reduce [our contribution] and you will
generate more [money]. [The idea] that universities will not be so exclusively publicly-
funded is [something] that quite a wide range of academics are very much against. They
feel the University should not be pushed into this situation and should not allow the
government to divest itself of its responsibility ..."
(52) Most notably these include the Institute of Grinding Technology, the Remote Sensing Unit, the
School for Advanced Urban Studies, the Comparative Orthopaedics Unit and the Communications
Engineering Unit.
(53) The Remote Sensing Unit, currently based in the Department of Geography, is linking with the
Electronics & Electrical Engineering Departments of other universities to develop and market
satellite reception facilities, image processing systems and sets of software packages for operational
environmental monitoring based on data from meteorological satellites, for example.
(54) At the ILO's suggestion, the University has a 12-month option on acquiring a share in a
biotechnology company which was formed by two members of the academic staff (see (52)).
Depending on the company's performance, the University may exercise its right to acquire a 10-25
per cent shareholding at a nominal E1 per share. This arrangement was made in preference to a
royalty payment partly because it overcame the problem of distinguishing between the IP which the
researchers generated in the course of their academic duties and that which they generated in the
course of their company activities. Since the University has the option of a share in both activities,
the distinction becomes less crucial.
(55) The primary motivation for this purportedly relates to safety on campus. Since a number of
such companies are known to operate from the campus, there is concern that the terms of the
Factories Act may inadvertently be contravened where access, building modifications, safety etc are
concerned.
However, there is also concern that even though academic spin-off companies are legally at arms'
length from the University, visitors and clients may not make that clear a distinction. Therefore, it
is important to check that a company's activities do not reflect negatively on the University's
reputation.
(56) In the 1982 Academic Enterprise Competition, Bristol had one entry, based on a discovery
made in the Pharmacology Department. In the 1988/89 competition, Bristol had two entries, one
from the Vascular Studies Unit and one from the Anatomy Department (Source: private
communication from the British Technology Group, 1989).
(57) Source: "Standing Orders of Council Governing the Appointment of Full-Time Members of
the Non-Professorial Academic Staff", University of Bristol, August 1979.
(58) Twenty per cent is not a figure which is laid down as an entitlement; it is more a question of
custom and practice.
(59) This was said, of course, before Bristol revealed that it was on the verge of financial collapse
in 1990/91.
(60) Ironically, the ILO has never been shown this Council minute. The head of the ILO was
alerted to its existence by members of the academic staff who have referred to it in conversation
with him.
(61) By 1989/90 this was known to have happened - with varying arrangements - in the
Departments of Engineering, Civil Engineering, Medicine and one other.
(62) Until 1987/88, the decision to give the University's blessing to on-campus companies was
purely a local one, made by the HoD. Since then, the decision has involved satisfying the Finance
Office that the correct charges are being levied for space occupied and resources - once the
company is up and running. It has also involved satisfying the Safety Officer. In some cases, the
HoD's in-principle decision may also be referred to the Committee of Deans.
(63) A lecturer from the Sociology Department is believed to have left the University in order to
run The New Work Trust, a company limited by guarantee which provides business start-up advice,
incubator units etc for small start-up companies.
(64) Bristol installed a modem telephone exchange towards the end of the 1980s. Academics
making calls on private business can preface the number they want by a dialling code which logs
the cost of their conversation. As yet, however, there appears to have been no great emphasis on
using this facility, despite the fact that heads of Department have devolved budgets and pay real
rather than notional money for excessive usage.
(65) The ILO recently required a biotechnology spin-off company to acquire off-campus premises,
for example, due to the complexity of the laws surrounding biotechnology products.
(66) The committee charged with finding ways to generate income first mooted the idea of a
science park in the early 1980s, in the wake of the 1981 cuts. The Department of Architecture,
before it was closed down, proposed a vertical science park, a tower block costing close to £13m,
which would be built in the city centre on University land.
In 1984/85 the working party chaired by the interim Vice-Chancellor proposed what the
Information Officer describes as "a bigger, better, shinier animal" which would primarily attract
major multi-national companies rather than small, start-up companies. This proposal gradually
firmed up into a joint project with Bath University and Bristol Polytechnic for a 500 acre site at
Emerson's Green, costing £50m. The proposal is for 100,000 sq.ft. of lakeside buildings of various
sizes, suitable for R&D and manufacturing. There would also be a small number of incubator units,
a block designed to act as a one-stop technology transfer resource, housing patent agents, lawyers
etc - and cheap residential accommodation for postgraduates.
The project has been delayed by a public inquiry since it entailed a change to the proposed county
structure plan and conflicted with a planning application for a retail scheme. If planning permission
is given, the bulldozers will probably move in in 1991. The University hopes the science park will
be open for business by the end of 1992.
Case Study Narrative: City University
(1) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", the University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986.
On the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent
in student numbers by 1989/90.
(2) In 1988/89 City had 3,367 student FTEs compared to 2,826 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 2,257 full-time undergraduate FTEs, 884 full-time taught postgraduate FTEs
and 226 full-time research student FTEs (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3:
Finance, USR, September 1990).
In 1980/81, in contrast, there were 2,317 undergraduate FTEs, 333 taught postgraduate FTEs and
212 research student FTEs.
There is a tremendous difference at City between numbers of student FTEs and numbers of
students, however, more so than at most universities. In 1988/89, for example, the University
registered 1,010 part-time postgraduates, most of whom were on taught courses (Source . Annual
Report, City University, 1988/89).
(3) In 1988/89 City had 459 full-time academic/academic-related staff, plus 40 part-timers. This
compared with 412 full-time academic/academic-related staff and just 6 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 262 (71%) of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC. 109 (29%) were
funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Academic-related staff
accounted for 19% of City's academic/academic-related staff.
There is no surviving record of how many of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UGC
in 1980/81. However, academic-related staff accounted for 14% of City's academic/academic-
related staff.
(4) The traditional base of the Northampton Polytechnic Institute, which was metamorphosed into
the City University in 1966, was engineering, optometry, physics and chemistry. The other subjects
areas are more recent additions.
(5) There was a total of 246 academic/academic-related staff in these departments; 188 were UFC-
funded and 58 non-UFC-funded.
(6) This information is derived from a series of tables of City's student FTE load for 1988/89
provided by the Academic Registrar's office. However, the categories employed do not equate
exactly with Departments.
(7) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986. This poll ranks
City as 49th out of 50 universities, with only Keele below it.
(8) In 1989/90 these included the Control Engineering Centre, the Centre for Information
Engineering, the Centre for Measurement, Instrumentation & Applied Physics, the Centre for
Aeronautics, the Engineering Design Centre, the Structures Research Centre, the Electrical Power
& Energy Systems Research Centre, the Ocean Engineering Research Centre, Geotechnical
Centrifuge Centre*, the Thermo-Fluids Engineering Research Centre, the Underwater Non-
Destructive Evaluation Centre*, the Ocean Engineering Centre, the Centre for Biomedical
Engineering, the Centre for Enterprise Management, the Centre for Measurement and Information
in Medicine, the Research Unit on Low-Dimensional Magnetic Structures, the Actuarial Research
Unit, the Social Statistics Research Unit, the Centre for Software Reliability and the Applied Vision
Research Centre.
Some of these were collaborative ventures between one or more departments and those with an
asterisk were collaborative ventures with other institutions. City's Research Committee laid down
criteria which must be fulfilled before such centres can be established. These include academic
criteria: they must be able to demonstrate the makings of a qualitative research output in terms of
refereed articles - and financial criteria: they must demonstrate a minimum level of income from
Research Councils and charities. In some cases, however, (eg. the Geotechnical Centrifuge Centre,
the Ocean Engineering Centre) centres require the support of industry, too, in order to attain their
objectives.
With one major exception, the Social Statistics Research Unit, City's research centres were all
notional groupings of researchers, usually UFC-funded, who participated on a "cafeteria" basis.
They did not usually have a separate staff on short-term contracts.
(9) Ratings by "unit of assessment":
Applied Mathematics, Statistics
Optometry, Speech Therapy, Systems Science,
Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering
1:	 Chemistry, Civil Engineering, Electrical & Electronic Engineering.
Source: The Academic Registrar, City University.
(10) City's current Secretary was previously Deputy Secretary and Bursar of Surrey University,
which took a conscious decision in 1970/71 to concentrate on top-class research:
"... Fifteen, seventeen years later they have achieved it. That shows the length of time and
the kind of investment you need to make ..."
(11) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, Volume 3- Finance, USR, September 1986.
(12) The science base contributed 80 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 84 per cent from charities, 69 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 87 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities plus various overseas organisations (Source: UGC University Statistics, volume 3:
Finance, USR, September 1987).
(13) The science base contributed 85 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 59 per cent from charities, 59 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 80 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities plus various overseas organisations (Source: UFC University Statistics, volume 3:
Finance, USR, September 1990).
(14) In the course of the fieldwork, City's Secretary emphasised that the University has a
"management", not an administration.
(15) City Technology Ltd (CTL) became a wholly-owned company in 1977/78. It was founded to
exploit gas sensor technology developed in the Chemistry Department. Initially, this was offered on
a voluntary basis to the NRDC, which "simply didn't respond quickly enough":
"... The commercial imperatives at the time were such that we had to get on and do
something - so we did it ourselves ..."
CTL has always covenanted its gross profits to City, which then allocates it development funding
as necessary. In 1987/88 CTL doubled its floorspace and became a fully independent commercial
company, still wholly-owned by City. This possibly makes it the only wholly-owned university
company in the UK to bring in profits of the order which it does.
(16) In 1982 City Technology Ltd won the Queen's Award for Technological Achievement, as it
did again in 1985. In 1988 it won a Queen's Award for Export Achievement.
(17) Citifluor Ltd was founded to exploit materials developed in the Chemistry Department which
do not "phase" quickly when medical slides are stained to facilitate examination.
(18) Surrey was the first British university to formulate a policy on patenting and IP. This policy
foreshadowed much of the CVCP's code of practice, circulated in 1977/78.
(19) By "restructuring periods", the respondent is referring to 1981-84 and 1986-90, during which
many universities underwent major structural changes, usually following the recommendations of
the UGC.
(20) City operates with a binary management system, dividing academic from financial affairs.
These two areas are the responsibility of the Academic Registrar and the Secretary respectively,
who are of equal status and report directly to the Vice-Chancellor.
In practice, IP questions cut across both areas, but since the management at City is very small, this
is usually dealt with at an informal level.
(21) Until then, discoveries arising out of Research Council-funded projects were offered to the
BIG, as usual.
(22) City's Terms and Conditions of Employment obliged it to embark upon a consultation process.
(23) City Consultancy Services (CCS) was then set up following the demise of CUBIE to perform
at least some of its functions in a less risky way. Its Director in 1989/90 was a member of the
academic staff whose responsibility for CCS was only part-time.
(24) The only exception is ownership of copyright in publications other than course notes,
syllabuses and examination papers.
(25) City has not updated its Staff Handbook since the 1970s. However, it makes an effort to issue
annual Supplements.
(26) City's attitude to revenue earned by inventors is similar to its attitude towards members of
staff who undertake paid, personal (arm's length) consultancy. There is no earnings limit, provided
members of staff stick roughly to the rule of thumb of a maximum of one day per week. City does
not take a percentage of earnings from personal, arm's length consultancy, though it may charge
for equipment/instrumentation or support staff if the consultancy activities have incurred
opportunity costs.
Like many institutions in central London, for City the problems of recruiting staff on nationally
negotiated salaries with only a minimal London weighting have reached crisis proportions. This is
seen as one way of allowing members of the academic staff to supplement their salaries and ease
the burden.
(27) Where there are joint authors - and presumably joint inventors - half these points are awarded
to each contributor.
(28) Source: City University Report on Research Activity, 1 December 1989.
(29) Source: Memorandum from the Academic Registrar's Office to all HoDs, 21 November 1989:
Review of Academic Salaries 1989/90.
(30) City's salary review committee consists of 11 people: the Vice-Chancellor, two Pro-Vice-
Chancellors, the Academic Registrar, the President of the local AUT, the Chairman of the
Academic Staff Association plus three HoDs and two members of Senate of senior lecturer status or
above. These last five are appointed by Senate and serve for three years.
(31) The "Newsletter" is scheduled to appear twice a term but in the calendar year 1989, for
example, the last issue was published in July.
(32) Being a committee which reports to the Senate, the Research Committee has no lay members.
It consists entirely of academic members and is serviced by the Deputy Academic Registrar.
(33) The centre believes that it is "fairly generous" in returning between 60 and 75 per cent of
research overheads to research groups/centres or departments, so that many departments should be
able to cover the cost.
(34) The Technological Development Fund was established around 1981, using the profits of CTL.
This was done to ensure that this revenue "was not seen as a kind of income stream that could
mitigate or temper the rigour that was being imposed by the UGC". Since CTL covenanted its
profits gross to the University, it was vital for the company to have access to them for its working
capital. Moreover, City felt it was appropriate to invest the residue on a capital basis, rather than
fritter it away in subsidies.
Any other income which the University receives from exploiting IP, by whatever route, is also paid
into the Technological Development Fund, after the proportions due to the inventors and the
Department have been deducted.
(35) It is not clear whether assigningEmt of the ownership presents problems in a university which
does not vest its patents jointly in the university and the inventor.
(36) This follows UDIL's recommendation (UDIL, 1988).
(37) Some details of how City Technology Ltd (CU) was founded are given in note (19) above.
The technology was developed by four member of the Chemistry Department's research staff, all of
whom were on short-term contracts. The four became Executive Directors of CTL, with one taking
on the role of Managing Director. In 1987/88 CTL became a fully independent commercial
company, having won its third Queen's Award - for Export Achievement. CTL is recognised as a
world leader in its field. In May 1988 City conferred an Honorary Degree on the Managing
Director, who was about to retire.
In 1983/84 City founded Citifluor Ltd to market a particular chemical. The company is managed
by the Head of the Chemistry Department on a day/week basis, with technical support.
In 1987/88 City founded Ocean Technology (UK) Ltd  (OTEC) to provide technical consultancy
services to international marine and offshore oil and gas industries, in association with a group of
professional companies and consultants. A Professor and a Reader in the Civil Engineering
Department were appointed as Executive Directors; the head of the University's computing service
became the third Executive Director. The company brought in a part-time Managing Director from
outside.
(38) OTEC's principal customers were in developing countries, several of which had severe
economic as well as political problems. City believes it founded the company two years too late to
get optimum advantage from the services it was offering.
(39) For instance, a number of inventions which originated in the Department of Optometry &
Visual Science have been exploited by existing companies, since it was more appropriate to have
them manufactured and marketed by existing instrument makers.
(40) In this situation, the assignation/licensing agreement could be between the research centre and
the industrial partner or between the university and the industrial partner.
(41) HoDs are now appointed for five years initially, and would not normally be reappointed more
than once. This prevents empire-building on a departmental scale, although in the view of the
managment, some research groups are exhibiting similar tendencies.
(42) City installed a new telephone system in 1980, but it does not offer the facility for users to
employ codes to indicate private versus university use. The University therefore has to rely on
academics being honest about reporting use of the telephone for private calls.
(43) The centre is well aware, for example, of the activities of LENTA, but would prefer to find
"horses for courses" rather than use "an overarching body there to generate economic activity for
the whole of greater London".
(44) This is effectively what happened with OTEC, which was founded on the basis of a business
plan drawn up by a Visiting Research Fellow who worked for a well-known consultants in marine
engineering. Once the company was registered, this person assumed the role of MD, not on a
salaried, employee basis but on the basis of an annual fee.
Case Study Narrative: Durham University
(1) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpol newsletter, June 1986. On the
basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(2) In 1988/89 Durham had 5,255 student FTEs, compared to 4,727 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 4,348 undergraduate FTEs, 412 taught postgraduate FTEs and the equivalent
of 495 full-time research students (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance,
USR, September 1990).
In 1980/81, in contrast, there were 4,048 undergraduate FTEs, 333 taught postgraduate FTEs and
the equivalent of 346 full-time research students (Source: UGC Univesity Statistics 1980/81,
volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(3) In 1988/89 Durham had 758 academic/academic-related FTEs, plus 30 part-timers. This
compared with 725 academic/academic-related FTEs and 5 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 441 (71%) of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC. 179 (29%) were
funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Academic-related staff,
funded from other sources and often on short-term contracts, accounted for 18% of the total
(Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
There is no surviving record of how many of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UGC
in 1980/81. However, academic-related staff, many of whom were on short-term contracts,
accounted for 20% of the total (Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance,
USR, September 1982).
(4) In December 1988 there were 179 academic staff in UGC-funded posts and 113 in non-UGC-
funded posts in the Faculty of Science (Source: Deputy Secretary, University of Durham)
(5) Ratings by subject area:
Outstanding:	 Geography
Above Average: Botany, Engineering
Average:	 Chemistry, Physics, Other Physical Sciences, Mathematics
Below Average: Computer Sciences
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May 1986.
(6) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May 1986.
(7) Ratings by "unit of assessment":
4:	 Chemistry, Physics, Geography
Other Biological Sciences, Other Physical Sciences, Mathematics, General
Engineering
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September, 1989.
(8) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986
(9) The Faculty of Science contributed 93 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 37 per cent of the income from UK charities, 79 per cent of the income from
industry/commerce and 62 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
government and various overseas organisations (Source: University of Durham Accounts for the
year ended 31 July, 1985).
(10) The Faculty of Science contributed 86 per cent of the University's total income from the
Research Councils, 48 per cent from UK charities, 98 per cent from industry/commerce and 42 per
cent of its combined income from central government, local government and various overseas
organisations (Source: University of Durham Accounts for the year ended 31 July, 1989).
(11) In the course of the 1970s and early 1980s, researchers in the Departments of Applied
Physics, Chemistry and Engineering had brought potentially exploitable IP to the attention of the
administration, for example.
(12) One took up a Chair in Engineering, the other a Chair in Computer Science. Both had worked
in industry previously.
(13) Members of the working party were the Vice-Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Deputy Secretary,
two lay members of Council with industrial experience and a number of academics, including a
member of the law Department who specialised in IP matters.
(14) The Treasurer at Durham is not a lay member of Council with considerable industrial
experience, as in some UK universities. The Treasurer is a full-time university employee, in the
manner of the Bursar or the Finance Officer in other universities.
(15) This impression was the result of Durham academics experiencing, albeit on a minor scale, a
number of unsatisfactory encounters with the BTG, together with awareness of a "general, national
dissatisfaction".
(16) The Registrar died in a car crash; as a result, much of his regular workload
was temporarily off-loaded onto some members of the working party.
(17) Durham's response was drafted by the Deputy Secretary, after consultation with the Vice-
Chancellor and the acting Treasurer. The AUT was also consulted, in view of proposed changes to
the Standard Terms and Conditions of Appointment.
(18) There was, apparently, only one discernible reaction of any kind. While the policy was being
deliberated in Council, Durham's "most successful exploiter" became alarmed that the proposed
phraseology suggested that people who joined a research team late on might expect to benefit to the
same extent as those who had been involved from the beginning. Minor modifications in the
wording were duly made.
(19) This attitude is reinforced by a critical incident in the university's recent history. Some years
ago Durham made an appointment in Computing; his remit was to bring in outside work and cover
his costs but:
"... It never worked. That has rather put us off that sort of thing".
(20) UDIRL was established to "act as a contract R&D agency for industry", to "bring together
and focus the expertise of [the] science and engineering Departments as a contribution to the
development of the region" and to attract high-tech companies to the science park. UDIRL is staffed
by a full-time director, experimental officers, research assistants and an administrative assistant,
together with support staff and is on target to become self-financing within 5 years. Its profits will
be ploughed back into improving its equipment and instrumentation resources.
(Source of quotes: The University Calendar, 1988/89)
(21) At Durham, the person who is head of department is called "Chairman of the Board of
Studies" or "Chairman of School"; for the sake of brevity and consistency, the term "HoD" will be
employed in this case study.
(22) Source: Communication from the Personnel Officer to Chairmen of Boards of Studies and
Schools, Heads of Houses, 16 October 1989 (ref. JB/SS).
(23) Source: Standard Terms and Conditions of Appointment to Lectureships in Durham, (ref.
T.3.3) and Standard Terms and Conditions of Appointment of Research Assistants in the University
of Durham (ref. T.7.1), University of Durham, 1988/89.
(24) The university recognises that researchers could patent their research findings clandestinely but
does not think it is likely to be a signficant problem. The confidentiality surrounding academic
entrepreneurship as an activity, together with the relative isolation of the Assistant Treasurer from
the academic community, suggests that it would be difficult for the university to identify academics
who were operating in the black economy, however.
(25) Durham's submission to the Exploitation Scrutiny Group stated:
N ... We rely on the academic staff to draw attention to work with exploitable potential. We
expect HoDs to keep the possibility of commercial spin-off in the minds of their colleagues
... in larger departments we expect them to do this in conjunction with research group
leaders".
(26) Durham negotiated a 3-year, non-exclusive enabling agreement with the Research
Corporation, now 3i Research Exploitation Ltd.
(27) Until January 1990, Durham's Staff Development Officer was a part-time appointment. His
priorities were to train HoDs to manage devolved budgets, to conduct staff appraisal, etc.
Following the receipt of funding under the Enterprise in Higher Education Initiative, this was
extended to a full-time appointment. It was anticipated that he might later turn his attention to IP
matters.
(28) To date, Durham has assigned the IP which it generated to the respective
industrial sponsors, albeit with some reluctance; in the centre's view, retaining the right to use the
IP as background IP in future research does not have a great deal of value if that future research
ends up being funded by other companies. The university feels heartened by UDIL's increasingly
uncompromising stand concerning ownership of IP arising out of industrial sponsorship.
(29) This might include, for example, a joint venture between the university and the researcher(s),
between the university and industry, between the university and the public sector, or joint ventures
encompassing several or all of these parties.
(30) The Vice-Chancellor is the Director, the Treasurer is Company Secretary and the Vice-
Chancellor and Registrar are named as share-holders.
(31) For instance, at the simplest level, a company can claw back VAT, whereas a university
cannot.
(32) Academics at Durham are not free to make their own arrangements, without the express
consent of Council. This is stated explicitly in the regulations:
"No person shall in connection with any invention, patent, process or manufacture, have
authority to make representation on behalf of the University or enter into any contract in
the like behalf or to be concerned in the like behalf in any transaction whatsoever relating
thereto without the express consent of the Council. No consent given under this Statute
shall be valid unless a copy of the relevant resolution of the Council has been
communicated in writing by the Registrar/Secretary to the person to whom the consent is
given".
(Source: University of Durham Calendar, 1988/89)
Council meets only twice a term and there are no meetings scheduled between late July and early
November. However, this is unlikely to cause problems, since it is unlikely that the university will
find it appropriate to give such authority to a member of staff or a student.
(33) A researcher/Lecturer in one department won joint second prize (£20,000) for his SMART-
ARMS robots, manufactured by his spin-off company, Systems Control. A researcher/Lecutrer in
one Department won joint third prize (£10,000) for his precision diamond tooling techniques,
commercialised by his spin-off company, Dianite Coatings Ltd.
(34) Ironically, at the end of 1989 the only academic spin-off company operating on the University
science park is a consultancy started by the botanist, David Bellamy, a Professor in the Department
of Adult Education at Durham. However, early in 1990 the first company founded by a Durham
academic set up in the science park to provide a software maintenance service.
There is also an economic consultancy, founded by a Durham graduate after some years as an
employee.
(35) At Durham all members of a Department are members of the Board of Studies, with "rights
which are greater than merely attending a staff meeting" - ie. they have voting rights. Decisions
about rescheduling workloads would therefore be taken by all members of staff attending, rather
than by fiat of the HoD.
(36) In the wake of the Jarratt Report, Departments and Schools were turned into budget centres.
(37) The administration recognised that if the university activated its holding company and forms
subidiary companies or joint ventures with members of staff, the administration ...
"... would have to have an ad hoc arrangement. There would have to be some recompense
to the budget centres for losing part of a member of staff" ...
In such cases, the administration felt it would have to become formally involved in the decision-
making process.
(38) Officially, applications for leave of absence are granted or refused by the Vice-Chancellor,
who is authorised to act on behalf of Council. However, applications for leave of absence will not
be granted unless they have the support of the Chairman of the Board of Studies or Schools
concerned. The Staff Handbook gives no guidance on the type of activities for which leave of
absence might normally be granted.
(39) The Durham Mountjoy Research Centre is situated on University-owned land which has been
leased for 125 years to English Estates. English Estates bears all the costs of the science park -
including the cost of erecting the buildings - and enjoys all the revenues. The University receives
no financial return other than that provided by the lease. The science park was opened in July
1986. It has 35,000 sq.ft. of lettable floorspace in total, comprising incubator units which range in
size from 440 sq.ft. to 600 sq.ft, with a few corner units of 700 sq.ft.
Rents went up rapidly in the Durham area at the end of the 1980s. At the end of 1989, rents
(exclusive of rates) in the science park for a 400 sq.ft. unit were just over £8.00/sq.ft. basic. On
top of this there was a service charge of £0.60p/sq.ft. to cover heating, lighting, common areas,
car parking, cleaning etc and a maintenance charge of approx. £0.90p/sq.ft. The overall cost,
including rates, was £10-11/sq.ft. This is about twice the cost of accommodation on an industrial
estate. However, rental in the science park includes free use of the common room, special tenants'
rates for use of the Boardroom, seminar rooms and secretarial services and free use of the
University library. Science park rents are slightly below office rents in Durham, where there is
tremendous pressure on space.
The science park operates an "easy in-easy out" three year tenancy during which the rent is fixed
for the full term of the lease. Tenants are required to give three months' notice.
(40) Tenant companies must be "technologically-based"; this is vetted very closely, if necessary
bringing in consultants from the University to make an evaluation. They must also be "financially-
sound". The University has a right of veto.
(41) Since the beginning of 1987 there has been a technology park with similar aims and objectives
associated with Sunderland Polytechnic, 16 miles away. However, at the end of 1989, it also had a
waiting list. There is also a "technology courtyard" at Consett's industrial park, 16 miles away, but
road conditions in winter are often atrocious.
ICI's large technology park in Billingham is interested in attracting larger, established
manufacturing companies rather than small, innovative start-up companies. It is more appropriate
for start-up companies which are expanding. Conversely, start-up companies which spin-off from
large companies located on the Billingham park sometimes locate in Durham's science park, rather
than the Billingham park.
There are likely to be more incubator units available in due course: Newcastle University plans to
create a science park in the city centre, sharing a site with a major retail centre.
Case Study Narrative: Glaszow University
(1) Numbers of student FTEs change from year to year, so that in 1985/86, for instance, Glasgow
was deemed to be the largest university, excluding London, Oxford and Cambridge (Source:
University of Glasgow Newsletter, 18 February 1988, p9, quoting "Hansard"). In 1988/89, when
participating universities were selected, it was Britain's second largest university, judging by
figures published by the Universities Statistical Record.
(2) In 1989/90 Glasgow had 1,740 full time academic/academic-related staff, plus 192 part-timers.
This compares with 1,716 full-timers plus 113 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1989/90 992 (66%) of the full-time academic were funded by the UFC; the remaining 513
(34%) were funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Academic-
related staff accounted for 14% of the total (Source: UFC University Statistics, volume 3: Finance,
USR, September 1990).
Glasgow has no surviving record of the proportion of full-time academic staff who were UGC-
funded in 1980/81. However, academic-related staff accounted for 13% of the total (Source: UGC
University Statistics, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(3) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986. On
the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(4) In 1988/89 Glasgow had 11,491 student FTEs, compared to 10,328 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 9,740 undergraduate FTEs, 793 taught postgraduate FTEs and 958 research
student FTEs (Source: UGC University Statistics, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
In 1980/81 there were 9,041 undergraduate FTEs, 571 taught postgraduate FTEs and 716 research
postgraduate FTEs (Source: UGC University Statistics, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(5) The eight Faculties are: Arts, Social Sciences, Divinity, Science, Engineering, Law & Financial
Studies, Medicine and Veterinary Medicine.
(6) In 1987 the Department of Religious Studies was closed. In 1986 the Departments of Natural
Philosophy and Astronomy merged to form the new Department of Physics & Astronomy and staff
from the Department of the History of Science transferred to the Department of Modem History in
the Faculty of Arts.
(7) Glasgow has the oldest University School of Engineering in Britain, founded in 1840 and the
first School of Naval Architecture in the world, founded in 1883.
(8) In 1988/89 the Faculty of Medicine grouped together the Departments of Anaesthesia,
Anatomy, Bacteriology, Immunology, Cardiac Surgery, Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Child
Health, Clinical Physics, Community Medicine, Dermatology, Forensic Medicine & Science,
General Practice, Geriatric Medicine, Haematology, Materia Medica, Medical Cardiology, Medical
Genetics, Medicine, Neurology, Neuropathology, Neurosurgery, Nursing Studies, Obstetrics &
Gynaeology, Oncology, Opthalmology, Orthopaedics, Otolaryngology, Pathological Biochemistry,
Physiology, Psychological Medicine, Radiology, Surgery, Surgical Paediatrics and Virology, plus
two hospital-based Pathology Departments. The Dental School also belonged to the Faculty of
Science and it, in turn, comprised the Departments of Conservative Dentistry, Oral Biology, Oral
Medicine & Pathology, Oral Surgery, Orthodontics and Prosthodontics.
The Faculty of Veterinary Science grouped together the Departments of Veterinary Anatomy,
Veterinary Physiology, Veterinary Animal Husbandry, Veterinary Pathology, Veterinary
Parasitology, Veterinary Medicine, Veterinary Surgery, Veterinary Pharmacology and Veterinary
Clinical Biochemistry.
(9) In 1989/90, there were 769 academic funded by the UFC (60%) and 503 (40%) in non-UFC-
funded posts in the Faculties of Science, Engineering, Medicine and Veterinary Science. (Source:
Glasgow University Personnel Department).
It is impossible to compare this with the percentage which the science base represented in 1980/81,
since Glasgow kept no Faculty-by-Faculty record of the number of academics in non-UGC-funded
posts at that time.
(10) Source: University of Glasgow Annual Report, 1988-89.
(11) Source: "Trouble in the Ranks", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May 1986.
(12) The 1986 research assessment rankings were as follows:
Outstanding:	 Veterinary Parasitology, Veterinary Pathology, Electronic &
Electrical Engineering.
Above Average: Clinical Medicine, Oral Medicine, Pathology, Other Biological
Sciences, Veterinary Clinical Biochemistry, Veterinary Medicine, Physics
& Astronomy, Computer Sciences, Mechanical Engineering, Aerospace
and Topographic Science.
Average :	 Clinical Dentistry, Anatomy & Physiology, Pharmacology,
Biochemistry, Other Biological Sciences, Veterinary Science, Chemistry,
Other Physical Sciences and Mathematics.
Below Average: Nursing, Civil Engineering and Geography.
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May 1986.
(13) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May 1986.
(14) The 1989 research assessment rankings were as follows:
Electrical & Electronic Engineering
Clinical Medicine, Biochemistry, Other Biological Sciences,
Veterinary Science, Physics, Other Physical Sciences and Computer
Science
Clinical Dentistry, Anatomy & Physiology, Pharmacology,
Chemistry, Mathematics, and Mechanical/Aero/ Production Engineering
2:	 Pharmacology
Nursing, Other Studies Allied to Medicine and Civil Engineering.
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September, 1989.
(15) Derived from UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(16) These Faculties contributed 95 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 92 per cent from charities, 96 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce, and 86 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations (Figures derived from Form 3, Table 3 of Glasgow
University's statistical data prepared for the UGC and the USR in 1984/85).
(17) These Faculties contributed 91 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 94 per cent from charities, 97 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 92 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities plus various overseas organisations (Figures derived from Form 3, Table 3 of Glasgow
University's statistical data prepared for the UGC and the USR in 1988/89).
(18) The most famous and apparently the most active of these was Lord Kelvin, who founded
several companies to exploit his discoveries. A company set up to exploit battery technology failed,
but the company he founded to exploit two inventions, a sounding device and a compass which
resisted deviation from iron ships, was highly successful; in 1965, following a number of changes,
it became the Kelvin Hughes division of Smiths Industries. Some inventions were exploited by
existing companies, such as Ferranti, which used Kelvin's zig-zag winding for alternators.
Kelvin was "part of a wider circle of Scottish entrepreneur- professors". These included Lewis
Gordon, Britain's first Professor of Engineering, who invented wire rope and helped found a
famous cablemalcing company in Gateshead. This company supplied half the cable when the
underwater cable across the Atlantic was laid, an enterprise in which Kelvin acted as director and
consulting inventor. "The connection of Gordon, Kelvin, Jenkin, Tait and Ewing as teachers, pupils
and business partners embracing both University science and practical activity and entrepreneurship
in the electrical industry was one of the strongest areas of close contact of the universities and
British industry in the nineteenth century. It was a tribute to Scottish universities at this time that
there was nothing comparable in England".
Quotes and information taken from The Universities and British Industry by Michael Sanderson,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972.
(19) "Guidelines on Inventions, License Agreements, Consultancies, Research Contracts, Computer
Software, Audio-Visual Materials, Publications and Outside Work", published by the University
Court.
(20) According to this respondent: "The discussion of TP rights as such has become much more
focussed and much clearer since then. The original idea ... well, we were just taking very gentle
first steps ...".
(21) It is difficult to determine unequivocally which is the case, since many of the key personnel
have left in the intervening years, including the ILO, the Secretary to Court and the Principal.
(22) The form in question elicited the name of the company for whom consultancy work would be
done, the duration, the number of hours per week including travel, the remuneration, a copy of the
agreement, together with details of any other outside work which the applicant was pursuing.
Where University resources were to be used, a separate form was provided which elicited details
on staffing, including external staff, computing facilities, materials, travel, subsistence etc. Both
forms required the signature of the HoD, with a comment which had regard "inter alia to the work
of the Department and possible conflicts of interest of members of staff' (Source: Form (B) Outside
Work, attached to the "Guidelines ...").
(23) Glasgow University differs from many UK universities in that the Registrar is a relatively
junior officer, whose primary concern is with University records. Glasgow University has a unitary
administrative structure (ie. there is no division of the personnel responsible for financial matters
from those responsible for academic matters). At the top of the pyramid, immediately below the
Principal and the University Management Group, is the Secretary to Court. The Finance Officer,
Personnel Officer, Estates Officer and Registrar form the next level of command, but the Registrar
is the most junior of these. In practice, he has less autonomy than the Finance Office or Estates &
Buildings. This structure is traditional in Scotland's four ancient universities.
(24) Source: University of Glasgow Newsletter, December 1985.
(25) It is interesting that in this particular context, Glasgow chose to focus on its fellow Scottish
universities. Generally, for comparison purposes, Glasgow identifies itself with Edinburgh and
Bristol. Broader comparisons take in Leeds, Sheffield, Manchester "and maybe Birmingham" - ie.
the big civic universities. We might profit by speculating on the reasons for a focus which is firstly
very localised and secondly, encompasses not only universities of the same ilk as Glasgow, but also
newer universities, in particular Strathclyde and Heriot-Watt. It is perhaps worth noting that the
eight Scots members of UDIL have their own association, as do the industrial liaison officers of
Scotland's Central Institutions; these two groups sometimes organise joint meetings. It is possible
that this has engendered a spirit of co-operation which was noticeably absent in the English
universities which participated in this study.
(26) "The Cambridge Phenomenon", (Segal, Quince, Wicksteed, 1984), was the first in-depth
analysis of the role played, albeit involuntarily, by a UK University in incubating spin-off
companies. It had been observed some 20 years earlier that certain US universities had performed
this function, most notably MIT, which was instrumental in the development of the "Route 128
phenomenon". As its title suggests, "The Cambridge Phenomenon" sought to establish whether
Cambridge University was associated with a similar phenomenon.
(27) HoDs may be appointed from full Professors, Titular Professors, Readers, Senior Lecturers
and occasionally, even Lecturers. The appointment is renewable, but the extent to which this
actually happens varies from one Department to another. In very large Departments, such as
Chemistry, for example, the annual "turnover" can be as high as £3m, a situation which makes
considerable demands on the HoD.
(28) On the iniative of the Director of Accommodation and Conference Services, the University
started selling in the Visitors' Centre Blackpool-style sticks of rock with its name in the middle.
Some members of the academic community were concerned that the University should be
promoting sugar-based products when its medical and dental staff were trying to promote healthy
eating habits. (Source: Glasgow Evening Times, 21 November 1989).
(29) The Commercial Policy Review Committee currently consists of the ILO, the current Vice-
Principal (Industrial Liaison) and a lay member of Court; until recently, it was chaired by the
previous Vice-Principal (Industrial Liaison).
(30) The new, 12-page document was titled "Commercial Policy Statements".
(31) In this situation, the money is diverted in an informal way to the inventor's Department. The
inventor generally retains control over its disbursement.
(32) Scotland's national press (in particular The (Glasgow) Herald and The Scotsman) has
frequently given coverage to the commercial activities of the academic community From January
1987 to January 1990, for instance, there were at least 15 articles about inventive academics from
Glasgow and the way in which their discoveries were being transferred into the economy.
(33) At Glasgow, after an initial Faculty-based assessment carried out by the appropriate
Committee of Review, applicants are assessed for promotion on a University-wide competitive basis
by the Board of Review. Appointed annually, the Board of Review consists of the Principal as
Convenor, the Vice-Principals, the Senate Assessors on the University Court, the Convenor of the
Finance Committee and one other member of Court who is neither a student nor a member of staff.
This same Board is also responsible for conducting an annual review of promotion procedures and
reporting its findings to Court and to the local AUT.
(34) Being highly structured, the forms do not make it particularly easy to do justice to such
contributions. Under the heading Research Contribution there is a short section headed "Links with
industry/commerce and other outside bodies"; under the heading Other Contributions there is a
section which directs applicants to "list any other contribution to the University, to the academic
world, or to the local community, which you think is relevant to your application for promotion"
(Source: Promotion Procedures for Academic and Academic Related Staff, University of Glasgow,
September 1989).
(35) "Exploitation of Research Council Funded Projects", Newsletter, 19 March 1987.
(36) "Patenting: The Opportunities and the Pitfalls", British Technology Group, 1989.
(37) The Research Corporation visited Glasgow University in 1986. A non-exclusive agreement
was tentatively discussed, but the Research Corporation did not return to finalise the agreement.
The ICDS was "not awfully impressed with them".
(38) Recently, for example, Glasgow identified IP which it felt it was not in a position to exploit.
Another company indicated that the IP fitted its portfolio and was in a position to exploit it. On this
occasion, the University chose to assign.
(39) This is a far from hypothetical concern. In recent years, one of Glasgow's own joint ventures
was liquidated; since the University had chosen to license rather than to assign, it did not lose its
rights to the IP. The University was subsequently able to relicense. Had it assigned the IP, the
University could only have reasserted its ownership by making a cash outlay which outbid other
interested parties.
(40) The ICDS has an overall exploitation budget which should not be exceeded. It is notionally
divided into headings, however, and virement between headings is permissible.
(41) The ICDS could argue for an increase over and above inflation but feels that it would not be
an easily-won argument because Court has recently voted additional funding to allow more staff to
be taken on. Thus, the ICDS finds itself in a somewhat paradoxical situation:
"... The logic behind more staffing is increased activity. Its difficult to get [that] across to
anybody in the public sector. It's the Government's narrow approach of year-by-year
budgets, rather than an investment for a future return ..."
(42) This might include, for example, a joint venture between the University and the researcher(s),
between the University and industry, between the University and the public sector, or joint ventures
encompassing several or all of these parties.
(43) This may be an underestimate. At least ten "academics" have entered the Academic Enterprise
Competition duing the 1980s; there may be others who have not entered. In 1982, Glasgow fielded
two entries to the Academic Enterprise Competition, one from the Department of Chemistry, one
from the Department of Electronic & Electrical Engineering. The five "academics" from the
Chemistry Department - they were, in fact, doctoral students - won joint second prize. Their
discoveries were subsequently exploited by a successful start-up company, Cruachem.
The BTG has no record of the unsuccessful entries to the 1985 Academic Enterprise Competition,
but Glasgow made at least one entry, with an invention originating in the Department of Electronic
& Electrical Engineering. In the 1989 Competition, Glasgow fielded four entries, one each from
the Departments of Electronic & Electrical Engineering, Biochemistry and Cardiac Surgery, and
one from the Veterinary School (Source: private communication from The British Technology
Group, 1989).
The ICDS has no record of researchers from Glasgow entering for a SMART award in any year,
but since there was nothing to prevent academics entering directly, some may indeed have entered.
None are known to have won. The same applies to the Prince of Wales Innovation Fund and
Toshiba's Year of Invention.
(44) The existing joint ventures were: Inform Software Ltd, Biomac Ltd and Surface Temperature
Systems Ltd. Surface Temperature Systems Ltd was originally an academic spin-off company,
founded in the 1970s; it did not succeed, due to lack of development funding. Since the company
did not go into liquidation, it still owns the patent. It is believed that the patent could now be
successfully exploited and the University is participating in resurrecting the company.
Nanoform Ltd was in the process of being set up after the academic concerned won second prize
(Section I) in the 1988/89 Academic Enterprise Competition. The company proposed to exploit a
microcomputer-controlled polishing system driven by novel software, which could be used in the
production of components for the optical and electronics industries.
(45) The University has already considered a number of options. The ICDS itself could be turned
into a company, which could then attract outside investment. The University could set up a holding
company, which would form subsidiaries for specific purposes, or it could set up a University-wide
umbrella company. The last option is the least likely:
"... 'We] don't think a campus company just for the sake of it makes sense. There has got
to be a very specific purpose ..."
(46) For the same reasons, the University was happy to set up Inform Software Ltd; in this
particular situation, company start-up was probably less trouble than identifying licensees and/or
distributors.
(47) To date, the ICDS has located its managing directors principally through the SDA and the
BTG.
(48) In fact, it has not been possible to identify any independent spin-off companies which failed,
other than Intellimetrix. Equally, one of the University's joint ventures, TEG Products, has also
failed, however.
(49) Towards the end of the 1980s the economic development officer of a nearby district council
was certainly contemplating approaching academics from Glasgow University who lived within the
council's boundaries with a view to assistance with starting up companies (licitly or illictly) within
the district, as part of the council's long-term job creation strategy (Source: private communication,
May 1988).
(50) Academics could, of course, found a company without the University's knowledge. Glasgow
has already discovered one such company. Even though it was unclear who owned the IP, the
University decided to recoup what it could from the situation by trying to negotiate a "golden
share". This would allow it to block anything the company did, should it choose to. The University
also demanded to be allocated 50 per cent of the equity. At the end of 1989 the matter was not
fully resolved, since the academic was unwilling to give up SO per cent of his equity.
It was the University's view that whether or not it had rights to the IP involved, the academic had
agreed to terms and conditions of contract which pledged him to ask permission before founding a
company of any sort. Whether this was intentional or an oversight, the academic concerned had not
sought permission.
(51) These are: the Centre for Housing Research, the Centre for Entrepreneurial Development and
the Building Services Research Unit. Each of these does some contract research funded by
industry/commerce or central/local government etc.
(52) Despite the new policy, this situation could arise where academics were exploiting their
expertise, or where pre-existing independent academic spin-off companies were exploiting IP.
(53) Since November 1985 Glasgow has had a modern telephone exchange which keeps a full
record of every number called, the caller, the duration and the cost. It is unclear, however,
precisely who would monitor this to sort out business from bona fide University calls.
(54) The idea for the West of Scotland Science Park came from both Glasgow and Strathclyde
Universities; the Scottish Development Agency co-ordinated the project, investing around £6m of
its own funds to acquire a 125 year lease on 34 acres of Glasgow University's land (the Kelvin
Campus) and to acquire a further 27 acres (the Todd Campus). Phase I of the Park was opened in
September 1983, Phase II in December 1987. At the end of 1989 the buildings comprised around
80,000 sq.ft. (Source: The West of Scotland Science Park).
(55) The West of Scotland Science Park provides conference facilities and central services including
telex, fax, photocopying and secretarial services on a pay-as-you-use basis. There are 13 small
units ranging in size from 350 sq.ft. to 904 sq.ft, together with larger units of upto 1884 sq.ft.
The rental/sq.ft. of the smaller units is relatively higher, ranging from £5/sq.ft. to £4.70/sq.ft. at
the end of 1989. All units pay an additional £1.10/sq.ft. service charge. At that time, the annual
rent for the two smallest sized units would have been about £2,135 and £2,388 respectively. The
smaller units became available in December 1987. Prior to that, minimum annual rentals would
have been closer to £6,000, including the service charge.
At the end of 1989 the minimum lease was one year, with one month's notice required. Two-year
and six-year leases were also available, with the rent fixed for the first three years. Three months
notice was required for longer leases. At the beginning of 1990, Phase I was fully occupied and
Phase II was 95 per cent occupied, however.
By the end of 1989, seven University spin-offs (not exclusively from Glasgow) had taken space on
the Park, but only three remained, one of which was a major consortium supported by Glasgow,
Strathclyde and Heriot-Watt Universities together with Paisley College of Technology and Napier
Polytechnic. The other four companies had failed.
(56) It is not a foregone conclusion that a University has to formally invest capital in a joint venture
in order to acquire an equity share. When Imperial College founded Imperial Biotechnology Ltd in
a joint venture with members of the academic staff, for example, the University contributed no
capital at all, but retained a 45 per cent shareholding in recognition of the central role which it
played in the enterprise.
(57) Source: Letter to the Assistant Industrial Liaison Officer of Glasgow University from the
Exploitation Scrutiny Group Secretariat (ref. F/TE/03/C71), 17 August 1990.
Case Study Narrative: University of Kent
(1) At the beginning of the 1980s, for example, taking into account England's 30 or so
autonomous, monolithic institutions, Kent was the largest member of the bottom size quartile
(Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(2) Source: Sixteenth Annual Report, University of Kent at Canterbury, December 1981.
(3) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986. On
the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(4) In 1988/89 Kent had 4,493 student FTEs, compared to 4,011 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 3,821 undergraduate FTEs, 337 taught postgraduate FTEs and 335 research
student FTEs (Source: UFC University Statistics, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990). In
1980/81 there were 3,465 undergraduate FTEs, 225 taught postgraduate FTEs and 321 research
student FTEs (Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September
1982).
(5) In 1988/89, taking into account England's 30 or so autonomous, monolithic institutions, Kent
had moved out of the bottom size quartile. It occupied sixth position in the next quartile (Source:
UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
(6) In the 1988/89 session, Kent had 639 full-time academic/ academic-related staff, plus 31 part-
timers. This compared with 559 full-timers plus 14 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 356 (70%) of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC; the remaining 154
(30%) were funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Academic-
related staff accounted for 20% of the total (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3:
Finance, USR, September 1990).
There is no surviving record of the proportion of full-time academic staff who were UGC-funded in
1980/81. However, academic-related staff accounted for 15% of the total (Source: UGC University
Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(7) In 1988/89 the full-time academic/academic-related staff numbered 119 in the Faculty of
Natural Sciences, 46 in the Faculty of Information Technology and 61 in the Computer Laboratory.
There were also 8 part-timers (Source: The Registry, University of Kent, compiled for the local
Association of University Teachers).
(8) Source: Assistant Registrar, University of Kent.
(9) When the UGC attempted in 1981 to re-establish the research resources required to underpin
research done for the Research Councils, it used a formula based on student numbers. This meant
that universities with a large science base gained at the expense of those, like Kent, with a small
science base. Kent was receiving higher than average support from the SERC, yet paradoxically, it
was penalised for having such a small percentage of science students, as the Vice-Chancellor
outlined in the Annual Report for 1981.
(10) Research ratings by subject area:
Above Average:	 Biochemistry, Other Biological Sciences,
Computer Sciences
Below Average:	 Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics,
Electrical & Electronic Engineering.
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(11) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(12) Research ratings by "unit of assessment"
Other Biological Sciences, Computer Science
Physics, Mathematics and Electrical & Electronic Engineering
2:	 Chemistry
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September, 1989.
(13) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(14) The science base contributed 82 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 34 per cent from charities, 100 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce, and 37 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations
(15) The science base contributed 92 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 66 per cent from charities, 87 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 55 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities plus various overseas organisations (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume
3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
(16) The University does not have a central record of patents applied for/acquired before 1983.
However, Kent's Annual Reports usually listed journal articles, books, broadcasts - and,
apparently, patents acquired each year. To take an example, the Annual Report for 1981 lists the
grant of a UK patent on work undertaken by a researcher attached to the Electronics Laboratory.
(17) The working party consisted of the then Dean (Professor of Microbiology), the Emeritus
Professor of Experimental Physics, the Professor of Digital Electronics and the then Finance
Officer (who had become the Registrar by 1989/90).
(18) The Faculty of Social Sciences founded the Applied Statistics Research Unit (ASRU), which
has been highly successful, rivalling KSIP in its ability to garner contract research. In the
intervening years other units have been set up to undertake contract work. Some of these (eg. the
Mathematics External Courses Initiative) concentrate on offering courses. Others (eg. the Institute
for Conservation and Ecology, recently transformed into the Durrell Institute) are research-
oriented. Each is governed by a Board which reports to the Finance Committee and Council.
(19) The person appointed had worked for both the SERC and the UGC and was believed to have a
track record in successfully identifying IP, arranging for it to be evaluated, protected and exploited.
(20) KSIP's initial Board of Directors consisted of around 16 people, the majority of whom were
academics or members of the Registry.
(21) The BTG does not appear to have pursued any of the opportunities which Kent offered it prior
to 1985; a number of (compulsory) assignations resulted in patent applications which the BTG
subsequently dropped. The University derives no income from IP exploited by the BTG.
(22) When he was first appointed, KSIP's third Managing Director saw such a document, signed by
the Registrar.
(23) Source: Note (ii) of a Report of the Board of Directors of KSIP Ltd to the Finance
Committee, 24 June, 1988 (ref. IRS/SC, 10 May, 1988). NB Had KSIP ever generated a profit
from exploiting IP which it owned - after distributing the relevant proportion of the income to the
inventor(s) and covering its patenting costs, the profit would have been covenanted to the
University, together with any other profits which KSIP generated.
(24) KSIP's third Managing Director recalls having seen such a document with a personnel
reference on it when he was first appointed.
(25) In 1989/90 Kent did not have a centralised personnel office handling all appointments; the
personnel division of the administration was responsible only for appointing secretarial staff,
cleaners etc. Academic/academic-related staff, technicians etc were appointed by the Faculties,
which also dealt with the personnel aspects of such appointments.
(26)This tranche of royalty income arose more by accident than by design: a postgraduate student
gave a paper at a conference, outlining a discovery which excited the interest of one of the
companies present. Despite the fact that this IP was not protected and was de facto in the public
domain, the company concerned asked for the IP to be assigned to it and paid an upfront fee of ca.
£12,000.
(27) The academic disciplines of the then Pro-Vice-Chancellors were European Studies and
Physics. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor was an Economist.
(28) The Registrar himself appears to have no recollection of drafting the response, but in the view
of a colleague, it bears several of his hallmarks.
(29) The new Managing Director, the third, was appointed as the university's Industrial Co-
operation Manager (ICM), an administrative grade 5 appointment, rather than as Managing
Director of KSIP. His remit as ICM included acting as KSIP's Managing Director, however. This
change was motivated by the fact that the University had not been sure to whom the previous
Managing Director could legitimately be asked to report to in the University.
The new incumbent had studied chemistry and instrumentation at the Universities of Manchester,
Liverpool and Loughborough, and business and marketing management at specialist colleges. He
then became regional sales manager of the world's largest scientific instrument company.
Subsequently he was responsible for transferring technology from Swedish universities into the
economy.
(30) He was concerned, for example, about grants from the Research Councils, charities and other
government agencies being handled by the university. Whereas he was often involved in negotiating
industrial contracts, KSIP's company status prevented these public-sector and charitable grants
being channelled to their academic recipients via KSIP. While this in itself need not create a
problem, in practice, he felt that despite having flagged it as a problem, no real effort was made to
alert him when public-sector grants were awarded.
He also felt that there were not enough hours in the day to single-handedly act as KSIP's Managing
Director, as the university's industrial liaison officer and as the person responsible for proactively
identifying, evaluating, protecting and exploiting IP.
(31) KSIP was set up on the basis that any profits would be covenanted to the university, not
retained by the company.
(32) Kent has a unitary administrative structure in which the Registrar occupies the most senior
position, immediately below the Vice-Chancellor. Below the Registrar are four Deputy Registrars,
with responsibility for Estates & Buildings, Finance, Faculty matters and Academic matters - ie. it
services the Senate, the Council, deals with student records etc. The Senior Assistant Registrar with
responsibility for IP is located in the Faculty Section.
(33) In fact, the planned research grants office has not yet materialised.
(34) Apart from theoretical and experimental physics, Kent has an established interest in applied
optics and space physics.
(35) Kent has chosen to focus on microbial technology, microbial biochemistry, molecular biology
and cell biology.
(36) The decision to relocate responsibility for IP rather than look for solutions to KSIP's problems
was also influenced by uncertainty over the exact nature of KSIP's relationship with the university.
(37) The previous UDIL meeting had taken place only two weeks before this respondent was
interviewed.
(38) Source: Report of the Board of Directors of KSIP Ltd to Finance Committee, 24 June, 1988
(ref: IRS/SC, 10 May, 1988)
(39) "Research Contracts, Academic Services and Consultancies", ref. HRC/SBH39, University of
Kent, 19 June, 1989.
(40) For instance, on a net income of £30,000, the inventor(s) would have received £16,873 under
the agreement operating from 1 April 1988, compared to only £11,000 under the new
arrangements. Similarly, on a net income of £50,000, the inventor(s) would have received £22,235
under the agreement operating from 1 April 1988, compared to only £16,000 under the new
arrangements. This represents a drop of 35 per cent and 28 per cent respectively.
(41) The University has not considered whether this is, in fact, legal or not.
(42) Individual members of the academic staff have already agreed on an ad hoc, trial basis to
covenant their royalties to the University.
(43) For instance, Kent belives that academics who covenant their royalties to the University can
avoid tax. The University would then transfer the author's share of the royalties not by means of a
personal payment but by means of research funds over which the author alone had control.
Moreover, by dint of entering royalties as earned income, the University would hope to attract
increased support from the UFC in future years in the same way that research grant and contract
income attracts additional support.
(44) The Senior Assistant Registrar has confirmed persistent rumours and gossip by dint of
checking the details of supposed academic spin-off companies through Companies House.
(45) The Biological Laboratory has just 17 full-time academic staff, the Chemical Laboratory and
the Physics Laboratory 16 apiece, for instance.
(46) I am indebted to Dr J Phillips, formerly of Queen Mary Westfield College, London, for this
information.
(47) The minutes of a meeting of KSIP's Board held on 7 July, 1986 note, under the heading
"Exploitation of Research Council Funded Inventions", that the Chairman of KSIP assumed
responsibility for ensuring that this was done. At this time - indeed, until July 1987, the Chairman
of KSIP was actually the Vice-Chancellor.
(48) This oversight was probably due to the fact that KSIP's first Managing Director left a month
after the authorisation was granted. A retired industrialist was then appointed to manage KSIP for 6
months until a permanent appointment could be made. KSIP's third Managing Director took up his
appointment in July 1987, but responsibility for IP was a part of his remit which he found
increasingly difficult to shoulder (see m, above). Initially, the new Managing Director assumed
that the academic community had been informed about the removal of the BTG's monopoly and the
University's subsequent authorisation to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects.
After dealing with members of the academic staff for some months, he began to realise that the
level of awareness was negligible, particularly among new Research Assistants/Research Fellows.
(49) In 1989 this group, which had no formal status and no formal remit, consisted of the
Registrar, the Senior Assistant Registrar, the administrative officer for the Faculty of Information
Technology and one or two others.
(50) The letter stated:
"If you have cashable lP hug it to your chest; don't publish it, broadcast it, even talk
about it until the University has had a chance to value it. Perhaps it would be as well not
to mention it to your students. Gone are the days when a lecturer's task was to teach by
sharing knowledge. Even students can't be trusted not to turn it to their material advantage
"
(51) "Patenting: The Opportunities and the Pitfalls", British Technology Group, 1989.
(52) He felt that even if there was no formal obligation to offer promising IP to the BTG, there
was "immense pressure to get into bed with them". If the university acceded to this pressure, there
was inevitably a limit to the university being able to use its discoveries for its own ends.
(53) This enabled him to know where he might get valuable information (eg. Frost & Sullivan
reports) without incurring the usual costs.
(54) In the middle of interviewing the Senior Assistant Registrar, a postgraduate student came to
discuss a discovery which he had helped to make; the Senior Assistant Registrar did, indeed,
immediately suggest contacting the BTG.
(55) Ironically, an overseas postgraduate student subsequently notified the administration of his
interest in patenting the same discovery.
(56) KSIP's third Managing Director was able to use the portfolio of patents acquired by the first
Managing Director to secure a number of research contracts, research studentships etc. He was
concerned that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group might apply only financial criteria in their
evaluation after the first three years. He was also concerned that their evaluation might be linked to
the way in which the information requested was presented in the annual returns. He had already
pressed the administration to consider face to face dialogue with the Exploitation Scrutiny Group on
this subject.
(57) KSIP felt that because of the financial situation within universities, such opportunities have
become restricted. If an academic was going to an international conference, it was KSIP's aim to
do everything to enable him to present a paper at that conference, particularly as the publicity could
engender new contacts which might lead, in turn, to development funding.
(58) The Financial Secretary proposed that an Industrial & Commercial Policy Board (ICPB) should
be appointed, to replace the Industry, Research & Development Committee. This had been set up in
1986/87 but had not met once during the previous two years. He proposed that membership of the
ICPB should include one particular lay member of Council as Chairman, the Vice-Chancellor, two
lay members appointed by Council, the Deans of the Faculties (or their nominees) and the
Registrar. Its remit should include "review[ing] policy and practice with regard to IPR and patents"
- ie. providing a policy for the Senior Assistant Registrar to put into practice on a day-to-day basis.
These proposals were accepted by Council. By April 1989, the ICPB had been established and
conducted its first meeting. However, it neither invited the Senior Assistant Registrar to attend, nor
did it make contact with him afterwards. He is, in any case, sceptical about the ability of a
committee such as this to reach policy decisions:
"When you are confronted with a hard and fast problem, you don't have the time to put it
to a committee ..."
(59) KSIP would have preferred to have the patent agent write the first draft, after interrogating the
researchers. However, researchers generally claimed this require take extra time, over and above
the time they spent writing their paper.
(60) KSIP recognised that there were sponsors, such as those in the pharmaceutical industry, where
a delay of 12-18 months was desirable, in the interests of acquiring world-wide patent protection.
(61) At Kent theses may be embargoed for upto five years.
(62) In this particular case, the original licensee was the victim of a take-over bid. The company's
new owners had no interest in the IPR and KSIP offered it to the inventor.
(63) KSIP has allowed some patents to lapse.
(64) In 1980 an academic member of staff of the former Institute of Management, now the Business
School, decided to set up a consortium to bid against four other groups for the commercial radio
franchise for East Kent. From the beginning, he informed the Vice-Chancellor, who took the view
that this was good for the University's links with the local community. In 1984, after his
consortium won the franchise, the University acquired a 7 per cent stake in the station at a cost of
£55,000. Confronted by a 2-day deadline, this was approved by the Finance and Planning
Committees by means of Chairman's action. It was treated as one of the University's portfolio of
investments, but it was recognised that there was the additional advantage of supporting the local
community In 1989 the University sold its stake in Invicta Radio for over Elm after the company
had been floated on the Unlisted Securities Market. The University has not publicised its return -
either internally or externally.
(65) In the mid-1980s the Professor of Microbial Biochemistry developed techniques of
biodegrading toxic wastes by means of microbes as a result of a research contract for an American
corporation. The IP belonged to the sponsor, but when it decided to shed its interests in this area,
KSIP acquired the rights to the IP. KSIP then suggested that the University should apply for a
SMART award, but it was impossible to meet the deadline. This was the trigger, however, for
founding a company to exploit the IP. KSIP assigned its rights in the IP to the University, which in
turn assigned its rights to Viridian, a start-up company located in East Kent. The University
prefers to treat the details of its "relatively small" equity stake as confidential.
(66) Information provided by the BTG suggests that only eight other universities have never had
academics who entered the Academic Enterprise Competition (East Anglia, Lancaster, St.Andrews,
Exeter, City, Keele, Aberdeen and Aston).
(67) For instance, in 1989 the Chemical Laboratory established the Chemical Analysis Centre
which offers a microanalytical service, exploiting techniques which can work with high accuracy on
samples smaller than one milligram. The University recently agreed to underwrite from central
funds the salary of a marketing manager. There have been certain problems associated with the fact
that the Chemical Analysis Centre currently has non-company status. Clients often require
certification of results; KSIP, as a company, was able to give this, having all the requisite liability
insurance. The Chemical Analysis Centre has insufficient liability insurance to be able to offer
certification in the same way.
The Computing Laboratory recently established the Kent Software Technology Centre as the
commercial equivalent of the academically-oriented Software Tools Research Group.
(68) The unit in question is the Applied Statistics Research Unit (ASRU), part of the Faculty of
Information Technology. It has a highly successful record of exploiting the expertise of full-time
members of the academic staff, who contribute to its activities on a "cafeteria" basis, together with
a number of external consultants. Owing to an increase in competition, it has recently been less
successful, however. The Director has partly been motivated by concern about the way ASRU is
managed. However, it is anticipated that the academic-run management committee may oppose a
direct proposal for change.
(69) This was questioned by a member of the Business School who believes that many academics
are quietly running consultancy companies and that some have even set up companies to try to
exploit discoveries which they made in the course of their research.
(70) For instance, Kent Life Sciences was co-founded by two senior members of the Faculty of
Natural Sciences, attached to the Biological Laboratory, together with two people from outside the
University. Founded to exploit expertise in biological screening, the company ceased to be very
active after one of the academic co-founders took a post at a university in the north of England.
Kent Electro-Optics was co-founded a Professor from the Faculty of Natural Sciences (attached to
the Physics Laboratory) and a Professor from the Faculty of Information Technology (attached to
the Electronics Laboratory). The company has now ceased trading, having served, in KSIP's view,
a specific purpose.
(71) The academic whose discovery led to the university's first joint venture is a shareholder in the
company; if the company is successful he will receive not only royalty payments but dividends and
could, in due course, sell his shares for a considerable profit.
The Senior Assistant Registrar had misgivings about this:
"... the Financial Secretary and I sat down and agonised for a few minutes about whether
this was excessive, too much for him. Our question was whether we should adapt the
university's royalty rules in this case to give him less, on the grounds that he was already
getting something via another route.
"We thought if we'd published a set of rules about the exploitation of inventions with
royalty ratios in it, we ought to stick to it. The fact that he happened to be a shareholder
as well was irrelevant ..."
(72) In one celebrated example dating from the early 1980s, the Professor of Microbial
Biochemistry was allowed to devote a considerable part of his working week to consultancy work
for three consecutive years. He was seconded to a multi-national company in return for £10,000 per
year, non-index-linked, for an unspecified proportion of his time.
(73) Kent does not employ this terminology. It has "academic visits", which are short-term
absences with pay, "study terms" which are equivalent to a sabbatical with pay, and "unpaid leave
of absence", which is generally limited to two terms.
(74) In the 1989/90 session, a Laboratory Director chose to refuse one such request. The academic
concerned decided to appeal the decision, but the University was not immediately able to identify
the appropriate procedures.
(75) Source: Research Report 1985, University of Kent at Canterbury.
(76) Kent Research & Development Centre is located on the 300-acre campus, alongside the five
laboratories. The existing building has 12,000 sq.ft. of laboratories and offices. It was built with at
least one specific tenant in mind and does not have small, multi-purpose incubator units suitable for
start-up companies. The university would now like to establish a more conventional science park.
(77) The local council has established some small business units at Whitstable, about ten miles from
the campus, but there are restrictions on how they are used (eg. no gases may be used).
(78) These include the Kent Economic Development Board and the Economic Development
Department, both run by the local County Council. There are also a dozen or so enterprise agencies
in Kent which have been set up by private-sector funding; one of these, the East Kent Enterprise
Agency, is located in Canterbury itself. Canterbury City Council also has an Economic
Development Department.
(79) Source: Letter to the Registrar of the University of Kent from the Exploitation Scrutiny Group
Secretariat (ref. F/TE/03/C16), 20 August 1990.
Case Study Narrative: Hull University
(1) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986. On
the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(2) In 1988/89 Hull had 5,169 student FTEs, compared to 5,652 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 4,364 undergraduate FTEs, 549 taught postgraduate FTEs and 256 research
student FTEs (Source: UFC Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
In 1980/81 there were 4,868 undergraduate FTEs, 486 taught postgraduate FTEs and 298 research
student FTEs (Source: UGC Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(3) In 1980/81 there were 701 full-time academic/academic-related members of staff plus 8 part-
timers (Source: UGC Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982). 644 (92%) of
these were academic staff; there is no surviving record of the proportion which was funded by the
UGC. Academic-related staff accounted for 17% of Hull's full-time academic/academic-related
employees (Source: UGC Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
In 1988/89 there were 578 full-time, academic/academic-related staff members, plus 48 were part-
timers. Of the 467 academic staff, 381 (82%) were were UFC-funded and 86 (18%) were funded
by other sources, often on fixed-term contracts. Academic-related staff accounted for 19% of
Hull's full-time academic/academic-related employees (Source: UFC Statistics 1988/89, volume 3:
Finance, USR, September 1990).
In that session, Hull also had around 75 Honorary Professors, Lecturers, Fellows and Associates
(Source: The University of Hull Calendar, 1988/89).
(4) According to Hull's Registrar, the University lost "considerably more than 27 per cent" of its
original academic staff. The figure is difficult to establish now owing to the influx of non-UFC-
funded academics in the intervening years. Most of these are on fairly short-term contracts.
(5) These are the Schools of Arts, Education, Humanities, Modern Languages, Economic &
European Studies, Social & Political Sciences, Management, Law, Mathematics, Life Sciences,
Engineering & Computing, Earth Resources and Chemistry. The fourteenth is the School of Adult
& Continuing Education, a leftover from the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Principal of the
newly-opened University College of Hull felt his staff should have an alternative source of students
in case the number of undergraduate students was too small to justify staff numbers (Source:
Bamford (1978)). Much of the work of the School of Adult & Continuing Education is in the
process of being absorbed by other units.
(6) Source: University of Hull Information Pack, ca. 1988 (no published date).
(7) The University College of Hull was intended to absorb Hull Technical College's Departments
of Engineering and Chemistry, to enable it to act as "a reference point for the locality and its
industry". However, these plans were thwarted by the first Principal, a specialist in English
Literature, who felt that "... the only possible foundation of a true University institution is to be
found in the faculties of Arts and Pure Science". He accepted the Department of Chemistry but
rejected the Department of Engineering, together with plans for a Department of Pharmacy.
(Quotes taken from Bamford, 1978).
Shortly after receiving its Charter in 1954, Hull tried to establish a number of technology-oriented
Departments. However, the UGC decided that the University should concentrate on expanding its
science base instead. In the era of expansion, the Department of Applied Physics, founded in 1962,
was to become the cornerstone of a new Faculty of Applied Science, but this never materialised. In
the mid-1960s the Departments of Biochemistry and Electrical Engineering were established, but
Hull was denied a Department of Mechanical Engineering until 1980, when it established one in the
guise of the Department of Engineering Design & Manufacture.
(8) Although its title suggests a research-oriented institute, in fact the Institute of Nursing studies
offers Honours Degrees in Nursing Sciences and Nursing Studies.
(9) Nominally the School of Earth Sciences includes the Department of Geology, which now has a
service function, since it no longer offers degree courses.
(10) In 1988/89 the academic staff in these four Schools numbered 196; of these, 137 (31%) were
UGC-funded and 59 (66%) were non-UGC-funded (Source: The University of Hull Calendar,
1988/89).
(11) In 1988/89 the five science-based Schools handled 1,564 out of a total of 4,536 full-time
undergraduate FTEs and 164 out of a total of 596 full-time postgraduate FTEs (Source: The
Academic Registrar, University of Hull).
(12) Ratings by subject area:
Above Average: Electronic Engineering
Average: Psychology, Other Biological Sciences, Chemistry, Other Physical
Sciences, Mathematics, Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering,
Geography
Below Average: Nursing, Other Studies Allied to Medicine, Biochemistry, Physics,
Computer Sciences.
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(13) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(14) Ratings by "unit of assessment":
4:	 Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering
Nursing, Applied Biology, Applied Physics, Pure Mathematics, Computer
Science, Geography
Psychology, Chemistry, Applied Mathematics, Statistics.
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September 1989.
(15) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(16) They contributed 96 per cent of the University's income from the Research Councils and from
charities, 77 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and private industry/commerce
and 97 per cent of its combined income from central government, local authorities and various
overseas organisations (Source: Figures derived from Form 3, Table 3 of Hull University's
statistical data prepared for the UGC and the USR in relation to 1984/85).
(17) They contributed 92 per cent of the University's income from the Research Councils, 79 per
cent from charities, 94 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and private
industry/commerce and 93 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations (Source: Figures derived from Form 3, Table 3 of
Hull University's statistical data prepared for the UGC and the USR in relation to 1988/89).
(18) In fact, Hull was granted its Royal Charter more rapidly than any other 20th century civic
foundation; only 27 years elapsed between the University College of Hull being founded and the
grant of the Charter in May 1954. However, as Bamford (1978) makes clear, many of the
academic staff felt they had struggled for recognition in a way which the "instant universities" of
the 1960s never had to:
"... Whether the modern universities got their Charters too easily or whether the older
ones had to work too hard is a matter of opinion, but certainly the newer approach
removed that sense of ultimate achievement, of standing alone and battling for existence
which is part of the history of the older universities, and of Hull itself'.
By the 1970s many of these academics were still at Hull, occupying senior positions.
(19) On the strength of over 20 years' research into liquid crystals, in 1971 Dr. George Gray of
Hull's Chemistry Department was contracted by the MoD to participate in a collaborative project
with the Royal Signals & Research Establishment (RSRE), Malvern. The objective was to identify
stable liquid crystals which could be used in instrument display panels and possibly replace the
cathode ray tube. The MoD had first broached the subject two years earlier. Since a contract was
not immediately forthcoming, Dr. Gray approached both the SRC and the NRDC for funding. Both
organisations rejected his proposal.
When the MoD contract finally materialised, Dr. Gray and a post-doctoral researcher were first in
the world to identify a range of liquid crystals which were stable, colourless and handleable. Since
it had been a collaborative project to which Dr. Gray contributed a considerable amount of
background IP, the MoD offered Hull University the opportunity to acquire patent protection in its
own name. The then Registrar pointed out that it would cost the University a considerable amount
of money to obtain patent protection. He asked Dr. Gray whether he could guarantee that the
University would get its money back. When Dr. Gray said he could offer no guarantees, the
Registrar decided to reject the MoD's offer. The MoD then offered Dr. Gray himself the
opportunity to acquire patent protection; he saw no way of raising the money needed and also
turned down the offer. The MoD itself then acquired patent protection, with Dr. Gray and his post-
doctoral researcher named as co-inventors. The MoD arranged for a company with whom it already
had an agreement to exploit the materials and a second company to exploit potential applications.
The materials came on the market in 1977.
Now a Professor, Gray is not sure he would describe the University's decision as a blunder:
"... I'm not sure they made a mistake, actually. They were very short of cash at the time
and they were being asked to shoulder the responsibility of patenting these materials world-
wide, which doesn't cost tuppence-halfpenny. I think it would have cost them several tens
of 1000s at a time when they couldn't afford it.
Wow, if I'd said - yes, you take out the patents and they fallen flat ... I hold fifty odd
patents and until last week only two of them were paying any money ... The success rate
from a patent is about one in forty. At the time I was being asked - because we'd patented
very quickly - we hadn't really a cast-iron case ..."
Professor Gray also points out that the MoD has had to spend considerable sums defending its
patents on liquid crystals in litigation.
(20) The Queen's Award for Technological Achievement was bestowed on the Chemistry
Department in 1979 in recognition of work in research, device development and large scale
commercial production of biphenyl liquid crystals.
(21) This is what Professor Gray estimates the centre has lost, based on the royalties which he has
received personally. He points out, however, that the Chemistry Department has benefitted
financially:
"... A considerable amount of money every year is knocked off my royalties to support the
[liquid crystal research] group - and will continue to be ... I'm an academic. You have to
keep that group going, maintain the size, maintain the patents.
... It costs the MoD money to run this group and part of the costs of running the group
has been taken out of the royalties, with my agreement. People who say I've made a lot of
money out of it should also remember that there has been group running there now, for the
past few years six or seven people, whose jobs have depended entirely on that money."
(22) Hull accepted at least part of the ownership of IP implied by the 1977 Patent Act. Researchers
wishing to exploit their discoveries were asked to notify the Registrar and a verbal agreement
would be reached about how any income would be split. The University's claims rested exclusively
on the 1977 Act and were not reinforced through its own terms and conditions of employment.
(23) These young professors tended to come from universities with what one of them described as
"a more positive attitude to exploiting expertise and inventions", eg. Warwick, or from industry.
(24) According to the CVCP, there was never any real prospect of the Treasury trying to offset
significant earnings against the Exchequer grant. However, there was a widespread fear that this
might happen, which occasioned the formal announcement (Source: private discussion with A. M.
A. Powell, Senior Administrative Officer at the CVCP, 20 April, 1990).
(25) For instance, one of the "new breed of young professors", a biochemist who had worked for
Unilever, discovered a way of making synthetic Evening Primrose Oil. The company which had
originally sponsored the research during the late 1970s did not believe he would be able to perfect
the process and gave up any rights in it. By 1981/82, however, financed from Departmental funds,
he succeeded. The University filed a patent application and almost immediately the process was
licensed to a large, existing company which had approached the University voluntarily.
(26) The fund was set up with approximately £20,000 in it. The intention was to see how long this
lasted and then, in the light of experience, to determine how much should be put into the fund on
an annual basis.
(27) Source: The University of Hull Research Handbook (Part 1), p29 of the 1990 draft version.
(28) There was also considerable pressure from members of the Faculty of Science & Technology
to have a written policy which outlined the University's and the individual researcher's rights and
responsibilities.
(29) The Sub-Committee on Patents consisted of the Registrar, the Personnel Officer, the then HoD
of Engineering Design & Manufacture, the HoD of Electronic Engineering, the Professor of
Microbial Biochemistry, the HoD of Applied Physics - a practising academic entrepreneur, the
Professor of Chemistry - who had invented and helped exploit liquid crystals and a Professor of
Social Administration, who had an interest in IP matters. The Financial Secretary was also involved
to some degree, but not the AUT.
(30) Hull's usual strategy in a situation like this was to ascertain how the other Yorkshire
universities were approaching the problem. In this instance, this was not formally done. However,
the policy was informed by Sub-Committee members' informal knowledge of how the universities
in which they were previously employed operated. These included Warwick.
(31) The post was originally conceived of as combining a general external relations function with
that of industrial liaison.
(32) In 1985, funded by the European Community, Hull's Registrar made a study visit to ten
provincial universities in Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Holland with which the University
of Hull maintained "formal academic relations". The results were published in a report to the
funding body, and in a subsequent journal article (see Mattison (1987)).
(33) The administration did not make a firm decision at the outset that it wished to recruit an
outsider, but it felt it would be advantageous if someone from industry could be recruited, since the
ILO had to act as a "hinge" between the University and industry.
(34) In the administration's view, the disciplines most likely to generate exploitable IP today are
paraclinical medicine, chemistry, physics and engineering. Hull has four engineering sub-
disciplines, physics and chemistry. Given the research interests of Hull's academic staff, the
administration believes that researchers in these fields may be more likely to identify exploitable IP
than many of their colleagues in other universities.
(35) The administration believes that, even when pursuing "pure" research objectives, Hull's
academics have tended to be alert to the practical applications which emerge as a by-product of that
research. For instance, Hull's most famous utilitarian discovery to date, liquid crystals, arose out
of a "pure" research project.
(36) The administration recognises that this may change in time, particularly if Hull's Research
Committee achieves its objectives vis-a-vis the University's research effort:
"... there may be 50 out of the 450 academic[s] ... who would dearly love to spend the
whole of their research time ... on the colour of the plumage of birds in the Amazon
jungle, or something. That might be a very interesting scientific problem but it may be for
the good of the University of Hull and its future that we divert most of their research time
into looking at biotechnological problems and applying this in a way which could grow
companies, benefit brewers or whatever ..."
(37) Hull's Treasurer is a lay member of Council, not a salaried member of the administration.
(38) Hull has a unitary administrative structure in which the Registrar/Secretary is second only to
the Vice-Chancellor. He presides over the Finance Office, the Estates Office, the Academic
Registrar, the Administrative Secretary - and the ICDA Officer.
(39) Recognising that this offers a considerably lower salary than the head of ICDA had received
for the work upto that point, the University gave him the freedom to enhance his income by means
of outside work contracts. The ILO, however, does not see this as a cost-saving strategy which the
University should pursue in the long-term. He has sent a "strongly worded" paper to the Registrar,
stressing that the University must "get its act together" for the future.
(40) The income which has accrued to Hull under the "services rendered" category has risen from
ca. £150,000 in 1985/86 to over 000,000 in 1988/89. The ICDA is held to be partially responsible
for this increase.
(41) In the event, the post-holder was not required to take responsibility for external relations in the
broader sense.
(42) The Working Party on Costing, Pricing & Income Targets for Schools was set up by the
Policy & Resources Committee in the wake of the so-called Hanham Report (The Costing of
Research and Projects in Universities, CVCP, 1988). Working party members included the
Registrar, the Academic Registrar, the Financial Secretary, the Industrial & Commercial
Development Officer, one Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Resources), the ex-Dean of the School of
Chemistry and the Dean of the School of Management. The Working Party submitted its Final
Report in June 1990.
(43) However, Hull has updated its General Terms of Engagement to incorporate recent legislation
on pensions, retirement etc. It has also incorporated a statement obliging academic staff to
paticipate in the University's staff development and appraisal scheme.
(44) Interestingly, in the most recent statement on ownership of IP a distinction is made between
students sponsored by the Research Councils/the University and students who receive no
sponsorship or whose sponsors waive their rights; the latter two groups now retain their rights to IP
unless they require the University to help them patent and exploit their discoveries. In that case,
their rights are the same as those enjoyed by members of staff (Source: Section I, paragraph 5 of
the University Policy on Intellectual Property, Appendix V, Final Report, Working Party on
Costing, Price & Income Targets for Schools, June 1990).
(45) Source: Seedcom Fund Applications 1989/90 - Applications, The University of Hull Research
Committee, 26 May 1989. Altogether there were 27 applications for funding totalling £41,000;
nearly 60 per cent of them were submitted by scientists. The sums distributed ranged from £685 to
£2,000.
In 1987/88, the Seedcom Fund paid £2,000 to an academic in the Department of Electronic
Engineering to help him develop a time domain phonetic vocoder, one potential application of his
work on speech analysis and processing as applied to digital speech communications systems.
At the same time one of his colleagues also received £2,000 to allow him to develop techniques of
modelling the intermodulation performance of radio equipment and the interference environment.
(46) At the time the Research Committee was chaired by the Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Resources); the
other Pro-Vice-Chancellors are ex-officio members, as are the Chairmen of the Area Research Sub-
Committees. The ICDA Officer sat on the Research Committee in a non-executive capacity.
(47) In this context, the term "royalties" is to be taken as shorthand for all income generated by the
exploitation of IP, rather than as literally.
(48) If external sponsors meet the patenting costs, where there are upto three inventors, 75 per cent
of the first £40,000 of net annual royalty income goes to the inventors and 25 per cent to the
University. Where there are four or more inventors, 75 per cent of the first £80,000 goes to the
inventors and 25 per cent to the University. In both cases, the net income is split 50:50 thereafter.
In this case, the sliding scale operates in terms of annual income rather than absolute income.
(49) The complexity of the formula is intended to reflect the fact that the BTG returns only 50 per
cent of the income to cover its supposed costs. Similarly, the MoD returns only 34 per cent of the
income on the same grounds. Contracts with industry may specify quite diverse and idiosyncratic
terms. Where the University itself incurs the patent costs, it appears to return only 50 per cent of
the net income to the inventor(s), no matter how many there are, even though it recovers its costs
first.
(50) "... If the University does not commit itselffinancially but gives official support to and makes a
substantial administrative input into negotiations for the commercial exploitation of an invention",
the University retains 40 per cent of the net income and returns 60 per cent to the inventors), no
matter how many there are. It is not clear whether academic inventors can recoup the costs of
patents which they have personally funded.
(51) Irrespective of the number of inventors, in terms of personal royalty income, it would be most
advantageous for the discovery to be exploited by the BIG. If the discovery generated £15,000 for
the University in one year, a single inventor would receive £11,250 from the BTG, compared to
only £7,500 if the University had paid the patenting costs and licensed the discovery to a company
or £9,000 if the University had not paid the patenting costs but had "given official support" and
"made a substantial administrative input into negotiations for commercial exploitation of an
invention"; this might, presumably, include situations where the inventor himself had founded a
successful company to exploit his discovery. If there were, say, four co-inventors, from an annual
income of £15,000 they would each receive £2,812 from the BTG, compared to only £1,873 if the
University had paid the patenting costs or £2,250 if it had not paid the patenting costs but made a
substantial administrative input.
The advantage offered by the BTG holds true at higher income levels, too. If the invention
generated £100,000 for the University in any one year, the single inventor would receive £60,000
from both the BTG and the University - provided it had not paid the patenting costs - but only
£50,000 if it had paid them. Four co-inventors would receive £17,500 each from the BTG but only
£12,500 if the University paid the patenting costs or £15,000 if the University's contribution to the
exploitation process was limited to a substantial administrative input.
There is an additional incentive for the academic inventor to favour the BTG, particularly if it looks
as though the discovery might generate a reasonable income over a number of years. At the end of
five years at an income to the University of £15,000 a year, the single inventor would receive
£56,250 from the BTG, compared to only £37,500 if the University paid the patenting costs and
£45,000 if it paid no costs but made a substantial administrative input. Similarly, four co-inventors
would each receive £14,060 from the BTG, compared to £9,375 if the University paid the patenting
costs or £11,250 if it paid no costs but made a substantial administrative input.
NB: The academic inventor would receive exactly the same personal income from discoveries
exploited by both the BTG and the MoD. However, since the MoD retains 66 per cent of the
income to cover its costs, compared to the BTG's 50 per cent, a discovery exploited by the MoD
would be required to generate considerably more income before it yielded the same level of return
for the inventor. Income from a company which paid the patenting costs as part of the licensing
deal would also be distributed on the same basis. Since the percentage of the overall income which
royalties represent can vary enormously, an invention exploited by some companies might be
required to generate even more income before it yielded the same return for the inventor.
(52) "Applications for Promotion & Other Salary Awards to Take Effect During the 1990/91
Session", ref. SWISH. 12 June 1990.
(53) Source: Appendix I, Memorandum relating to the Annual Report on Research 1989/90, ref.
PSR/EA rescom/arr.
(54) Under the current funding regime, Hull splits the annual UFC allocation into two, a teaching
element and a research element. These are distributed to Schools on a formula basis. Part of the
research element - around 15 per cent of the total grant of each member Department - has been
allocated selectively for the past three years on the basis of the Department's internal research
grading*. In future, Departments' performance in relation to their income generation target will
also be taken into account when determining the distribution of the discretionary element.
''This grading is done by the Research Committee and takes into account the UFC's most recent
research grading, the Department's research plans and the UFC grade which it aims to get in the
next research selectivity exercise.
(55) Three of these categories are those commonly used by the UFC, namely:
(a) Research Council Grants
(b) Other Research Grants/Contracts (eg. central/local government, industry/commerce,
charities, EC etc)
(c) Other Services Rendered (eg. short courses, hospital authorities, validation fees etc).
The fourth is fee income from overseas students, which the University accepts is a highly volatile
market.
(56) From the late 1980s the administration expected overheads to be charged at a minimum of 50
per cent and made its calculations on this basis, irrespective of whether or not the 50 per cent had
been achieved. Until 1990 30 per cent of the supposed overheads was retained by the centre and the
remainder was channelled back to the Department which generated them. In June 1990 the Working
Party on Costing, Pricing & Income Targets for Schools recommended that this should be changed
to a 50:50 split between the centre and the Departments, since in practice 78 per cent of non-
indirect costs were borne by the centre and only 22 per cent by the Departments.
(57) Appendix V of the Final Report of the Working Party on Costing, Price & Income Targets for
Schools, June 1990 - which outlines the University's policy on IP - makes no reference to this.
(58) The "Bulletin" is published "for the information of staff and students of the University" and as
such it is "an infomal newsletter, not an official publication". Between January 1985 and June
1990, the "Bulletin" carried relatively few items dealing with any aspect of IP. Three articles
described research grants/contracts which generated or were intended to generate specific
products/processes. Four articles described commercially-oriented units/companies set up in/by the
University to exploit expertise and/or equipment. A fifth article described the activities of an
independent academic spin-off company. Two items dealt with the opening and the subsequent
extension of the science park. Another announced Hull's 1986 participation in Techmart; the same
issue publicised the DTI's contribution of £10,000 to help Hull University to help small firms in
the Humberside and Grimsby area.
(59) For this reason, the ICDA Officer has made no attempt to circulate fresh copies of the
University's patents policy. Copies are available in the ICDA office, should any academic express
an interest.
(60) The Department of Electronic Engineering submitted an entry to the Academic Enterprise
Competition in 1982. There were no entries from Hull in 1985, but in the 1988/89 competition
there was an entry from the Department of Applied Biology (Source: Private communications from
the BTG's London and Edinburgh offices).
(61) Source: Section II, paragraphs 1-3 of the University Policy on Intellectual Property, Appendix
V. Final Report, Working Party on Costing, Price & Income Targets for Schools, June 1990.
(62) Source: The University of Hull Research Handbook (Part 1), p36 of the draft version.
(63) However, the ICDA Officer has made a presentation to administrative staff under the
auspices of this scheme.
(64) At the third seminar, members of the Working Party on Costing, Price and Income Targets for
Schools presented their Final Report, which deals with IP issues in Appendix V.
(65) In 1989/90 Hull did not have a dedicated research grant and contract support section. Grant
proposal forms were drafted by the academics concerned and checked for financial probity by the
Finance Officer. The ICDA Officer saw no great value in scrutinising them for IP at that stage,
preferring to concentrate on research contracts, which he usually helped to draft. He relied on
informal contacts to ascertain which grant applications were successful and which might eventually
generate IP.
However, the administration was planning to restructure the ICDA in such a way that it would have
a dedicated research grants and contracts officer who was also responsible for IP.
(66) "Innovation" is published twice a year by Longman Cartermill, with financial assistance from
the SERC. It contains details of discoveries from Britain's universities, polytechnics, medical
schools and government research laboratories. Entries are broken down by discipline, by the stage
of development which has been reached and indicate whether or not they have been patented or
published.
(67) Hull is served by the BTG's Manchester office, which went though a phase of changing its
staff so frequently that the ICDA Officer found himself dealing with a different person on each
occasion. This did not engender confidence.
In any case, the BTG's relationship with Hull's academics is not an easy one. The ICDA Officer
concedes that because its predecessor, the NRDC, turned down the opportunity to exploit liquid
crystals, there has been a tendency for the academic community to snigger at the BTG.
(68) For instance, during the 1980s a team of physicists from Hull discovered a way to recover a
high proportion of the tin from used cans. At the time, the cost of tin was very high. They gave the
BTG the chance to take charge of exploiting it, but their offer was rejected. Instead of accepting
the BTG's evaluation, the physicists concerned devoted considerable efforts to perfecting the
process, with a view to exploiting it more entrepreneurially. By the time they had perfected it, the
world price of tin had dropped dramatically, making it uneconomical to use their process.
(69) "Reasonable" is not a term which has been explicitly defined at Hull. Delaying publication is
seen by the administration as an operational issue rather than a policy issue. However, in keeping
with the rules relating to embargoes on PhD theses, the University would be concerned if
publication were delayed for longer than five years. In practice, the ICDA Officer tries to avoid
committing academics to a course of action which will lead to delaying publication for longer than
three years. This applies equally to IP which is exploited via secret know-how and IP which is in
the process of being protected via a patent/a series of patents.
(70) Source: Paragraph 1, "The University's Policy on Patents", University of Hull, March 1986,
ref. DJF/SS/JB.
(71) Source: Paragraph 2, "The University's Policy on Patents", University of Hull, 10 December
1986, ref. SJP/VMO.
(72) The ICDA Officer tries to locate discoveries on a conceptual matrix which indicates high
versus low academic value, and high versus low commercial value. In most cases, a discovery with
high commercial value has a relatively low academic value, and vice versa. The ICDA Officer
believes that discoveries with high academic and high commercial value are rare. More commonly,
discoveries are located in the middle of both values and reaching a concensus decision is not
difficult.
(73) Writing a patent specification impinges not only on the academic's time, but also on secretarial
time. Few government grants allow researchers to cover the cost of preparing patent specifications:
certain DTI grants are the exception which make provision for this are the exception rather than the
rule. If there is sufficient pressure on secretarial resources, HoDs have been known to consider
using overhead income to cover the cost of having the specification typed. The ICDA Officer does
not know whether any of Hull's HoDs have been prepared to use overhead income to temporarily
free an academic to write the patent specification in the first place.
(74) Similarly, on the rare occasions that the University is confronted by renewal fees, the ICDA
Officer only pays them if a "willing bride" has been identified. Since the University makes every
attempt to transfer the responsibility for maintaining patent protection to licensees/assignees, this is
fairly unusual, however.
(75) In this case, the academic concerned was very junior and relied on his HoD to negotiate with
the University centrally.
(76) The company in question was registered in 1988/89 as a subsidiary of Hull Unico. Initially the
University put up £1,000; this was followed in 1989/90 by a further £1,350, giving the University -
via Hull Unico - a stake of around 25 per cent.
(77) By "participation" the administration meant that it would consider buying equity, rather than
demanding it on a "droit-de-seigneur" basis, even though University regulations would not preclude
this as an option. The administration did not have in mind a minimum or a maximum percentage -
though it was mindful of the fact that the Charities Act (1960) precluded it from investing too
heavily in a company. All decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, taking into account the merits of
the proposed venture and the University's cash flow at the time.
(78) Hull's administration cited Bath as an example of a University believed to have lost in the
region of L.25m as a result of incautious investment in a company with which it did not have an
arm's length relationship. It is aware that if such companies are on the balance-sheet, the standard
or recommended accounting procedure for universities requires that provision should be made for
potential losses.
(79) The company was founded because at the time universities were not eligible to apply for
certain DTI grants. Company status effectively enabled the University to apply - as part of a
consortium - for assistance under the DTI's "Support for Innovation" programme. The consortium
consisted of I -Rser Applications Ltd - an academic spin-off company founded by the HoD of the
Department of Applied Physics - and two existing companies, Cambridge Interconnection
Technology Ltd and Ouantel Ltd, which subsequently opted out of active participation. The IP was
jointly owned by all consortium members. The University - via Hull Unico - is entitled to 29 per
cent of any royalties.
(80) The Treasurer of Hull University, a local industrialist, is Chairman of Hull Unico; the
Financial Secretary acts as Company Secretary and the other members of the Board include the
Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar and the head of the ICDA. The head of the ICDA is the only
executive member of the Board; the company has no staff.
(81) Unico Marine was set up in 1985 to exploit the work of two postgraduate students who had
done research for a regional water authority under the auspices of the Institute of Estuarine &
Coastal Studies (IECS)*. The two students wanted to continue working in this area after graduation
and felt that the University's involvement would give them greater credibility. The University
contributed physical assets in the shape of vehicles, boats etc in exchange for a share of future
profits.
* IECS is a cross-disciplinary unit which capitalises on the expertise of academics in two or three
Departments. Most of its research is academic in character, rather than commercial and most of its
funding comes from the Research Councils and the public sector, rather than from industry.
(82) In the ICDA Officer's view, there were two insuperable problems. Firstly, despite the fact that
the then Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar and a senior professor who had his own spin-off company
were directors of Hull Unico, not one of them had ever been to check on Unico Marine's activities.
The University exercised no managerial control at all.
Secondly, a company located outside the Humberside region was, in any case, difficult to monitor.
It was not a responsibility which the ICDA Officer was prepared to shoulder, since it felt the Hull
campus should be its priority.
(83) See note (77) above for details.
(84) The ICDA Officer feels that the guidance which he received informally from a barrister
associated with Hull Unico has stood him in good stead - though he would find it difficult to judge
whether he has negotiated particularly good or particularly bad deals to date. He recognises that
with experience, he will develop a better understanding of the nuances of negotiating licenses. In
the meantime, if he feels he needs some support, he will involve the University's commercial
solicitors. He has not thought of joining the LES.
(85) When the regulations relating to outside work were drawn up by the current Registrar in 1976,
he did not envisage company start-up as an activity which academics were likely to pursue. In the
intervening years, however, around a dozen academic spin-off companies have been founded, with
the University's blessing. In the Registrar's view, the outside work rules were formulated in
sufficiently general terms as to cover this and obviate the need for clauses relating specifically to
company start-up.
(86) Hull's academics are not allowed to earn more than 25 per cent p.a. of their gross annual
income from outside work. If they exceed this sum, they are required to covenant the excess to the
University. Clearly, the University has to rely on members of the academic staff being honest,
since it has no foolproof way of policing it. In one or two cases, academics have volunteered the
information that they have exceeded the limit and covenanted the excess to the University.
(87) There is evidence to suggest that one or two academics at Hull set up "soft", R&D-based
companies as early as the 1960s, though the majority date from the 1970s and 1980s. A member of
the library staff set up a company during the mid-1970s to exploit his hobby - facsimile publishing.
(88) In the ICDA Officer's view, the administration was failing to enforce the outside work
regulations in the case of a "soft" company exploiting the work of Departmental research group.
The company was operating quite openly, to the extent of placing advertisements in the press which
attributed its reputation to its academic origins.
The ICDA Officer felt that the HoD of the Department concerned was having "mud thrown at him"
- by the academic staff of other Departments - because he appeared to tolerate the situation. In fact,
although a HoD can withhold his approval if a member of staff requests permission to do outside
work, only the Vice-Chancellor (in practice, the Registrar) can grant/deny the member of staff
permission or take them to task for failing to seek permission.
(89) If would-be academic entrepreneurs object to the University exercising its right to participate,
the Vice-Chancellor could refuse the academic permission to found a company. The ICDA Officer
hopes that if the situation ever arises, the Vice-Chancellor will take a hard line: this might be the
only way to prevent an academic from proceeding independently, especially if the IP was in the
form of a jointly vested patent. In this situation, the ICDA Officer could refuse on the University's
behalf to license the academic's company. As joint owner of the patent, the academic could equally
veto any alternative licensees which the ICDA Officer proposed. This could lead to stale-mate.
(90) ie. the Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar, the Financial Secretary and members of the academic
community
(91) The University also sees some academic spin-off companies as doing work which might
otherwise come to the University.
(92) In other words, income received in this category does not carry the added financial value of
income in the other two categories, whereby research income received in year 1 is reflected in the
the "DR" component of a University's block grant in year 3.
The University may also be suggesting that consultancy work carries no benefits in terms of future
research selectivity exercises, either.
(93) Source: Section 4.5 of the Final Report, Working Party on Costing, Price & Income Targets
for Schools, June 1990.
(94) Source: Sections 5.5 and 5.6 of the Final Report, Working Party on Costing, Price & Income
Targets for Schools, June 1990.
(95) This is stated quite clearly in paragraph 6 of the University Policy on Intellectual Property,
Appendix V, Final Report, Working Party on Costing, Price & Income Targets for Schools, June
1990.
(96) Hull's Calendar, Prospectus and Information Pack for 1988/89 listed some 28 institutes/
centres/units/groups operating within the University. The vast majority of these had purely
academic objectives, however. Only a few had commercial objectives, too. These included:
• the Robotics Research Unit (Department of Electronic Engineering)
• the Centre for Applied Electronics (ditto)
• the Centre for Industrial Applied Mathematics (Department of Applied
Mathematics)
• the Institute of Estuarine & Coastal Studies (a stand-alone unit jointly run by the
Departments of Geography, Law and Economics)
In some cases, Departments had two separate units which complemented each other, one
concentrating on academic research, the other on providing a commercial service. For instance,
Hull Analysis was the commercial counterpart of the School of Chemistry's Analytical Science
Group. The commercial activities of the Psychology Department's Ergonomics Research Group
were subsequently taken over by an academic spin-off company.
The Regional Electronics Centre was set up to give courses and advice on advanced manufacturing
techniques as a result of a DTI initiative. As with 11 other centres throughout the UK, the DTI
provided pump priming funding for the first two years, after which the Centre was expected to
become self-sufficient.
(97) Deans are required to sign a document which effectively makes them completely responsible
for their School's budget.
(98) Until now, academics at Hull have not been entitled to spend part of their working week on
outside work; it has been more a custom and practice situation. Permission to do outside work has
been - and will still be - given subject to the HoD agreeing that it should not impinge on the
member of staff's primary academic commitments.
(99) Leave of absence falls into three categories:
(a) Study leave - ie. sabbaticals;
(b) Leave of absence for short periods to attend courses, conferences etc;
(c) Leave for ad hoc purposes.
(100) The University would be "less enthusiastic" about academics who requested leave of absence
to set up companies exploiting their hobbies, however.
(101) In one instance, the academic entrepreneur was made redundant as a result of the entire
Department being closed. In another, the academic concerned was on a short-term contract which
ended.
(102) The Registrar stated that such activities were expressly proscribed in Hull's General Terms
of Engagement of Academic Staff; in fact, there is no reference to this.
(103) Newlands High Technology Park was developed by English Estates in conjunction with the
University, which owns the land. The first phase of the development provided 25,000 sq.ft. of
space, including a few incubator units. There were nominally three units at 590 sq.ft., three at 690
sq.ft., a further three at 1,280 sq.ft. and seven at over 2,000 sq.ft. These were not fixed sizes,
however: composite units upto 7,580 sq.ft. can be created, if necessary. Phase I was formally
opened in 1987 but the first tenants moved in during 1985.
Phase II is now completed, offering two additional units of 5,000 sq.ft. and one of 2,500 sq.ft. In
response to demand, one of the large units in Phase I has been converted into five small units
varying in size from 300 sq.ft. to 400 sq.ft. There are plans for a third phase.
Rents are set by English Estates at £6 per sq.ft. for the smaller units, £4 per sq.ft. for the larger
units in Phases I and II. This includes service charges. Phase III rents will be in the order of £9 per
sq.ft., including services charges. Academics locating spin-off companies in incubator units on the
science park currently face annual rents ranging from £1,800 to £4,140. This is very cheap
compared to other parts of the country, but it is not cheap compared to other parts of Hull. The
ICDA Officer feels that the relatively high rents in Newlands High Technology Park are quite
acceptable, since proximity to the University enhances companies' prestige.
The minimum lease is three months on units below 5,000 sq. ft. in size. For larger units, the
minimum lease is one year. Two of the 17 companies on-site in 1989/90 were founded by
academics: Laser Monitoring Services Ltd and Advanced Processor Design, which was taken over
by Lynx Plc in 1988.
(104) For instance, Hull City Council operated the Hull Business Centre, with units from 105
sq.ft. to 750 sq.ft. with rents at around E4 per sq.ft in 1989, inclusive of rates and service charges.
It also operated factory units ranging in size from 430 sq.ft. to 970 sq.ft. at rents of £3.20 per
sq.ft. inclusive of service charges but not rates. There was also office and workspace
accommodation available in 1989 for as little as £5.70 per sq.ft. inclusive of service charges. (I am
grateful to Mr N W Smales of Hull City Economic Development and Property Department for this
information).
(105) For instance, the Acorn Business Park charged around £10 per sq.ft. exclusive of service
charges or rates etc.
(106) "The Costing of Research and Projects in Universities", CVCP, 1988.
(107) Initially the DTI made £180,000 available over three years, starting in October 1986. Source:
"The Bulletin", 5 November 1986.
(108) Source: Letter to the Registrar of Hull University from the Exploitation Scrutiny Group
Secretariat (ref. F/TE/03/C14), 17 August, 1990.
(109) All but one of these respondents was interviewed - using the pilot questionnaire - in
September 1989, before the new scheme was introduced. One respondent (F) was interviewed in
June 1990, however, using the modified questionnaire; the interview with a second respondent 04
was broken off part of the way through in September 1989 owing to pressure of time; the interview
was completed in June 1990, using the modified questionnaire for Q69 onwards. By this time
details of the new scheme had been been given limited circulation.
Case Study Narrative: Liverpool University
(1) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986. On
the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(2) In 1988/89 Liverpool had 8,458 student FTEs, compared to 8,169 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 6,871 undergraduate FTEs, 725 taught postgraduate FTEs and 862 research
student FTEs (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September
1990).
In 1980/81, in contrast, there were 6,783 undergraduate FTEs, 662 taught postgraduate FTEs and
724 research student FTEs (Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR,
September 1982).
(3) In 1988/89 Liverpool had 1,489 full-time academic/academic-related staff, plus 75 part-timers.
(3) In 1988/89 Liverpool had 1,489 full-time academic/academic-related staff, plus 75 part-timers.
This compared with 1,368 full-timers plus 6 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 855 (70%) of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC; the remaining 367
(30%) were funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Academic-
related staff accounted for 18% of the total (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3:
Finance, USR, September 1990).
There is no surviving record of the proportion of full-time academic staff who were UGC-funded in
1980/81. However, academic-related staff accounted for 16% of the total (Source: UGC University
Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(4) Following a UGC subject review, the Departments of Greek, Latin and Classical Archaeology
were merged into a single Department of Classics & Archaeology; a sizeable proportion of the
academic staff was dispersed to other universities. Anticipating the recommendations of another
UGC subject review, the University merged the Departments of Geology, Geophysics and
Oceanography into a single Department of Earth Sciences, retaining the staff concerned. This was
followed in 1988/89 by the merger of the six life sciences Departments into a single School of
Ecology, Evolution and Physiology, for similar reasons. At the same time, the Departments of
Organic Chemistry and Inorganic, Physical & Industrial Chemistry were merged to form a single
Department of Chemistry.
(5) In 1988/89 the Faculty of Medicine grouped together the Departments of Anaesthesia, Child
Health, Community Health, Dermatology, General Practice, Genito-Urinary Medicine, Geriatric
Medicine, Haematology, Human Anatomy & Cell Biology, Immunology, International Community
Health, Medical Entomology, Medical Microbiology, Medicine, Neurological Science, Nursing,
Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Ophthalmology, Orthopaedic & Accident Surgery, Otorhinolaryngology,
Parasitology, Pathology, Pharmacology & Therapeutics, Physiology, Psychiatry, Radiation
Oncology, Radio Diagnosis, Surgery, Tropical Medicine & Infectious Diseases and Tropical
Paediatrics & International Child Health.
The Dental School also came under the wing of the Faculty of Medicine, grouping together the
Departments of Dental Sciences, Dental Surgery and Operative Dentistry.
The Faculty of Veterinary Science comprised the Departments of Animal Husbandry, Veterinary
Clinical Science, Veterinary Parasitology, Veterinary Pathology and Veterinary Preclinical
Sciences.
(6) Source: Senior Assistant Registrar, Planning & Development Division, University of Liverpool.
(7) Source: "Trouble in the Ranks", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(8) Ratings by subject area in 1986:
Outstanding:
	 Pure Mathematics
Above Average: Anatomy & Physiology, Pharmacology, Genetics,
Chemistry, Physics, Geological Sciences, Materials
Science & Engineering, Production Engineering
Average:	 Clinical Dentistry, Clinical Medicine, Other
Biological Sciences, Computer Science, Civil
Engineering, Architecture, Farm Animal Medicine,
Veterinary Anatomy, Veterinary Physiology, Veterinary
Pathology
Below Average: Nursing, Other Studies Allied to Medicine, Biochemistry,
Veterinary Science, Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Mechanical
Engineering, Other Technologies
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(9) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May 1986.
(10) Ratings by "unit of assessment" in 1989:
Physics, Other Physical Sciences, Pharmacology
Anatomy & Physiology, Chemistry, Mathematics, Metallurgy &
Minerals
Clinical Medicine, Other Biological Sciences, Computer Science,
Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Mechanical/Aero/Production
Engineering
2:	 Clinical Dentistry, Pharmacy, Biochemistry, Veterinary Science
Civil Engineering
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September 1989.
NB	 This breaks down the ratings by cost centre; in some universities, "units of assessment" do
not fit neatly into cost centres. The results given may therefore be incomplete.
(11) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(12) These four Faculties contributed 95 per cent of the University's income from the Research
Councils, 99 per cent from charities, 100 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 85 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations (These percentages are derived from Form 3, Table 3
of the information supplied to the UGC by the University of Liverpool for 1984/85).
(13) They contributed 95 per cent of the University's income from the Research Councils, 86 per
cent from charities, 98 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and private
industry/commerce and 91 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities plus various overseas organisations (These percentages are derived from Form 3, Table
3 of the information supplied to the UFC by the University of Liverpool for 1988/89).
(14) Liverpool's former Acting Vice-Chancellor (1984-85) emphasised that the University grew out
of a city with a commercial rather than an industrial tradition. As a port, the city's interests were
in insurance, finance, law, the cotton exchange - and ship-building. Accordingly, the University
established one of the first engineering Faculties in England but it was not regarded by the rest of
the academic community as a proper discipline. The prevailing interest in "pure" disciplines was
reinforced by the appointment of James Mountford, a Latinist, as the Vice-Chancellor who oversaw
the immediate post-war expansion of the University.
(15) The officer in question had joined the administration in the mid-1940s, became Registrar in the
late 1950s and stayed until he retired in 1984. He was an administrator, rather than an innovator.
He saw his remit as the implementation of policy rather than the creation of new policy initiatives.
From the beginning of the 1980s, however, this ethos began to be challenged from within the
administration - by two holders of the post of Academic Secretary in turn. The current Academic
Secretary also claims to be keen for the University's IP to be effectively exploited.
(16) The Outside Work rules provided a framework for recouping costs: academics were asked to
pass 15 per cent of the resulting income to the University until all the costs had been covered.
(17) The new Assistant Registrar had a PhD in chemistry and had spent two years as a University-
based post-doctoral researcher before becoming a research chemist in the company which
subsequently became Amersham International. He joined Liverpool's administration eight years
later.
(18) At Liverpool University the Registrar has overall responsibility for the administration, below
the Vice-Chancellor. Below the Registrar at the time were five officers of equal status: the Director
of Finance, the Director of Building Services, the Director of Estates, the Administrative Secretary
and the Academic Secretary. The new Assistant Registrar reported to the Academic Secretary partly
because of his personal interest and partly because, prior to the publication of the Jarratt Report in
1985, Council did not take an interest in industrial liaison, despite the revenue-raising potential of
IP in both its "hard" and "soft" forms.
(19) The Wolfson Foundation provided two thirds of the new Assistant Registrar's salary for the
first 5 years (1980-84); the University made up the shortfall.
(20) In the late 1960s the Professor of Applied Mathematics had expressed concern that Liverpool
postgraduates left without any knowledge of industry. To remedy this, ICI seconded an employee to
act as Director of Industrial Studies - to give open lectures to postgraduates in any discipline. Shell
and a number of other companies provided additional funding. The lectures were not well attended,
so ICI's third secondee converted them into a undergraduate course which became a popular option
for students in both the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Engineering. This subsequently
became an orthodox academic Department, the Department of Industrial Studies - located in the
Faculty of Engineering, with the University funding an HoD of Professorial status. The first such
HoD became a co-founder of UDIL.
(21) The informal "Monday morning meeting", a weekly get-together of the Vice-Chancellor, the
Pro-Vice-Chancellors and the Registrar evolved into the formally-constituted Senior Management
Team in the wake of the 1985 Jarratt Report.
(22) The President of Council, a stockbroker, had been Treasurer of the Liverpool School of
Tropical Medicine; in that capacity, he had raised over £1.5m by appeal. He felt that the University
would raise more money by appeal than by setting up a company. The University took his advice
and organised an appeal; it also set up a company.
(23) When the then Vice-Chancellor died unexpectedly in 1984, the HoD of the Department of
Mechanical Engineering, who was also ex-Dean of the Faculty of Engineering and the most senior
former Pro-Vice-Chancellor, was invited to become Vice-Chancellor in his place. Since he was
nearly 60 years old, he had no desire to become the substantive Vice-Chancellor. Instead, he
became Acting Vice-Chancellor for 16 months until a suitable appointee could be located.
(24) Liverpool is an unusually well-endowed University. At the time, this represented a negligible
proportion of the £44m in liquid assets which the University had prior to the stockmarket crash of
October 1987 (Source: Acting Vice-Chancellor (1984/85)).
(25) This average conceals a spread which ranged from about two opportunities in one year
compared to ten in another.
(26) During 1984 the new Acting Vice-Chancellor had carried out his own analysis of the
management of Liverpool University and made recommendations which in part, at least,
anticipated the recommendations of the Jarratt Report.
(27) There was originally a fourth officer, an Industrial Development Officer, jointly appointed by
Liverpool University and Liverpool Polytechnic. Funded by the DES, his remit was to promote
technology transfer, primarily by liaising with the field officers of the Northwest's Regional
Technology Centre, NIMTECH. He resigned in April 1989 following a serious road accident. His
duties at Liverpool University were taken over by the Director of ORSIL.
(28) The Assistant Registrar was promoted in 1987.
(29) The Director, formerly an academic in the Department of Electrical Engineering &
Electronics, is a grade 5 appointment. In 1990 it was upgraded to grade 6, equivalent to a
Professorial salary.
(30) In 1989/90 ORSIL's primary objective was to increase the level of external research funding.
(31) It is interesting, in this context, to note that while the University's new mission statement
recognises the importance of "forming effective partnerships with industrial, commercial,
professional and governmental institutions" and with local and regional community groups, there is
no mention of the transfer of technology or the exploitation of IP (Source: University of Liverpool
Mission Statement, A Declaration of the Objectives and Aims of the University, adopted by
Council and presented to Court in November, 1988).
(32) There are two exceptions: (i) research which has been supported by outside funds, where the
results may belong either to the sponsor or to the University, depending on the terms of the
contract and (ii) research which is done by academics in accordance with the Outside Work rules.
(33) Source: section C21, paragraph 6 of the Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff,
January 1990.
(34) Source: Section C22 of the Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff, January 1990.
(35) The first four of these criteria are derived from the 1977 Patent Act and relate to whether or
not researchers could be expected to invent something in the course of carrying out their
normal/specially assigned duties. The next five concern the relative contributions made by various
researchers and the University itself. The last, also derived from the 1977 Act, takes into account
the financial return and other benefits which the invention yields.
(36) Liverpool has not laid down a minimum percentage for overhead recovery. From July 1989
the University centrally started taking 10 per cent of the total £ awarded in any contract/grant. The
remaining 90 per cent went initially to the grant-holder to cover direct costs. Any excess was kept
by the Department.
(37) This met with the disapproval of some members of staff in the humanities.
(38) Source: Section B50, Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff, University of
Liverpool, January 1990.
(39) Source: Section B51, Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff, University of
Liverpool, January 1990.
(40) Source: Section B52, Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff, University of
Liverpool, January 1990.
(41) In one instance, which dates from after the 1977 Patent Act, a former member of ORSIL's
staff discovered through a chance conversation with a company that it was exploiting IP which had
been transferred in a private arrangement by a member of the academic staff. When contacted, the
academic concerned claimed he felt he had acted legitimately because the discovery was made
jointly with a student; only students in receipt of Research Council grants were obliged to assign
their IP to the University. Despite the fact that the academic concerned had breached his terms and
conditions of employment, in this instance, ORSIL took no action because the company concerned
was about to go out of business and the patent had limited value.
It is known that there are other instances of academics clandestinely running companies exploiting
IP they have generated.
(42) Source: Extract from a Paper Prepared for the Planning & Resources Committee, July 1987,
Annex to "Research Support & Industrial Liaison", a Report on the First Year of Operation,
University of Liverpool, 1989.
(43) According to the Senior Assistant Registrar, who has been involved with the University's IP
since the beginning of the 1980s:
"When I started, the ethos was very much more academic than [at] many others, or
certainly a number of others. That has changed, but I think everybody else has changed as
well. Perhaps we are still more academic than ... certainly places like Salford or
Bradford, the former CATs. That's a matter of history".
(44) In 1989/90 ORSIL believed that if universities failed to capitalise properly on their IP, if
opportunities were missed, those rights could well revert to the BTG.
(45) "Patenting: The Opportunities and the Pitfalls", British Technology Group, London, 1989.
(445) There is pressure on new members of the academic staff to attend the induction programme.
However, since this takes place in June each year, it is possible for a new academic to be in post
for nearly a year before the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, it is considered acceptable if
new members of staff attend within three years of being appointed.
Whatever the staff development programme features, it tends to attract no more than 10-20 per cent
of the academic community at any one time.
(47) Since June 1987 the University newsletter has carried a column entitled "Research Matters".
However, it has appeared very sporadically and has concentrated on research grants/contracts won,
rather than the results of research, exploitable or otherwise.
(48) ORSIL's Director believes that it may be more productive to present these seminars himself,
since he is still perceived as an academic, not an administrator or an outsider. He believes that the
BTG is now far too aggressive, that the DTI is hard for academics to identify with and that the
Patent Office tends to give rather dry presentations.
(49) Two of Liverpool's discoveries are currently on offer to the BTG. Though promising,
disclosure prior to protecting them means that they are in the public domain; it remains to be seen
what can be salvaged. This happens repeatedly:
"We can take a very recent example of someone who came to me with a good idea. We
went through it and [he] confirmed that [he] hadn't published anything at all, though [he]
had submitted a paper to an international journal.
"We went right through it and just before he left he made the comment - It was well
received when I gave my talk"! What talk? It was a talk to a professional body. [He]
hadn't realised that that put the work into the public domain".
(50) The term of appointment varies from one Department to the next. Five years is becoming the
norm, however. There is no limit to the number of times than an individual can be reappointed, but
in practice few academics want to shoulder the burden for too long.
(51) According to ORSIL, no HoDs in the Faculty of Engineering would adopt a negative attitude
towards the researchers wishing to see their discoveries exploited. This is not the case in every
science-based Faculty, however:
"I can certainly think of at least one peson in the [Faculty of Medicine] who would feel
that exploitation is not the sort of thing a University ought to be doing".
(52) In-house research committees consist of the HoD or a Professor from each of the constituent
Departments.
(53) Together with the Administrative Services Committee, the Buildings & Estates Committee and
the Staff Development Committee, the Academic Committee is one of the major committees of the
University. It makes recommendations to the Planning & Resources Committee on academic policy
and is responsible for developing and implementing the University's Academic Plan.
As ORSIL saw it in 1989/90, the Academic Committee was concentrating on counteracting a "them
and us" situation which developed in some quarters following changes introduced before and after
the publication of the Jarratt Report.
(54) Source: Extract from a Paper Prepared for the Planning & Resources Committee, July 1987,
Annex to "Research Support & Industrial Liaison", a Report on the First Year of Operation,
University of Liverpool, 1989.
(55) At that time, 3i Research Exploitation Ltd charged a daily rate for conducting a comprehensive
technical audit. Given the size of Liverpool University, ORSIL estimated the bill would be £5,000-
£10,000.
(56) This became evident in 1988 following ORSIL's request for information relating to discoveries
arising out of Research Council-funded projects. It became obvious from the replies that academics
were not notifying ORSIL of all that was going on. Personal contact with a "hit list" of researchers
was far more productive:
"It was amazing (original emphasis) what crept out of the woodwork ... We found all
manner of things that were going on, quite legitimately, which we didn't know about. For
example, a big unit originally funded by Wolfson is actually making a product - or rather,
the product was being made [as a result of] work done here. The University was receiving
money for it which was going back into the unit, and we didn't know anything about it".
(57) For instance, the Director of Research at Pillcington was formerly a Professor at Liverpool
University.
(58) Well over half the IP identified at Liverpool arises out of research sponsored by
industry/commerce or out of collaborative programmes which commit the University to offering the
IP to the industrial partner(s).
(59) Apart from organisations like the BTG, the Research Corporation and DTE, the IP could also
be assigned to local technology transfer agencies like the Merseyside Innovation Centre. This is a
private company limited by guarantee which was established in 1981 jointly by Liverpool
University, the former Merseyside County Council and Liverpool Polytechnic, with the aim of
promoting the economic regeneration of Merseyside - eg. via technology transfer.
(60) In one recent case, a researcher flagged a discovery which ORSIL felt was of dubious value.
The researcher himself proposed that he should register the discovery himself, via the "do-it-
yourself route" and ORSIL paid the fee. The discovery was picked up within a short time by a
company and is now in the process of being exploited.
(61) In 1989/90 ORSIL did not have a dedicated annual patent budget. It spent what it regarded as
necessary. Patenting costs were borne by central funds under a budget heading covering legal costs
and were monitored very closely by the Planning & Resources Committee. Until recently, a
significant proportion the annual expenditure had arisen from Liverpool's portfolio of patents
relating to optical sensors, a high-risk/high-reward area where the University was obliged to bear
the cost of patent protection itself for a number of years. Much of this burden was subsequently
borne by an industrial partner.
(62) ORSIL never takes a unilateral decision as to whether or not to continue paying renewal fees.
The decision is always taken with the agreement of the researcher who generated the IP.
(63) Section C23 of the 1990 staff handbook indicates that unless the University does not wish to
participate in the development or exploitation of an invention, "the University shall undertake
responsibility for its further development and exploitation and the member of staff shall, as directed
by the University, do any one or more of the following ..... The first four clauses require
academics to keep their discovery secret until it has been patented, to apply or join with the
University in applying for patent protection or to offer the discovery to the BTG.
(64) Prior to 1977/78, the University effectively relinquished any rights it might have had in
determining how IP generated by members of staff should be "protected" or exploited, though it
retained a limited financial interest.
(65) This might include, for example, a joint venture between the University and the researcher(s),
between the University and industry, between the University and the public sector, or joint ventures
encompassing several or all of these parties.
(66) Due to inexperience, the University underestimated the lead time - and, more importantly, the
amount of capital - which ULTRA would require to successfully exploit the 15 or so projects
originally identified. Since the University was unwilling to give up sole ownership of the company
or to invest more of its own money, ULTRA was forced to concentrate on the two or three most
promising projects.
(67) ULTRA Physics was originally intended to function as a subsidiary of ULTRA, marketing
products - chiefly instrumentation. In practice, it became increasingly R&D-oriented. By mutual
agreement, the company was subsequently spun-off as an independent operation. Since then, Ultra
Physics has turned its attention to marketing instrumentation once more.
(68) The other was Ultra Digital Systems.
(69) ULTRA had two main product ranges: in electronics and biotechnology.
(70) ULTRA's first Managing Director was asked to step down after it became clear that the scale
on which he wished to operate demanded far more capital than the University wished to commit
and uncertainty over when the University might see a return on its investment.
(71) To date, these opportunities have exploited expertise rather than "hard" IP. In 1985, for
instance, following new legislation which allowed universities to generate their own electrity, the
Director of Engineering Services proposed that Liverpool should instal a gas turbine to generate
electricity and use the exhaust heat to heat the buildings. Having gained the support of the (lay)
Treasurer and the Acting Vice-Chancellor, Liverpool formed a wholly-owned company, University
of Liverpool Energy Company (ULEC) to do this. A capital outlay of £2m in toto - financed partly
by bank loans - generated savings of £0.5m within the first year of operation.
Recently, Liverpool founded a second company, ULEC Services Ltd, to sell its expertise to other
universities. The two members of staff who were the prime movers in establishing ULEC were
seconded to the new company on a full-time basis.
(72) Section C23 of the staff handbook states that unless the University does not wish to participate
in the development or exploitation of an invention, "the University shall undertake responsibility for
its further development and exploitation and the member of staff shall, as directed by the
University, do any one or more of the following ....". The following clauses outline academics'
obligation to collaborate with the University in one of three ways listed - assigning/licensing to
industry, assigning/ licensing to the BTG or the Merseyside Innovation Centre. It does not mention
independent academic spin-off companies.
(73) Liverpool has had a fairly average number of entries to the Academic Enterprise Competition,
with two entries in 1982, at least one in 1985 and two in 1988 (Source: private communication
from the British Technology Group, 1989).
(74) In 1985 Liverpool won third prize, which provided part of the start-up capital for Epichem
Ltd. The company was set up to exploit strategically important materials developed originally for
the MoD by Liverpool's Chemistry Department. The MoD suggested that the chemicals in question
should be produced in commercial quantitites for UK customers, since the only other source in the
world was Japan. The entry to the Academic Enterprise Competition was fronted by the Research
Assistant concerned, who subsequently became Technical Director of the company, which is a joint
venture with another company.
(75) ORSIL reported it was in the process of constructing a database of companies with which the
University has a connection.
(76) ORSIL believed that, if necessary, it would have access to local databases run by the
Merseyside Innovation Centre and/or by NIMTECH, the North West's Regional Technology
Centre.
(77) Most of the Centres and Institutes listed in the Annual Report have purely academic objectives.
A few supply commercial services, too - eg. The Magnetic Resonance Research Centre, the
Radiometric, Mineral Magnetic & Palaeoenvironmental Research Centre, the Centre for
Mathematical Software Research, the Electron Microscopy Unit. However, the former
Environmental Advisory Unit had purely commercial objectives, while the newly-formed Industrial
Ecology Research Centre does contract research for industry/commerce.
(78) The Professor of Botany, an expert in the "greening" of waste land, found he could not accept
all the personal consultancy he was offered. He set up the Environmental Advisory Unit as a quasi-
commercial operation within his Department, employing researchers on short-term contracts as
required.
(79) In 1988 the former Environmental Advisory Unit was spun-off as a private company, the
Economic Advisory Unit (Liverpool University) Ltd (Source: "Precinct", University of Liverpool
newsletter, 14 November, 1988).
(80) In the late 1980s the Department of Obstetrics & Gynaecology set up an in-vitro fertilisation
(IVF) service, capitalising on the expertise of a Lecturer in the Department. The IVF service used
new techniques which enable women to be treated on an outpatient basis; there was no need to
undergo an operation and a general anaesthetic. Women were charged around 050 for a treatment
cycle, less than half the cost of a typical private clinic in London. The University contributed
£60,000 to underwrite its initial running costs (Source: "Precinct", University of Liverpool
newsletter, 1 February, 1989).
(81) The Outside Work Committee consists of the Vice-Chancellor, the President of Council (as
Chairman), the Vice-President of Council, the Pro-Chancellor elected by Court, the three Pro-Vice-
Chancellors, the Treasurer and the Deputy Treasurer. Staff may apply to do Outside Work at any
time, but the Committee meets on fixed dates twice a term.
(82) For instance, ORSIL was aware of one who had a market gardening business, and two or
three who were involved in antiques businesses.
(83) The Acting Vice-Chancellor discovered that one academic whose performance was causing
concern was co-running a pub with his wife.
(84) This is a norm rather than an entitlement and in practice the time allowed varies from one
Department to another, depending on the exigencies of the situation at any given time.
(85) Source: Section B77, Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff, University of
Liverpool, January 1990.
(86) The Leave of Absence Committee consists of the Vice-Chancellor (as Chairman), the President
of Council, the Vice-President of Council, the Pro-Chancellor elected by Court, the three Pro-Vice-
Chancellors, the Treasurer and the Deputy Treasurer - ie. it has the same membership as the
Outside Work Committee. Staff may apply for Leave of Absence at any time, but the Committee
meets on fixed dates twice a term. In the event of an emergency, the Director of Staffing Services
can take action which would be retrospectively endorsed.
(87) Liverpool's new telephone system, installed in October 1988, permits itemised billing of
directly dialled calls from University extensions.
(88) The MIC is a member of the UKSPA but it differs from many science parks in that it is not
intended to generate a return on University land; it is not built on University land. Nor is it
specifically intended to transfer technology coming out of the University. Its prime purpose is "to
create jobs and wealth for Merseyside. Not for the University, not for the Polytechnic, but for
Merseyside" by whatever means is appropriate. Its remit is regional economic development and it
works alongside a number of agencies whose remit is restricted to economic regeneration in the
City of Liverpool or in specific districts.
(89) The then Director of the MIC was known as "the godfather of small industry" in the area. The
MIC gave a variety of support to SMEs in the county of Merseyside, ranging from assessment of
inventions, technical problem solving and prototype fabrication to company start-up, marketing
advice, financial advice, quality assurance and computing services. Initial consultations were
usually free; in-depth advice tailored to an individual company's requirements attracted a fee,
however it was part of the MIC's remit to find grant aid, where possible, to cover the cost.
(90) In its current building, the MIC has 11,000 sq.ft. of incubator space, ranging from units at
200 sq.ft. to units at 2,000 sq.ft. The largest single room is 700 sq.ft. There is a uniform rental of
£7.50 per sq.ft. which includes a service charge of £2.50 per sq.ft. The service charge covers
heating, lighting, cleaning of common areas and security. All tenants also benefit from a shared,
full-time receptionist and an office which handles incoming and outgoing post. Other facilities - eg.
the typing pool, payroll etc can be bought by the hour or by contract, as required. The MIC
provides informal business advice at no cost. Situations which require a more formal approach must
be paid for, but the MIC's Finance Advisory Service generally obtains local, national or European
grant aid on behalf of small businesses to offset at least part of the cost.
Lease terms are extremely flexible: the minimum lease is for a half-day. Leases do not involve a
maximum term, either. In addition to its own service activities, the MIC currently houses 14
companies, of which two are academic spin-off companies. There is a short waiting list, but the
MIC plans to expand in the near future.
(91) One is Wavertree Technology Park, established by the County Council, English Estates and
Plessey in the mid-1980s. English Estates managed the land and the buildings, Plessey provided
management advice to tenant companies. There are a few small units around 500 sq.ft. in size, but
most of the units are 1000 sq.ft. in size or bigger.
The other is the Brunswick Business Park (no comparable details available).
Both are located within 2-3 miles of the University.
(92) The Academic Committee consists of one Pro-Vice-Chancellor (as Chairman), the Vice-
Chancellor and nine of the elected members of Senate - a maximum of two from any one Faculty.
(If Deans are elected to the Academic Committee, they must relinquish their Deanship)
(93) The University has a good, informal link with 3i, which has a representative on the
Commercial Opportunities Group.
(7) Ratings by subject area:
Above Average:
Case Study Narrative: Strathclyde University
(1) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986. On
the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(2) In 1988/89 Strathclyde had 8,149 student FTEs, compared to 6,911 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 6,368 undergraduate FTEs, 1,104 taught postgraduate FTEs and 677
research student FTEs (Source: UFC Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September
1990).
In 1980/81 there were 5,611 undergraduate FTEs, 791 taught postgraduates FTEs and 509 research
student FTEs (Source: UGC Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982..
(3) In 1988/89 Strathclyde had 1,185 academic/academic related staff FTEs plus 61 part-timers,
compared to 1,055 plus 22 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1989/90 Strathclyde 675 (68%) of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC; the
remaining 322 (32%) were funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts.
Academic-related staff accounted for 16% of the total (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89,
volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
There is no surviving record of the proportion of full-time academic staff who were UGC-funded in
1980/81. However, academic-related staff accounted for 15% of the total (Source: UGC University
Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(4) The Department of Statistics was created at the end of the 1988/89 session as a result of staff
from the Department of Mathematics' statistics division joining forces with the Population
Dynamics Group from the Department of Physics & Applied Physics (Source: University of
Strathclyde Newsletter: "Prism" no, 41, August 1990).
(5) Source: the Registry, Strathclyde University.
(6) In 1989/90 3,745 undergraduates and 474 research students were registered in the two science




Oceanography, Electrical & Electronic
Engineering, Bio-Engineering
Pharmacology, Other Physical Sciences,
Computer Sciences,
Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering,
Metallurgy & Materials, Other
Technologies




Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(8) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(9) Ratings by "unit of assessment":
Medical Engineering
	
4:	 Pharmacology, Statistics, Electrical & Electronic
Engineering, Marine Technology
Pharmacy, Biological Sciences, Chemistry, Physics,
Applied Mathematics, Pure Mathematics, Computer
Science, Mechanical/Aero/Production Engineering and Architecture
	
2:	 Food Science, Microbiology, Energy Studies, Design
Technology, Metallurgy & Metals
	
1:	 General Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Civil
Engineering, Mineral Engineering.
Source: Registry, University of Strathclyde.
(10) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(11) They contributed 92 per cent of the university's income from the Research Councils, 51 per
cent from charities, 85 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and private industry/
commerce and 73 per cent of its combined income from central government, local authorities and
various overseas organisations (Figures derived from: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume
3: Finance, USR, September 1986).
(12) These Departments contributed 90 per cent of the university's income from the Research
Councils, 89 per cent from charities, 72 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private industry/commerce and 79 per cent of its combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations (Figures derived from: UFC University Statistics
1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
(13) Source: University of Strathclyde Newsletter: "Prism" no. 53, June 1990.
(14) I am grateful to Mr D Stewart, formerly of Strathclyde University, for providing this
information.
(15) One had been Chief Metallurgist at BP; the other had worked for both John Brown
Engineering and Babcock & Wilcox as an engineer.
(16) The other HEIs included Paisley College of Technology, Dundee College of Technology,
Robert Gordons Institute (Aberdeen), and what subsequently became Heriot-Watt University. These
five institutions operated on a collaborative, rather than a competitive basis. Their objective was to
solve the problem posed, with the most appropriate institution providing the expertise.
(17) There is no readily available record of the exact sum, but £300,000 is the figure most
frequently mentioned by respondents who were involved at the time.
(18) Strathclyde has traditionally had a binary administrative structure in which the Registrar and
the Bursar assume responsibility for the academic and financial affairs of the University
respectively and are of equal status, immediately below the Principal. In the course of 1989/90,
however, the University moved to a unitary administrative structure with a Secretary, a newly
created post, at its head, overseeing both the academic and the financial affairs of the University
(Source: University of Strathclyde Newsletter: Court Report for "Prism", "Prism" no. 50, March
1990).
(19) In 1984 the University's patent portfolio contained close to 50 items, a mixture of full patents
and applications, of which only 5 or 6 were earning any income. However, that income amounted
to around £300,000 p.a. by the mid-1980s.
(20) A wide range of dates for the establishment of the CII is to be found in the literature. 1968 is
the date given by the ex-Principal, Sir Samuel Curran, in his memoirs.
(21) In Strathclyde the Court is roughly equivalent to the Council in English universities.
(22) The two ILOs had been appointed prior to the inclusion of Ordinance 16 - relating to tenure -
in the University Calendar. It was also unclear whether they were academic/academic-related
appointees. Since they had regularly voted for Senate members, they argued that they were
academics with tenure. One became a lecturer in the School of Engineering and the other joined the
University's public relations team, turning the quarterly Gazette into a monthly newsletter.
(23) The muscle-relaxant "Atracurium" was discovered more or less by accident by researchers in
the Department of Pharmacy at the beginning of the 1980s. Strathclyde licensed it to Burroughs
Wellcome in 1983 and by the end of 1989 had received close to £10m in royalties.
(24) The University provided development funding for the IP which it later licensed to Flexigage
Ltd. This was repaid when the company received its first-round funding. In recognition of its
support, the University was allocated (gratis) a proportion of the 25 per cent which was not
allocated to the major backer; the academic staff involved were allocated the remaining shares.
The University provided a loan to Polvsystems Ltd and subsequently purchased shares in the
company.
(25) The commission was given to Arthur D. Little, which presented its report after little or no on-
site research:
"[It] missed out on all sorts of realities of the commercial consultancy [situation]. It is not
brilliant. A number of things were wrong financially and of course, none of that really
materialised until we started ..."
(26) Following the government's announcement in 1983 that the cost of providing an infrastructure
for collaboration with industry represented proper use of a university's general income,
Strathclyde was able to cover the full cost of an industrial liaision office without fear of being told
that this was not a legitimate use of their funds.
(27) The Director of RDS in 1989/90 was an engineering graduate with many years' practical
experience of production engineering. This was followed by a period devoted to marketing
production engineering services in the UK and abroad, after which he became marketing manager
of a Wolfson-funded Microelectronics Institute and then managing director of a government-backed
spin-off company set up to market microelectronics hardware and software.
(28) The Deputy Director had previously worked in the Bursar's office for 17 years, with
responsibility for IP.
(29) The conference which influenced the new Principal most was a follow-up to the the Scottish
Council (Development & Industry)'s publication of "Profit through Partnership" in 1983.
(30) The only exception to this is the stipulation that, in keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent
Act, members of staff notify RDS if they believe they have generated protectable IP.
(31) In 1984 RDS appointed an EC Liaison Officer. Strathclyde was one of the first universities in
the UK to make such an appointment, which it believes contributes to the fact that for several
years, Strathclyde won more £ from the EC than any other university in the UK.
(32) Despite the fact that the 1977 Patent Act had been passed and was soon to come into force,
and despite the fact that the CVCP had alerted universities to its implications in 1977, there was no
reference to the Patent Act.
(33) Source: Section 3.26 (Patents) and Section 3.25 (Outside Employment) respectively.
(34) This was to be found in section 6.2, as part of the University's Financial Code of Practice.
(35) The Joint Management Committee was set up informally in the early 1980s in order to try and
deal coherently with the implications of the 1981 cuts. It was to some extent the forerunner of the
University Management Group, which was formally constituted in 1987 on the recommendation of
the Committee on the Organisation and Efficiency of Decision-Making. This Committee,
"composed largely of distinguished external authorities", was set up in the wake of the Jarratt
Report (CVCP, 1985). (Source: University of Strathclyde Newsletter: "Prism", September 1987).
(36) In its last full financial year, STT achieved a turnover in excess of £400,000 (Source:
University of Strathdyde Newsletter: "Prism" no. 45, November 1989).
(37) These are effectively commercial arms of Departments, which perform the same function as
"soft" companies, though they generally have quasi-company status rather than true company
status.
(38) When the UFC called for bids for grants to support income-generating developments,
Strathdyde received £100,000 to assist it set up the Enterprise Office (Source: University of
Strathclyde Newsletter: "Prism" no. 45, November 1989).
(39) The person appointed as IPR Officer had previously been a technician in the Department of
Pharmacology & Physiology for 17 years, during which time he completed an MSc by research and
registered for a part-time PhD. He was the co-discoverer of a drug which had similar applications
and similar potential to "Atracurium". Exploitation of this drug was mismanaged with the result
that neither the University nor the inventors received a penny for their efforts.
(40) Academics are encouraged to participate in the process of evaluating, protecting and exploiting
IP, which is viewed as a team effort; however, academic time is not costed into the cost-gauging
equation.
(41) The IPR Officer discovered that the University had been automatically paying annual renewal
fees, even if the patent was 15 years old and there was no prospect of a licensee.
(42) RDS pursues a strategy of obtaining as much revenue as it can "upfront". It earns a
considerable sums from option fees;
"... when people say they would like to look at our technology and evaluate it, we say -
well, fine, but it will cost you 125,000 for, say, 90 days ..."
It is not unknown for companies to ask for extensions, at the same rate. RDS also prefers to
negotiate "upfront" license fees in preference to royalty income or in conjunction with royalty
income. Moreover, it looks for guaranteed royalties in the early years.
(43) Strathclyde originally returned 90 per cent of overhead income to the Department. This was
later reduced to 50 per cent when the University found it difficult to balance its accounts. However,
it is intended to return a higher proportion to Departments as soon as possible.
(44) The drug "Atracurium" was discovered in the Department of Pharmacy; in 1989/90 it was
earning the University around Elm per year in royalties.
(45) The working party consisted of two Deputy Principals, a Dean and the Director of RDS.
(46) Court agreed that all costs attributable to a University source which are used to translate
research into a commercial proposition - together with all professional costs incurred in protecting
IP and in licensing it - should be a first charge on 80 per cent of any royalty income received. The
remaining 20 per cent is to be treated as distributable income to be shared out - on the same basis
as 100 per cent of the income after all costs have been reimbursed. On income upto £10,000, the
split is 80:16:4 between the inventor(s), the University and the Department respectively. The next
£40,000 is shared on a 60:32:8 basis and the following £50,000 on a 40:48:12 basis. Income
between £100,000 and £0.5m is to be split 30:56:14 and income over £0.5m attracts a split of
25:60:15. (Source: University of Strathclyde Newsletter: Court Report for "Prism", "Prism" no.
51, April 1990).
(47) Researchers have no legal authority over IP they generate because Strathclyde does not vest
patents jointly in the University and the inventors. RDS regards this as an unnecessary complication
when it comes to negotiating and documenting agreements to exploit them.
(48) In order to patent cell lines, samples must be deposited in recognised national depositories.
RDS is concerned about the potential for cell lines to be cloned overnight, if security is not water-
tight. For the same reason, RDS demands royalties on all monoclonal antibodies derived from cell
lines which it has licensed to industry, unless the company can produce hard evidence of having
used cell lines from a different source. The burden of proof is on the company, not the University.
(49) Between 1972 - when records started - and the end of 1989, Strathclyde had applied for 166
patents and been granted 39, a ratio of over 4:1 (Source: R&D Services, Strathclyde University).
(50) By the end of 1989, RDS had tried to "cold sell" IP in this way on two occasions. Both
attempts were successful. One yielded a license agreement with a German company which
guaranteed the University £100,000 per year for two years plus very advantageous royalties. The
other yielded a highly successful collaborative agreement.
(51) The section relating to Outside Employment stated that "the University Court encourages full-
time staff to engage in outside employment, ie. employment, in the field for which appointed,
undertaken for another employer for payment". It indicated that private practice and participation in
a commercial or professional enterprise fell into this category and that before undertaking any
outside employment, staff should seek permission in writing from the Principal, giving "full
particulars". It was made clear that financial arrangements would be made "according to the
circumstances in each case" but that they would be based on the arrangements for personal
consultancies. (Quotes taken from the Staff Handbook for 1978, section 3.25).
(52) The Business Venture Group (BVG) was formally constituted in 1984 following
recommendations from the Principal and the then Bursar. It consisted of several lay members of
Court and senior University officers, plus the Vice-Principal, the Deputy Principal (Management)
and the Deputy Principal (Research) and it reported to the University Management Group and to
Court. Its stated mission was "to enable research results to be translated into commercial ventures
by providing advice, managerial services and early seed funding". It identified six, linked
objectives which will enable it to carry out its mission. (Source: Paper presented by the Director of
RDS to the University Court on 26 November, 1989). The BVG helps formulate policy -and
reformulate it in the light of experience, but it is more geared to examining specific investment
opportunies and acting as an enabler, where appropriate. The BVG administers the University's
Commercial Development Fund.
(53) Source: Paper presented by the Director of RDS to the University Court on 26 November,
1989.
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(54) RDS has already experienced what can happen when academics in two "rival" Departments put
forward the idea of company start-up, and RDS decides to fund only one of them. The one who
was not funded ...
"... grumbled like hell to me, the Principal, to whoever would listen. He didn't raise his
little finger to do anything to justify the investment, whereas his colleague in the other
Department worked colossally hard and got industrial involvement and contracts ..."
(55) Examples include the Strathclyde Institute for Drug Research and the Centre for Parallel
Processing. These commercially-oriented institutes/units/centres sometimes have separate,
academically-oriented equivalents, such as the Addiction Research Group (ARGUS).
(56) If the capital investment needed is small, academic staff could be allocated the majority share-
holding. If it is upward of £0.25m, they would be unlikely to receive more than 20-25 per cent.
They may be given the opportunity to lma additional shares, however.
(57) RDS uses a variety of techniques to locate "the right person" - headhunting, advertising, the
SDA, databases of people wanting to become CEOs etc.
(58) The Faculty Boards consist principally of HoDs of all the member Departments.
(59) The idea for the West of Scotland Science Park came from both Glasgow and Strathclyde
Universities; the Scottish Development Agency co-ordinated the project, investing around £6m of
its own funds to secure a 125 year lease on 34 acres of Glasgow University's land (the Kelvin
Campus) and to acquire a further 27 acres (the Todd Campus). Phase I of the Park was opened in
September 1983, Phase II in December 1987. At the end of 1989 the buildings comprised around
80,000 sq.ft. (Source: The West of Scotland Science Park).
(60) The West of Scotland Science Park provides conference facilities and central services including
telex, fax, photocopying and secretarial services on a pay-as-you-use basis. There are 13 small
units ranging in size from 350 sq.ft. to 904 sq.ft, together with larger units of upto 1884 sq.ft.
The rental/sq.ft. of the smaller units is relatively higher, ranging from £5/sq.ft. to £4.70/sq.ft. at
the end of 1989. All units pay an additional £1.10/sq.ft. service charge. At that time, the annual
rent for the two smallest sized units would have been about £2,135 and £2,388 respectively. The
smaller units became available in December 1987. Prior to that, minimum annual rentals would
have been closer to £6,000, including the service charge.
At the end of 1989 the minimum lease was one year, with one month's notice required. Two-year
and six-year leases were also available, with the rent fixed for the first three years. Three months
notice was required for longer leases. At the beginning of 1990, Phase I was fully occupied and
Phase II was 95 per cent occupied, however.
By the end of 1989, seven university spin-offs (not exclusively from Glasgow) had taken space on
the Park, but only three remained, one of which was a major consortium supported by Glasgow,
Strathclyde and Heriot-Watt Universities together with Paisley College of Technology and Napier
Polytechnic. The other four companies had failed.
(61) The incubator unit grew from an initiative of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), which
was trying to create incubator units in the wake of management consultants' recommendations on
how best to promote advanced engineering. The SDA approached Strathclyde's Principal in 1986
with a view to creating such a unit on campus. Strathclyde agreed to convert 30,000 sq.ft. - the
top three floors - of an old warehouse which it owned. The £0.5m required to renovate and
refurbish the property and fund the company was provided by the SDA, TSB Scotland and
Gresham Plc. Strathclyde University Incubator Ltd. is a joint venture between
these three partners and the University, which has leased the building to the company.
The incubator unit was opened in January 1990. Although the original intention was to promote
advanced engineering, there is no restriction on the types of business activity which tenants pursue,
except that they should involve "innovative risk-taking". The smallest units are "broom cupboard"
sized and the rental is currently £14/sq.ft., of which a proportion represents a management services
charge. There is no minimum lease but tenants will be encouraged to leave after 3 or 4 years
maximum. In addition to accommodation, the incubator unit provides communal equipment,
secretarial support and day-to-day business support.
(62) University of Strathclyde Newsletter: "Prism" no. 39, June 1989 and "Prism" no. 50, March
1990 respectively.
(63) University of Strathclyde Newsletter: Court Report for "Prism", "Prism" no. 51, April 1990.
Case Study Narrative: York University
(1) At both the beginning and the end of the 1980s, for example, taking into account the 40 or so
autonomous, monolithic institutions in Great Britain, York only just occupied the bottom size
quartile.
(2) In the course of being interviewed, one member of the administration said: "There was a
naivety on the part of one or two of the very early university administrators", which resulted in
York putting in for the bottom of the range of potential income rather than aiming higher and
reaching a concensus. Once the UGC moved to a formula basis for funding universities based on
FTEs, the university began to recoup lost ground.
(3) Source: Table 1: Comparative Changes in % Grant, Student Numbers and Unit of Resource for
UK Universities, Special Issue of "Precinct", University of Liverpool newsletter, June 1986. On
the basis of the figures given in this table, the national average was an increase of 5.02 per cent in
student numbers by 1989/90.
(4) In 1988/89 York had 4,082 student FTEs, compared to 3,407 in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 there were 3,137 undergraduate FTEs, 595 taught postgraduate FTEs and 350 research
student FTEs (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89, volume 3: Finance, USR, September
1990). In 1980/81 there were 2,822 undergraduate FTEs, 350 taught postgraduate FTEs and 235
research student FTEs (Source: UGC University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR,
September 1982).
(5) In 1989/90 York had 593 full-time academic/academic-related staff plus 52 part-timers. this
compared with 499 full-timers plus 15 part-timers in 1980/81.
In 1988/89 328 (55%) of the full-time academic staff were funded by the UFC; the remaining 172
(45%) were funded from other sources; many of these were on fixed-term contracts. Academic-
related staff accounted for 16 per cent of the total (Source: UFC University Statistics 1988/89,
volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1990).
There is no surviving record of the proportion of full-time academic staff who were UGC-funded in
1980/81. However, academic-related staff accounted for 18 per cent of the total (Source: UGC
University Statistics 1980/81, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1982).
(6) In 1980/81 there were only 93 UGC-funded staff in the science departments, compared to 146
in 1988/89 (Source: Deputy Registrar, University of York). In real terms, by the end of the
decade, the number of academic staff in the science Departments had increased by 64 per cent.
(7) These subject areas were:
Outstanding: Electrical & Electronic Engineering
Above Average: Biology, Computer Science
Average: Chemistry, Mathematics, Physics
Source: "The Strengths and Weaknesses", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(8) Source: "Poll of Polls", Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 May, 1986.
(9) These "units of assessment" were:
4:	 Electrical & Electronic Engineering, Physics, Computer Science,
Other Biological Sciences
Mathematics, Chemistry
Source: "Countdown to Excellence", Times Higher Education Supplement, 1 September 1989.
(10) Information taken from the University of York "News Sheet", Issue No. 208, October 1989.
(11) Source: UGC University Statistics 1984/85, volume 3: Finance, USR, September 1986.
(12) They contributed 81 per cent of the University's income from the Research Councils, 54 per
cent of its income from charities, 90 per cent of its income from UK public corporations and
private sector industry/commerce, and 36 per cent of its combined income from central
government, local authorities, public corporations and various overseas organisations (These figures
are derived from Form 3, Table 3 of the statistical data prepared for the UGC and the USR by
University of York, relating to 1984/85).
(13) Scientists contributed 73 per cent of the income from Research Councils, 58 per cent of the
income from charities, 78 per cent of the income from UK public corporations and
industry/commerce and 37 per cent of the combined income from central government, local
authorities and various overseas organisations (These figures are derived from Form 3, Table 3 of
the statistical data prepared for the UFC and the USR by University of York, relating to 1988/89).
(14) In his report for 1988/89 the Vice-Chancellor, an economic historian, described the industrial
scene in the York area as based on the 19th century. In York itself, the three largest employers are
Rowntree Mackintosh, British Rail and the University. The dominant economic activities in the
surrounding area are tourism and agriculture.
(15) The Physics Department at York chose to concentrate on expensive, surface physics which
requires Emillions in finding; this was seen as unlikely to generate IP which is exploitable on a
small scale. The Chemistry Department tended to focus on issues relating to the education of
chemistry. The Biology Department's strengths related to the environment, which has only recently
benefitted from non-traditional sources of funding.
(16) This was the first British compiler to be validated by the US Department of Defense for use
with its standard programming language, Ada.
(17) York has a tripartite administrative structure in which all academic matters are handled by the
Registrar's office, all financial matters by the Finance Office and all matters relating to estates and
buildings by the Bursar. The Registrar, the Finance Officer and the Bursar are of equal rank,
reporting on a day-to-day basis directly to the Vice-Chancellor.
(18) The Finance Officer observed that whereas he had handed the appointee around four files in
1982, three years later the appointee had made so many contacts, the documentation took up four
filing cabinet drawers.
(19) York is a university which prided itself from the outset on having relatively few rules and
regulations. It has always given academic staff the freedom to pursue innovative initiatives in
curriculum content, teaching style and examination methods, for example, and tried to support their
efforts to introduce their innovations. The purpose of the Innovation Fund is to ensure that tradition
does not falter for want of money.
(20) The Commercial Activities Committee was wound up in October 1988. It met only three times
a year. Because of this, and the fact that the Chairman did not have executive powers, it was not in
a position to respond quickly enough to some initiatives or events. Instead of reporting to the Sub-
Committee, the Director of the newly established IDU was asked to report direct to the Vice-
Chancellor. In practice, for day to day matters he reports to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor or the
Pro-Vice-Chancellor, whichever of the two is a scientist.
(21) The working party was chosen by the Registrar. It consisted of the newly-appointed ILO, a
Professor from the Chemistry Department, the former Finance Officer, the Registrar and another
member of the administration who was acting as a part-time, salaried consultant, all people who
were deemed to have some knowledge of or at least an interest in IP.
(22) "University Intellectual Property: Its Management and Commercial Exploitation", UDIL,
1989.
(23) "Intellectual Property - How to Lose It" was a talk given by Kynric Lewis, LL.B, QC, at the
Conference of University Registrars and Secretaries, Aberystwyth, 1988.
(24) In the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) definition, r p includes the rights to
"literary, artistic and scientific works, performances or performing artists, phonograms and
broadcasts; inventions in all fields of human endeavour; scientific discoveries; industrial designs;
trade marks; service marks and commercial names and designations; and all other rights resulting
from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields".
(25) Membership of the Joint Committee for Academic & Related Staff comprises three members
of the university appointed by Council, including the Vice-Chancellor and/or his deputy, a lay
member of Council and three members of the local AUT, including the President/Vice-President.
(26) During the second half of the 1980s, with the agreement of the Finance Officer, the HoD of
the Computer Science Department apportioned any revenue paid to "the investigator" between the
grant holder and all researchers working directly on the project which generated the IP. The
income was apportioned in direct proportion to the number of years (measured to the nearest three
months) each individual was associated with the work. The HoD expressly avoided attempting to
make a judgement about the relative importance of the contributions made by the various parties
(Source: Memo from the HoD, Computer Science Department, to all teaching staff, Experimental
Officers and Research Assistants, 7 June, 1990).
(27) Source: "Planning for the Late 1980s", special supplement to the News Sheet, December
1985.
(28) Built at a cost of £470,000, the first phase of the Institute for Applied Biology (IFAB) was
officially opened in March 1990. It was financed by a gift of £150,000 from Rowntree, some
support from the university's central funds and a bank loan which will be repaid from the Institute's
commercial activities.
Besides housing a number of in-house contract research units, IFAB's building is occupied by the
northern regional office of the Nature Conservancy Council, the Swedish Environment Institute in
York, the Soil Survey and Land Research Centre and an office of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature.
(29) The new Director of the IDU was the driving force behind the realisation of the Institute for
Applied Biology.
(30) Source: Academic & Related Staff Handbook, University of York, January 1989.
(31) Intellectual Property Regulations, University of York, April 1990.
(32) Rounded to the nearest integer, in 1989/90 the aggregate, unweighted staff: student ratio at
York was 1:13. This concealed a spread ranging from 1:10 in the Archaeology Department to 1:20
in the Education Department. The aggregate, unweighted staff:student ratio for the science
departments was 1:12. This concealed a spread ranging from 1:11 in the Physics Department to
1:16 in the Mathematics Department (Source: The Deputy Registrar, University of York).
These ratios may not not give an adequate indication of the teaching load of staff in individual
departments. At York, as at Oxford and Cambridge, students in the arts departments in particular
are taught in very small, intensive tutorial groups.
(33) University of York News Sheet, Issue no. 188, April/May 1986.
(34) It is difficult to get academics to grasp all the activities which count as disclosure in terms of
patent law. In one recent case, for instance, an academic wrote to his alma mater, enthusing about
his new research project in some detail. His alma mater was working in the same field on a rival
project and treated this as public disclosure.
(35) For example, the university negotiated a contract with an industrial sponsor to develop a
quality control device. The device could be applied to a number of manufacturing situations, but the
industrial sponsor had no interest in exploiting it. Due to the way in which the contract had been
written, the company was able to prevent the university from exploiting it. In a subsequent
contract, the university was able to avoid making the same mistake.
(36) Although the IDU benefits from the fact that its Director is a known quantity and still a
practising academic, making it mandatory to report discoveries to the IDU may not suffice. The
maxim about leading a horse to water may still apply.
(37) The first issue of the bulletin was published in May 1989, entitled "York Enterprise - The
University of York Commercial Bulletin".
(38) The "North East" is deemed to stretch as far south as Middlesborough, some 40 miles to the
north of York. Whereas Durham and Newcastle Universities, the former Middlesborough and
Sunderland Polytechnics etc could benefit from public sector grant aid, York cannot.
(39) The Electronics Department, for example, channelled a number of its discoveries to its
commercial arm, the York Electronics Centre, which marketed them without benefit of patent
protection.
(40) Having said that, the IDU has not found it easy to locate a patent agent. York's rural location
means that there is not the kind of infrastructure which urban universities take for granted. There
are no firms of patent lawyers in York, though there is one freelance patent agent living locally
whom the IDU's Director has brought in to draft one particular patent.
(41) It is not clear whether the inventor is included among the "interested parties".
(42) A university department has no separate legal status, so patents vested in a department's name
are effectively vested in the university's name.
(43) A period longer than three months is allowed only by mutual agreement.
(44) This might include, for example, a joint venture between the university and the researcher(s),
between the university and industry, between the university and the public sector, or joint ventures
encompassing several or all of these parties.
(45) In one instance, the University got approximately an 8-fold return on its investment within
four years.
(46) "Innovation" is published twice a year by Longman-Cartennill, which also manages the BEST
Index. It gives brief details of scientific and technological discoveries, their likely applications and
an indication of how much development work still remains to be done.
(47) The IDU's Director has a symbiotic relationship with the North East division of the LES.
Whilst the Director is keen to acquire licensing skills, he is also actively involved in stimulating his
local division to greater activity. It has been considerably less active than its counterpart in the
North West. This is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the character of the North East:
"... when you talk about patenting, you haven't got the services. You haven't got the
people, the lawyers, the patent agents. You're very much in a desert in terms of IP. Part
of what I'm about is trying to [promote] a system which talks and thinks in that particular
way..."
The IDU's Director has helped set up a new committee of LES which is organising monthly
meetings to build up awareness in the North East.
(48) Like consultancy work or private professional practice, directorships of/partnerships in outside
firms comes under the university's rules concerning work for outside bodies, which are outlined in
section 27 of the staff handbook. Academics are required to ask their HoD for permission to
undertake work for outside bodies; HoDs are required to seek the permission of the Vice-
Chancellor.
(49) In fact, two of York's academics are known to have left the university to pursue their business
career full-time. One had tenure, one was an Industrial Fellow on a fixed-term contract.
(50) The Computer Science Department imposed a limit of 20 days per year maximim.
(51) Source: Section 27.2 (e) of the Academic and Related Staff Handbook, January 1989.
(52) Departmental Boards of Study comprise every full-time member of the teaching staff together
with any additional members which the General Academic Board cares to nominate.
(53) This Advisory Committee is appointed by the Vice-Chancellor and consists of the Vice-
Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, two members of the Professorial Board and two members
of the General Academic Board. It submits its recommendations to the Council via the academic
Boards.
(54) Preference for granting only a year's partly-paid leave of absence is due to the difficulty of
granting longer without harming academics' pension rights under the USS scheme.
(55) These quotes are taken from section 13.2 of the Academic and Related Staff Handbook,
January 1989.
(56) Both before and after it was sold on, York's first joint venture operated out of a series of
portacabins adjacent to the Department from which it spun out, for instance. Its second joint
venture is located off-campus in the adjacent village, but in property owned by the University.
(57) The project was held up by planning difficulties over its proposed use of greenbelt land. It has
also been held up by the fact that the university itself has nothing but land to contribute. It has been
necessary to put together a joint venture with the public and the private sector to overcome this
difficulty.
It is proposed to situate the science park on land adjacent to the Chemistry Department. Planning
permission has been sought for 13 new buildings, including small incubator units. It is estimated
that the science park will be worth around £18m and will stimulate the creation of over 1,000 new
jobs in the next five years.
(58) The exception has been Parkside Commercial Centre, where the local authority has made
available units ranging from around 400 sq.ft. to around 800 sq.ft., with initial leases as short as 3
months. The local authority also set up a "Young Business Project" which offered incubator-sized
units to people aged under 25. Although these are not suitable for the average academic, a number
of York's graduates have set up companies in its units.
(59) Source: Innovation and Research Priming Fund Committee guidelines, August 1986.
(60) A member of the Biology Department received a grant to cover the cost of biochemical
analysis of particular fluids. The grant led indirectly to the discovery of a method of sexing cattle
embryo, which has considerable commercial value. The Milk Marketing Board subsequently
financed further work.
(61) Perhaps the most striking example was the academic whose entrepreneurial activities led to the
University's first joint venture. Both 3i and the University agreed to the academic concerned
assuming the role of Managing Director, but each reserved the right to appoint a director.
However, this was a right which neither felt the need to exercise and when the company was sold
on, it yielded the University an eight-fold return on its investment. The academic concerned had no
previous experience of running a business, nor a family background in small business.
(62) York Enterprise Ltd is a joint project between the local authority and the public sector. It




1	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Bristol (based primarily on data elicited
in the course of administering Questionnaires A & B)
2	 Case Study Narrative: The City University (based primarily on data elicited in the
course of administering Questionnaires A & B)
3	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Durham (based primarily on data elicited
in the course of administering Questionnaires A & B)
4	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Glasgow (based primarily on data elicited
in the course of administering Questionnaires A & B)
5	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Kent (based primarily on data elicited in
the course of admiministering Questionnaires A & B)
6	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Hull (based primarily on data elicited in
the course of administering Questionnaires A, B & C)
7	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Liverpool (based primarily on data
elicited in the course of administering Questionnaires A, B & C)
8	 Case Study Narrative: The University of Strathclyde (based primarily on data
elicited in the course of administering Questionnaires A, B & C)
9	 Case Study Narrative: The University of York (based primarily on data elicited in




Bristol is one of a group of British universities commonly referred to as "civic"
universities. Founded as a University College in 1876, at the request of the citizens of
Bristol the University College was upgraded to full university status in its own right by
Edward VII in 1909.
1.2	 Size
By the 1980s Bristol had matured into a medium-sized university by UK standards (1) . In
1981 the UGC advised Bristol to reduce the number of home student registered in
1979/80 by 4 per cent within three sessions. As Figure 2 showed, this was fractionally
below the national average. At the same time the UGC announced that Bristol's recurrent
grant would be cut by 16 per cent by 1983/84. As we can see from Figure 2, this, too,
was slightly below the national average.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that Bristol should increase its student numbers by just over 1
per cent over the next four sessions; this was well below the national average of an
increase of 5.02 per cent in student numbers by 1989/90. By the end of the decade, the
University had around 5 per cent more students than it had at the beginning ( 2) . Due to
unforseen circumstances, this was somewhat lower than it might otherwise have been (3)
and these had the effect of reducting Bristol's size relative to some UK universities.
Between the beginning and the end of the 1980s, Bristol managed to increase its full-time
academic staff by 10 per cent; during the same period, the number of part-timers
increased three-fold (4) • By most methods of reckoning, Bristol was one of a middle group
of universities which were treated neither particularly harshly nor particularly leniently by
the UGC.
Structurally, the University ended the decade much as it had begun, with six Faculties
comprising nearly 70 Departments. Bristol closed only one Department as a direct result
of the cuts announced in 1981, though the size or status of several other Departments
changed (5).
1.3	 Science Base
Bristol has a particularly comprehensive science base, incorporating not only the physical
sciences and engineering, but also medicine, dentistry and veterinary science. Whereas at
most universities a Faculty is a fixed grouping of Departments, at Bristol it is more a
grouping of courses. Whilst courses in the Faculty of Engineering are provided almost
exclusively by the engineering Departments, the Faculties of Science and Medicine are far
more fluid in terms of the Departments which contribute courses. Some Departments, like
Anatomy, run courses in both the Faculties of Science and Medicine, for example. Others,
like Geography and Psychology, run courses in both the Faculties of Science and Social
Sciences. The Departments which - wholly or partially - contribute to courses in the
science base are listed in note (6) . It is difficult to put a figure on the the proportion of the
University's total academic staff which the science base represented in 1989/90, since this
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would entail categorising the research activities of individual members of staff in
Departments such as Geography and Psychology, which contribute to the social science
base of the University as well as the science base.
As we can see from Figure 6a, in the UGC's 1985/86 assessment of universities' research
strengths in the natural sciences, engineering and technology, Bristol was ranked 8th best
in the UK. A peer review instigated by the Times Higher Education Supplement rated
Bristol as 5th best (7). Four subject areas were rated as outstanding, twelve as above
average, six as average and three as average (8) . It was suggested that if the ABRC's
recommendations were implemented, Bristol would have been assigned to the 'R' category
(8); accordingly, the University would be funded to conduct high-level research across a
wide range of subjects.
Figure 6b In the 1988/89 research selectivity exercise, five "units of assessment" were
awarded a "5", four received a "4", eight received a "3". Only one received a "2" and
none a "1" (10).
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
As Figure 41a shows, in 1984/85 Bristol ranked 9th in terms of £ earned in external
research grants and contracts, but 15th in terms of the percentage of its total recurrent
income which this external revenue represented, namely 17.5 per cent ( 11). The science
base generated close to £7.5m, accounting for 85 per cent of the University's total income
from research grants and contracts (12) • As we can see from Figure 41b, by 1988/89 the
science base had increased its 1985 earnings by 70 per cent, generating over £12.5m, but
still accounting for 85 per cent of the University's total income from research grants and
contracts (").
The pattern of sponsorship which the science base attracted was marginally different from
the pattern four years earlier. Whereas industry/commerce provided only 7 per cent of its
research grant & contract income in 1984/85, by 1988/89 this had risen to 11 per cent.
This was largely at the expense of income from central government, local government and
various overseas organisations. As Figures 345-346 show, Bristol was the only university
participating in this study to maintain the proportion of Research Council and charity
funding which it was used to receiving - 70 per cent in 1988/89, compared to 71 per cent
in 1984/85. Research Councils and charities funded the four science Faculties to the tune
of £8.9m. In most cases, ownership of any resulting IP rested with the University.
2	 HISTORY OF H' EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Bristol is a University which has traditionally obtained its research funding from the
Research Councils and charities. At the beginning of the 1980s, it was attracting virtually
no contract research income from industry/commerce. This was not a situation which
troubled either the administration or the majority of the academic community. Individual
academics who occasionally spoke in favour of establishing an IL office, with a view to
increasing the level of support from industry, found their arguments fell on deaf ears (").
The University saw no need for an ILO, either to promote the University to industry or to
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handle IP. It was seldom beholden to industrial sponsors and if academics did generate
exploitable research discoveries, the IP had to be offered to the NRDC/BTG. If the
NRDC/BTG did not see fit to exploit the IP, the University tended to assign the IPR to
industry, if partners could be found. Occasionally, if so requested, the University would
waive its rights in favour of the academic inventor(s).
Sporadically, academics generated IP which was not obligated to sponsors. If they were
keen that it should be exploited, the University sometimes paid for an initial registration.
What happened then was often upto the researchers concerned. In some cases, the
University retained ownership of the IP which was then licensed. In others, ownership was
assigned to an industrial partner. The administration did not look for a significant financial
return on its investment. Since it had no particular need of the income, it was happy for
the academics concerned to reap the rewards, particularly as they frequently took charge
of the exploitation process. Equally, if IP was assigned to the NRDC/BTG, the inventor
usually kept the bulk of the income. In one such case, a generic patent led to a number of
follow-on process and applications patents us). These generated around £0.5m during the
patents' lifetime, of which the University received only around 5 per cent.
This attitude changed almost overnight in 1981, when the UGC announced a 16 per cent
cut in the University's recurrent grant. Bristol has fewer reserves than many civic
universities, with the result that in the event of a disaster, its realisable assets would
sustain it for no more than ten days. In the wake of the UGC announcement, two working
parties were established, one to examine ways of making savings, the other to consider
ways to generate income. The latter identified a number of ways to generate income,
including selling the University's expertise more productively, exploiting IP and creating a
science park. Some of these proposals were accepted by the Senate, but although there
was talk about producing a policy document on IP based on the CVCP's 1978 report, in
fact, no such document appears to have been produced.
2.2	 Incentives
Senate did agree, however, to changing the manner in which the revenue from IP was
distributed. Whereas before, most of the revenue was channelled to the academics
concerned, from 1983 the net revenue was split equally between the inventor, the
Department and the University centrally, after deductions for costs.
This change did not occasion immediate comment, except among the few academics who
were likely to find themselves benefitting far less in the future than they had in the past.
In fact, the AUT was keen that a greater proportion of the revenue from exploiting IP
should be channelled into central University funds than the administration itself had
proposed (1°.
2.3	 Structures
By 1984, Bristol was almost unique among British universities in not having at least a
part-time industrial liaison officer (' 7). This meant that IP which was flagged by academics
in response to the new policy was handled by the Deputy Secretary, as an extension of his
existing financial responsibilities u8)• This administrator's lack of experience in exploiting
IP meant that despite the University's interest in getting a good return on its IP, in
practice nothing changed except the way any resulting revenue was distributed. Through
ignorance of alternatives (19), the Deputy Secretary usually offered non-obligated IP to the
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BTG. If the BTG had no interest in it, Bristol was still happy to let the researchers
concerned take charge of the exploitation process. If academics took the trouble to notify
the administration of their discoveries before publishing, the University was usually
prepared to pay for an initial patent registration. Exploitation usually entailed the
academics concerned identifying and approaching potential licensees, although in some
cases, the University simply assigned its IP to companies identified by the academic(s)
concerned. If researchers proposed founding/co-founding spin-off companies to exploit the
IP they had generated, the University had no objection and this is known to have occurred
at least once during this period ( 2°). These were the only options which the University
seriously contemplated at this time. If thought was given to setting up a campus company
to exploit its IP, it was soon dismissed as impractical. Licensing or assigning was seen as
the solution, given the University's lack of experience of evaluating, developing,
manufacturing and marketing its IP. It was also seen as less disruptive, taking up less of
the administration's time and resources. For the same reasons, Bristol did not contemplate
joint ventures with members of the academic staff.
By late 1984, however, academics who were in favour of appointing an ILO found that
they had support in principle from the UGC (21) • The CVCP had also set up a number of
working parties to look into the opportunities and problems presented by
university/industry relations which were due to report ( 22). In November 1984 Bristol's
Senate established a joint Committee of Senate and Council "to initiate discussion of
arrangements for improving and defining the scope of industrial liaison". Chaired by the
Acting Vice-Chancellor (23) , it managed to make more headway than the first committee,
despite the reservations of traditionalists, a number of whom were to be found in key roles
in the administration itself. In 1985 the committee recommended, among other things, that
a Director of Industrial and Commercial Affairs should be appointed ( 24). During the
course of 1985/86 it was decided that the new director should be a Grade IV appointment
(Other Related Staff), on a professorial salary - minus a professorial title - with the
possibility of an annual bonus (23) . It was felt that the IL office should have quasi-
Departmental rather than administrative status. This was motivated by a perceived need to
bridge the gulf between the academic community and the administration. The new director
was to report directly to the Vice-Chancellor.
This was the situation when the Kingman letter arrived: the decision to appoint an ILO
had been taken, the structure and the job specification were in the process of being
agreed, but as yet no ILO had been appointed.
3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
The arrival of the Kingman letter triggered a series of discussions at the Committee of
Deans. It was this group which made the decision in principle to seek to assume rights and
responsibilities relating to the exploitation of inventions arising out of Research Council-
funded projects.
By the time a reply to the letter had been drafted, Sir John Kingman had become Bristol's
new Vice-Chancellor. As a result, he ended up replying to his own letter, although the
substance of the reply had been agreed before he took up his appointment.
Bristol, together with 32 other institutions, had its proposals accepted by the Scrutiny
Group in the first round of deliberations. The letter of authorisation was sent on 26 July
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1986.
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Structures
Although the decision to establish an IL office had been taken in 1985, its head was not
appointed until February 1987 (26) . Bristol was looking for someone with considerable
"real-world experience" as well as academic respectability, yet someone who would not be
associated too strongly with one particular discipline. It took over a year - and
innumerable interviews - to identify someone whom the University regarded as suitable.
The remit of the new Industrial Liaison Office was to consolidate the University's existing
relationships with industry and cultivate new relationships, delivering whatever is required
(services, R&D, short courses, etc). Its remit also involved overseeing the
commercialisation of the University's IP. The job specification emphasised the need for
the head of the IL Office to have a grasp of "the range of means whereby products and
services may be exploited commercially and a knowledge of company and patent law ..."
cm . The ILO's remit explicitly excluded responsibility for the University's relationship
with the Research Councils and charities, Local Authorities, Government Departments and
the EEC, except where the exploitation of IP is concerned.
The IL Office was set up with two full-time officers, one of whom concentrated on the
EC, plus secretarial support staff. The IL Office as a whole was "expected to be self-
financing from additional net income generated over [a 5-year] period taken as a whole",
with the bulk of its income coming from "selling of rights in inventions, manufacture of
products, payments for services rendered [and] rentals". The ILO himself felt that the
University had a naive and over-optimistic view of what its IP might yield in such a short
time-span, however. Although he inherited a portfolio of IP, including around 20 patents,
only two discoveries were big earners. This was partly due to the nature of the IP which
had been protected and partly due to the University's lack of experience in exploiting its
IP effectively. One of the two big earners was due to expire, with the bulk of the income
having been channelled to the inventor, not the University. The other had been licensed in
a way which yielded a high proportion of the projected income up-front, with the
possibility of relatively little to follow. Although the costs of protecting the University's
IP were almost covered by the revenue it yielded, it was not in a position to carry the IL
Office's other activities. As a result, although becoming self-financing was still the
ultimate objective, in 1989/90 there was no projected date for achieving it.
The Senate committee whose deliberations led to the establishment of the ILO
recommended a number of actions which should be taken, but did not concern itself with
policy, let alone the minutiae of policy implementation. Since there was no standing
committee in 1989/90, and since the ILO reported directly to the Vice-Chancellor, in
practice it was the ILO who began to reconcile recommendations, attitudes, custom and
practice in an effort to develop a more coherent and comprehensive policy, particularly
with regard to the identification, evaluation, protection and commercialisation of IP °.
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4.2	 Rationale
Despite the fact that the revenue from IP is unlikely to cover the cost of the IL operation
within five years, as originally intended, the ILO believes that the University has the
capacity to generate a considerable amount of exploitable IP (29):
"... Looking at the resources we have, the range of activities which we're now
involved in ... I'm quite sure that if this University and others had taken the same
attitude as it is taking now, today's income would be five or ten times more [than]
it is ..."
However, the ILO is more sceptical about the potential of discoveries arising out of
Research Council-funded projects, estimating that at best only half the University's
exploitation agreements will be based on Research Council-funded research. Moreover,
most of those will have reached the exploitation stage as a result of additional funding
from other sources.
The ILO recognises that, whatever the University's potential, its actual success in
generating a healthy income from IP will depend very much on its policy and the manner
in which it attempts to implement that policy. The University recognises that some
academics regard relations with industry and the exploitation of IP as "striking a Faustian
bargain which threatens the very nature of the institution" 0°) . The Senate committee
which recommended the establishment of the ILO observed that the term "University" is
partly shorthand for the individual scholars who make it up and added:
"... The experience of Cambridge suggests that part of the reason for the success
of its industrial links has been the relatively relaxed attitude of the University and
Colleges to external industrial commitments..."
The committee did not recommend the completely laissez-faire approach associated with
Cambridge. It recognised there could be a conflict between the best interests of an
individual and the best interests of the University. Accordingly, it recommended that
guidelines should be developed, rather than all-encompassing rules, for fear of "imposing
reporting requirements of a rigidity that no group of scholars would readily accept". It
also commented:
"... even the most sensible guidelines depend on how they are regarded by the
Faculty members to whom they apply. Only if [they] are widely understood,
warmly supported and wisely interpreted are they likely to prove successful..."
4.3	 Regulations and Documentation
The policy which was emerging in 1989/90 dictated that, although Departments and
individuals were not obliged the consult the ILO regarding their relations with industry
and were free to conduct their own negotiations, academics were required to notify the
ILO if their research discoveries seemed exploitable. Moreover, the ILO decided that he
should have the final say as to how discoveries are exploited, feeling that since the
University had assumed the rights to any IP arising out of Research Council-funded
projects, it must also assume the responsibility of ensuring that they were exploited "in the
way which appear[ed] most advantageous in the circumstances" (31).
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By 1989/90 the ILO had not produced a free-standing, written version of the University's
policy vis-a-vis IP. However, he did introduce amendments to the terms and conditions
governing the appointment of full-time members of the academic staff. For the first time
the terms and conditions of appointment indicated that the University claims ownership of
inventions, citing the 1977 Patent Act and the 1988 Copyright, Design 8c Patents Act.
Employees are required to discuss their discovery with the ILO; "such consultations must
include technical matters relating to patentability with particular reference to the non-
publication or disclosure of inventions before patenting". If there is reason to believe their
discovery may be commercially exploitable, academics are required to report it to the
University Secretary via their HoD. The terms and conditions also require academic staff
to consult the Secretary about computer software "in order that appropriate arrangements
are agreed which take into account the particular circumstances and may involve questions
relating to ownership of copyright". However, they make it clear that the University "will
not in normal circumstances seek to benefit from any rights it may have as an employer in
the academic publications of members of the academic staff". These amendments were
approved by Council in March 1989.
The terms and conditions of appointment also outline the way in which IP revenue is
likely to be distributed.
4.4	 Incentives
The ILO paid particular attention to the question of incentives, believing that the
incentives which the University offered between 1983 and 1987 were neither generous nor
comprehensive enough:
"... what one needs is a package, not something which is the panacea. The
package includes visible justice, potential financial benefit, ability to publish safely
without getting told off by the University and the belief that good performance in
that area of the academic's role will contribute to - and certainly not damage -
their progress ..."
In the opinion of the ILO, this means positive incentives, rather than negative incentives:
...What [we] want is willing co-operation, not grudging duty ..."
(i)	 Financial
In keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, academics are not rewarded financially
for bringing IP to the ILO's attention. They are rewarded only if the IP is successfully
commercialised, and they may be able to influence the decision as to how to
commercialise it.
In 1989 a fairly standard formula (32) was introduced to regulate the way that income from
IP is shared out, replacing a wide variety of schemes which appeared to be operating
previously. The ILO opted for a sliding scale whereby the inventor(s) receive 100 per cent
of the first £2,500, 70 per cent of the next £10,000, 50 per cent of the following E40,000
and 33 per cent of any income in excess of £50,000 net. The balance is split equally
between the University and the Department which generated the IP.
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This is considerably more generous towards the inventors than the scheme which the
University introduced in 1983. The ILO believed that by 1989/90 - only a year or so later,
this was already beginning to have a positive effect:
"... The University takes less proportionately but already, I think, more in total. It
takes a smaller share [of something] which is much more likely to grow ...
"Since most of the active researchers are those with a number of children and a
significant mortgage, its a real incentive to give some thought whilst driving home
to whether anything they have done in the past year might be [exploitable].
"People say to me - well, i f I can see the University is being lair about this ...
yes, I am prepared to give it some thought.
"With several of the dozen or so patents that I've been involved in filing, the
possibilities have come to me because people have heard that the University is now
taking a more enlightened view to sharing the benefits..."
The income which the Department receives is believed to act as a strong incentive to the
HoD to identify IP. It also acts as an additional incentive to the researchers who generated
it. Although HoDs have the right to determine how such money is spent, they are
encouraged to channel it back to the research group concerned, to fund further research.
Whether or not they adhere to this particular recommendation, they are certainly likely to
spend the money, rather than keep it in reserve, since otherwise it may be taxed to
support less fortunate Departments (").
Over the past two or three years there have several instances of individual researchers and
their Departments benefitting from a share in the revenue which the exploitation of their
IP yielded; Bristol's incentives are certainly more than hypothetical. However, the benefits
have not always been widely publicised. When the University received £25,000 as an up-
front payment on a licensing deal, for instance, a Department in the Faculty of
Engineering received close to £5,000. However, the licensee imposed restrictions on
publicising the deal, with the result that the ILO has only been able to pass on the
information in a restricted form by word of mouth.
(ii)	 Career Progression
The ILO felt that the University had given out inconsistent messages about the non-
financial value it places on academics flagging IP. In Appendix B of the 1985/86 Annual
Report, for example, academics' publications were listed in their entirety, but patents were
not mentioned. This is an issue which the ILO quickly addressed:
"... I have pointed out to the University ... that if we are expecting [academics] to
identify exploitable, protectable know-how, we may be asking them to divert some
effort from producing papers ... I have got the University to agree that patents
filed will now be included as a record of academic achievement. Therefore, it
[should] add up to brownie points for internal promotion ..."
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In fact, the criteria for promotion to Senior Lecturer make no explicit reference to patents.




general contribution to the University and the community within which the
University operates.
For promotion to Reader, the greatest weight is given to scholarship and research, but for
promotion to Senior Lecturer, the relative weight given to these four criteria may vary
appreciably, in recognition of the fact that candidates may not have had equal opportunity
to excel in all four.
The failure to mention patents explicitly may not necessarily indicate that they have no
value as a criterion for promotion. The memorandum dealing with criteria (34) stressed,
under the heading "Scholarship and Research", that articles in refereed journals are not
necessarily the main form of communication of research findings in some subjects. It
recognised that today research findings are disseminated in increasingly diverse ways.
Given that exploiting IP in the most advantageous way often requires the involvement of
the researcher, the ILO is concerned that the University should give clear messages about
this use of their time. He believes it is now generally appreciated that time and effort
spent on exploitation will not damage people's academic position, but:
"... that is not quite the same as saying that it will positively [enhance] it ... It's
dealing with the fear first, rather than starting with a positive incentive ..."
There are indications that involvement in the exploitation process, particularly
entrepreneurial involvement, may actually be positively rewarded in terms of promotion.
Under the heading "Management and Administration", the criteria for promotion include
"entrepreneurial activities". It is clear that "entrepreneurial" is interpreted here in its
widest sense, including, for example, "establishing working relationships with universities
elsewhere". However, this paragraph also indicates that account will be taken of income
generation activities. Moreover, under the heading "General Contribution to the University
and the Community", involvement in "enterprises directed at the economic development of
the region" is also listed as a criterion for promotion.
4.5	 Sanctions
The ILO is fairly sure that there are some academics at Bristol who have failed to bring
potentially exploitable research discoveries to the University's attention. Some may even
have transferred technology in a way which did not benefit the University, and may or
may not have benefitted themselves:
"... It's almost certain that this has happened, in the same way as people bend the
truth when filling in Inland Revenue forms. I think its quite unlikely that there has
been a major, knowingly dishonest act, though ..."
Even if there were, the ILO does not believe the University would seek redress via the
courts:
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"... It's not the style here to do so ... The emphasis would be on recovery.
Recovering ownership, if possible, recovering rights. But actually suing the
employee would be such a unique situation, I couldn't say how the University
would act ..."
The ILO believes the University would be more likely to deal with it within the
framework of conventional disciplinary procedures, although minor abuses might be dealt
with less formally. Academics might be quietly told that they had damanged their chances
of promotion, for example. This is not something which the head of the ILO feels he
should tackle:
"... it [is] very important that I remain trustable and credible ... I think I
would be breaching any trust i f I said to someone - You've blown it, we can't let
this go ..."
In the view of the ILO, this should be delegated to the HoD or the Dean or even Senate.
5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
It is difficult to know exactly how Bristol interpreted Sir Keith Joseph's statement
concerning the role of academics in the exploitation process. Although Sir John Kingman
was later installed as Vice-Chancellor at Bristol, and he effectively responded to his own
letter, he was not involved in the discussions which the arrival of his letter and Sir Keith
Joseph's statement triggered. If detailed notes of those discussions were kept, no record of
them is now to hand, because the relevant file cannot be traced. Since the ILO has
effectively assumed responsibility for reconciling recommendations, attitudes, custom and
practice into a coherent policy - and he has never seen a copy of either document, it is not
surprising to learn that the policy he has formulated takes no account of the government's
wishes in this respect.
5.2	 Identification
The ILO chose to concentrate his efforts for the first two or three years on the first stage
of the exploitation process: identifying promising research discoveries. He was not privy
to research proposals submitted to funding bodies other than industry. Nor is he
necessarily privy to every proposal which is submitted to industry, since Departments have
the right to conduct their own negotiations. In theory, at least, this could place the ILO at
a considerable disadvantage. In practice, however, Departments are increasingly opting to
involve the ILO in their negotiations - and since many applications to the Research
Councils involve collaborative schemes with industry, the ILO is aware of some of these
submissions, too. Moreover, a list is circulated roughly once a month detailing successful
grant applications to every type of funding body.
Academics who have been at Bristol since the early 1980s are unlikely to be completely
unaware of the University's sudden interest in asserting its rights in employee inventions
in order to generate income for the University. When Bristol thought about formulating a
policy on IP in the wake of the 1981 cuts, both the University's ownership of employee
inventions and the University's desire to assert its righs were discussed in Senate on a
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number of occasions. These discussions were duly reported in the University's fortnightly
newsletter. Staff who joined the University more recently - particularly researchers on
short-term contracts - present the ILO with more of a problem, however. There is no
documentation other than Bristol's terms and conditions of appointment, which were
amended in 1989 to incorporate the terms of the 1977 Patent Act and the 1988 Copyright
Act, and a set of Senate guidelines on IP, outside work etc which is supposed to be
displayed in every Department.
Recognising the problem, the ILO offered in 1988 to make a presentation on IP at the
annual induction course for new members of staff. By 1989/90 the Personnel Office had
not taken up his offer (35).
Irrespective of when they joined the University, the ILO feels that some academics are not
sufficiently aware that the University's policy has been extended to include IP arising out
of Research Council-funded projects. The "Newsletter" did mention the removal of the
BTG's monopoly in May 1985, but it was buried in the small print of a long report (.
This same report mentioned in the broadest terms that British universities were being
approached by patent agents and patent brokers as a consequence, but did not spell out the
fact the Research Councils had offered exploitation rights to the University. Equally, it
failed to report on the University's response to the Research Councils or on the
authorisation which the University subsequently received from the Research Councils (Th
The ILO believes it was the Vice-Chancellor's practice to despatch an annual memo to
some members of staff to remind them of the University's responsibility vis-a-vis
discoveries arising out of Research Council-funded projects m . However, despite such
memos and the best efforts of the ILO, it is still possible to encounter academics whose
first instinct is to offer their discoveries to their long-standing contacts at the BTG.
Others are aware of the change, but question the wisdom of the University accepting
responsibility for exploiting IP. The ILO has sometimes had to play an evangelising role,
persuading doubters that:
"... exploitation is largely to do with producing further income to do what the
University is here for, rather than shifting towards [becoming] a commercial
institute ..."
On the whole, though, people's attitudes to IP and its exploitation are closely correlated to
how easy it is for them to imagine commercially viable applications of their research:
"... Within Physics, for example, there are groups working very near the frontiers
of knowledge who are honestly convinced both that what they are doing is not
readily exploitable and that it would require a diversion of their efforts to even
spend time thinking about it.
"They are probably right that their work is much further from the market than
some people's. I don't think they are right [to] get doctrinaire about it ..."
The ILO's strategy is to raise awareness of IP in the broadest sense, rather than to focus
specifically on research funded by the Research Councils. Tactically, the ILO prefers to
rely on face-to-face rather than written reminders. Reminders may be spontaneous or
planned, addressed to individuals or to groups. Casual conversations provide an
opportunity to leave a trail of "triggers" which will encourage individual researchers to
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contact the ILO before doing anything which might prejudice the ability to protect their
IP. Departmental meetings provide a more formal opportunity to impart the same message
to larger groups and the ILO tries to solicit invitations to speak. The ILO has also
organised several events designed to raise awareness of IP (39) • In 1989/90, he arranged for
a local patent agent to hold a regular, on-campus surgery for each of the three science-
based Faculties, at no cost to the University.
In theory, the ILO should be helped in his search for IP by the HoDs. Since 1983/84 it
has been University policy for HoDs to scrutinise outgoing research reports for potentially
exploitable IP. However, it is not clear how - or indeed, whether - HoDs are carrying out
their responsibilities in practice, or whether those who are doing so remember to pass on
their findings to the ILO. This is not a gap which the ILO plans to plug in the immediate
future, partly for pragmatic, political reasons - the ILO is still in the process of
establishing himself - and partly for principled reasons:
"... a new bit of bureaucracy is often a major demotivator. It could well be that
we [devise] an efficient system which is so under-utilised that we would be better
with the old method.
"The fact that there is a fairly widespread lack of concrete systems may well be the
way that this University should continue. It may well be the best way to get
ffieople'sj free co-operation.
"That relates to the high level of Departmental differences and the high degree of
academic freedom which is traditional here. ['Thad carries other advantages
[which] we don't want to lose ..."
For similar reasons, the ILO would not consider asking academics to submit drafts of
papers before submitting them to journals:
"... [We would] not wish to give the impression of any restriction on the
dissemination of knowledge. There's a very strong stand [against that] at Bristol
..."
The ILO is not keen on allowing outside organisations into the University to trawl for IP
unless they have "earned respectability". The two exceptions are the BTG and 31 Research
Exploitation Ltd. By 1989/90 Bristol's enabling agreement with 31 Research Exploitation
Ltd had not yet led to any exploitation deals, however, and in the previous year or so, the
BTG had not made any visits.
5.3	 Evaluation
By 1989/90 the ILO had paid less attention to evaluating potentially exploitable IP than it
had to identifying it in the first place, even though his remit stated: "one major
responsibility ... will be to help assess the commercial potential of inventions made within
the University ...". Faced with a need to prioritise his activities, the ILO felt he could rely
to some extent on his own judgement in this area, given his previous experience. As a
result, he concentrated on assessing the scientific and novelty value rather than the
market value. He did this by means of discussions with the researcher and, to gain
greater objectivity, with his peers within the Department.
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The working party which approved the establishment of the ILO recognised that evaluating
IP would present the University with a problem. Instead of creating a budget heading with
funding to commission private sector market analyses, the University opted for a patents
review panel which could act as an in-house resource to give an indication of the likely
market value. The panel, consisting in 1989/90 of a financier, a retired industrialist who is
a member of Council, an IP specialist and representatives of two high-tech companies had
its first meeting in September 1989 (4°) and was scheduled to meet at least twice a year.
Given that the decision on initial registration sometimes needs to be made within a matter
of days, rather than weeks or months (41) , it is likely that the panel's expertise will be
reserved for the more expensive decisions, such as whether to proceed with a full
application when commercial interest in a discovery is uncertain.
Although there is no budget heading dedicated to commissioning a market evaluation of
academics' discover universities, in practice the ILO has virement between budget
headings. If it was necessary, the requisite sums (estimated at around 050 minimum)
might be found. However, the ILO is sceptical about the value of such exercises: they
require considerable effort to set up and monitor and the results inevitably fall
considerably short of the kind of evaluation which the BTG would provide. The ILO
acknowledges that the BTG itself sometimes makes money available for a market analysis,
but does not regard this as a particularly useful option:
"... For a start, you have to ask for it, and they don't always say yes. They've
only said yes to us once, so far. Secondly, a market analysis is generally
more appropriate when there is something more mature. At the stage [that] we are
considering filing patent applications, we're quite likely to have something that
needs another year before one can take the sensible industrial view, anyway. The
option of not filing until then and keeping very quiet, preventing leakage and not
publishing is sometimes too high a risk. So we tend to file quite substantially
before the work is sufficiently mature for a good market assessment ..."
There is a conspicuous absence of public sector agencies in the Bristol area which could
provide a worthwhile, independent and free market evaluation when the time was right.
5.4	 Protection
(i)	 Philosophy
The ILO makes every effort to ensure that potentially exploitable IP is protected at the
earliest possible opportunity. This may entail an initial registration, copyrighting or simply
keeping it secret. Despite the ILO's qualms about the risks involved in keeping a
discovery secret, he recognises that this is sometimes necessary as a strategem "to delay
the start of the clock ticking" - it allows more time for development work before having to
submit a full application. This often yields a stronger, broader patent. In situations where
secrecy is considered too risky, the ILO recognises that premature initial registrations may
yield a patent of lower quality or may, indeed, have to be withdrawn and resubmitted a
year later.
Secrecy on a long-term basis is a different issue. If an industrial partner is insistent that it
wants to use IP on the basis of secret know-how, rather than be granted a license to
exploit a patent, Bristol's decision will depend on the partner agreeing to two things: that
the University has free use of the know-how for its own teaching and research purposes,
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and that any embargo on publishing should not exceed one year. The ILO has no
sympathy with either companies or universities which negotiate embargoes of upto five
years:
"... If five years were really necessary, I might find it easier to swallow. But
generally an outside funding body that requires five years is really just trying to
make their own life easy, rather than asking for something that's absolutely
necessary ..."
Bristol's reluctance to accept delays on publication is a long-standing phenomenon.
Developing this into a policy with hard and fast numbers is something which the ILO has
done, guided by his knowledge of what industry can be persuaded to accept. Despite the
general ethos, naive academics are sometimes willing to accept a longer delay than the
ILO would regard as necessary:
"... It's rather interesting, because one would expect it to be the ILO who would
try to encourage them to waive their academic interests, but sometimes it is the
other way around.
"If an academic is keen to go ahead, after having pointed out the disadvantages of
the delay and [tried] to get it to a minimum, ultimately it would be the academic's
decision as to whether it complies with the Senate guidelines or not.
"... If I felt sufficiently strongly, I would make sure it was dealt with at sufficiently
high academic levels. I'd say - I think we ought to get your Dean to check there's
going to be no problem with academic guidelines. Just saying that may be enought
to make somebody think - well, yes, it is a bit long ..."
Ideally, Bristol would like to retain ownership of all the IP generated by its staff, protect
it on a fairly world-wide basis (42) , find one or more active partners who are prepared to
pay a substantial sum upfront or generate an ongoing revenue stream, and still have
reversion rights to the IP. In practice, the University has not always been able to retain
ownership. In two or three cases, the IP has been assigned in return for a lump sum:
"... [we] know that we could regret it later but ... we just cannot have an
unlimited number of patents which we continue to support even though there is no
prospect [of a partner] ..."
(ii)	 Practicalities
If it is possible to protect a discovery via a patent application, financially feasible - and the
academic agrees to it (43) - the ILO brings in a patent agent to draft the specification.
Academics are simply asked to discuss their discovery with the patent agent and review
the resulting specification. Although this is more costly, the ILO regards it as essential:
"... the patent agent knows everything that needs to be included and has the
experience and know-how to be able to extend into other fields that the University
might not have thought of In any case, if he's doing his job properly, he is going
to add quite a lot.
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"Academics are much more likely to write a patent specification as if it
were a paper, perhaps not including things that they would include after cross-
examination, but wouldn't include, just sitting and writing ..."
The ILO also sees this approach as less distracting to academics. It means, too, that the
cost of filing patents is more easily quantifiable.
(ii)	 Finance
Bristol's budget for filing new applications was £6,000 in 1989/90. Ongoing costs like
renewal fees do not come out of the ILO's budget but are borne centrally, with £12,000
set aside for this purpose in 1989/90. The ILO felt that £6,000 was sufficient to cover the
cost of employing a patent agent to draft and file all the patents it can handle in any one
year:
"... It is dictated not by the ultimate need, but by what I could see us being able
to handle, year on year. Perhaps we should be identihing 30-50 patentable
inventions a year Put I don't envisage] suddenly being able to build upto that
level ..."
On the other hand, if there was a sudden flurry of promising discoveries, the ILO has
virement between budget headings. It is also likely that he would be allocated a mid-year
budget supplement if his case were strong enough.
So far, Bristol has managed to keep supporting only two long-term, more speculative
patents. In both cases, the inventions concerned have such a breadth of application in a
number of industries that the ILO feels it can justify the considerable costs involved. In
the long-term, the ILO would like to support a higher proportion of speculative patents
and to a certain extent, this objective influences its approach to commercialising IP.
The ILO recognises that there may be occasions when it cannot justify patenting a
discovery - or paying the renewal fees for a patent which has been granted but not
exploited:
"... We are prepared to be less risk averse [than the BTG] with the first few
hundred pounds. We then diverge quite rapidly from the BTG. Once they have
committed themselves, they are prepared to spend Emillions, if necessary. Once
we've committed ourselves, we might jump out if more than the odd fl ,000 were
involved ..."
(iv)	 Ownership
It is the University's practice to vest patent ownership solely in its own name, not in the
joint names of the University and the member/s of staff who generated the IP. Where
students are concerned, Bristol has agreed to joint ownership in two cases, however.
Neither practice has yet been formally articulated as a policy decision. The ILO is in the
process of addressing the complex issues of ownership together with the Secretary, the
Director of Personnel and the Patents Panel.
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In a situation where the ILO does not feel he can justify patenting a discovery, or paying
renewal fees, if the researcher felt it was worth continuing, the University would consider
issuing a conditional waiver/assignment. This has not happened since the ILO was
appointed, but the University occasionally issued a conditional waiver in the preceding
years. It retained a modest interest in the IP as recompense for the resources it had
invariably contributed (44) . Despite his own reluctance to pay the patenting costs, in this
situation the ILO would prefer that researchers did not use the "DIY route" to protect the
IP:
"... having seen some amateur proposals, I'm pretty disillusioned with them ..."
In this situation, the ILO would hope that the Department concerned might cover the cost
of some input by a patent agent, unless the IP showed no promise at all. The ILO is
confident that his cautious approach to protecting IP will generate sufficient income to
enable it to adopt a more speculative stance within a relatively short period. Even if it is
proved wrong, it does believe that the University will demand a change of policy:
"... I don't think it would alter the way we behave very much, because quite a lot
of what is going on through the ILO is a University act of faith rather than simply
a hard-nosed, we'll-see-year-by-year-if it-pays-and-decide-whether-to-continue
[approach] ..."
5.5	 Commercialisation
Where it retains rights to its IP, Bristol has no principled objection to exploiting it via
licensing to a third party, a University company, a joint venture ( 4.5) or even an
independent academic spin-off company.
(i)	 University Companies
In 1987 the University took the decision to set up a holding company, with a view to
forming subsidiary companies to exploit equipment, expertise and IP in different areas, as
opportunities arise. In practice, however, by 1989/90 it has not elected to exploit IP by
any of these more entrepreneurial routes (46) . IP has only been assigned or licensed to a
third party. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the fact that - in the view of
the ILO - Bristol is a fairly risk-averse organisation:
"... flf] we put in a commercial proposal which might involve a company or
something similar, generally, the major question the University is interested in is -
if things go badly, what is the worst it can do to us? - rather than - if things go
well, what is the best it can do for us?
"[There are] three sorts of risk: investing money and never seeing a return, ie. a
simple financial risk; the risk to the University's reputation as a scholarly
institution; and finally, the risk of litigation from others.
"If all of these are well under control, then the University is prepared to be quite
entrepreneurial in principle about investing money in new activities ..."
In this equation, Bristol is particularly concerned about its reputation as a scholarly
institution:
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"... the University is ii2t wanting, in principle, to be seen as a go-getting,
commercial whizz-kid University which might give the impression of putting
academics ends into second place. It is very important to Bristol to be seen as an
academically high-class University. Anything that might hint that that was being
eroded would be [vetoed] ..."
At the moment, the ILO also prefers assigning or licensing IP to more the entrepreneurial
exploitation routes, though for more pragmatic reasons:
"... It goes back to [the question of] short, medium and long-term. As we build up
our portfolio of first of all short-term revenue via divesting ourselves of ownership,
and secondly setting up commercial licenses, then we will have a stronger basis on
which to do some long-term work which might include hanging onto ownership
and investing substantial sums of money in patenting and/or setting up companies
to exploit them. That really needs a stronger base ..."
The ILO is confident that this could happen in the not too distant future, though it will
always be the exception, not the rule (47):
"... As of next year (1990/91), if a potential goldmine came along where there was
a product champion - an in-house product champion - then [we] would seriously
consider and perhaps recommend that the University went ahead [and founded] a
University company, for example.
"It would have to be lower-risk than most, it would have to have a clearly
identified person who is going to pull it along to make it fly - not just hope to find
someone. If all that came together within the next year, yes!"
(ii)	 Academic Spin-Off Companies
The ILO adopts much the same approach to academic spin-off companies. This does not
necessarily mean that Bristol is full of thwarted would-be academic entrepreneurs,
however:
"... It's fairly common for somebody to say - I've got this brilliant idea, I know
it's a winner, I want to set up a company so that I can make lots of money.
Questioning reveals they actually do understand that its not that simple, but
they've sublimated that to their enthusiasm ..."
In the cold light of day, it is unusual for them to want to continue. Since February 1987,
only one academic spin-off company has been founded to exploit IP - with the ILO's
blessing (48) , and nobody has challenged the ILO's decision as to how their IP should be
exploited. If someone did, the ILO would ask why ...
"... if there was any way of adapting the University's route so as to deal with that
objection, fine ... It would not be right for the University simply to say that
because the academic preferred another route, ok! ..."
If there were still disagreement, the Vice-Chancellor would probably make the final
decision, taking account of the fact that the head of the ILO has 15 years commercial
experience whereas the academic may have none.
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(iii) Licensing
In practice, at the moment Bristol's IP is almost invariably exploited by licensing - or
occasionally assigning - it to existing companies with a track record. With the one
exception detailed, academics' contribution to the exploitation process has been limited to
helping identify companies to whom the IP can be licensed or assigned, making the initial
approach, supporting the ILO in any subsequent negotiations and providing
scientific/technical support once agreements have been signed. Experience to date suggests
that Bristol's academics are generally keen to become involved in this way. Given that at
present the ILO has chosen to concentrate on the beginning of the exploitation process, he
sees the researcher's contribution as particularly valuable (49):
"... In engineering, especially, the academic input in terms of finding potential
partners is very, very important ... It is likely to be important in all areas, because
the inventor is quite likely to know the most likely application for what he has got
II
Academics can sometimes be a mixed blessing, however:
"... There are certainly instances where the University's negotiating strength has
been prejudiced by things being said or implied offers being made by academics,
where we have had to try and recover [lost ground] ..."
This has not deterred the ILO from involving academics. In the rare instances where
researchers are not immediately interested, the ILO persuades them to co-operate:
"... [we] mainly take account of how much involvement is needed from the
academic, rather than how much they want ..."
(iv) BTG
Their assistance in identifying industrial partners is particularly necessary, since the ILO
has largely dismissed the idea of offering research discoveries to the BTG:
"... In the last nine months or so, I've involved them less because of the lack of
success with maybe five, six, seven, even eight examples in my first eighteen
months here.
"I've developed the feeling that the BTG has become much more oriented towards




Bristol has not had sufficient experience of academic entrepreneurship to cause it to
formulate an explicit, comprehensive policy. What it has is a general view, which holds
that academic entrepreneurship is "a good thing". Bristol's attitude was influenced by what
it perceived was happening in other civic universities ( 5°). It discovered this largely through
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chance conversations with fellow Vice-Chancellors, Secretaries, Finance Officers etc,
rather than through UDIL, which it did not join until 1987/88. This general view received
a fillip when Sir John Kingman was made Vice-Chancellor in 1985. The ILO feels that
where entrepreneurial activities are concerned, he has given "unusually unlimited moral
and other support which other Vice-Chancellors might not have done".
The administration's enthusiasm derives largely from its belief that spin-off companies
create opportunities for synergy, as staff move between University and company. Many
academics are sympathetic to this view - in principle, at least. In practice, though, some of
them would prefer not to suffer the disruption of technology-transfer-by-movement-of-
people in their own Department. There are academics who have a principled objection to
activities such as academic entrepreneurship, moreover, seeing it as an unwelcome sign of
the University's acceptance of government policy (51) . Others feel threatened by the
concept:
"... There are individuals and little pockets of individuals who really want to be
left alone to do their own research in their own corner ... Some have expressed it
[in terms such as] - I didn't come here to a University to do what I could have
done in industry ..."
Despite the disquiet which academic entrepreneurship provokes in some quarters, over the
years a number of academics have become involved in entrepreneurial activities of various
types. For some, this has meant operating within the system, setting up
institutes/centres/units which have a partial or complete self-funding requirement (52) • On
the initiative of these entrepreneurs some of these quasi-academic organisations are likely
to be converted to limited companies - wholly-owned subsidiaries of a University holding
company - operating on-campus and managed in many cases by the academics concerned.
Whilst most of these are currently exploiting equipment and/or expertise, all have the
potential to exploit "hard" IP and one already does (53) • By 1989/90, however, none of
Bristol's academics had proposed a joint venture with the University, though in 1989/90
the framework was set up for one such venture on the initiative of the ILO (54).
A not insignificant number of Bristol's academics have founded independent spin-off
companies - usually to exploit "soft" IP in the form of expertise, though there are two
known cases of academics exploiting "hard" IP. Given the administration's laissez-faire
attitude to such activities up until 1983, it is not surprising that there is no central record
of academic spin-off companies having been founded. This is something which now
concerns the administration and it has been suggested that the ILO should make every
effort to identify as many as possible ( 55) . It is felt that this may yield a record of successes
and failures, and even wasted opportunities. Several of Bristol's academics have entered
the Academic Enterprise Competition but failed to win prizes (56) . There is no record of
what subsequently happened to their discoveries.
6.2	 Making Time
Academics who want to do outside work "of an occasional and minor nature" are not
required to ask permission at Bristol, but those wanting to do outside work "of a more
continuous or substantial nature" are expected to ask permission - unless it is consultancy
or contract research negotiated by the Department (57). Asking permission involves
academics consulting their HoD before sending their request in writing to the Secretary;
HoDs are expected to ask permission of the Vice-Chancellor. Although there is no
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reference to company start-up, this would presumably be defined as outside work of a
more continuous or substantial nature. However, given its attitude to academic
entrepreneurship, the University is unlikely to withhold permission. This would enable
academics to devote around 20 per cent of their working week to their business activities
provided they did not neglect their primary academic commitments ( 5 • On the same basis,
they could also devote evenings and weekends to business activities.
If the University felt that an academic's commercial activities complemented the work of
his Department, the ILO believes s/he might be allowed to devote significantly more time
to them, irrespective of whether s/he was involved in the commercial arm of the
Department, a campus company, a joint venture with the University or an independent
spin-off company. Moreover, s/he might even be allowed to do this on full pay for a
limited period, if her/his Department had sufficient funds to buy in a part-time
replacement (59)• If the Department in question were in deficit, this might mean having to
negotiate a part-time contract or arrange for a year's leave of absence, however. It is felt
that leave of absence for company start-up activities would be granted "on the nod",
though using a sabbatical for such activities might be more controversial.
Although the University does not have a comprehensive policy regarding academic
entrepreneurship, its willingness to assist would-be academic entrepreneurs for a limited
period by giving them time was minuted by Council in the mid-1980s ( 6°). In principle this
offer is open to academics from any Department, but by 1989/90 only science-based
Departments (61) had taken advantage of it. In practice, it may depend very much on the
attitude of the HoD whether or not exploitation of expertise or IP are seen as being
complementary to the Department's main activities. It also depends on the company
satisfying the demands of the Safety Officer and the Finance Office, if it is planning to
operate from the campus (62).
After a year or so, academics are expected either to become full-time entrepreneurs or
revert to being full-time academics, dedicating no more than a day a week to running the
business. With one exception (", the ILO knows of no academic entrepreneurs who
elected to leave the University completely in favour of becoming full-time businessmen.
6.3	 Other Resources
(i)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
In principle, the University is in favour of allowing would-be academic entrepreneurs
access to such resources, irrespective of whether they are involved in an in-house
commercial arm, a campus company, a joint venture with the University or an
independent spin-off company. This willingness to help applies equally to academics
exploiting expertise and to those trying to exploit "hard" IP and it applies whether the
University profits from the academic's activities or not.
In practice, the extent to which entrepreneurial academics get access to resources depends
entirely on the local situation in their Department. The overall demand for any particular
resource obviously influences the situation, as may the attitude of the HoD. This is also
likely to determine whether or not they have to pay for the resources used, despite the
dictat of the Finance Office, which requires academics to keep a log of resources used for
personal work so that a charge can be levied. If the Department's
equipment/instrumentation has spare capacity, and the HoD approves of an academic's
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entrepreneurial activities, he is likely to turn a blind eye for the first 6 to 12 months,
while the academic "tests the water". Similarly, if the academic needs the assistance of
technicians or secretarial staff, the HoD may try to find ways to subsidise the cost from
other operations. Only materials or telephone calls are likely to be charged at cost from
the outset (64).
(ii) Accommodation
In principle, Bristol also tries to help its entrepreneurial academics by allowing them to set
up - and in some cases - actually run their businesses from University accommodation.
This applies equally to academics involved with an in-house commercial arm or a campus
company, to those involved in a joint venture with the University and to those whose spin-
off company is completely independent of the University. In practice, there are some
businesses which the ILO has preferred to see locate off-campus, however ( 65). Although
the University perceives itself as being short of space, UFC norms suggest that Bristol is
under less pressure than many other universities. If an academic is able to conduct his
business from existing Departmental space, he is unlikely to be charged for it in the start-
up period. Where academics have been allocated additional space by the administration,
theyALe. liable to have to pay for it, however, and they will also have to pay once the
company is up and running. Bristol looks for no return over and above charging for
space, unless a profit-sharing arrangement has been negotiated because the academic is
exploiting the University's IP.
The University's relaxed attitude to the use of its accommodation for commercial activities
may change during the 1990s, when or if the proposed science park is built ( 6'5); academics
may then be encouraged to move out to one of the incubator units.
(iii) Finance
Bristol has not set up any kind of seedcorn fund, innovation fund or development fund to
support the entrepreneurial activities of its members of staff. Despite being increasingly
prevalent in other universities, the concept is quite new to Bristol. To date, the University
has only made a small loan to fund a negative cash flow on two in-house commercial
projects. In one case, the commercial arm of a Department has been registered as a
company, in the other, the commercial arm may become a company in due course. The
ILO has no plans to buy equity in an independent spin-off company. Any joint ventures to
date are joint ventures by virtue of the University demanding an equity stake in lieu of
routine payments for the use of its IP.
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
If academics decide to become entrepreneurs, the University does not consider it has a
responsibility to ensure that they go about it the right way. On the other hand, it does not
take a totally laissez-faire attitude. The ILO has established a resource centre with
numerous publications on obtaining funding, setting up in business etc. Time permitting,
the ILO will always try to answer any further queries which academics might have - or
refer them to appropriate sources of assistance.
At the moment, these are likely to be outside the University since the ILO has not had
time to research the kind of assistance which is available in-house. Although the
University does not offer Honours courses in business studies or marketing, it is one of
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Britain's nine Regional Enterprise Centres. The Industrial & Management Services section
of the Department of Extra Mural Studies runs the Graduate Enterprise Programme and a
number of other small business training programmes. Moreover, the Faculty of Law has
substantial knowledge of commercial law and business liability. It runs a variety of
evening classes, half-day and one-day courses on IP law, company law, personal and
corporate taxation etc. The ILO recognises that there may be scope for a directory of in-
house resources, but this is not an immediate priority. In the meantime, fellow-academics
who have more experience may be the next best in-house resource.
7	 EXPLOITATION SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Bristol was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was satisfied
with the exploitation arrangements which the University had established. A formal
document was scheduled to follow confirming the University's rights to IP arising out of
Research Council-funded projects for an indefinite period. Henceforth, Bristol was





City is one of a group of ten British universities commonly referred to as an "ex-CAT" -
that is to say, a former College of Advanced Technology. City started life in 1894 as the
Northampton Polytechnic - named not after the town but after a square to the north of the
City of London. In 1966, the Northampton Polytechnic was given university status, at the
same time as Salford, Bradford, Surrey etc.
1.2	 Size
At the beginning of the 1980s City was the smallest monolithic university in England,
measured in terms of student FTEs. Nevertheless, in 1981 City was advised by the UGC
to reduce the number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 5 per cent by 1983/84.
This was very close to the national average, as Figure 2 revealed. However, City was
already recruiting 20 per cent of its students from overseas. As we can see from Figure 2,
this was the third highest percentage in Britain and almost double the national average.
This was therefore a bigger blow than is immediately obvious. City had already been put
under considerable financial pressure in the late 1970s, as a result of being required to
charge overseas students full fees; the proportion of overseas students had already begun
to diminish. This was compounded by the UGC's 1981 announcement that City's recurrent
grant was to be reduced by 20 per cent between 1980/81 and 1983/84. As we can see
from Figure 2, this was somewhat above the national average. City had no endowments
and by most methods of reckoning, this concatenation of events place it in the worst
afflicted group of universities in terms of resulting hardship.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that City should increase its student numbers by 15.39 per cent
over the next four sessions ( 0 . This was around three times the national average - but in
fact, student FTEs increased by 19 per cent between the beginning and the end of the
decade (2). By 1989/90 City had the highest percentage of postgraduate students of any
university in Britain. Moreover, City managed to increase its full-time academic staff
numbers by 11 per cent in the course of the 1980s; at the same time, the number of part-
timers employed increased by a factor of seven (3) . This expansion almost brought City out
of the bottom size quartile, as UK universities go, and its size relative to many other
universities increased somewhat. However, it is still the smallest university to participate
in this study.
Structurally, City ended the decade with one less Department than at the beginning,
though this is not directly attributable to the cuts. In the mid-1980s, as a result of City's
own decision, the Physics Department was subsumed into the Engineering School. As a
direct result of the UGC's Chemistry Review, City's Chemistry Department was due to
close in 1990, with the majority of the staff being made redundant.
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1.3	 Science Base
Being an ex-College of Advanced Technology, City's science base consists predominantly
of engineering and applied science disciplines more than pure sciences (4) . This bias will be
reinforced by the closure of the Chemistry Department. City will be left with Departments
of Civil Engineering, Electrical, Electronic & Information Engineering (grouped together
as the School of Engineering), Mathematics, Actuarial Science & Statistics (grouped
together as a School), Computer Science, Information Science, Business Systems Analysis,
Optometry & Visual Science, Clinical Communication Studies and Systems Science.
On the basis of student numbers, these Departments represent a sizeable proportion of the
University: the School of Engineering accounts for roughly a quarter, as do health-related
subjects. The Business School also accounts for roughly a quarter. On an aggregate basis,
staff in these Departments represented about 54 per cent of the University's total
academic/academic-related staff in the 1988/89 session ( 5). They appear to have been
responsible for 67 per cent of City's undergraduates, 68 per cent of registered research
students and 36 per cent of City's taught postgraduates, who numbered close to one
thousand (6).
As Figure 6a revealed, in the UGC's 1986 assessment of universities' research strengths
in the natural sciences, engineering and technology, all of City's subject areas were rated
as below average. It was suggested that if the ABRC's recommendations were
implemented, in common with seven of Britain's ten ex-Colleges of Advanced
Technology, City would be assigned to the "T" category; accordingly, the University
would be able to offer some postgraduate work, but without advanced research facilities
(7). City's ranking was not a reflection of poor research so much as little or no research.
Traditionally, City has been a strongly vocational University which channelled its energies
into producing engineers who would be first-class practitioners. Research, particularly the
type of research funded by the Research Councils, has had little place in this tradition.
This is a deficiency which City has been striving hard to overcome. It has founded a
number of research centres which are dedicated predominantly to academic rather than
commercial contract research (8), though some undertake collaborative research. As Figure
6b showed, City's ratings in the 1989 research selectivity exercise suggest that it is
embarked upon a long, slow process. No "units of assessment" in the natural sciences,
engineering & technology were awarded a "5" or a "4"; two were awarded a "3", four
received a "2" rating and three a "1" (8) • City's management has reason to believe that
perseverance eventually pays dividends, however (it)).
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
As Figure 41a indicates, in 1984/85 City ranked 43rd in terms of £ earned in external
research grants and contracts, and 47th in terms of the percentage of its total recurrent
income which this external revenue represented, namely 7.5 per cent Go . There is no
surviving record of the proportion of City's £1.7m which was contributed by the science
base in that year. However, in the following year, as we can see from Figure 41a, the
science base generated just over £1.5m, accounting for 81 per cent of the University's
total income from research grants and contracts (12)• Figure 41b shows us that in 1988/89
the science base generated over £2.2m, accounting for only 74 per cent of the University's
total income from research grants and contracts (13)•
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The pattern of sponsorship which the science base attracted differed considerably from the
pattern three years earlier. Whereas industry/commerce provided 13 per cent of its reseach
grant and contract income in 1985/86, by 1988/89 this had risen to 21 per cent. This was
largely at the expense of income from central government, local government and various
overseas sources, which dropped from 45 per cent in 1985/86 to 36 per cent in 1988/89.
Figures 345-346 reveal that City was the only university participating in this study to
increase the proportion of funding it received from Research Councils and charities, but
only by 1 per cent.
2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Despite its technological background, City does not have a history of actively seeking out
IP with a view to exploiting it:
"... There wasn't ... a distinct policy of encouragement, help or support ..."
If IP was identified and flagged prior to the 1980s, it was invariably on the initiative of
the academics concerned. Whether or not this happened seems to have been less a question
of subject area than the attitude of the individuals concerned. Inevitably, opportunities
were missed, even when individuals were alert to the possibilities:
" ... They died - withered on the vine because there were more important things to
do - or there seemed to be at the time: teaching students and all the other
University activities ..."
On the other Nand, once possibilities were drawn to its attention the management (") was
generally supportive, providing encouragement and money if it appeared a discovery was
both patentable and exploitable and not obligated to the NRDC or a sponsor. A rough and
ready evaluation of its potential would be obtained in-house, often from the HoD. If it
looked promising, the management would cover from central funds the cost of a patent
agent to make an initial registration. The academics concerned would be encouraged to try
and identify an industrial partner who would help develop, manufacture and market the
IP.
This laissez-faire approach to the exploitation of IP began to change in 1978. It was not
particularly motivated by an increased interest in IP in its own right; it was rather part of
a global change of approach which followed the arrival of a new Vice-Chancellor and the
beginning of City's financial difficulties. City began to take a more entrepreneurial interest
in exploiting its IP. The outgoing Vice-Chancellor had played a part in this, when he
agreed in 1977/78 to City founding City Technology Ltd (CTL), a wholly-owned
University company dedicated to exploiting "hard" IP 05). The highly successful activities
of this company served to reinforce this new approach over the years: within five years it
had generated an income of around £0.3m with no strings attached to it. In the process the
company had won the first of three Queen's Awards to Industry 00 . In 1983/84 City
founded a second wholly-owned company, which has been modestly successful (17)•
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City's courage to exploit its IP itself is generally attributed to the attitude of two Vice-
Chancellors and the Director of Finance:
"... [These people all had] a background which ... encouraged them not to be
averse, when it seemed right, to take risks ..."
This same group of people has influenced City's whole approach to IP, together with the
current Secretary, who was appointed in 1983 after twenty years at the University of
Surrey, culminating in four years as Deputy Secretary and Bursar. His interest in Surrey's
business activities led to him helping formulate that University's patent policy in the early
1970s ("). Despite the insights and knowledge which this experience afforded, initially he
discouraged City from formulating its own formal policy vis-a-vis IP:
"... I felt we didn't have enough orthodox or conventional research, mainstream
research, enough track record actually, on which to build a policy. I think policy
to some extent needs to reflect experience, because universities do differ. It seemed
to me that we needed to build up a stock of knowledge and collate our custom and
practice.
"Something also said to me: C7L is a one-off, so we don't allow that to
determine our approach to everything else. We've been exceedingly lucky.
Lightning doesn't strike in the same place twice ..."
Round about the same time as the Kingman letter arrived, City started to take a more
proactive approach to identifying IP. Again, this was part of a global change of approach:
"... Half-way through the decade there was a change in the balance of our
approach. We knew we had to work more at seams we were already working at ...
but there was a year or two [between the two restructuring periods] during which
we realised we would have to be much more businesslike about the whole spectrum
of University activities ..." (19)
This "change of gear" helped City to focus on its handling of IP, among other things.
2.2	 Structures
City's belief that "lightning doesn't strike in the same place twice" and its consequent lack
of policy coloured the University's approach to the way in which it handled IP which
academics flagged from time to time: City saw no need for a dedicated structure. The
Secretary's office had always had the job of dealing with IP - in the sense of doing
whatever was necessary legally 0'4 . This continued with the appointment of the current
Secretary. However, he had not only an interest in the subject, but also some experience.
2.3	 Incentives
During the 1970s when the management relied on members of the academic staff to find
an industrial partner to develop, manufacture and market their discoveries, it was usual to
split the resulting income equally between the University and the inventors, with no upper
limit. The more proactive, entrepreneurial City of the 1980s continued to divide the
income in this way - until July 1989.
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2.4	 Regulations and Documentation
None of this was formally articulated anywhere; it was "in the air", a question of custom
and practice rather than a formal policy. In fact, City had no detailed documentation
relating to IP until 1989; the Terms and Conditions of Employment simply stated:
"... Regulations shall be made from time to time by the Council, after consultation
and agreement with The City University Association of University Teachers with
regard to inventions and discoveries ..."
This was the situation when the Kingman letter arrived in 1985. City had an entirely
reactive approach to identifying IP, but if academics took the trouble to flag discoveries
with commercial potential, the University was prepared, if the circumstances warranted it,
to be very entrepreneurial about exploiting it. City had already generated a not
inconsiderable income from exploiting its own IP, unlike the BTG which was handling ten
or so patents on City's behalf; none of those had produced a net income. However, City
rated its experience in exploiting IP as modest: "we were the parents, really, of one
child".
3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
City was not surprised to receive the Kingman letter because the Secretary had been on
the steering committee of the Conference of Registrars & Secretaries' Industrial Forum
since 1984. Despite being forewarned, and despite having successfully exploited its own
IP, City did not at once feel able to respond positively to the Research Councils' offer:
"... the immediate reaction was - we are not ready to respond. We don't have
sufficient volume coming through for it to make sense even to have a prescriptive
policy. We're also dealing with flow] levels of awareness out there.
"... We thought - this is something we take slowly. We hadn't a policy. We had a
way of dealing with things but we hadn't written it out, it hadn't gone to Council
[and] we hadn't talked to the AUT. So, all the circumstances encouraged us to say
- we'll take it slowly ..."
City's reply indicated that the University would approach the Exploitation Scrutiny Group
once it had had time to devise a considered policy which would apply to all IP, however it
was generated. Nonetheless, on several occasions the Exploitation Scrutiny Group
"chivvied" City to respond. After the third letter, City felt obliged to respond
affirmatively, even though it was still considering the details of its policy:
"... We did not want to be seen as totally contumacious or [as not] caring,
because that was wrong ..."
The Exploitation Scrutiny Group then took nearly a year to respond to the University's
reply; City's letter of authorisation was not sent until 1 April 1989 c20 . In the meantime,
City continued to ponder its policy vis-a-vis IP. This did not involve a formal consultative
process; no working party or sub-committee was set up, and neither were the unions
formally consulted at this stage:
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" ... it is very difficult for these groups to get their minds round this ..."
The Secretary alone determined City's policy and embodied it in a draft Code of Practice.
Since it made claims and sought to impose requirements on staff which exceeded any
previous (unwritten) claims, it was put to the AUT and the MSF (22). Once minor changes
were made, the draft was circulated to members for comment. The resulting Code of
Practice Relating to Intellectual Property was put to Council and endorsed on 3 July 1989.
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Rationale
The rationale underlying City's Code of Practice is that the management - in the shape of
the Secretary - has a good grasp of what constitutes IP and how it might be exploited,
whereas members of the academic community do not:
"... It is written for [academics] who are aware of an area which says, you know -
here big dragons, IP. They know little or nothing about it except that it exists ...
They need, in a sense, some expert advice. That is the one-eyed approach, taking
them by the hand in a fairly friendly way to explain how things are likely to turn
out, what the alternatives are, what the factors are.
"Its encouragement for them to come and talk to someone centrally, so that things
will be identified, set up and dealt with in a case-by-case way which is appropriate
for their level, the kind of investment that might be required and such that no-one
disadvantages themselves individually, as a possible inventor, or the Department
or the University ..."
City's primary objective in accepting the Research Councils' offer was to turn the
identification, evaluation, protection and exploitation of IP first into a self-financing
activity and then into a profitable activity, generating additional revenue for the University
centrally, the Departments and the researchers concerned. Doing this in a way which most
benefits the UK economy was a secondary objective. However, it feels that profitability is
a long way off:
"... Given our knowledge and experience of QLL. we ... take a long view. We
know [that] ... other than in a very exceptional case, the pay-back is bound to be
long..."
Since 1985 City has acquired the rights to some of the IP which it originally assigned to
the NDC/BTG. City has opted to develop discoveries which it believes have marked
potential, despite BTG's disinterest.
4.2	 Structures
This largely explains why City still prefers not to set up a dedicated structure which would
combine responsibility for IP with the conventional IL function:
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"... it would be a snare and an illusion and would eat up our resources, too ...
Because our research even now, even though it has grown considerably, is still
very modest. And a lot of our research will not be in the technological field. It is
in social statistics, business-related areas, where the methods of pay-back and
applicability are quite, quite different from the manufacturing industry.
"We could easily set up something which would eat up resources and not really be
a very satisfying job to those who were doing it. How much content [would there
be] to the activity? It would be a misrepresentation, both internally and externally,
as to the capacity of the University ..."
City has arrived at this view by dint of experience. In 1985/86 it established the City
University Bureau of Industrial Enterprise (CUBIE), appointing an outsider to market the
University's spare research capacity. Two years later, CUBIE was closed down with a net
deficit of over £60,000. Instead, responsibility for all aspects of IP rests with the
management. The person who formulated City's policy - the Secretary - also implements
that policy on a day-to-day basis. Given his other commitments, he is not able to attend
meetings of UDIL. However, the Director of City Consultancy Services (23) does, and
passes on relevant information to the Secretary.
4.3	 Regulations and Documentation
City has not expanded upon the brief reference to IP contained in the terms and conditions
of employent since the early 1980s.
Since July 1989, however, there has been a formal Code of Practice which is encapsulated
in a nine-page document. This was circulated to all members of the academic and
technical staff in summer 1989. It defines different types of protectable IP and makes it
clear that the University claims ownership of all these types (24) , not simply patents, ie. its
claims are wider than those covered by the 1977 Patent Act. The Code outlines the
University's policy objectives vis-a-vis IP and indicates what is required of researchers in
order to achieve those objectives. Exploitation of IP is presented as a partnership between
the University and members of staff. Various exploitation routes are discussed, including
licensing/assigning, University companies and the use of technology transfer agencies, but
there is no reference to independent academic spin-off companies. Finally, the Code
shows how the revenue generated by exploitable discoveries will be divided between the
University and the researcher(s).
In case academics lose, throw away or forget about the Code of Practice, there are
references to it in the latest Supplements to the Staff Handbook ( 25) , but it is not
reproduced in full. Unlike some universities', City's Staff Handbook is intended to do no
more than give a brief overview of how the University works.
4.4	 Incentives
In recognition of the key role played by researchers in identifying and exploiting IP, City
has introduced a variety of incentives. Two are for the direct, personal benefit of inventive




In keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, academics at City are not rewarded
financially simply for bringing IP to the management's attention. They are rewarded only
if the IP is successfully and profitably commercialised, and they may have some say in the
decision as to how it is commercialised. In July 1989, City introduced a sliding scale to
regulate the division of revenue from IP. After deductions for costs, researchers receive
100 per cent of the first £5,000, 75 per cent of the next £45,000, 50 per cent of the
following £50,000 and 25 per cent of any income over £100,000. These percentages apply
whether there is a single inventor or multiple inventors. This is a direct, personal reward
for flagging IP - and probably helping to get it exploited. This division of income is
considerably more generous than that which applies in many of the other participating
universities, as Figure 33 showed. It is intended to be generous towards inventors, and to
convey that the University has no wish to "screw every last penny out of them" (26).
There is also an indirect financial incentive. The University channels only 25 to 40 per
cent of the residual income into central funds. As with overheads, between 60 and 75 per
cent of the residue is returned to the research team which generated the IP, rather than to
the HoD. This money is earmarked for academic purposes: to finance overseas conference
visits, new equipment, additional Research Assistants etc. This income in turn brings
additional benefits to the Department as a whole: a Department's grant is enhanced each
year proportionate to its earnings during the previous year. This is an incentive for HoDs
to take a positive, proactive stance towards identifying IP and to encourage members of
the Department to do likewise.
(ii) Kudos
There is another incentive for HoDs to do this: in 1987 City introduced its own, in-house
version of the UGC's research selectivity exercise. The Research Committee receives an
annual report on each Department's research performance. This is assessed by aggregating
the scores of every UFC-funded member of staff in the Department. In this scoring system
five points are awarded for books/independent publications, two are awarded for articles
in refereed journals and full patents and one is awarded for other articles and provisional
patents (27) (28) . The Research Committee reports its findings to Senate each year; it is a
matter of public knowledge if Departments are rated as above or below average.
This system of scoring patents on a par with publications has not been been entirely
successful to date. Only those publications/patents which are listed in the University's
Annual Report score points. Some members of staff have not understood that they should
list patents as well as publications in the Annual Report; City is now trying to
communicate this more effectively.
(iii) Career Progression
The problem may arise from the fact that although IP is deemed to count as a criterion for
promotion, it is not explicitly mentioned in the memorandum which is circulated to HoDs
each year. City assesses applicants under four, equally weighted headings:
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* contribution to research;
* contribution to teaching;
* contribution to Departmental administration and the internal work of the
University;
* general external contribution and professional standing.
The format specified for applicants' curricula vitae does not include a dedicated heading
for IP which has been identified and protected - and/or exploited - though it could,
perhaps, be included under item 14: additional relevant information. In the detailed list of
criteria under each of the four main headings, there is no mention of patents. If they are
equated with publications, as in the Departmental research performance exercise, this is
not made clear. "Innovation" is listed as a criterion under the heading "research", but
since it is also listed under the headings "teaching" and "administration", it is not clear
whether this might include devices/products/processes (29).
The Academic Registrar is not concerned by the failure to mention patents explicitly, or to
indicate whether they are an integral part of the research process or an external activity:
"... I don't think it is right that there should be a ruling because the weighting is
done by the individual members of the salary review committee. It is really upto
them how they assess under the four headings, to give a total figure ..."
City works on the assumption that the sheer size of its salary review committee ( 3°) will
allow a variety of weightings but yield "a reasonable statistical result when you average
fit]".
There is no mention of the effort which academics may have put into facilitating the
exploitation of patents, though consultancy is mentioned under the heading "external".
Technology transfer in a manner which benefits the UK economy is one of the
University's stated policy objectives with regard to IP. It is not clear, however, whether
founding an independent spin-off company to exploit one's discoveries would count as a
criterion for promotion, whether it is irrelevant, or whether it could, in fact, impede
promotion prospects. The management believes this would depend on whether it was
"purely a money-making activity for a member of staff' or whether it brought benefit of
some sort to the University itself.
4.5
	 Sanctions
City is confident its incentives will ensure that discoveries made by its academics will be
generally be identified and exploited in one way or another. If, on occasion, researchers
are not particularly aware of commercial possibilities, discoveries may be exploited
intellectually by means of a publication, rather than commercially. The management
believes that the wilful, deliberate withholding of information out of vested interest would
be "very rare" - no more than one in a hundred times ...
"... and your system cannot legislate - and nor should it - against that one time in
a hundred ..."
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S	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
City has not concerned itself unduly with government statements - such as Sir Keith
Joseph's - to the effect that academics should be encouraged to become more actively
involved in the exploitation process. The University regards such statements as:
"... a piety which needs to be uttered. It can and should mean more than that ..."
This "piety" has done little to influence City's policy on the identification, evaluation,
protection and exploitation of IP:
"... You take it on board, but you don't give it a specific meaning ..."
In any case, for ten years or more, City has felt it appropriate in principle for academics
to become involved in the exploitation of their discoveries. This is seen as a logical
extension of the University's strong professional and vocational bias. In practice the
extent to which individual researchers become involved is the result of a careful balancing
act between the exigencies of the exploitation process and their own interests and
commitments. City sees it as a partnership between the University and the individual
member of staff.
5.2	 Identification
Since City has no structure dedicated to the identification, evaluation, protection and
commercialisation of IP, it inevitably relies to a considerable extent on researchers
themselves coming forward and flagging potentially exploitable discoveries. In 1989/90 it
was felt that existing members of the academic staff should have been very aware of the
University's general policy objectives with regard to IP, given that the Code of Practice
was circulated to all members of staff in the summer of 1989. It was also routinely sent to
all new members of staff. However, the Code of Practice makes no reference to the
removal of the BTG's monopoly or to the University's authorisation to exploit IP arising
out of Research Council-funded projects. Existing members of staff were possibly aware
of these changes; the management reported that the academic community at City was kept
informed about the Research Councils' offer vis-a-vis IP, the University's response and
the subsequent authorisation via articles in the newsletter ( 31) - though, in fact, no items
could be found which covered these events - and through the University-wide Research
Committee. It is less clear how new members of staff might learn about these specific
changes. There is a compulsory induction programme for all new academics which
examines documents such as Supplements to the Staff Handbook and discusses various
aspects of research. IP is certainly mentioned during the induction programme but the
management would not claim that the subject was "covered".
City has not yet formally considered how to ensure that levels of awareness achieved in
1989/90 are maintained in the future. Informal suggestions include notices in the
University newsletter or a mailshot from the Research Grants and Contracts Office
together with the monthly statements which it sends to principal investigators. City has
just set up a staff development programme which could possibly examine IP matters under
the broad heading of research. However, attendance at the staff development programme
is voluntary, not compulsory. There are no plans at present to organise University-wide or
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Department-based seminars on IP.
In the event that awareness levels slump globally or individually, the management believes
it has an effective back-up mechanism in the shape of the Research Grants and Contracts
Officer. It is his task to scrutinise all proposals to check for financial probity and legal
probity where the clauses relating to IP are concerned. This same officer scrutinises
outgoing reports at the interim and final stages.
City recognises that at some point it may have to take a more proactive role vis-a-vis
identifying IP. It is envisaged that the Research Committee could act as a "filter" and
possibly conduct a technical audit of the University's potential, too. City has no plans at
present to bring in outside bodies to do this. The BTG comes in response to specific
requests from individual academics, but it no longer appears to make regular, 6-monthly
visits as it used to.
5.3	 Evaluation
Researchers who bring potentially exploitable IP to the management's attention are asked
to discuss it with their HoD. This gives an in-house evaluation of the scientific potential
and also ensures that everyone who has contributed to the discovery - including students -
is identified. If the HoD agrees that the discovery looks promising, the researcher submits
a short report to the Research Administrator in the Finance Office. He in turn consults
appropriate members of the Research Committee and then refers to the Secretary "those
cases where there appears to be commercial potential such that a prima fade case exists
to seek protection, whether through a patent application or other means".
As the Code of Practice indicates, "in normal circumstances the University will refer the
invention or discovery for detailed evaluation to the British Technology Group or the
Research Corporation Ltd, with both of whom it has enabling agreements". This is done
with a view to obtaining a market evaluation and possibly a development grant.
In "exceptional circumstances", City will organise its own market evaluation. This may be
done by offering it under the seal of a confidentiality agreement to a company with which
the University has had some contact. Alternatively, the University may pay for a market
evaluation to be made by known and trusted independent consultants whose services they
have been able to acquire at below the market rate:
"... We have used an 'uncle', an ex-GEC man, as an external assessor
appointment ..."
In every case, the researcher concerned is expected to contribute to the evaluation process
by making time to "discuss the invention or discovery, its nature and applications".
The Research Committee (32) is supposed to make the final decision as to whether or not
the discovery is worth protecting and exploiting - "for the sake of good practice, so that
[protecting IP] can't be seen [as] slightly dilettante or arbitrary". The Research
Committee meets as and when necessary, but can also deal with items informally by
circulation of members, or by chairman's action. As yet, however, the Research
Committee has not performed this function. The final decision has been made by the




IP can be protected by copyrighting it, where appropriate, patenting it, where possible,
assigning ownership to an industrial partner/the BTG/the Research Corporation or treating
it as secret know-how. City is not averse in principle to any of these methods. The
management believes that secret know-how is unlikely to arise at the "blue sky" end of the
research spectrum and cause conflicts over the wish to publish research findings:
"... Secret know-how is likely to arise in work that is close to the development
phase, to come out of contracts supported by commercial firms [and] Government
Departments ..."
However, in practice very little of City's IP has been treated as secret know-how to date.
Most discoveries have been published in one form or another, either as a paper or as a
patent. City has assigned relatively little IP which was not obligated to the BTG.
(ii) Practicalities
If a discovery is deemed to have commercial potential and is patentable, City will usually
file an initial registration. It does this "expeditiously" in order to let researchers
disseminate their findings at the earliest opportunity. The management feels that many of
the arguments which are advanced concerning the dangers of filing early are "arguments
of hindsight". It feels confident that it will often be able to file a second patent and
preserve its original priority date.
City tries to ensure that the patenting process subjects researchers to the minimum of
pressure. The decision to proceed is always a joint one, taken by the management, the
researcher - and the HoD, so that he is aware of the pressures on his staff. Researchers
are not asked to write the first draft of the patent specification. They provide a 2-3 page
summary of their discovery which is given to a patent agent as the basis for a draft
specification. They then discuss this draft with the patent agent, who refines it
accordingly.
(iii) Finance
City has increasingly found itself using the Patent Co-operation Treaty:
"... Most of the technological things we are into ... you can't simply stop at
Europe. You've got to immediately think of the [United] States, Canada, Korea,
Japan. One or two of those countries aren't in the Patent Co-operation Treaty and
you end up with a hybrid arrangement ..."
This is an expensive process. During the late 1980s City was spending around £10,000 a
year on patenting relatively few discoveries. The management believes this figure is likely
to increase now that the University is authorised to exploit discoveries arising out of
Research Council-funded projects. City has not used the University's central funds - or,
indeed, any other funds - to set up a formal patent budget. This was a conscious decision,
motivated by a number of concerns. Budgets must either be adhered to, leading to possible
opportunity costs, or exceeded. This could lead to problems of a different kind:
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"... You could build up a hell of a debt and year after year it simply grows ... It
might actually attract an oblatory or an almost dismissive approach to the activity
Instead, City asks the Department concerned whether it is able to cover the cost of an
initial patent registration 03)• If the Department is in deficit or has more pressing priorities,
the Technological Development Fund (34) pays the cost instead. The existence of this fund
has strongly influenced City's attitude to protecting IP:
"... It [is] sufficiently large that it [gives] you confidence: if you backed one or two
things and they didn't prove to be winners, you could simply say - well,
gentlemen, we've had one sure-fire winner already. We can afford to some extent
to cast our bread upon water. As long as we don't to it to an extreme extent, we
are safe ..."
Where City licenses its IP to industrial partners, it usually tries to get the company
concerned to pick up ongoing patenting costs.
(iv)	 Ownership
Patents are vested jointly in the name of the University and the inventor(s). If City decides
that a non-obligated discovery is not worth protecting and exploiting, the University
automatically waives/assigns its ownership rights. This is enshrined in the Code of
Practice which states that City will make a declaration to this effect to the member of staff
concerned within six months of the IP being flagged. The researcher may then proceed as
he sees fit. If he succeeds in exploiting his discovery and makes a profit, City asks only
that he reimburse the University for the actual costs which it has occurred in
evaluating/protecting that IP. The University has actually offered to waive its rights in one
or two cases, but as yet, none of City's researchers have tried to take advantage of that
offer.
City may also give up its interest in a discovery if the academic moves to another
University before the development work is completed. It is intended that the researcher
should then assign the University's share of the ownership to his new employer (35).
5.5	 Commercialisation
Where City retains ownership of its IP, it has no principled objection to it being exploited
by any route, from licensing to University company, joint venture or independent
academic spin-off company. Inventive researchers have "a fair amount" of influence on
the decision as to how a given piece of IP is exploited, though they do not have total




In practice, as the Code of Practice indicates, the management usually prefers to license
rather than pursue a more entrepreneurial route:
"... the usual means of exploitation will be by way of a license agreement or an
assignment with [a] revenue sharing agreement ..."
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City is motivated largely by financial considerations: licensing gives it control over how
the IP is exploited and a reasonable return without costing a great deal in terms of money,
time or effort. City tries, however, to reach a concensus with researchers as to how their
discoveries should be exploited.
Potential licensees are identified as a result of a joint effort by the Secretary, the Director
of Finance, the Vice-Chancellor and the research team concerned. City may also bring in
one of the "uncles" whom it retains, for advice. The actual negotiations are generally
conducted jointly by the researchers and the management, who may be "aided and abetted
by professional advisors" at various stages. However, unless the management agrees to the
terms which academics are proposing, no contract will be signed. License agreements also
require the approval of the Finance & General Purposes Committee. However, since it
meets only five times a year, this may entail retrospective approval. In practice, no
agreement will be signed without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, who is a key
member of this Committee.
(ii) University Companies
As the Code of Practice also indicates, City will only consider founding a University
company to exploit the IP in exceptional circumstances:
"... It is unlikely that the University will wish to divert its energies into setting up
a [University] company to market a new product unless a well-researched business
plan shows that it is capable of making a minimum of E100,000 profit annually
within four or five years" c.
Once again, City tries to reach a concensus with academic inventors. However, since the
setting up of a university company inevitably involves some degree of capital investment
on the part of the University, it is the University which has "quite a large, if not a
determining say". The management takes into account not just the proposed product, but
also the person - the academic's perceived standing with industry, his background,
contacts, interests, skills - and how applied his research is. Enthusiasm alone is not
enough. Academics must demonstrate that they have:
"... at least one foot on the ground and their head screwed on ... ff
As the above excerpt suggests, City is not in favour of a single, umbrella company which
exploits all appropriate products as well as marketing the University's expertise and
equipment. It prefers "horses for courses" - dedicated companies to exploit specific areas.
To date City has founded three wholly-owned University companies to exploit IP in one
form or another (37). One has since become a fully independent commercial company, but
the other two are still wholly-owned subsidiaries of the University itself, rather than a
holding company. The first is extremely profitable, the second "modestly profitable" and
the third has temporarily ceased trading, having cost City "a high, five-figure sum" (38) .
However, City has plans to use it as a marketing vehicle for the research activities of a
particular division of the Civil Engineering Department. In each case, the company was
formed following an initiative from the researchers whose technology it was designed to
exploit. In each case, the researchers concerned became Executive Directors of the
company, and in two cases, one of the researchers involved took on the role of Managing
Director, too.
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(iii) Academic Spin-off Companies
So far, none of City's IP has been exploited via a joint venture with members of the
academic staff or by an independent academic spin-off company. This is not because the
management has rejected such proposals in favour of other routes. It is because, to date,
no members of the academic staff have come forward with such a proposal. City's
management does not believe it inhibits would-be academic entrepreneurs:
"... I think most of our staff here are sort of aware, if they read the [Code of
Practice] that we are prepared to take one of a number of different routes,
depending on circumstances. I think they've got sufficient confidence to come to us
centrally and say - look, this is it. I suggest this or [that] ..."
However, City does not suggest company start-up as an option to researchers who flag
potentially exploitable IP, in case they feel they are being "pushed down that route". The
local AUT is keen to avoid that kind of pressure.
6	 ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
6.1	 Policy
Academic entrepreneurship is not an activity concerning which City has developed a
coherent policy. Moreover, since very few of City's academics are known to have been
entrepreneurial, custom and practice will not yet act as a basis for a developing a coherent
policy. The management does not know of any academics who have founded an
independent spin-off company to exploit "hard" IP. This may indicate that City has a less
entrepreneurial ethos than some universities, but equally it could be a consequence of the
fact that the university is located in central London, or a consequence of the type of IP
which has been generated at City. In several cases, founding a company to exploit a
discovery has appeared to be a less than optimal course of action ( 39). However, the
management is not aware of many academics having founded "soft" companies to exploit
expertise, either. In any case, City views "soft" companies differently from "hard"
companies exploiting protectable IP. It sees the former as an extension of consultancy
activities:
"... The idea of setting up a company to do one's own consultancy or to sell
[expertise] or to do one's own teaching - all of that comes under the same broad
heading. The University - speccally the Vice-Chancellor - would look at it with
that kind of approach ..."
Whereas many University Departments have set up hybrid or overtly commercial centres
to exploit their expertise and/or equipment, City's research centres have been founded
with a view to conducting academic research, to overcome City's poor research ratings.
This has given City's academics little opportunity to be entrepreneurial within the
framework of their Department. Only a few centres exploit IP in the form of expertise,
and it is not really their role to exploit "hard" IP in the form of products/ processes. This
would either be achieved by assigning or licensing the IP to an industrial partner ( 4°), or by
spinning off a dedicated University company, as happened with OTEC.
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It is only via the University's wholly-owned companies that City academics have become
involved to any extent in entrepreneurially exploiting their discoveries. If, in due course,
academics broach the idea of exploiting their discoveries by an independent spin-off
company, City will inevitably respond in a fairly ad hoc way. The management would try
to establish whether company formation was the best route for exploiting the discovery. It
would also pay close attention to the proposed timescale:
"... [You] need to commercialise reasonably quickly. Academics may want to
improve on something to the point where you are actually losing lead times. There
is a kind of academic who will never be satisfied until it is 101 per cent perfect
"•••
Researchers would be asked to consider whether they might be better suited
temperamentally to exploiting their discovery by means of further research and
publications - unless the University had invested sufficient resources in the discovery that
it needed a return. In that case, the management might require it to be commercialised -
by another route. However ...
"... if someone's real metier is in that direction, we would support that person ...
In that case, City would try to ensure that the would-be entrepreneur got moral
encouragement and practical support - from the HoD to the Vice-Chancellor, with the
management in a co-ordinating role. If the HoD was not in sympathy with the idea, the
Vice-Chancellor might be asked to mediate. In the early 1980s the management's interest
in exploiting IP entrepreneurially could have triggered an obstructive reaction from some
HoDs. However, most of these have since reached retirement age or been encouraged to
take early retirement (41) • Today it would be unlikely for a HoD to object to academic
entrepreneurship as a matter of principle. There could be practical objections, however.
Since City prides itself on its long-standing professional and vocational tradition, HoDs
would be loathe to let members of their staff take on fresh commitments which might
conflict with their existing commitment to students, particularly taught postgraduate
students.
6.2	 Making Time
For this reason, if would-be academic entrepreneurs felt they needed to devote more time
to company start-up than the day per week which City allows for consultancy activities,
the management would not be in favour of juggling with their teaching load - or their
existing research commitments. It would prefer to arrange a part-time contract or leave of
absence when the situation permitted it. Over and above a day a week consultancy time,
time given to facilitate company start-up would be without pay; sabbaticals are seen as a
period which should be devoted to advancing academics' careers academically, in a way
which will subsequently benefit the Department's teaching or research activities.
In the management's view, going without pay has advantages for both parties:
"... We'd want to put them in the position of very realistically trying it out ..."
Leave of absence simply requires a recommendation from the HoD or the Dean to the
Vice-Chancellor and to Senate. City usually allows only a year's leave of absence. If it
has taken longer than anticipated to establish a spin-off company to the point where the
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academic can reduce his input, it may not be possible to extend that year:
" ... A lot of our courses are fairly new and they change quite regularly,
particularly taught postgraduate courses. [Wel would have to see where that
person slotted in, how central they were to course development ..."
In any case, sooner or later, City expects academics to make a choice between being an
academic and being in business. This is made clear in the Code of Practice:
"... a trading company needs managing in a very different way from a Research
management or team and its success will depend much more on the motivation and
management ability of those involved than on the intrinsic merit of the product
being developed.
"In the event of company being formed the staff originally concerned with the IF
will have the right to remain on their existing contracts of employment, but in so
doing they may well give up being directly involved in its further exploitation ..."
6.3	 Other Resources
(i) Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
City is happy for would-be academic entrepreneurs to have access to resources where
demand permits it, but for a price. Use of equipment and instrumentation would initially
be charged at cost plus a small percentage. However, if this involved regular use once the
company was established, the charge would be increased to the full market rate. The
management feels that staffing levels in most Departments are high enough to allow access
to existing secretarial and technical support staff during the start-up period. However, they
would have to be paid at the going rate - and if it involved regular use, it might be
necessary to bring in a part-timer. Given the scarcity and the cost of secretarial staff in
London, the financial implications are not inconsiderable. Similarly, academics would be
expected to pay for the telephone calls made in pursuit of their business activities, though
the system has no way of independently monitoring such use (42) . If they chose to use the
telephone surreptitiously, the management believes "they could get away with it quite
successfully for quite some time", though it would detect them in the end. It will be less
easy to do this once telephone budgets are devolved to Departments; this is planned but
there is, as yet, no date fixed for it.
(ii) Accommodation
During the start-up phase, City would allow would-be academic entrepreneurs free use of
their office as a base. They would also be allowed to occupy a corner of a laboratory, if
space permitted. However, if they needed additional space, the University would almost
certainly ask them to relocate their business activities outside the Department. Whilst City
has been following a policy of consolidating its freehold space, given that it is situated in
central London, there is considerable pressure on accommodation. Recognising the
problem, in the mid-1980s City tried to convert one of its buildings into a number of
incubator units. In practice, these became second generation, light industrial units. This
change of emphasis arose because the rents which could be charged on incubator spaces
were insufficient to cover the costs incurred in refurbishing the old building in which they
are situated.
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Moreover, the layout of the building meant that in order to maximise the net space
available for rental, the resulting units tended to be larger than those usually required by
companies in the start-up or pre-start-up phase. City does not believe it will be possible
for it to provide proper incubator units in the future.
The City Innovation Centre is managed by the Secretary. Several of the projects which
started out in this space have now grown, relocated and are viable companies. Those
which were less successful were asked to leave, including a company which was founded
by the ex-HoD of the Electrical Engineering Department:
"... [It] wasn't so successful in using our facilities and working with us that we
could keep them here and continue to provide accommodation. I had to give them
notice. I'm not sure where they have gone, and because they may not have had
access to any more low-cost accommodation ...
"That was quite a knock for that small company. Whether it has actually knocked
the company on the head or not, I couldn't say. Ild was not such a success in our
terms to have real links with the University ..."
(iii) Financial Support
If an academic wants to try and exploit his research discoveries entrepreneurially - and
City gives its blessing - the University is prepared to give financial support:
"... Almost certainly there would need to be money spent to take it to a
development stage such that you had a prototype or documentation or a model or
something which you could use to interest [partners] or even venture capitalists
"
In this situation, City would bring its Technological Development Fund into play. The
money would probably be provided in the form of a development grant. The Director of
Finance would set up a budget heading, specifying spending and time limits. The recipient
would have "a fairly free hand" but would be required to report back regularly. The HoD
would be required to monitor his progress.
City might also consider providing money in the form of equity, or possibly even a "soft"
loan. This has never yet happened, and the management believes that the University would
be more likely to contribute second-round funding rather than start-up funding. City
might require academics exploiting IP by means of independent spin-off companies to give
the University a first-round equity stake as a token of its contribution to the discovery.
Since it lacks experience, City is not sure what kind of stake the University would buy,
over and above that, though it sees little point in having 5 or 10 per cent. It is prepared to
be fairly speculative:
"... rather than looking for an income stream that we might get from a royalty
arrangement, a better arangement for a particular development would be to have a
share in it but postpone any rewards that might come out of it. One wouldn't be
expecting dividends in the early years. They might be pretty paltry anyway. [This]
might be a way for the University ... to take a risk. It would then either have
worthless shares or very valuable shares five years into the future ..."
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If City opted for an equity stake in place of a royalty arrangement, this would, of course,
affect the personal income which the researcher derived from the exploitation of his
discovery, since there would be no immediate income to split.
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
City would want to ensure that academics trying to exploit their discoveries
entrepreneurially had access to the relevant advice, in the interests of protecting its IP.
Moreover, even if academics were founding completely independent spin-off companies,
although this does not legally constitute a joint venture, the University feels that morally,
it has the flavour of one.
Since the University can only provide limited advice in-house, it would refer academics to
external sources of advice like the BTG, the Research Corporation, the University's
commercial solicitor, patent agents, the University's bankers, venture capitalists and
possibly an enterprise trust (43)• If the academic was founding an entirely independent spin-
off company and the University was likely to see no return beyond a royalty stream, this
might be the full extent of City's help. If the University had an equity stake, however, it
might look for an experienced businessman to "nurse" the project, paid for by the
University ("). Moreover, if City had an equity stake, it would want to nominate someone
from the Finance Office as a non-executive board member, both as a safeguard and as a
means of providing financial advice.
7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
City will not learn the Scrutiny Group's view of its arrangements until 1992 at the
earliest, because it received its initial 3-year authorisation nearly three years later than the





Efforts were made during the reign of Henry VIII to establish a university in Durham,
following the dissolution of the monasteries. A similar project was proposed in 1657
during the Commonwealth, but it came to nothing after Oxford and Cambridge objected to
the idea of other institutions being allowed to grant degrees. A third - and successful -
attempt was made by last the Prince Bishop of Durham, whose objective was to found an
institution which could secure for the inhabitants of the north east of England "the
advantages of a sound yet not expensive academical education". The University was
finally established in 1832 and granted a Royal Charter in 1837, making it England's third
oldest university. Strictly speaking, Durham does not belong to any of the recognised
classifications of British universities. However, since it took Oxford and Cambridge as its
model, for the purposes of this study it was characterised as a quasi-ancient university.
1.2	 Size
Measured in terms of student FTEs, Durham is now medium-sized compared to other
monolithic universities in Britain. In 1981 Durham was advised by the UGC to reduce the
number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 4 per cent within the next two or three
sessions. As Figure 2 showed, this was very close to the national average. At the same
time the UGC also announced that Durham's recurrent grant was to be reduced by 10 per
cent by 1983/84. As we can see from Figure 2 this, too, was close to the national
average. By most methods of reckoning, Durham falls into a middle group of universities
which were treated neither particularly harshly nor particularly leniently by the UGC.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that Durham should increase its student numbers by a little
over 7 per cent over the next four sessions ('). In fact, by the end of the decade, Durham
had 11 per cent more student FTEs than it had at the beginning ( 2). By the end of the
decade, Durham also had nearly 5 per cent more full-time academic/academic-related staff
than it had at the beginning; there was a six-fold increase in the number of part-time staff
over the same period (3) . The academic community underwent considerable structural
changes during the 1980s. The seven Faculties with which the University began the decade
were reorganised into just three - Science, Social Science and Art - encompassing 19
Departments and five Schools. In the process, several Departments were either merged or
closed.
1.3	 Science Base
In its latest incarnation, the Faculty of Science groups together the Departments of
Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, Geography, Geological Sciences and Biological
Sciences; the School of Engineering & Applied Sciences also belongs to the Faculty of
Science. In 1988/89 staff in these Departments accounted for close to 39 per cent of the
University's total academic/academic-related staff (4).
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As Figure 6a revealed, in the UGC's 1986 assessment of universities' research strengths
in the natural sciences, engineering and technology, one subject area was rated as
outstanding, two as above average, four as average and one as below average (5)• It was
suggested that if the ABRC's recommendations were implemented, Durham would be
assigned to the "X" category; accordingly it would have been able to offer teaching across
a broad range of fields and substantial research activity in particular fields, in some cases
in collaboration with others (6).
Figure 6b showed that in the 1988/89 research selectivity exercise, no "units of
assessment" at Durham were awarded a "5", three were awarded a "4" and four were
awarded a "3". None received either a "2" or a "1" (7) .
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
As Figure 41a indicates, in 1984/85, Durham ranked 31st in terms of £ earned from
external research grants and contracts, but 38th in terms of the percentage of its total
recurrent income which external research grants and contracts represented, namely 11 per
cent (8) . The Faculty of Science brought in just over £2.2m, accounting for 77 per cent of
the University's total income from research grants and contracts ( 9)• By 1988/89, as Figure
4Ib shows, the Faculty of Science had nearly doubled its 1985 earnings, generating just
nearly £4.4m and accounting for 74 per cent of the University's total income from
research grants and contracts m.
The pattern of sponsorship which the science base attracted differed considerably from the
pattern four years earlier, as we can see from Figures 345-346. Whereas
industry/commerce provided 16 per cent of its research grant and contract income in
1984/85, by 1988/89 this had risen significantly - to 30 per cent. This was largely at the
expense of income from central government, local government and various overseas
sources - down from 26 per cent in 1984/85 to just 16 per cent in 1988/89. The
proportion provided by Research Councils and charities was down slightly at 54 per cent,
compared to 58 per cent four years earlier.
2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Durham has not had a history of actively seeking out IP arising out of research with a
view to commercialising it. When IP was identified prior to 1983/84, it was invariably on
the initiative of the academics concerned ("). The outcome was often unsatisfactory. The
University had no patent budget and did not feel it could justify an ad hoc payment from
central funds. As a result, "hard" IP was generally unprotected; the University does not
seem to have thought of drawing up a confidentiality agreement and marketing the LP to
potential industrial partners. As a result, when trying to obtain development funds from
industry, the University often found itself losing its rights in the IP. A second
consequence was that the financial return on such IP was very limited. Despite perceiving
problems, the University did nothing about it. Prior to 1983/84, there was little or no
formal discussion of IP. Durham took very little notice of the CVCP's 1977 report on IP
matters.
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In 1980, however, Durham appointed a new Vice-Chancellor, a zoologist who was
interested in the University's relations with industry and in IP. In 1983/84, when the
CVCP sent documentation aimed at developing a computer users' agreement, the Vice-
Chancellor encouraged the administration to pose itself questions about IP in the broader
sense. These deliberations found an echo in parts of the academic community following
the conscious appointment of two new Professors who were interested in pursuing "the
sort of research which attracts industrial backing" and in exploiting IP 02).
In May 1984 a working party was set up to consider amendments to academics' Standard
Terms and Conditions of Appointment, in the light of the University's growing interest in
IP n . Reporting to both Senate and Council, the working party met infrequently, with the
result that its progress was inevitably slow.
2.2	 Structures
At the same time there was a minor change in the way in which the University dealt with
IP flagged by academics. Where previously the Treasurer ( 14) had been responsible, from
1984 the Assistant Treasurer took over. The rationale underlying this change was that,
although both had numerous other responsibilities, on balance, the Assistant Treasurer had
fewer. This change did not signify a more proactive stance. The University's policy at this
time was to take charge of commercialising its IP if it was asked to:
"... We were not actively engaged in promoting University policy and resources
The new Vice-Chancellor addressed the problem of protecting IP which had commercial
potential - and the problem of obtaining funding to support the development of prototypes.
He was instrumental in setting up a fund, the objective of which was to pay for patent
protection and to reduce academics' dependency on outside funding until the development
work had reached a more promising point - giving the University a better bargaining
position in subsequent negotiations for additional development funding. This fund paid
almost immediately for a patent application in the area of electric motors and control.
However, its target value of £150,000 within 3 years was never realised, due to the cuts
announced by the UGC in 1981.
This was the situation when the Kingman letter arrived. Having invariably assigned its
rights to industrial partners prior to the establishment of the fund, Durham had only just
begun to build a patent portfolio. The University's experience in exploiting IP was
negligible:
"... We were in a learning situation. We had begun to start learning before the
letter came. We hadn't got very far ..."
As yet, Durham had no policy on IP, no regulations or documentation and no incentives
to encourage researchers to flag potentially exploitable IP.
3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
The arrival of the Kingman letter in mid-May 1985 did not come as a surprise to Durham
University, which was waiting for it, having closely followed the press coverage which
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preceded it. The University had no hesitation in accepting the offer, seeing the exploitation
of discoveries arising out of Research Council-funded projects as an extension of the
policy which it was already in the process of evolving, via the working party. It was
encouraged to accept by the fact that "nobody had been very impressed with the way the
BTG operated" ".
It was also seen as politically advisable to accept the offer:
"... Refusing the offer] didn't seem to us to be a sensible thing to do,
partly for reasons of prestige ..."
"... We didn't want to be a second-rate University which wasn't allowed to do it
II
There was also a desire to increase the University's revenues, but this played a very minor
part in the decision, since Durham has never been very optimistic about generating a
significant income from its IP.
The arrival of the Kingman letter had a number of consequences. The working party had
been formulating policy in "a very slow, ineffectual way"; it was further handicapped by
unforseen and unavoidable delays ". The letter galvanised the administration " into
taking decisions quickly. The University's response to the Kingman letter represented a
swift distillation of the documentation sent by the CVCP, recommendations of individual
Council members with industrial experience and insights which the Deputy Secretary had
gained from informal discussions with fellow administrators. It also owed something to the
documents accompanying the Kingman letter:
"... In a sense, the ... letter was an exam paper which gave hints on how to
answer the questions ..."
Despite this, Durham's reply did not initially satisfy the Exploitation Scrutiny Group. It
was more a problem of detail than substance, however, and a more detailed response was
accepted a year later at the second round of deliberations. Durham was one of twelve
institutions whose letter of authorisation was sent on 3 November 1986.
Given the lack of publicity, it is perhaps not surprising that neither the policy nor the
authorisation from the Research Councils generated any adverse reactions in the academic
community ". The administration believes there is a more fundamental explanation for
the lack of controversy:
"... We're a quiet University..."
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Rationale
Durham's policy and the manner in which it is implemented reflects the administration's
expectations vis-a-vis IP. The administration has very limited expectations, for three
principal reasons. The first relates to ethos:
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" ... The nature of the University means that the number of things coming forward
is not as great as we would like ..."
The second relates to the subject distribution within the science base. This was emphasised
repeatedly during the interviews:
"... The distribution of subjects is such that we don't have that many members of
staff involved in work that has got immediate commercial potential. We're not at
the hot end, as perhaps we ought to be ..."
"... If we had a lot of applied science Departments, there would be more that we
were doing which was of direct interest to industry ..."
The third reason for having low expectations vis-a-vis IP relates to the pattern of funding
which the science base attracts. As Figure 345 showed, in the year the Kingman letter
arrived Durham's science base attracted the third lowest proportion of funding from the
Research Councils and charities of the nine universities participating in this study.
Durham's position had not changed by 1989 - in fact, the science base attracted an even
lower proportion of funding that year.
The administration was not happy with the situation as it perceived it:
"... It is a concern to us that we haven't more exploitable material ... We would
welcome more business ..."
4.2	 Structures
However, the way in which the administration has elected to handle such "business" on a
practical, day-to-day basis owes more to its perception of the status quo than to its
aspirations for the future. On financial grounds, Durham has chosen not to set up a
separate structure which is dedicated or even partly dedicated to exploiting IP. This is still
the responsibility of the Assistant Treasurer, whose remit includes helping to negotiate and
administering the University's research grants and contracts. The administration does not
believe it generates enough exploitable IP to enable a separate structure to become self-
financing, and it is not prepared to subsidise it to any great extent from general funds ".
No formal attempt has been made to assess what administering IP costs the centre, but it
is generally assumed that since the Assistant Treasurer's position is justified by "lots of
other things to do", this is the most cost-effective approach. If it could be demonstrated
that it was missing a great deal of business, the University might consider a different
approach, but to date the authorisation from the Research Councils has led to only a slight
increase in the amount of IP to be evaluated and no noticeable increase in the number of
patent applications. This tends to confirm the administration's beliefs.
The person responsible for overseeing the exploitation of IP is not the University's UDIL
representative. That role has been allocated to the director of the University's Industrial
Research Laboratories (UDIRL) rm . No thought has been given to transferring
responsibility for IP to UDIRL, even though UDIRL could find itself playing a part in the
commercialisation of discoveries (see section 5.5). The rationale for this is that UDIRL
has a bias in favour of materials science and technologies. Effectively, this results in an
administrative divorce of the person who deals with "hard" IP in the form of patents from
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those who deal with "soft" IP in the form of expertise.
4.3	 Incentives
The administration believes it has instituted three incentives to remind researchers of their
obligations to "flag" potentially exploitable IP. They are: money, status and "making life
more interesting".
(i)	 Financial
In keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, academics at Durham are not rewarded
financially for bringing IP to the administration's attention. They are rewarded only if the
IP is successfully and profitably commercialised, but they have little or no say in the
decision as to how to commercialise it. Despite being pressed by the Exploitation Scrutiny
Group, Durham refused to institute a fixed revenue-sharing agreement:
"... We felt each case had to be looked at on its own merits ... [to assess] what is
brought in, what the contribution was and the extent to which [researchers] were
dependent on the University for facilities ..."
This could lead to wide variations: for example, where a new member of staff brought
most of the background IP with him, the University might require 5 per cent, by way of
an administrative charge. If, on the other hand, a researcher used University facilities and
perhaps received an equipment grant from the Research Initiatives Committee, the
University might take 90 per cent. No account is taken in this calculation of the number of
inventors involved.
Although UK patent law does not require the inventor's reward to be determined at the
beginning of the exploitation process (so that the size of the reward can be influenced by
the income realised), Durham determines the reward to inventors at the beginning of the
commercialisation process, based on the projected income. It is not clear what would
happen if the discovery subsequently generated a far higher income. In the Deputy
Secretary's opinion, inventors could appeal to the Vice-Chancellor. In the view of the
Assistant Treasurer, however, inventors should seek redress via the courts:
"... the inventor has the right to go to court. He has a legal safeguard..."
The University believes it also provides an incentive to encourage HoDs cn) to remind
staff of their obligations to flag IP. The revenue which accrues to the University from IP
is split 50:50 between the University centrally and the budget centre which generated it,
ie. in most cases, the Department. In theory, this represents an injection of funds with no
strings attached, which Departments are allowed to vire. Given that there is no fixed
revenue-sharing agreement, however, the return that Departments will get on IP which is
commercialised is likely to vary considerably. This compares unfavourably with the
(fixed) proportion of income from overheads which Departments receive. To date, it is
also a fairly hypothetical incentive, since none of the IP which Durham has tried to
commercialise has brought in a significant income. Even if it had, this would not be
widely publicised. It is not seen as appropriate for "Password" to carry details of
individual gain:
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"... That is regarded, rather like salary, as confidential. It may be that we are
tying our hands unnecessarily. On the other hand, it is only fair to the individual.
It could create jealousy. But also, why should anybody know how much X is
getting?"
(ii) Career Progression
Promotions to Senior Lecturer at Durham are based on competitive merit in:
teaching, course preparation and examining;
research and scholarship;
Departmental and other management and administrative
responsibilities.
However, the annual letter to HoDs (22) is more concerned with procedures and
documentation than with providing examples of activities which might be included in each
of these broad categories. There is, therefore, no reference to IP until the tenth and final
page, a page which presents the AUT's view of factors to be considered when assessing
promotion to Senior Lecturer. Stressing that its views do not represent the formal view of
Academic Staffing Committee, the AUT suggests that performance in teaching should
carry equal weight with research; administrative duties should carry somewhat less weight.
It adds, however, that discussions with the Academic Staffing Committee (Promotions)
identified "the sorts of factors to be taken into account" under each of the above headings.
For example, "Evaluation of Research might include ... patents held ...". It is not clear
what weight might be attached to patents in comparison to publications in refereed journals
or books and monographs - indeed, as the AUT emphasises:
"... The relative weight given by each member of the Committee to a number of
these and other factors in order to reach a decision is a matter of personal choice
n
There is no indication of how involvement in the process of exploiting IP might be treated
when it comes to promotion. The only overt reference to outside work is to "Academic
work outside the University (eg. external examining, invitations to speak at conferences
and other institutions)". The only reference to industry comes in the final paragraph,
which states: "Other factors which might be taken into account ... work in industry in a
teaching company scheme ...". It is not clear whether the local AUT views the
identification, evaluation, protection and commercialisation of IP as an integral part of the
research process or as a separate process altogether.
(iii) Interest/Self-Determination
In the view of the Deputy Secretary, Durham provides researchers who "flag" IP with an
additional incentive: the opportunity to cultivate new interests and take charge of their own
destiny. It does this by providing opportunities for consultancy which the exploitation of
IP might require and opportunities to be entrepreneurial, if academics wish to:
"... If you are your own boss, I suppose you are a bit freer than the next man ..."
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However, as section 5.5 will show, the manner in which the Assistant Treasurer
implements the University's policy on IP would seem to differ somewhat from the
apparent intention of the Deputy Secretary, who helped formulate that policy.
4.4	 Regulations and Documentation
It was the specific remit of the working party set up to redraft the Standard Terms and
Conditions of Appointment of academic staff at Durham in a way which included
appropriate, explicit references to IP. The amendments agreed with the local AUT were
duly incorporated into the contracts of new members of staff and applied retrospectively to
existing members of staff by means of. Under section 4 (Duties), it is indicated that
Lecturers are expected to engage in research in their subject. Section 8 (Commercial
Exploitation & Publication of Work) states:
"... Members of the academic staff shall not, in connection with any invention,
patent, process or manufacture, have authority to make representations on behalf
of the University or to enter into any contract in the like behalf, or to be
concerned in the like behalf in any transactions whatsoever relating thereto
without the express consent of Council ..."
Notwithstanding this, Council ...
"... retains the right to require members of staff to assign their interests in any
valuable rights arising from the financial exploitation of any work with commercial
potential ..."
Section 8 concludes by requiring all members of academic staff to notify the Treasurer in
writing ...
"... of any device, materials, product or process, computer software or other
result developed or obtained in the course of his or her employment which it is
considered might have commercial significance, whether patentable or not ..."
Furthermore, academics are required ...
"... to ensure that the notification takes place in good time before publication or
other disclosure and to withhold publication for a limited period if required to do
so by the Council of the University ..." (23)
The University's position vis-a-vis patents is reiterated in the University Calendar and the
current edition of the Staff Handbook refers researchers with queries about IPR to the
Assistant Treasurer. (Durham's policy also covers students, both post-graduates and
under-graduates. It is effectively a condition of registration, in that students must agree to
observe the general regulations, one of which requires them to assign their IP to the
university.) However, Durham has not encapsulated the details of and reasons for its




If, through lack of awareness, researchers missed an opportunity to exploit IP which they
had generated, the administration at Durham would "express pain and displeasure", but
would take no further action. However, if a researcher was discovered to have passed IP
which the University owned to another body, Durham would be concerned. If it transpired
that the academic concerned had benefitted financially from doing this, the University
believes it would try to seek financial redress; this is not known to have happened, to date
(24)
Beyond seeking financial redress, it is unlikely that Durham would apply any sanctions
against a member of the academic staff who breached his Standard Terms and Conditions
of Appointment in this way:
"... Mere are very few sanctions that you can impose on a member of staff, except
draw attention to the breach of duty and embarrass them. Because unless it was a
very serious breach, you wouldn't want to take legal or other proceedings against
them ..."
Durham feels that disciplinary procedures would be neither appropriate nor effective.
5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
Sir Keith Joseph's statement - in which the Secretary of State expressed the hope that
universities would encourge academics to exploit their discoveries themselves and give
help and guidance to those who wished to do so - was interpreted at Durham as:
"... encouraging those who do come up with something to exploit it ... by
assisting us with patents: whether they are worth taking out and so on, by being
involved in the licensing agreement ..."
Despite comments about the incentive of letting academics become their own boss,
Durham did not interpret the Secretary of State's statement in terms of more
entrepreneurial activities, such as company start-up on the part of academics:
" I don't think we took it as literally as that ... I don't think it is feasible ..."
Accordingly, Durham's policy is to lean heavily on the contribution of the academic at
certain stages in the exploitation process, but to limit his/her involvement to certain, well-
defined activities.
5.2	 Identification
Durham's administration did not directly inform members of the academic community
about the removal of the BTG's first right of refusal or the 1985 offer from the Research
Councils to assume the rights and responsibilities previously held by the BTG. In 1986/87,
when the University was authorised to assume those rights and responsibilities, the
information was transmitted only to Deans and HoDs, who were "urged to pass on the
news". The opportunity of publicising the fact that University, not the BTG, was
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henceforth responsible for commercialising discoveries arising out of Research Council-
funded projects was not exploited when the University's Standard Terms and Conditions
of Appointment were amended, either. Although all staff were notified of the changes,
they were not told the reason for the them.
Less formal opportunities for publicising the change were also missed. The University
newsletter, "Password", came into being in January 1987, just two months after Durham's
authorisation was granted by the Research Councils. Despite its remit to inform staff
about what is happening at the University, no issues of "Password" have devoted any
column inches to the fact that the University has taken charge of exploitation in place of
the BTG. The administration concedes that it may not have made the reasons for the
change sufficiently clear at the time. It has tried to make up for that in the invervening
years, but once again, it has done this indirectly:
"... Every year now we are repeating injunctions via Deans and HoDs, because
our examples of exploitation are still not in the Research Council field, by and
large ..."
However potentially exploitable research discoveries were funded, Durham relies almost
exclusively on academics themselves coming forward to notify the administration. The
administration itself does not directly try to solicit IP. The Assistant Treasurer has neither
the time nor the expertise to conduct an in-house technical audit. Durham delegates that
responsibility, as it made clear in its submission to the Exploitation Scrutiny Group (25).
Durham expects HoDs - and research group leaders in larger Departments - to shoulder
the responsibility of reminding staff of their obligation to "flag" IP. It reminds them of
this responsibility in an annual memo to Deans and HoDs, seeking information which
forms the basis of its annual report to the Research Councils; this is a mechanism which
Durham has found useful and would continue to use, even if it were no longer required
to. The administration also seeks to remind Deans by means of "pep talks" at meetings of
the Research Committee:
" ... The Deans hopefully go back to their Faculty committees and pass it on ..."
Formal mechanisms for doing this have been neither instituted nor proposed by the
administration, however:
"... there would be a great deal of resistance to any formal arrangements of that
nature ..."
The administration is aware neither of any new mechanisms having been introduced nor
any existing mechanisms having been annexed by Departments or Faculties to formalise
this procedure.
Durham has also reached agreements with the BTG and the Research Corporation (26) . It
would be happy to reach agreements with other technology transfer agencies, but finds
that they tend not to follow up their introductory letters. Accordingly, only BTG and the
Research Corporation have the right to conduct periodic trawls for IP, but the timing is
left entirely to their initiative. The University does not keep a check on their activities -
indeed, it often discovers only some time afterwards that they have made a visit.
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The only direct contact which the administration makes with members of the academic
staff to publicise its interest in IP is at the induction course for new staff. Since January
1987 Durham has required, rather than encouraged, new staff to attend the Conference
for New Members of Staff. Since 1988, the Treasurer has used this forum to give new
staff a short presentation on IP in general and the University's policy in particular. The
Assistant Treasurer has also suggested that IP would make a suitable topic for the
University's staff development programme. This may happen once Durham's new Staff
Development Officer becomes a full-time appointment (n).
5.3	 Evaluation
Once the administration has been notified of research discoveries with commercial
potential, evaluating them is not seen as a particularly problematical task at Durham. This
is principally because the University relies heavily on the extensive links which its
academics have with industry:
"... There can't be many researchers around the University, even the most junior
ones who started last September, who - if they are working in a particular area -
haven't already got some links with a commercial company who will know what to
do with it ..."
Durham's standard procedure is to locate what looks like an appropriate company, draw
up a confidentiality agreement and let the company evaluate the discovery. If the
researchers had no suggestions as to who to contact, the Director of UDIRL might be
called in - but this has never yet been necessary.
It is very unusual for Durham to consider any other means of evaluating a discovery:
" ... A person would have to be pretty convincing that it was going to generate a
lot of money for us to consider doing something else ..."
In 1988, when a member of the Chemistry Department suggested that they could easily
manufacture and distribute a new chemical which he had synthesised, the University
contacted the BTG. However, Durham has never conducted or commissioned its own
market evaluation:
"... We have never come to the third instance, where somebody [was] so
convincing in his argument ... that we evaluated it ourselves ..."
5.4	 Protection
(i)	 Philosophy
If a discovery is considered to have market value, it is Durham's policy to try and get the
discovery protected. Although the University has not formulated a policy relating to secret
know-how, it prefers not to use this as a means of protection:
"... we have a policy to publish things and make them public. So, I think we
would be unhappy about that ..."
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The University also feels constrained by the VAT legislation, which allows research
contracts exemption from VAT as long as the results are made publicly available. Where
there is sufficient novelty to warrant a patent, Durham prefers to have its IP protected in
this more formal way. It is also motivated by financial concerns:
"... [A patent] increases your chances of getting any money out of it ..."
Despite its concern about having foregone many of its rights in its IP during the 1970s and
early 1980s, today Durham usually protects its IP by assigning it to an industrial partner.
By holding discussions under seal of a confidentiality agreement, the University feels it
has more control than it used to.
(ii) Finance
Not long after it was set up, the fund which was intended to cover the cost of patents etc
was discontinued, primarily because of the effect of the cuts imposed by the UGC. The
University not set up a formal patent budget to replace that aspect of the Fund's remit.
Durham's philosophy is that it should spend as little as possible on IP and leave its
partners in the commercialisation process to absorb all the costs. Where that is not an
option, Durham covers the cost of patenting from the general administration allocation.
However, in the five years following the arrival of the Kingman letter, the University
applied for only 3 patents in its own name, each arising out of projects funded by the
Research Councils. Direct patent costs have been limited to around £300 per year, with an
additional £3,000-£4,000 per year in solicitors' fees. However, other discoveries made by
Durham's academics have yielded an additional 12 to 20 patents per year, taken out by
industrial partners.
Durham has an upfront approach to generating revenue from its IP: it prefers to net an
immediate £5,000 for the right to take out the patent in exchange for lower royalties at a
later date. It believes this is a sounder strategy, since most patents do not become
significant earners.
(iii) Practicalities
This practice has implications for academics wishing to publish their findings. The
Standard Terms and Conditions of Appointment give the University the right to require
academics to delay publication in the interests of filing a patent application, although the
same document seeks to reassure by stating that ultimately it is the University's policy that
all results shall be published.
The administration gives neither a written nor a verbal indication of the kind of delay
which might be involved:
"... Taking a patent out can be done fairly quickly, but ... we don't go that way.
We go to a company. And so there might be six months of negotiation before [we]
tie in the company ..."
"... it might [take] any length of time. Because our preferred route is to go to a
company, it is actually likely to be more than a year ..."
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In the event of an academic disagreeing with the administration's requirement to delay
publication, the Treasurer and the Vice-Chancellor would probably make the final
decision. This is not articulated anywhere, however, and to date it has not happened.
When the decision is made to patent, researchers are expected to write the first draft of
the patent specification; this is then re-drafted in the appropriate "register" by a patent
agent. Staff are generally expected to simply find the extra time to carry out this
obligation. Where existing commitments make this impossible within the required
timescale, the centre would be willing to help negotiate with the HoD for a temporary
adjustment to the researcher's schedule, but this has never yet been necessary.
Where Durham assigns its rights, the industrial partner selects the countries in which to
apply for a patent; on the three occasions where the University has filed in its own name,
applications have been restricted to the UK, since Durham has only contemplated breaking
into UK markets:
"... We are certainly not geared up to operating fin] other markets, so there's a
risk ... that the patents we're sitting on at the moment could be taken up by
somebody in Japan or wherever ..."
This is a risk which Durham feels it has to take at the moment.
The decision whether to proceed with a full application or to let the claim lapse is
generally determined by the researcher's success in identifying potential licensees:
"... In most cases we are not actually going to think of producing ourselves. We
are going to think of licensing to other people ..."
Durham's approach is essentially pragmatic and short-term at present. The centre
recognises that some universities are moving towards a more speculative, long-term
approach and would like to build up a more comprehensive portfolio itself. It is concerned
that its own researchers may be infringing patents held by industry because the University
has not built up portofolios of "strategic" IP (2-8). At present, if the researcher could
convince them that further work would lead to additional patents:
"... it is conceivable that ... we would just be happy that the patent was on file
.• •
but this has not happened yet.
(iv)	 Ownership
Durham's policy is to vest patents in the University's name alone. It pursues this policy to
the extent of asking appointees who bring with them rights to IP they have generated
elsewhere to assign those rights to the University if they form the basis of follow-on
discoveries which might be commercially exploited.
To date, Durham researchers have never challenged the administration's decision not to
protect a discovery, or not to continue protecting it. If they did, the administration would
ask whether their Department was prepared to pay the cost of protecting/continuing to
protect the IP concerned - and to reap a greater reward in exchange for taking all the risk.
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If not, Durham might consider waiving/assigning its rights to the researcher. This has not
yet happened, but if it did, the administration believes it would issue a conditional
waiver/assignation, retaining a small percentage interest as a quid pro quo for the
resources already provided.
5.5	 Commercialisation
Durham's policy permits University-owned IP to be exploited by any route, from licensing
to a University company, joint venture (29) or academic spin-off company.
(i) University Companies
Durham's Council has laid the groundwork for the University to take a more
entrepreneurial approach to commercialising its IP: in 1988 the University founded the
wholly-owned company, Applied Durham Research Ltd (3°). This was intended to act as a
holding company. The initiative for this came from certain lay members of Council. Their
motive was to provide a legal framework which could spawn subsidiaries dedicated to
exploiting specific IP opportunities as and when the need arose. These lay members were
in favour of Durham being more entrepreneurial, provided it kept such activities at arms'
length from the University and ensured it could reap those benefits of a company structure
which are denied to universities PD . They also felt that a company structure would
overcome the constraints of paying academic staff on University salary scales. By the end
of 1989, the holding company had still not formed any subsidiaries, however, and it was
wound up shortly afterwards. The administration attributed the lack of subsidiares to a
lack of IP which was "appropriate for company formation".
(ii) Joint Ventures
From a policy point of view, Durham does not rule out the possibility of participating in
joint ventures with members of the academic staff. Policymakers see this as a means of
putting a damper on:
II
... particularly entrepreneurial member[s] of staff who might set up [their] own
company and cut us out and leave ..."
However, there have been no joint ventures to date.
(iii) Academic Spin-Off Companies
Durham has granted a license to only one academic-spin-off company wishing to exploit
"hard" IP; the Assistant Treasurer, an accountant by training, prefers to license to existing
companies. He also believes that if the University agrees to license an academic spin-off
company, it should drive as hard a bargain as it can get:
"... they are in the driving seat, because they have a full knowledge of what the
worth is and they are the people who really know what the University's input was.
If it is the individual's own IPR, obviously they are in a stronger position ..."
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(iv)	 Licensing
Not only does Durham prefer in practice to license to existing companies, it also prefers
to license to large companies. It is guided by three concerns: safeguarding the University's
image, minimising the risk and expenditure incurred by the University and maximising the
financial return:
"... we wouldn't want to get involved in what might be described as a get-rich-
quick method ..."
"... We would choose the route which gave the best financial result consistent with
the image of the University ..."
If it was more rewarding financially to license a large company, Durham would be
reluctant to follow any other course. Since it is obligatory for IP to be exploited in the
way which the administration determines (32) , this could limit - and probably has limited -
the number of legal academic spin-off companies exploiting "hard" IP. On the other hand,
if it were possible to license both a big company and an academic spin-off company,
Durham would see that as a way of reaching a compromise. Since the University prefers
to grant non-exclusive licenses, there is no intrinsic obstacle to this solution.
Whereas academics at Durham have played almost no part in entrepreneurially exploiting
"hard" IP which they have generated, the University depends almost entirely on the
researchers to identify licensees and make the first approach, armed with a confidentiality
agreement. At that point, however, the Assistant Treasurer usually steps in and conducts
the license negotiations, with the researcher providing little or nothing more than technical
support. This was not always the case - Durham's most successful license agreement to
date owed at least as much to the negotiations of the academic whose work was being
licensed as to the University's input. However, it is the way in which the Assistant
Treasurer prefers to work. He is not a member of the UK Licensing Executives Society
nor does he call on them for help, relying instead on the University's commercial
solicitors if he feels he needs assistance. He believes he has learned considerably from
experience:
"... I've no reason to believe that Durham University is any worse than most
universities. At least I'm a qualified accountant, so I'm fairly happy that the
financial arrangments are correct ..."
He is concerned that the only people in the University with any experience of conducting
license negotiations are the Treasurer and himself; this leaves Durham very vulnerable in
an emergency. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the academics he consigns to




Durham has not formulated an explicit policy governing the activities of academic
entrepreneurs. Although the Outside Work rules refer only to "consultancies", would-be
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academic entrepreneurs are expected to understand that setting up and running a company
is subject to the same requirements. Accordingly, they should seek permission from the
Vice-Chancellor. In practice, this usually means simply declaring their activities to the
Vice-Chancellor. If they propose to exploit "hard" IP as opposed to "soft" expertise, they
should not do this unless the University grants their company the requisite license, of
course.
The absence of a policy may reflect a lack of concensus in the administration about
academic entrepreneurship. In some quarters, the prospect of academics with businesses
leaving the University to pursue their business activities on a full-time basis causes
concern. These members of the administration are less worried about established
academics whose goal is a Chair than they are about the next generation of academics:
members of research teams who do not have tenure and confront a future consisting of 5
or even 3 year temporary contracts. At least two academics in this situation have left
Durham already, preferring to concentrate on their business activities; both were winners
in the 1982 Academic Enterprise Competition ("). Furthermore, a long-standing member
of staff with tenure eventually left to become a full-time entrepreneur after working part-
time for two or three years. The academic concerned had particular teaching skills which
were hard to replace:
"... [The Department] was anxious to hang onto his knowledge for as long as
possible ..."
Other members of the administration feel that Durham's academics are enterprising rather
than entrepreneurial and there is therefore no need for a policy:
"... maybe we don't take it seriously enough. But I think the real reason is that the
scope for academic entrepreneurship is not as great as it might be. Most of the
enterprising activity is carried out within traditional University Departments ..."
This may be an accurate assessment - or it may be a false impression, occasioned by the
fact that, like consultancy, spin-off company formation is regarded at Durham as a
personal activity which academics are required to report only to the Vice-Chancellor. It is
a tradition at Durham that Vice-Chancellors keep such information to themselves. While it
is generally felt that the previous Vice-Chancellor was "much stronger at keeping it all
under wraps", this information is still treated as confidential. If the University has
incubated many academic entrepreneurs, it is not common knowledge within the
institution. Moreoever, the Director of the University's science park knows of only one
member of Durham's academic staff who has started a technology-based spin-off company
since 1986 c's):
"... I don't think the academic culture at Durham at the moment is tending
towards academic entrepreneurship ... The majority of academics that I've spoken
to are quite happy to deal with industry and deal with industry in a very effective
manner by taking research contracts and accepting time targets and perfonnance
targets ... But none of them seem to want to take that jump into actually going it
alone ..."
Paradoxically, Durham University Business School is one of Britain's nine Regional
Enterprise Centres and is renowned for its evangelistic zeal in promoting small business
start-up in the north-east of England.
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6.2	 Making Time
Parts of the administration support the idea that academics trying to exploit promising IP
should be allowed to devote some time to the project. This is not policy, however, and if
researchers require more time than the half day per week which they are allowed for
outside work, arrangements would depend on individual circumstances:
"... It [would] be our aim to assist somebody in the exploitation of something
promising and if the only way to do that is to let them off some of their normal
workload, then we'll try to arrange that ..."
However, at present the administration has no formal mechanism which allows it to
influence that decision-making process. The decision would be taken by the Departmental
Board of Studies, which effectively means by concensus of the whole Department °.
Since Departments were turned into budget centres (36) , it has become less easy to be
flexible:
"... if they try to get Y to do some of X's work, they'll want to make sure they can
manage it within their budgets. It is not going to be easy. But if the idea is good
enough and the return is likely to be good, I guess they would do it ..."
At present, the administration has no budget which could be used to compensate
Departments for the partial loss of staff time m . The administration believes that
Departments are even less likely to be flexible where the researcher is proposing to exploit
promising IP by means of an independent academic spin-off company. At present, short of
an eventual royalty income from IP which is successfully exploited, the University gets no
return on the activities of academics who become entrepreneurs. This is because academic
entrepreneurship is treated on the same basis as private, personal consultancy: Durham
does not levy a percentage tax on the resulting income. Would-be academic entrepreneurs
would probably have to agree to an ad hoc arrangement whereby the University - or at
least, their Department - got some additional return as a quid pro quo for rescheduling
their workloads.
Alternatively, they could opt to work part-time pro-rata or ask for leave of absence
without pay; where complete leave of absence is concerned, Durham usually imposes a
two-year time limit. Provided that part-time academics are not "so obsessed with
entrepreneurship" as to neglect their teaching and research commitments, the
administration sees this arrangement as a bonus to the University:
"... He (sic) would be bringing in money, he would be a useful example to the
students, his teaching ought to benefit ..."
However, the administration recognises that individual Departments may have a different
perspective - and part-time arrangements and leave of absence are also in the gift of the
Departmental Boards of Studies, effectively (38):
"... I don't know whether they would get it ... It wouldn't be automatic ... You
couldn't afford to do that for too many people ..."
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The administration believes Departments would be concerned both about academic
entrepreneurs' ability to maintain a sense of identity and about where their loyalties lay.
At least one member of staff has been allowed to work part-time pro-rata; after two years
he left the University to pursue his business career full-time.
6.3	 Other Resources
(i) Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
Senior members of the administration also support the idea that academics who are trying
to exploit promising IP should have access to University resources, where demand permits
it. In their view, researchers in the process of setting up a company might be allowed free
use of equipment and instrumentation initially, though the University would want a return
if use were protracted. However, even then academics are liable to be charged less than
the full market rate. Similarly, in the start-up phase, they might be allowed free local
telephone calls. Use of technical and secretarial support staff might be more problematical:
"... Durham is not over-populated with technicians or secretaries ..."
Using University facilities in pursuit of any sort of outside activities does not meet with
the approval of certain, more junior administrators:
"... Obviously it's difficult for [academics] to separate their University activities
from their external activities. The fact that somebody is director of a company and
uses the University's phone is in theoretical terms no different to the one who
happens to be chairman of the local civic trust, who takes a phone call at work in
relation to that.
"... there is no University policy that says that one is more acceptable than the
other ..."
(ii) Accommodation
It is unlikely that academics using their offices in the pre-start-up phase would be charged
rent for use of that space. However, use of additional space already allocated to the
Department is a matter for the HoD to determine. Requests for additional non-allocated
space are decided centrally. The administration ...
"... would be unhappy if somebody wanted to set up a company for it to be
operating for any length of time in University premises, because we are
desperately short of space ..."
The University feels it is able to take a strong line on this, because Durham has a science
park on campus which incorporates a number of incubator units c"). However, unless they
have a backer, academics with start-up companies could be penalised by the requirement
that tenant companies should be "financially sound" (4°)• Moreover, since Easter 1989
there has been a waiting list and there is only one other suitable "parks" within a 20 mile
radius (41)• Recognising the problem, towards the end of 1989 the University started to
negotiate for a building in which to house the second phase of its science park.
59
(iii)	 Finance
Would-be academic entrepreneurs may be able to get limited financial assistance from the
University. Since the discontinuation of the exploitation fund, the nearest equivalent is an
equipment fund allocated by the Research Initiatives Committee at the beginning of each
academic year. In 1989/90 the fund had £210,000 to disburse. Like the much smaller
general purposes fund, it gives only a proportion of the sums required, to encourage
academics to locate other sources of funding. Since commercial exploitation is not its main
objective, the equipment fund does not look for a return on its "investment".
The University has no principled objection to putting up seedcorn money to support
academics trying to exploit promising IP in the pre-company stage. There is no such fund
at present, though in theory, one could be set up from the general, non-earmarked income
which the University generates from overheads, for example. However, in the view of one
administrator, this would be an unlikely way to employ the general income.
Durham has never formally discussed the question of holding or acquiring equity in
academic spin-off companies, and it has not yet done either on an ad hoc basis. However,
in the view of one administrator, the University should not have to buy itself an equity
stake; academic entrepreneurs should volunteer to give the University an equity stake in
their companies, as a quid pro quo for the many resources which the University is certain
to have contributed to that start-up. Another felt that in an ideal world, the University
should acquire equity in suitable academic spin-off companies through first-round funding
... it should act as a mini-venture capitalist. This should not be motivated by a mission to
transfer technology but by the drive to maximise profits:
"... It would have to be treated as an investment, like any other investment ... We
don't have money to throw around ..."
However, this administrator did not anticipate the University doing this in the forseeable
future:
"... if we had more resources, I'm not sure that academic entrepreneurs would be
our top priority, to be honest ..."
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
The structure which Durham has chosen to deal with IP on a day-to-day basis is not
equipped to provide would-be academic entrepreneurs with business start-up advice. In
theory, this should not matter, given the presence of the Business School. However,
attitudes vary as to the role which the Business School should play. One administrator felt:
"... We [should] probably push them in the direction of the small business section
of our Business School. They are getting a lot of Government money to help small
business start up in the north east of England ..."
Another was quite opposed to this idea unless the academics concerned paid for the
advice:
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"... I see no reason why we should help academics to set their own company up. I
see no reason why we should discourage them. Well, there might be circumstances
where we encourage them to do it, but I see no reason why any University
resource, financial or non-financial, should particularly go towards helping them
It is part of the remit of the administrator in question to implement the University's policy
on the identification, evaluation, protection and exploitation of IP. An expert on VAT, his
response to a would-be academic entrepreneur with a VAT inquiry was:
"... I told him the answer - and that if he was coming back again, he'd better tell
me how much fee he was [prepared to pay], because I'm certainly not going to get
into advising people about their own companies if it is nothing to do with the
University. I'm prepared to be ruthless about it ..."
If, at a future date, academics participate in joint ventures with the University, this
administrator will ensure they get advice, however. In that context, entrepreneurship
would be seen as "a University activity", on the basis that the company would covenant its
profits back to the University.
7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Durham was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was satisfied
with the exploitation arrangements which the University had established. A formal
document was scheduled to follow, confirming the University's rights and responsibilities
to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects for an indefinite period.







In recent years Glasgow has frequently had the distinction of being Britain's largest
monolithic university, its main rival for this position being Manchester ( 1). 1981 the UGC
advised Glasgow to reduce the number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 3 per
cent within the next three sessions. As Figure 2 showed, this was below the national
average. At the same time the UGC announced that Glasgow's recurrent grant was to be
reduced by 11 per cent by 1983/84. As we can see from Figure 2, this was also well
below the national average. The Principal had "read the signs well", however, and had
already shed a number of posts in advance of notification from the UGC. Academic staff
numbers at Glasgow have changed very little over the 1980s; there has been only a 1 per
cent increase in the total (2) . In 1986 the UGC indicated that Glasgow should further
decrease its student numbers by 0.5 per cent over the next four sessions ( 3). Nonetheless,
by the end of the decade, Glasgow had around 11 per cent more students than at the
beginning (4) .
By most methods of reckoning, Glasgow falls into a group of universities least afflicted by
the UGC's decisions. Structurally, the University ended the decade as it had begun - with
eight Faculties, comprising around 120 Departments ( 5) . There was a "fairly radical"
reorganisation of the Faculties of Divinity, Law & Financial Studies. However, there were
no changes to the Faculties of Engineering or Veterinary Medicine and only two changes
to the Faculty of Natural Science (6).
1.3	 Science Base
Glasgow has a extremely comprehensive science base. In 1988/89 the Faculty of Science
itself grouped together the Departments of Physics & Astronomy, Biology, Cell Biology,
Biochemistry, Genetics, Microbiology, Pharmacology, Botany, Zoology, Geography &
Topographic Science, Geology, Chemistry, Computing Science and Mathematics. The
Faculty of Engineering comprised the Departments of Civil Engineering, Electronics &
Electrical Engineering, Aerospace, Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture &
Ocean Engineering, two of which were pioneering departments when they were founded
O) . For a comprehensive list of departments in the Faculties of Medicine and Veterinary
Medicine, see note (8). There were also Departments of Agriculture and Dairy Science
which appeared to defy classification by Faculty.
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Glasgow's Departments vary enormously in size; in the Faculty of Medicine, in particular,
there are numerous departments which have only two or three - and in several cases only
one permanent academic member of staff, backed up by a relatively large number of
honorary lecturers. On an aggregate basis, staff in the four Faculties making up the
science base represented about 73 per cent of the university's total academic/academic-
related staff at the end of the 1980s ( 9)• They were responsible for around 52 per cent of
Glasgow's undergraduates and 78 per cent of registered research students (19).
In the UGC's 1986 assessment of universities' research strengths in the natural sciences,
engineering and technology, Glasgow was ranked tenth best in the UK (h1)• As Figure 6a
showed, three subject areas were rated as outstanding, eleven as above average, nine as
average and three as below average 02). It was suggested that if the ABRC's
recommendations were implemented, Glasgow would be assigned to the "R" category;
accordingly, the University would be funded to do high-level research across a wide range
of subjects (12).
As Figure 61) indicated, in the 1988/89 research selectivity exercise, one "unit of
assessment" in the natural sciences, engineering and technology received a "5" rating,
seven received a "4", six received a 3", one received a "2" and three received a "1"
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
As we can see from Figure 41a, in 1984/85, Glasgow ranked 5th in terms of £ earned in
external research grants and contracts, but 19th in terms of the percentage of its total
recurrent income which this external revenue represented, namely 15.7 per cent (15).
Departments in the Faculties of Science, Engineering, Medicine and Veterinary Science
brought in close to £1 1 m, accounting for 93 per cent of the University's total income
from research grants and contracts ( 16). By 1988/89, as Figure 41b shows, these Faculties
had nearly doubled their 1985 earnings, generating close to £21m, accounting for 93 per
cent of the university's total income from research grants and contracts (12).
The pattern of sponsorship which Glasgow's science base attracted was noticeably
different to the pattern four years earlier, as Figures 345-346 show. The proportion of
funding received from the Research Councils and charities fell from 73 per cent in
1984/85 to 58 per cent in 1988/89. This was not due to increased funding from
industry/commerce - indeed, the proportion of funding from this sector fell marginally,
from 9 per cent in 1984/85 to 8 per cent in 1988/89. Glasgow significantly increased the
proportion of funding received from central government, local government and various
overseas organisations - up from 18 per cent in 1984/85 to 34 per cent in 1988/89.
2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
During the 19th century, Glasgow University was renowned for its innovative Professors,
who transferred their discoveries into the economy not only through consulting
relationships with existing companies but also through their own start-up companies ".
This entrepreneurial activity seems to have taken place on their own initiative, rather than
the University's, in a situation where salaries, if they existed at all, were often little more
than token. It was expected that salaries would be supplemented, whether by private
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income or additional, paid activities.
The University assumes that in the intervening years, academics from Glasgow continued
sporadically to found spin-off companies or to make independent arrangements with
industry to exploit their discoveries. The University sometimes sanctioned these activities,
if its opinion was sought, but it made no great effort to ensure that its opinion was sought.
By the end of the 1970s, however, the University began to take an interest in the IP over
which it now appeared to have unequivocal rights. Glasgow responded fairly promptly to
the documentation sent by the CVCP in the wake of the 1977 Patent Act. In 1978 the
Principal, the Vice-Principal (Industrial Liaison) and a group of senior officers drafted a
set of guidelines on the subject.
2.2	 Regulations and Documentation
The 2-page "Guidelines ..." 09) were issued to every existing member of staff in all
Faculties and subsequently to every new member of staff. Updated in June 1982, they set
the scene by reproducing Section 39 of the 1977 Patent Act in a bold footnote on the
opening page. Despite this demonstration of the University's legal rights as an employer,
the tone of the document is far from legalistic. In the first section, headed "Inventions",
the Court encouraged researchers to furnish it with a 2-page description of their invention
prior to publishing their findings. Attached to the guidelines was a form on which
researchers were asked to give an estimate of development costs, possible sources of
funding, an indication of companies likely to be interested and an estimate of the annual
volume of gross sales in years one to three. The guidelines indicated that if the Court
decided against patent protection, inventors would be informed in writing that they might
proceed on their own account, if they wished - unless the research was supported by the
Research Councils.
In the second section, headed "Licence Agreements", researchers were again:
"... encourageldJ ... to make their inventions, whether patented or not, available
to industry for commercial purposes ..."
The Court reserved the right to negotiate the terms of any license agreement, with
appropriate legal assistance. There appears to have been an implicit assumption that
exploitation of IP (and computer software) would be accomplished via licensing. This was
not motivated by disapproval of academic spin-off companies per se. Section 5 of the
guidelines, headed "Businesses Carried On By Members of Staff', indicated that the Court
might grant permission for full-time members of staff to carry on business either on their
own account, or in partnership, or through limited companies:
"... The Court considers that such activities are to be encouraged, particularly as
the University is collaborating in ventures such as the West of Scotland Science
Park for the exploitation of academic expertise in industry and commerce ..."
Taken together with the apparent assumption that IP would be exploited via licensing, use
of the term "expertise" suggests an assumption that academics would or should restrict
themselves to "soft" R&D-based businesses, rather than "hard" companies exploiting
"hard" IP. This may be imputing to the guidelines a more discriminating use of
terminology than was actually the case; in some quarters, the document has come to be
seen as "somewhat opaque" (2°) . On the other hand, this could be the embryonic version of
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a policy which has recently been firmly laid down (21)•
Whichever it was, Glasgow placed the exploitation of "soft", expertise-based IP under
similar strictures to the exploitation of "hard" IP: the University's terms and conditions of
employment ranged somewhat wider than the terms of the 1977 Patent Act. Business
activities were treated in the same way as consultancy; both were subject to the "outside
work" provisions. Attached to the guidelines was a form on which academics were
expected to give a detailed account of their proposed activities (22) . Those wishing to start a
business were asked to state the registered name and address of the business, the nature of
the business, the names and addresses of the directors/partners and details of shareholdings
or profit-sharing ratios. Once given, permission expired after three years unless an
application for renewal was made before the expiry date.
Glasgow was not keen for businesses to be run from University premises, but the
guidelines indicated it was prepared occasionally to consider it on certain terms, viz:
"... Where, in an exceptional case, the Court grants permission to staff to carry
on a business from University premises, the Court may stipulate for any or all of
the following requirements:
(a) to participate in the business by means of a shareholding or otherwise;
(b) to charge for all overheads and administrative facilities provided by the
Court;
(c) to reserve the right to withdraw permission in the event of any change in
the ownership of the business;
(d) to require that University employees and not others be used in connection
with the business".
2.3	 Incentives
The front page of the guidelines indicated that the Court would generally apportion 50 per
cent of the income from exploitation of IP to the researchers concerned, after deduction of
costs, with no upper earnings limit. The remaining 50 per cent would genrally be split
equally between the centre and the Department concerned. This income was to be disposed
according to the HoD's recommendations "... for Departmental purposes including the
need to support new work in related areas".
2.4	 Structures
Though reference is made throughout the guidelines to the Court, in practice, until 1982
IP was handled on a very part-time basis by the Registrar (23) , with reference to the
Secretary to the Court, when necessary. This meant that Glasgow's approach to IP was
inevitably reactive rather than proactive. By the early 1980s, the centre recognised that it
was paying a price for this approach:
"... We had a feeling that there was a lot happening out there which we didn't
know all that much about. Where it was successful, that was fine, but it was
important that the University should know about it.
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"[We needed] the ability to actively present the University with a profile which
accurately reflected the nature of our industrial contacts, when the figures tended
to show that we had almost no contact, which was not true..."
Medics, for instance, had long been bridging the gap between their academic work and the
application of that work. They were used to dealing with companies and generating
income for their Departments which the centre knew nothing about and therefore failed to
include in the University's statements of external revenue. In a dawning era of
performance criteria, the centre lacked the requisite management information.
At that time, the centre had no desire to control such activities:
"... The feeling was, certainly in the early days, that there was a lot of activity
going on already and it was not our job to control or co-ordinate the people who
were already active. The intention was to spread the net of activity wider ..."
In 1982, in an attempt to give a higher profile to its industrial collaboration, Glasgow
made a full-time, dedicated administrative appointment; originally a grade 3 appointment,
it became a grade 4 appointment in October 1985 (24) . The new ILO was expected to
develop the University's industrial contacts, to identify opportunities for collaboration and,
in a softly-softly way, to generate enthusiasm among the academic community:
"... to spread interest and involvement and as far as possible to keep out of the
hair of the people who were already actively involved ..."
His remit had not been fully fleshed out, but it was assumed that responsibility for IP
would form part of it, for the time being at least. The appointment was seen as the first of
a number of future appointments:
"... [We recognised] that other places, like Strathclyde, were much further down
the road and already had much larger numbers of people involved, when we were
just making our first appointment ..."
The University was less clear about the function of those future appointments, or about the
framework in which they would operate:
"... We had no real base to start from ... We knew, broadly speaking, which
direction we wanted to go in, which was to develop that side of the University's
activities. [We had] recognised the need to make one post, but that ... was a first
step in building a larger organisation.
"What kind of larger organisation we might want, whether we should go for a
company structure like Aberdeen, or whether we should go for a straight industrial
liaison office as part of the central services of the University, we were not at all
clear about ..."
These questions became all the more pressing when it was realised that the University's
initial appointment was not a success:
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"... the lesson of our first appointment was that somebody who was drawn from an
industrial background and didn't know how universities worked was going to
struggle desperately, trying to understand ..."
Having identified this as the problem, early in 1986 Glasgow made an internal
appointment, replacing the industrialist with a member of its Finance Office. This choice
was dictated largely by the belief that the financial implications of the steps it was taking
were going to become increasingly important.
2.5	 Guidance
Having made one mistake already, Glasgow felt it needed guidance on how it could best
achieve its long-term objectives. The University had a fairly detailed grasp of the general
structure and scale of neighbouring Strathclyde University's approach, and the Vice-
Principal (Industrial Liaison) made it his business to find out what the other Scottish
universities were doing (23). In the end, however, Glasgow decided to embark on a strategy
which Strathclyde had employed. The Court voted to provide funds to engage professional
consultants, with financial assistance from the Scottish Development Agency (SDA),
which was promoting the use of consultants at the time. Segal, Quince, Wicksteed, co-
authors of "The Cambridge Phenomenon" (2'5), were hired to guide Glasgow towards a
solution which suited its own particular needs.
This was the situation when the Kingman letter arrived in May 1985. Influenced by the
senior officers and one particular Vice-Principal, the centre had moved away from its
traditional disinterest in the transfer of its expertise and "hard" IP into the economy. Its
new policy was to capitalise on the University's strengths, both in expertise and "hard"
IP, to encourage the academic community to embrace this philosophy more widely and to
monitor progress by means of suitable management information procedures. However, its
initial tactics had failed to bear fruit: by the end of 1985, Glasgow had very few patents to
its name, and the University's experience in exploiting them was "not far short of
negligible" - though there was reason to believe that individual academics acting on their
own initiative over the years had been more successful. Accordingly, Glasgow was in the
process of seeking professional guidance on how to achieve its long-term objectives.
3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
Glasgow was not specifically expecting the Kingman letter, but its arrival did not occasion
much surprise, in view of what the University perceived to be a constant stream of new,
externally-inspired initiatives and increasing demands for management information:
"... nothing, by 1985, would have surprised anyone in [British] universities..."
Since the Research Councils' offer was entirely in keeping with the University's evolving
policy, the centre had no hesitation in accepting it. A Vice-Principal whose portfolio
included industrial liaison drafted a reply, indicating the steps which the University had
already taken and its objectives for the future. The Exploitation Scrutiny Group accepted
the University's response without comment at its second round of deliberations. Glasgow
was one of twelve institutions whose letter of authorisation was sent on 3 November 1986.
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4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Rationale
The tactics which Glasgow has since adopted to achieve its long-term objectives owe more
to its aspirations for the future than its current expectations, particularly where the
Research Councils are concerned. In the short-term, the centre does not have particularly
high expectations, despite the level of Research Council funding which the four science-
based Faculties regularly attract. This has less to do with disciplinary spread - Glasgow's
is particularly comprehensive - than with its view of what Research Council-funded
projects might yield in the forseeable future. It believes there is unquestionably potential,
though not to the extent which either the Government or the Research Councils imagine,
because their criteria for funding relate more to the "upstream" scientific value of a
project than "downstream" applicability. More than anything, however, the centre's
expectations are influenced by what it perceives to be the ethos of the University:
"...traditionally, there has been a belief here that the way forward is through peer
review, Research Council grants ... Traditionally, people were ... less susceptible,
less likely to be involved in exploitation than in getting [their findings] to the stage
where they got publications out of [them] ..."
"... there are lots of other universities where the instinctive reaction from some
academics would have been to see what was in it ..."
Given this general caveat, the centre concedes that individual Faculties exhibit different
attitudes to the exploitation of expertise and IP and that "natural preconceptions of where
a Faculty might stand [don't] necessarily apply". In May 1989, for example, the
University ran a series of Faculty-based seminars on income generation. These were used
as a forum to explain new statements on IP, research contracts and consultancies. The
presentation was:
"... greeted by some quite aggressive questioning. Hostile, if not aggressive, at
least. Hostile to the approach ..."
Hostility was expressed by members of all Faculties, but whereas on the whole, medics
appeared to take a relatively pragmatic stance, members of the Faculty of Science saw the
new policies as liable to lose them valuable research opportunities, if other universities
made fewer demands of their industrial partners. On the other hand, social scientists have
shown a high degree of interest in patenting and exploitation following joint projects with
medics, for example.
At a Departmental level, there are one or two HoDs within the science-based Faculties
whose attitude is not as positive as the centre would like. Since the University moved in
1976 to a system of rotating headships every three years (27), this is not an intractable
problem; most of the HoDs appointed for life prior to 1976 have now retired or left and
few HoDs have stayed in post for longer than two 3-year stints. Moreover, increasing
inter-departmental collaboration means that the parentage of IP is much more mixed than
was historically the case.
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In any case, there is evidence that attitudes may be changing. There has been a significant
increase in the amount of IP which has been flagged by academics since 1986, but this has
arisen largely from projects funded by the University itself, from the research element of
its recurrent grant. When the income generation seminars were repeated in December
1989, around 10 per cent of the academic/academic-related staff attended and the hostility
appeared to have evaporated. The centre was "very favourably impressed" by the general
attitude and the "very sensible" questions which were asked, though it was uncertain
whether to attribute this to a genuine change of heart or a feeling of resignation.
Whichever it was, it did not prevent some academics from voicing concern about the
University marketing sticks of rock in its Visitors Centre (28).
Glasgow believes there is a widespread misconception about the timescale involved in
achieving its objectives with regard to the exploitation of IP, many of which it broadly
shares with the Government and the Research Councils:
"... making people more aware in this current phase may take a number of years
to come through the system as potentially patentable, exploitable things ..."
Glasgow's tactics are geared to speeding up that process as far as possible.
4.2	 Structures
On receipt of the consultants' report in autumn 1987, Court set about implementing many
of its recommendations, both structural and regulatory. An ad hoc group, the Central
Policy Review Group, was established. Consisting of the replacement ILO, the then Vice-
Principal (Industrial Liaison), his designated successor and a lay member of Court, its
remit was to investigate and progress issues such as IP rights and exploitation of IP. In
1988 this ad hoc group became a formal committee, meeting whenever necessary and
reporting to Court (29).
The consultants' report also made a number of recommendations about the staffing and the
role of the industrial liaison office, which was named the Industrial and Commercial
Development Service (ICDS). The recommendations were implemented on a step-by-step
basis: in 1988/89 an extra two officers were taken on, bringing the total to 5, including 2
secretaries. Two contracts clerks were scheduled to arrive in 1990. It was planned to
consider the recruitment of a fourth officer once the ICDS' performance had been assessed
late in 1990.
As the staffing profile indicates, responsibility for research grants and contracts was
transferred from the Finance Office to the ICDS, which was able to offer more detailed
advice on sources of funding and on the legal, pricing and costing aspects of negotiating
research grants and contracts. The ICDS feels that this recent change has made it much
more alluring in the eyes of the academic community. Since it is involved in research
grants and contracts from the very beginning, the ICDS is able to ensure that the
University's IP is protected ... "which gets the bricks and mortar right".
As its title suggests, the ICDS is still conceived of as a central, administrative service, and
it has no global self-financing requirement. To date, only its research contract function has
been set financial targets, not its technology transfer function or its liaison function.
69
4.3	 Regulations and Documentation
Acting largely on the consultants' recommendations, the Commercial Policy Review
Committee drafted a new "Statement on Intellectual Property", which was approved by
Court in April 1989, together with a "Statement on Research Contracts & Consultancies".
Combined in one document c'), these were sent to every member of the academic staff in
October 1989, with a request to read them in conjunction with the Conditions of
Employment, which had duly been amended.
Where IP is concerned, the new policy document is less opaque and more comprehensive
than the 1982 guidelines. It explains that IP can exist in many different forms and that the
form generally dictates whether it is protected by patent, copyright or registered design. It
explains that in some cases, maintaining confidentiality may be the only way to protect it.
It establishes the University's ownership of IP as an employer (quoting section 39 of the
1977 Patent Act in full in an appendix) but indicates that the University will not claim its
rights of copyright in books or articles for learned journals. The document goes on to
discuss the exploitation of IP in terms of patenting and licensing/formal confidentiality
agreements where secret know-how is concerned. It concludes with an indication of the
way in which the resulting profits are shared between the inventor and the University.
The new document makes no reference at all to company start-up as a route by which IP
might be exploited. This is perhaps because entrepreneurial activity comes under the aegis
of the outside work provisions, which were still under review at the time when the
commercial policy statements were finalised.
Although the document stresses the facilitating remit of the ICDS, in fact it is now
obligatory for the ICDS to have a say in how IP is exploited:
"... If you allow people to opt out, the whole thing becomes a bit self-defeating ...
We have an organisation which is designed to work for the University and to assist
the individual working within the University. Issues arising and opportunities
should therefore be channelled through [the ICDS] and that should be expected as
the norm of behaviour.
"If we don't, the University is likely to lose out and that is undoubtedly which is
much more important now that it has been recognised..."
However, although the document does not overtly say so, the Court has left the right of
final decision about whether to delay publication in the interests of obtaining patent
protection with the academic:
"... If a company came back to us and said - this is at a stage where we believe
we can make an enormous breakthrough and we're willing to sign a deal - I'm
sure we would go to the academic and say, look - we need two years but they have
guaranteed us X, Y and Z. But its upto the chap. If the chap turned round and
said - no way - I don't know what the legal position is, but in reality, nothing is
workable if you don't have the academic's agreement ..."
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Glasgow came to this conclusion after discussions with administrators from other
universities and reference to documentation from UDIL and the CVCP. Although it was
not publicised at the time, it became policy in 1987, on the recommendations of the ILO,
the then Vice-Principal (Industrial Liaison), his designated successor and an academic
member of the Court.
4.4	 Incentives
(i)	 Financial
Glasgow has chosen to concentrate on financial incentives to encourage academics to
adhere to its policy on IP. After some discussion, the University opted to keep the
revenue-sharing arrangements laid down in the 1982 "Guidelines...". Unlike many UK
universities, Glasgow came out against a sliding scale, whereby the split between the
inventor and the University increases in the University's favour as the aggregate income
grows. The centre believes there are benefits to be gained from being more generous:
"... if you try and draw the bottom line too early, you undoubtedly run into snags.
People just begin to think - this guy is going to take us for everything and give us
very little. Its better to be generous with something than not to be be generous and
find that they get round it ..."
The centre feels that in some areas, for instance pharmacology, it would be very easy for
academics to come to secret agreements with companies which cut out the University
altogether. This is a practice which the centre believes has already happened at other
universities and is anxious to avoid. On occasion, this philosophy leads to the revenue-
sharing rules being bent in a way which favours the inventor: for instance, if it looks as
though the build-up of cash is going to be particularly slow, the inventor may be given all
of the first £5,000, at the expense of the centre and the Department.
In practice, academics do not necessarily accept the financial rewards which the policy has
instituted. The ICDS has worked with a number of academics who have rejected their
right to royalties:
"... Some of them seem to be genuinely altruistic. Some of them want the money to
go back into the Department for research purposes (."). Some in the medical field
want to be able to say they have no personal interest and are pushing [something]
for its scientific value, not for personal gain. It happens in other disciplines as
well ..."
The centre still returns 25 per cent of the income from IP to the Department which
generated it. Because of the relatively high proportion which it gives the inventor, the
return to the Department from IP is considerably less than the return on overheads: 50 per
cent is returned to science Departments.
The hypothetical financial rewards which may be derived from adhering to the
University's policy are well publicised at Glasgow. There are also a number of examples
of academics and Departments which have actually been rewarded: at the end of 1989 the
University had around a dozen revenue-earning patents. To take an extreme example,
during the life of the patent, the vaccine "Dictol" earned the equivalent of Om at today's
value, of which 50 per cent went to the inventors and a further 25 per cent to the
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Veterinary School, which used it to acquire a teaching aid in the shape of its own farm.
The ICDS makes every effort to send out a press release to the media every time a major
licensing deal is signed and the Scots media have frequently responded very positively (32).
There has also been close attention to publicity within the University via the newsletter,
which details licensing deals, joint ventures with members of the academic staff etc.
However, the financial return to Departments and to individuals is not covered in the
newsletter:
"... We have never ... highlighted anything which says - well done, Department
X! They have made the following amount of money and that has gone into the
Department's discretionary fund.
"We might consider that, but ... we might get some academics saying - look, I'm,
quite happy for you to exploit it, but I don't want you telling every Tom, Dick and
Harry how much I'm making ... That would be a perfectly reasonable request ..."
This means that while the Veterinary School's acquisition of a farm is well-known in some
circles, that knowledge may not be very widespread. Where the sums involved have been
less substantial or the benefits perhaps less tangible, it is unlikely that such a large
academic community will know about the IP-related activities of colleagues.
Glasgow has not instituted any "negative" financial incentives. This results partly from the
fact that the University has not set Departmental income generation targets, nor has it
plans to:
"... that would be most unfortunate. If a HoD came and said - I reckon I could
make the University £100,000 a year in free income, or I could get Elm in
Research Council grants, but I can't do both - [we] would rather have Elm in
Research Council grants, as things stand.
"... As far as the Commercial Policy Review Committee is concerned, we are here
to teach and do basic research. We want to encourage income generation, but it
must not be at the expense of the other two ..."
(ii)	 Career Progression
In 1989/90, Glasgow updated its promotion procedures. Applicants now use a standard
form, so that the presentation of material is more consistent from one applicant to another
(23) . The form solicits information on three areas of work:
teaching, course preparation and examining;
- research, scholarship and academic standing;
- departmental and other management or administrative responsibility.
Outside work is not considered as a separate category, but divided between these three
categories, according to type. Thus, "consulting practice", "provision of technical advice
within the University" and "service while on secondment to a University company" are
deemed to be part of the research process. "Industrial liaison" and "contributions to the
management of a University company" are seen as administrative contributions (34).
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This means that whereas involvement in the exploitation of IP is included among the
criteria for promotion, the identification of IP is not rewarded. Nor is the successful
protection of that IP in the form of a patent: at no point in the application forms or in
the guidelines accompanying them is the word "patent" used.
There has been a long-standing dispute at Glasgow over the contribution made by a patent.
The local AUT has refused for many years to consider a patent as a criterion for
promotion, let alone equivalent to any form of publication. The AUT is not alone in its
misgivings. Similar views were expressed by the centre, for different reasons:
"... we are sufficiently generous in rewarding and to be rewarded twice for the
same thing seems ... to be particularly lucky ..."
This was tempered by the observation that in any case, academics whose IP generates a lot
of revenue are almost always the more active members of the academic community. As
such, they are likely to be promoted in any case.
The ICDS is not convinced by this argument and plans to put it on the agenda for the
Commercial Policy Review Committee to reconsider:
"... It is a stumbling block ... Some individuals see it that way, because in some
cases, people who are upto their eyes are looking at two distinct routes to go and
they are definite either/ors. If they see only one of them as assisting promotion ..."
4.5	 Sanctions
Glasgow has never applied sanctions against academics who failed to flag potentially
exploitable research discoveries, even if this failure appeared to be motivated by personal
financial gain at the expense of the University:
"... For those who have done it in the past, we didn't make our position clear
enough, or it would be argued that we didn't. [We] don't want to lose any sleep
over it ..."
Since the new policy statement has been issued, the University is not aware of anyone
having contravened it. Asked to speculate on how it might respond if someone did, the
centre's view was:
"... I would not wish the University to quote a situation where it would say: we
are going to sack such and such a member of staff or we are going to get an
injunction against him continuing to trade.
"... I wouldn't even say we would invoke any disciplinary procedures ... I cannot
see the University at the moment going to court, sacking somebody, disciplining
them ..."
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5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Identification
The academic community was first informed that the University had assumed
responsibility for exploiting IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects by an
article in the newsletter in March 1987 (35) . There appears to have been no specific written
reminder until November 1989, when a circular was sent to all Research Council-funded
graduate students and all academic supervisors, confirming that the University had taken
over from the BTG. This is now repeated at the beginning of each academic year. On the
whole, the University has tended not to single out its objectives vis-a-vis Research
Council-funded projects from its objectives vis-a-vis IP in general.
Towards the end of the initial three-year authorisation from the Research Councils, the
University began employing a number of tactics to ensure that the academic community
was aware of these broader objectives. The new policy statements on IP were circulated to
all staff as soon as documentation became available in summer 1989. The ICDS also
planned to produce a "user-friendly booklet of DOs and DON'Ts" to help inventors, which
would be circulated to all members of staff and pinned onto noticeboards. In the
meantime, the BTG circulated its 1989 pamphlet on patents (315) to HoDs and possibly some
research group leaders; the ICDS did not know who received it and who did not.
The ICDS also began employing face-to-face tactics to increase awareness, such as
presentations at the income generation seminars, contributions to staff development
seminars, and Departmental visits at which the functions of the ICDS are explained. At
the end of 1989 it was recognised that new staff needed to be targeted more effectively:
although all new staff are given a copy of the relevant policy statements, the staff
induction programme did not at that time include a presentation on IP.
Despite its increased staff, the ICDS is obliged to rely fairly heavily on academics
responding to its awareness campaign. Since an intitial trawl when the ICDS was
established, the amount of trawling carried out within the Departments has been
"minimal". This is due partly to the pressures of exploiting IP which had already been
identified and partly to a desire to wait until the new documentation relating to IP was
prepared. Lately, trawling has effectively been limited to the BTG's regular bi-annual
visits and those occasioned by special initiatives m.
Despite the fact that ICDS handles both IP and research grants and contracts, research
reports are not actively scrutinised for potential IP at either the interim or final report
stage. Glasgow has doubts about how cost-effective it would be - and about how
academics would react to the idea at the moment;
"... it is very seldom that somebody else - here or elsewhere - would turn round to
an academic and say to them: that's a good idea, why don't you do a, b and c?
II
However, the centre does not entirely rule out the possibility in the future, on a voluntary
basis:
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"... As the service gains in credibility - and it is evident that it is: those who
previously wouldn't deal with its forerunner, or found its forerunner so
bureaucratic and slow that it wasn't worth dealing with are now quite supportive
•••
"...in due time, if we said - well, before you send off your things to journals, why
don't you just push them through and let Dr. Bloggs cast his eye over and see if
there is anything in it, then I think we'd get people doing it. But I don't think we
would ever get a situation where the academics would agree to doing it
automatically ..."
The ICDS would be unlikely to undertake scrutinising reports or drafts of papers itself;
the responsibility would probably be devolved down to the level of Faculty or
Department:
"... We are going through a sea change at the moment, involving at least the
potential for a number of areas perhaps being devolved ... Devolved responsibility
is very much on the cards, in the widest sense ..."
For it to be a worthwhile exercise, the ICDS feels that the person(s) responsible would
have to be able to balance knowledge of the field against an ability to assess commercial
exploitability and possible applications.
5.2	 Evaluation
The ICDS regards evaluation as the most tricky part of the exploitation process.:
"... At the end of the day, it is not how good the science is, or how clever it is, it
is whether it is going to get into the marketplace. That is notoriously fickle and
difficult. The number of examples of tremendous science that haven't hit the
marketplace for no valid reason! They've been innovative, they've been cheaper,
but they just not caught the imagination ..."
For this reason, although the ICDS uses peer review to assess the scientific value of a
discovery, its decision on how to proceed is guided primarily by the market value. In
general, academics contribute little to this part of the exploitation process, unless they
have industrial contacts, whom Glasgow may involve on an informal basis. The University
often uses public sector agencies such as the SDA to evaluate its IP, or private sector
consultants. Medical discoveries are the exception to this rule. Since medics are likely to




Glasgow generally prefers to retain ownership of its IP rather than assign it to an
industrial partner, unless circumstances are exceptional m . It is motivated by the desire to
retain control over the IP, to prevent the technology being suppressed or under-exploited,
and not to lose its IP assets, should industrial partners go into receivership (39).
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If a discovery is considered to have market value, it is Glasgow's policy to try and get a
discovery protected by a patent, where appropriate. This is not because the centre has a
principled objection to treating IP as secret know-how:
"... at the end of the day, if something appears to have the [potential] for
exploitation, provided the academic is agreeable to a secrecy agreement (added
emphasis), it is probably in the long-term interests of science - and certainly the
University - that we get a decent financial reward rather than an immediate
publication ..."
but rather that because the ICDS believes industry sees a patent as a yardstick of
credibility:
"... Mere is still sufficient distrust of University-based R&D and Heath Robinson
inventions for them to say - we're not interested unless you have got a patent ..."
(ii) Finance
Unless they have considerable skill and experience, Glasgow does not ask inventive
academics to draft patent applications themselves. The University prefers to employ a
patent agent, even though it is more expensive, believing this yields a better patent.
Glasgow's patent budget for 1989/90 was £35,000, to cover all associated costs. If
necessary, this budget can be exceeded (40); in the previous year, the budget was exceeded
as a result of legal fees, for example. This level of funding allows the University to
gamble on one long-term project a year; generally, cost dictates a fairly pragmatic, short-
term approach, particularly at this early stage in the University's exploitation history:
"... [We are] now struggling in terms of our patent portfolio and [the] ability to
service it financially. [We] just don't have licensees involved in enough cases ..."
(41) .
Nonetheless, the ICDS can normally cover the initial registration and the first year's costs.
Glasgow does not attempt to save money by acquiring UK-only patents; it regards the UK,
US and certain European countries as the norm. In order to get the most out of its budget,
however, Glasgow generally uses the PCT route: the expenditure is slower and there is a
greater chance of identifying licensees before the heavy expenditure occurs. The
University also tries to cover the cost of renewal fees for the first couple of years, but
would find it impossible to keep protecting technology which was a long way ahead of its
time.
(iii) Practicalities
Academics at Glasgow who agree to delay publication rarely find themselves having to do
so for more than a few months. If they are committed to giving a conference paper, the
delay can be as short as a month - in the absence of a contractual obligation to delay
longer. In this case, the objective is simply to establish a priority date via an initial
registration. This gives little commercial advantage, however: it may result in a hastily-
written patent which is limiting in scope or easy to get around. For this reason the ICDS
will often suggest delaying longer, but if researchers disagree, the ICDS has to make the
best of a less than perfect situation.
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(iv)	 Ownership
Glasgow vests its patents solely in the University's name, not jointly, in the inventors'
names, too. However, if a patent remains unexploited for a long time, the University is
prepared to assign its rights to the inventors. Equally, if the University decides not to
protect a discovery by filing a patent application in the first place, it is policy to
unconditionally waive the University's rights in favour of the inventor(s). This does not
happen automatically - only if a researcher requests it. A waiver/assignation would be
issued as soon as was practicable, but if a discovery was at a very early stage, the ICDS
might recommend waiting another year to see what developed. Glasgow does not
subscribe to the six month limit recommended by UDIL. Since the early 1980s, only one
researcher has challenged the University's decision not to protect a discovery by filing a
patent application. On this occasion, the inventor chose to incur the cost of a patent agent,
rather than write the patent himself and pay the minimum fee. He made use of none of the
ICDS's resources in the effort to exploit his IP. The ICDS is not prepared to incur any
direct expenditure once it has issued a waiver/assignation, but it would be prepared to
devote staff time and expertise - in exchange for "a small slice of the action" - if it felt the
academic was worth backing as a person.
5.4	 Commercialisation
Where it retains rights to its IP, Glasgow has no principled objection to exploiting it via
licensing to a third party, a University company or a joint venture (42) , but it is against
independent academic spin-off companies exploiting "hard" IP.
(i)	 Joint Ventures
In practice, since the early 1980s, around 90 per cent of the University's IP has been
exploited by means of licensing. In some cases, company start-up was not the appropriate
mechanism; in others, there was simply no option:
"... [we] just don't happen to believe that there is a whole big pile of academics
wanting to become entrepreneurs ..."
The ICDS estimates that since the early 1980s, no more than ten academics have seriously
considered starting a company to exploit their research discoveries and even fewer have
taken the necessary steps (43) • Where company formation looks like a viable option, the
ICDS does suggest it to researchers. Once the ICDS has outlined the advantages and
disadvantages, researchers have tended to reject the idea, however:
"... Very few of them have shown that they have understood the problems, the
obligations, the red tape, the paperwork - and very few of them want to take it on
board ..."
By the end of 1989, Glasgow had set up three joint ventures, two with members of the
academic staff alone and one involving academic staff, the public sector and the private
sector. A fourth joint venture was in the process of being set up ("). In each case, the
academics themselves took the initiative.
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(ii) University Companies
In principle, if company start-up is an appropriate way to exploit a piece of IP - yet the
researchers concerned are not entrepreneurial, there is no reason why the University
should not set up its own campus company. However, Glasgow entered the 1990s without
a University company of any kind. Having failed with its first attempt at an industrial
liaison office, the centre was keen for the ICDS to establish its credibility with the
academic community:
"... We reckoned it was going to be twice as hard if [the ILO] was perceived as
being part of an outside organisation, something that they couldn't comprehend
Once the climate changes, a University company may well be formed (45).
(iii) Licensing
Glasgow is not unhappy about the fact that most of its IP is exploited by means of
licensing. This is generally seen as "less trouble" than any other exploitation route (415).
Setting up a joint venture demands far more of the ICDS than the average licensing deal.
The distribution of equity requires delicate handling, it is often difficult to locate a suitable
managing director (47) and academics do not immediately understand the obligations which
they have taken on. Moreover, lengthy procedures are involved if the academic wants to
devote more than the minimum time to the company (see section 6.2 for more details).
Non-entrepreneurial academics can still play an important role in the commercialisation of
their discoveries:
"... the academic, in a lot of cases, has a better working knowledge of the
market - and contacts in it - than outsiders. [Wel tend to use them as the first
selection point for people to contact. Some of them are very switched on. Some of
them, like the vets, are working in a very small marketplace anyway. They know
all the contacts ..."
In this situation, the academics usually make the initial contact. It is their job to "sell"
both themselves and their technology. Once they have done that, the ICDS establishes the
University's terms and conditions and finalises the deal, often granting licenses with some
degree of exclusivity. Academics are never excluded from this process: they participate in
an advisory capacity unless they are unwilling to.
6	 ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
6.1	 Policy
Glasgow has a fairly specific policy with regard to would-be academic entrepreneurs, but
it is not one which has been formally written down and circulated amongst the academic
staff:
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"... [We] would like ... our academics, when they see opportunities for
exploitation, to advise us of it. But I'm not sure that we would want to have what I
would call a policy (added emphasis) which goes around with a big flag saying,
you know, you must all become entrepreneurs. I think that would be counter-
productive ..."
The centre would not welcome a significant upturn in the number of would-be academic
entrepreneurs. While Court is still prepared to permit independent academic spin-off
companies which exploit expertise, it would now be very unusual for an academic to be
allowed to exploit IP via an independent spin-off company. This unwritten policy is
motivated by a number of concerns. The centre has first-hand knowledge of University
companies run by academics which failed dramatically at another University. Moreover, it
is "known" that in the past a number of spin-off companies set up by academics from
Glasgow have failed, running the danger of leaving the IP unexploited ("). A high
proportion of all new businesses fail, yet there seems to be an implicit assumption that
these businesses failed due to the inexperience of their academic founders.
Glasgow is concerned not only about the viability of academic spin-off companies, but
also about the squandering of academic expertise:
"... the concept that one should cut one's teeth as an entrepreneur - in most cases
with little or no experience - based on [one's] own scientific project that might of
itself be extremely valuable - that ... is a nonsense.
"[People] are in the marketplace because they have those skills. We have skills in
a different area. Let's do what we are good at ..."
It is possible that successful academic spin-off companies have been incubated, unknown
to the University (49) ; it has certainly incubated a highly successful post-doctoral spin-off
company (see note (43) for details) - but this would be no consolation to the centre, which
would see them as rivals, unless the University had a share in them:
"... We just don't believe we should allow people to go out and start businesses in
competing lines to the University (added emphasis) without the University having
an involvement. It just takes away business from the University ... That is
madness. Any employer who encourages that must want his head examined ..."
The centre seems to expect a higher return from academic entrepreneurs than it expects
from third parties who negotiate a license agreement. As things stand, however,
structurally the University would get no more than a third party agreement would be likely
to yield: an eventual royalty and possibly an up-front payment. This is because the income
from spin-off companies is treated in the same way as personal consultancy: Glasgow does
not levy a percentage tax on academics' income from personal consultancy.
If academics at Glasgow wish to become entrepreneurially involved with the exploitation
of the IP they have generated, they can only do this legally via a joint venture, with the
University "in the driving seat" (5°) . They are not allowed to take on the role of managing
director: the University prefers to put in a managing director who has an established track
record. Academics may hold directorships which exploit their scientific or technical
ability, however.
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A number of centres/institutes/units have been established at Glasgow. With the exception
of three (') - most of which have sprung from social sciences disciplines - they were
established to achieve purely academic objectives. There is no indication that Glasgow's
academics have tried to pursue their entrepreneurial interests within the University system,
by setting up commercial arms to their Department, explicitly and exclusively intended to
exploit expertise/resources.
6.2 Making Time
If the University agrees to a joint venture to exploit IP, it recognises that the project's
success depends on researchers' ability to commit time and energy to it. If academics
require more than the 30 days a year which is the recognised limit for personal
consultancy activities, they must seek formal permission. In principle, the centre is willing
to consider any arrangement which academics care to propose, from extending their
consultancy limit to temporary part-time employment or leave of absence. In general,
decisions about time off are based on a value judgement about the relative merits of the
academic's normal contributions to his Department versus the activities for which he
requires time off. In theory this could mean that Professors are less likely to be granted a
reduced workload than Lecturers:
"... Clearly somebody's worth to you as HoD is much more than if he is a junior
Lecturer ..."
However, most of Glasgow's entrepreneurial academics have had the status of Senior
Lecturer or Professor. This suggests that their contribution to the exploitation process has
been highly valued.
In practice, entrepreneurial academics have not been allowed to devote more than 20 per
cent of their time to the company on full pay. Alternative solutions have been found,
however. In one case, an academic has been allowed to buy-out additional time on full
pay, by paying for a Research Fellow for three years. This was at the academic's
initiative:
"... He came along and said - look, I'm spending a lot of time on this. You are
still telling me I can't do it and [since] we are both agreed that we like each other
... I would like to pay for a Research Fellow ..."
In another case, an academic who was willing to forego his pay was granted one year's
leave of absence. In principle, the centre would be sympathetic to a request to extend
previously agreed periods of absence, if it was critical to the success of the company;
again, it would assess the relative merit. In practice, though, the ICDS feels that many
HoDs would be unhappy if previously agreed terms of absence were to be extended:
"... The reality very often is that the guys who have that commercial edge are the
ones who are key to the Department ..."
From the ICDS's perspective, making time for academics' entrepreneurial activities
involves procedures which leave a lot to be desired:
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"... There is a lot of red tape involved. A lot of people have to agree to it - HoDs,
the Staffing Committee, perhaps the Secretary to the Court. The procedure is not
as quick as it should be.
"The problem is that it is an iterative process. You're having to consult with the
Staffing Committee about time off. There may be matters of policy because ... each
new vehicle may bring up points of principle - which may take you to the
Commercial Policy Review Committee.
"The actual funding of the company takes you to the Innovation Fund and then the
Court has to approve the whole thing. You're going through far too many
committees ... To dot the i's and cross the t's [takes] months ..."
These are quite separate procedures which have developed piecemeal over the years to
regulate unrelated activities. They have a dynamic of their own which takes no account of
the demands of business start-up, and this has already come close to causing serious
problems. Moreover, since each decision is taken independently, there is no guarantee that
conflicting decisions will not be made.
6.3	 Other Resources
(i) Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
In principle the centre is in favour of allowing academics who are trying to exploit
promising IP access to resources. However, as a university, Glasgow feels it is operating
under sufficient constraints that it cannot properly resource its primary functions. The
centre is therefore keen to get a return on such "extraordinary" use of its resources. That
may be a short-term or a long-term return, depending on the circumstances. If an
academic wanted use of equipment/instrumentation or accommodation and the University
did not have an equity share in his company (52) , it would look for a fairly immediate
return, charging the market rate per day, per telephone call ("), etc:
"... If you say to somebody - yes, you can set up a company and you can use our
spectrometer and we won't charge you, it really is a misuse of the University's
funds unless the long-term aim is to add to the University's funds ..."
If the University has an equity stake in the company, it is prepared to look for its return
considerably later and in a different form. Academics are unlikely to be charged for phone
calls for some time. Their use of equipment, instrumentation and technical or secretarial
support staff tends to be overlooked initially, though charges below the market rate are
generally levied eventually.
(ii) Accommodation
Accommodation is so scarce at Glasgow that entrepreneurial academics are never allocated
additional space, even if the University has an equity stake in the company. However,
they are allowed to use their existing accommodation during the start-up phase. Again,
would-be academic entrepreneurs are unlikely to be charged for this for some time. This
is in recognition of the fact that the University offers no suitable incubator units, despite
having been instrumental in the founding of the West of Scotland Science Park, the greater
part of which is located on Glasgow University's Kelvin campus (54):
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"... In conceptual terms, it is not the right place for a start-up company. There
are no incubator units in the right sense. They are too expensive. You're talking
about a relatively high quality, high facility operation and that's not really for
start-ups ..." (55).
Since there are no other "technology parks" in the immediate vicinity, it is on the ICDS's
agenda to find some space locally where it could set up incubator units, but this is unlikely
to happen in the immediate future.
(iii)	 Financial Support
Although the University would appreciate being given an equity share in an independent
academic spin-off company as a quid pro quo - something which has not yet happened - it
generally puts up the capital for its equity share (*. Glasgow does not operate in terms of
minimum or maximum percentages or controlling interests; it generally makes an ad hoc,
pragmatic decision based largely on the funds which it can make available. However, as a
rule, academics are given a 5-10 per cent holding in joint ventures, unless they can make
a strong case for a larger holding or are prepared to contribute capital. The University has
also been known to make loans, both preferential and non-preferential, to the company,
rather than the individual academic. These do not usually exceed £20,000.
Financial support of this sort is given via a special innovation fund, which was established
in 1985 at the initiative of the Court. An initial £200,000 was diverted into the innovation
fund from the University's general funds. A committee, chaired by a retired banker who
is a lay member of Court, meets to consider requests for funding whenever necessary. The
fund is intended to plug the gap between blue-sky research and the stage at which venture
capitalists are prepared to invest, providing "softer money in more speculative situations".
This can be start-up or second-phase funding. In the view of the University, "venture
capitalists ... are still risk-averse, despite everything they say". Glasgow sees risk as:
"... an acceptable criterion in relation to the exploitation of University projects
•• •
The fund was intended to be regenerated partly through token dividends but mainly
through successful companies being sold-on:
"... I don't think we see ourselves as having a 20-year interest in any companies.
We would be selling-on once the inventors had got it to a certain stage in the
market and it needed another level of money and expertise ..."
At the end of 1989 the innovation fund stood at just £50,000. It may be some time before
it can regenerate itself as planned: the University has not yet had a return on its equity
holdings - the companies it has financed are all too new - and it will be some years before
any of them are ready to be sold-on. Moreover, the committee backed one company which
failed before it got its product to the marketplace. This has not acted as a deterrent,
however. The University feels it has learned valuable lessons from the exercise.
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6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
Since the ICDS is headed by an accountant with commercial experience, it has sufficient
expertise to give business start-up advice to the University's would-be academic
entrepreneurs. However, this is not a resource which can be made available to all-comers:
"... If they were doing it entirely privately, for their own gain, the question of
whether I wanted to [help them] wouldn't apply: we just don't have the manpower
In practice, though, there are few situations where there is a prima facie case for a
company being entirely independent. Where IP is being exploited, the University generally
acquires an equity stake. Moreover, the University is moving in the direction of taking an
interest in spin-off companies founded to exploit academic expertise, even if this involves
a nominal shareholding:
"... [It] is much easier for all parties if the University has a shareholding. First of
all, the guy has credibility on campus ... He	 also has better marketing potential
if he is seen to be linked to the University. Secondly, we've got a handle on his
activity ..."
In such situations, company spin-off is treated as a University project and every effort is
made to give business advice.
7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Glasgow was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was
"generally satisfied" with the exploitation arrangements which the University had
established. The Exploitation Scrutiny Group noted Glasgow's intention to establish a
more formal network for identifying IP in the future. A formal document was scheduled to
follow, confirming the University's rights and responsibilities to exploit IP arising out of
Research Council-funded projects for a further 2 years. The situation was due to be





An abortive bid was made in 1947 to have a university sited in Kent - at Canterbury,
specifically - to fill the increased post-war demand for a university education. In the late
1950s a number of towns in Kent drew up plans in preparation for a bid. Kent County
Council opted to support Canterbury's bid, which was successful. Kent received its Royal
Charter in 1965, making it one of the group of universities often referred to as "plate-
glass".
1.2	 Size
By the beginning of the 1980s Kent had become one of the larger small universities in the
UK, measured in terms of student FTEs ('). In 1981 the UGC advised the University to
reduce by 7 per cent the number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 1984/85. Like
many of the south coast universities, Kent already had a relatively high proportion of
overseas students, as Figure 2 showed. At the same time the UGC announced that Kent's
recurrent grant was to be reduced by 21 per cent between 1980/81 and 1983/84. As we
can see from Figure 2, this was somewhat above the national average. This advice was
also received with some surprise, since the UGC appeared to have accepted that Kent had
been significantly underfunded for years, compared to other universities of a similar size
and subject distribution (2). By most methods of reckoning, Kent falls into the group of
universities worst afflicted by the UGC's decisions.
Kent's response to the cuts was to reduce staff numbers by natural wastage, rather than by
closing down whole subject areas. The area which suffered most was the history division
of the Faculty of Humanities; the science base was not so seriously eroded. Kent ended
the 1980s with one more Faculty than it had at the beginning. A Faculty of Information
Technology was added to the existing Faculties of Natural Sciences, Humanities and
Social Sciences. In practice, this represented a restructuring of existing resources, rather
than a completely new departure. The previously non-aligned Computer Lab and Institute
of Mathematics joined forces to form the new Faculty, to which were added the existing
Electronic Engineering Laboratories, previously located in the Faculty of Natural
Sciences.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that Kent should increase its student numbers by 5.12 per cent
over the next four sessions (3) . In fact, by the end of the 1980s, the University managed to
increase aggregate student numbers over the decade by 12 per cent ( 4) . As a result, Kent
also increased its size relative to other universities over the same period ( 5). By the end of
the 1980s, Kent had also managed to increase full-time staff numbers by around 14 per
cent and had more than doubled the number of part-timers (6)•
1.3	 Science Base
Kent is unusual having no Departments: this was a deliberate ploy when the University
was founded, designed to encourage an inter-disciplinary approach to teaching and
research. The Faculty of Natural Sciences is organised around the Biological Laboratory,
the Chemical Laboratory and the Physics Laboratory, which act as cost centres. Similarly,
84
the new Faculty of Information Technology is organised around the Computing
Laboratory, the Electronics Laboratory and the Mathematical Institute, each of which acts
as a cost centre, likewise.
In 1988/89 the combined staff of these two Faculties accounted for 35 per cent of the
University's total academic/academic-related staff (7)• They were responsible for around 27
per cent of Kent's undergraduates and 47 per cent of registered research students (8). In
absolute terms, Kent has one of the smallest science bases of any monolithic university in
the UK. This has led to a spiral of increasing financial deprivation (9).
As Figure 6a showed, in the UGC's 1986 assessment of universities' research strengths in
the natural sciences, engineering and technology, none of Kent's subject areas were rated
as outstanding. Three were assessed as above average, none were rated as average, but
four were rated as below average °°). It was suggested that if the ABRC's
recommendations were ever implemented, Kent would be assigned to the "T" category;
accordingly, the University would be able to offer some postgraduate work, but without
advanced research facilities °D.
Figure 6b revealed that in the 1988/89 research selectivity exercise, no "units of
assessment" in the natural sciences, engineering and technology received a "5" rating at
Kent; two received a "4", three received a "3", one received a "2" and none received a
u 1 u (1 2) .
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
Figure 41a shows that in 1984/85 Kent ranked 41st in terms of £ earned in external
research grants and contracts, but 32nd in terms of the percentage of its total recurrent
income which this external revenue represented, namely 11.7 per cent m . The Faculty of
Natural Sciences, the former School of Mathematics and the Computing Laboratory
brought in close to £1.4m, accounting for 61 per cent of the University's total income
from research grants and contracts 04) • We can see from Figure 41b that by 1988/89 the
Faculties of Natural Sciences and Information Technology had increased their earnings for
1984/85 by a factor of 2.5, generating close to £3.4m; this accounted for 74 per cent of
the University's total income from research grants and contracts ".
The pattern of sponsorship which Kent's science base attracted was slightly different to the
pattern four years earlier, as Figures 345-346 the proportion of funding received from the
Research Councils and charities fell from 65 per cent in 1984/85 to 59 per cent in
1988/89. This was not due to increased funding from industry/commerce - indeed, the
proportion of funding from this sector fell marginally, from 8 per cent in 1984/85 to 7 per
cent in 1988/89. Kent significantly increased the proportion of funding received from
central government, local government and various overseas organisations - up from 26 per
cent in 1984/85 to 34 per cent in 1988/89.
2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1
	 Background
Prior to the 1980s, potentially exploitable, "hard" IP was occasionally identified and
patented at Kent 06), but this happened purely as a result of individual researchers having
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sufficient interest to pursue the matter. If the IP was exploited commercially, this was also
due to the researcher's efforts. The administration had no interest in actively seeking out
IP and arranging for it to be exploited. The administration did not have a great deal of
interest in the University's relationship with industry, either.
2.2	 Structures
The push to establish some kind of structure to foster the University's relations with
industry came not from the administration but from a section of the academic community.
In 1979 the Dean of the Faculty of Natural Sciences presented a paper to his Faculty's
Board of Studies, proposing that the University should found a company to act as a
vehicle for soliciting research contracts from industry and handling the resulting income.
The Board of Studies nominated a working party 07) to investigate whether a company was
the most appropriate way to achieve the objectives he had outlined, and if so, to draw up
a business plan. The Dean originally proposed approaching the Wolfson Foundation with a
view to obtaining funding, but in the event, an approach to the UGC yielded the offer of
04,000 as a pump-priming grant, payable in 1980/81.
Armed with this, the proposal was formally put to Senate and Council and was duly
accepted in the 1980/81 session. This did not necessarily indicate a sudden interest in
industry on the part of the administration or the rest of the academic community:
"... this was regarded by the University at large as one of those personal hobbies
that people in high places in universities tend to pursue and that should, by and
large, be humoured ..."
Cynics in the administration saw it as a mechanism which allowed a minority of the
acadenlic community to overcome the fact that their activities conflicted with the
prevailing ethos:
"... commercial deals could be treated with a greater degree of confidentiality
than they could under the then existing procedures in the University: basically,
backhanders for academics.
"In those days people were fairly puritan. It wasn't the done thing to have a grant
go to [the University] and for £25,000 of it to go to Professor X for working on it
... It enabled a cetain amount of camouflage to be imposed on these things with
the aim that - if academics could be stimulated to greater efforts by this
mechanism - the company would make a profit and the profits would be remitted to
the University ..."
Kent Scientific & Industrial Projects Ltd (KSIP) was founded in 1980 and began operating
at the beginning of 1981. Its official function was to act as a commercial arm for the
whole University, exploiting its expertise and equipment in much the same way that
discipline/technology-specific units located within particular Departments do in certain
other universities. In subsequent years, a number of such discipline-specific units were
founded at Kent, too, independently of KSIP (, but only KSIP was given the right and
responsibility for handling "hard" IP in the form of patentable products and processes.
However, KSIP was intended to be an R&D-based business, not a "hard" manufacturing
company which would entrepreneurially exploit such IP itself. KSIP was to act as a
broker, identifying, evaluating and protecting IP and arranging for third parties to exploit
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it. A Managing Director was duly appointed who was believed to have experience of
dealing with IP and a grasp of how universities operate 09).
2.3	 Policy
With the benefit of six or seven years' hindsight, the administration no longer regards the
appointment as an unmitigated success, though it recognises that the University itself must
take some of the blame for this. Neither the administration nor the then Board of Directors
(213) had formulated a policy to guide KSIP's activities:
"... We hadn't got a policy. We had just jumped on the bandwagon of having a
company because somebody said it was a good idea. Nobody had really sat down
and considered the advantages and the disadvantages ... Therefore, he was
basically alone out there ..."
KSIP was left to its own devices where IP was concerned, though it is unclear how much
the new Managing Director was responsible for what ensued and how much academics
with a vested interest were responsible. Upto December 1986, when the first Managing
Director left, KSIP made around ten patent applications, vesting the patents in its own
name rather than the University's, or jointly in the name of KSIP and the inventors. Some
of the IP arose out of research funded by the University itself and some out of Research
Council-funded projects, which the BTG saw no future in pursuing (21)• By omission or by
design - it is unclear which - Kent did not establish a patent budget. As a result, KSIP
ended up bearing the patent costs. In the majority of cases KSIP bore not just initial
registration fees but the costs of acquiring full patents as well as renewal fees. Since much
of the IP was protected not only in the UK but also in Europe, the US and Canada, this
involved a considerable sum of money. With one exception, KSIP did not recoup these
costs from licensees. In fact, KSIP seldom capitalised on protected IP by finding licensees.
In the administration's view, the IP tended to be exploited intellectually rather than
commercially. It is unclear whether this was the result of a deliberate, long-term policy to
acquire a portfolio of strategic patents, or whether this was the result of individual
academics acting out of vested interest. In the early 1980s, a considerable effort was being
made to build up research groups. Some academics may have felt that more benefit would
be derived from using research discoveries as background IP to gain new research
contracts from industry than would be derived from licensing it. However, the
administration suspects that some academics were also exploiting the IP via their own
spin-off companies, a number of which began to emerge during this period.
With the benefit of hindsight, Kent's administration questions not only KSIP's approach to
protecting and exploiting IP, but also its efficacy in identifying IP in the first place. Most
of the patents which KSIP acquired during its first few years of operation protected IP
which had originated in the Physics Laboratory. KSIP's first Managing Director had
trained as a physicist and KSIP itself was located in the Physics Laboratory:
"... It's not accidental that virtually all the patents we got when he was here were
in physics ... It was easy for him to interact with the physicists ..."
It is unclear whether the first Managing Director took a proactive or a reactive approach
to the rest of the campus:
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"... It might have been that KSIP went out and sought to obtain IP, went round
the campus and proselytised, but I doubt it. In fact, I'm sure fit] didn't, because of
one of the perpetual moans of the KSIP Board [was] that it [wasn't] a sufficiently
proactive organisation ..."
2.4	 Regulations and Documentation
There is no record of KSIP producing any written documentation to indicate to the
academic community that it was responsible for IP, that researchers with potentially
exploitable discoveries should notify KSIP - though this might perhaps have been deduced
from an article in the university newsletter about the appointment and remit of KSIP's first
Managing Director. There is evidence to suggest (22) that the Registrar produced a
document in 1982 which detailed the IP rights claimed by the University. However, it is
not clear by what means this was circulated - or, indeed, whether it was circulated at all.
The administrator who currently has responsibility for IP matters has no knowledge of it.
He believes that even if it was circulated, it was soon forgotten. In his view, it is likely
that academics who thought their discoveries had potential took some time to find out what
they should do about it:
"... They probably wouldn't have known that they should [go to KSIP]. They
probably would have talked in various common rooms and even made a judicious
phone call to someone in the Registry and eventually they would have tracked
down that that was where they should go ..."
On the other hand, if academics decided to exploit the IP themselves, there was little to
deter them. The University had not amended its terms and conditions of employment in
the wake of the 1977 Patent Act, nor had it reached a collective agreement with the local
AUT.
2.5	 Incentives
At the same time as outlining the IP rights claimed by the University, Kent introduced a
financial incentive to encourage researchers to "flag" potentially exploitable discoveries. In
keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, they were rewarded financially only if the
patent was successfully exploited on a commercial basis. For the first time, Kent came to
a policy decision on how royalty income from exploiting inventions should be distributed.
There is no record of how this decision was reached, though more recent documents
suggest that it may have been at the behest of the Board of KSIP, anxious to recoup some
of its outgoings. In any case, the Finance Committee agreed to introduce a sliding scale.
The first £1,000 net went to the inventor(s); the next £4,000 net was split 75:25 between
the inventor(s) and KSIP; the next £20,000 net was split 50:50 between the inventor(s)
and KSIP. Income in excess of £25,001 net was divided 25:75 between the inventor(s) and
KSIP (23). There is evidence to suggest (24) that a document detailing this was sent to
existing and subsequently to new members of the academic/academic-related staff by
someone with responsibility for personnel. However, during the 1980s responsibility for
academic/academic-related personnel at Kent was devolved to the Faculties, rather than
organised centrally (25) . It is not clear who would have sent such a document and it was
not possible to find a copy.
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2.6	 Summary
This was the situation when the Kingman letter arrived. KSIP had been left to work out its
own modus operandi, with the result that whilst it had put together a portfolio of patents,
it had made no real effort to exploit them commercially. Patents were costing the company
around £15,000 a year, and it was not clear who, if anyone, was benefitting from this
expenditure. Little or no attempt had been made to quantify the benefits to the University,
either in financial or non-financial terms. An attempt had been made to recoup some of
the cost by agreeing on the distribution of royalty income, but there had been only one
tranche of royalty income to distribute (26) . The administration was in the process of slowly
recognising that KSIP was operating in a less than optimal way - and that by default, if
not by design, the University itself was partly responsible for this state of affairs.
3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
When the Kingman letter arrived, it was discussed by a group consisting of the Vice-
Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, two Pro-Vice-Chancellors cm , the Registrar and
the Academic Secretary. The administration did not inform the academic community about
the Research Councils' offer. Academics were not given an opportunity to make their
views known or to contribute to the decision- and policy-making process. The decision to
accept the offer was made by this small group, as was the decision to make KSIP
responsible for any IP which might arise as a result. The idea of the University effectively
taking over from the BTG was not seen as a controversial issue:
"Nobody would care tuppence! We had been doing nothing [via BTGJ previously,
so any increment would have been an improvement on the previous situation ..."
The response seems to have been drafted by the Registrar m . Kent, together with eleven
other institutions, had its proposals accepted by the Scrutiny Group in the second round of
deliberations. The letter of authorisation was sent on 3 November, 1986.
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Rationale
Despite the dissatisfaction with which certain members of the administration had come to
view Kent's arrangements for handling IP, it was not the administration alone which
agitated for a change. The new Managing Director of KSIP cm felt there were
circumstances which prevented him from effectively identifying, evaluating, protecting and
exploiting the University's IP m) . Moreover, KSIP's new Board discovered that the
company was spending around £15,000 a year on patenting costs, for no return (31).
Concerned that this was "assassinating the balance sheet", in 1988/89 the Board put a
resolution to Council diverting responsibility for patenting costs to the Registry.
The resolution was accepted and at the same time, responsibility for IP was transferred
from KSIP to the Registry, more specifically to a Senior Assistant Registrar (32) . It was
planned to establish a dedicated research grants office under his supervision and it seemed
logical to locate responsibility for IP in the same place (")• It was also felt that the
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administration could ensure more of the University's IP was commercially exploited,
eventually generating a surplus income.
Given its misgivings over KSIP's proficiency in identifying "hard" IP, Kent is not sure
where to pitch its expectations for the future. On the one hand, many of its physicists have
fairly applied interests (34) , as do its biologists (35) and some of its electronics researchers.
On the other hand, Kent feels that not having an engineering Faculty is a considerable
handicap:
"... If you've got a lot of engineers around, it must influence the corporate view. I
think it's an ethos thing ..."
This may partly explain why the University has been prepared to take what could be seen
as a retrograde step. It has chosen to make IP the responsibility of a career administrator
who already has a considerable workload, in preference to solving the problems which
KSIP felt prevented it from handling IP effectively. Solving those problems would have
involved instituting better systems for sharing information, but it might also have involved
expanding the staff of KSIP, with all the associated cost implications m.
4.2	 Structures
Kent now has a dual structure for handling "hard" IP. KSIP still handles the patents which
were vested in its name, but the Senior Assistant Registrar is officially responsible for all
IP discovered after mid-1989. It is already evident that this situation gives rise to a
number of problems.
Firstly, while the University centrally has sole responsibility for research grants, both
KSIP and the University centrally have the right to negotiate contracts with industry,
Government Departments etc. Academics can choose which structure to deal with;
theoretically, they could even play one structure off against the other in the search for the
best deal.
Secondly, in contracts negotiated by KSIP, any IP generated which does not belong to the
sponsor will belong in the first instance to KSIP. It is not clear whether KSLP will be
obliged to assign that IP to the University and leave it to decide whether or not to protect
and exploit it - or whether the ownership of such IP will remain with KSIP. As yet, there
has been no occasion to consider this.
Thirdly, there is a conflict of interest inherent in the relationship between the Senior
Assistant Registrar and KSIP. As Secretary of KSIP's Board, the Senior Assistant
Registrar is effectively involved in evaluating KSIP's performance. Where exploitation of
IP arising out of contracts is concerned, he and the Managing Director of KSIP could
find themselves competing. At the very least, the Senior Assistant Registrar has assumed
responsibility for exploiting IP identified after June 1989, while the Managing Director of
KSIP has an ongoing responsibility for IP identified prior to that date. The inherent
conflict of interest is compounded by the fact that, to date, the Managing Director of KSIP
undoubtedly has considerably more experience of handling IP matters than the Senior
Assistant Registrar: ergo, the less experienced of the two is sitting in judgement on the
more experienced.
90
Fourthly, the Managing Director of KSIP retains his position as the University's ILO; as
such, he, rather than the Senior Assistant Registrar, attends meetings of UDIL. Whilst he
takes care to pass on to the Senior Assistant Registrar any relevant documentation, no
mechanism has been established for communicating less formal information:
"... I talk to [him] occasionally, when particular matters come up. I haven't
spoken to him since the last UDIL meeting •.•" cm.
4.3	 Incentives
(i) Financial Incentives
Until 1989, there was only one incentive aimed at encouraging researchers to "flag"
potentially exploitable IP - a financial incentive. In keeping with the terms of the 1977
Patent Act, researchers were rewarded financially only if their patent was successfully
exploited commercially. At Kent, this was a largely hypothetical incentive, since upto
October 1989, only two patents had been commercially exploited - and one of those
collapsed after the licensee's company was taken over. Moreover, it was an out-of-date
incentive. When KSIP's third Managing Director was appointed in July 1987, he noticed
that personnel (see note en was still distributing a document dated 1982. The income
bands on the sliding scale introduced that year had not kept pace with inflation.
Accordingly, in 1988, following a recommendation from the Board of KSIP, the Finance
Committee increased the income bands by around 4 per cent per year, compounded (.38),
with effect from 1 April.
(ii) Career Progression
KSIP's new Managing Director was concerned about the affect that spending time on IP
matters might have on academics' careers, since this might act as a deterrent to "flagging"
and helping exploit IP. As a result, Kent introduced additional incentives to encourage
researchers to devote time to generating revenue from industry and to exploiting IP in its
widest sense. The University has recognised that in some instances academics may have to
make a choice between this kind of activity and "more traditional academic work". A
paper prepared by the Financial Secretary for Council in June 1989 c") recommended
mitigating this conflict by:
"... accepting that, in terms of career development, the successful completion of
research contracts and consultancies (including obtaining licenses and patents)
will be given equal credit to grants and publications ..."
This change was justified by the fact that a Department's research performance is to a
large extent judged by the income it receives from research grants and contracts, that this
in turn affects the block grant paid by the UFC and that greater contact with industry will
make the University's "Enterprise in Higher Education" programme more effective. It was
also observed that patentable IP could lead to new companies being founded.
Council approved these recommendations in August 1989 and in November 1989 the
University's criteria for promotion were duly amended. Under category F "important
outside activities including consultancy" were specified as being a criterion for promotion.
91
(iii) Financial Incentives Revisited
At the same time, Council approved changes in the income bands which dictate how
royalty income is distributed. Since August 1989 the first £1,000 net goes to the
inventor(s); the next £9,000 net is split 50:50 between the inventor(s) and the University;
income in excess of £10,000	 is  divided 25:75 between the inventor(s) and the
University. This is considerably less generous than the terms agreed and circulated the
previous year (40.
There are no incentives directed specifically at the Directors of Laboratories to encourage
them to seek out and "flag" IP. At present the residue of the income from royalties stays
in the University's central funds; none of it is channelled back into the Laboratory which
generated the IP:
"... Nobody has grappled with that yet ... Nobody knows what [proportion] of the
payment to the University ought to be [returned to the Laboratory] ..."
The administration believes that these two personal incentives - "cash and glory" - are the
only ones required, but doubts whether either will have much impact on some senior staff:
"... the people who are interested in money have gone out and got it already. The
people who are interested in glory have gone out and got that.
"... If people really think you can take some Senior Lecturer who has been at the
top of the scale for 15 years ... and has published one ... paper a year and has
never had a research grant - if you think you can simply transform him into a
vibrant, active IP person just by the stroke of a pen, basically that's just nonsense
II
Moreover, despite sending copies of the Financial Secretary's paper to all Laboratory
Directors, together with a note that Council had approved its recommendations, it is
evident they have not fully taken it in:
"... even though we did our best to make sure it was practically printed on the
flag at the top of the ... flagpole, at the last meeting of the KSIP Board of
Directors, two Directors of Laboratories evinced a massive lack of knowledge of
this. Which proves that you can take a horse to water, but you can't make it drink
"...
This may not be helped by the fact that the phraseology employed by the University in the
annual memorandum detailing its promotions criteria is not very explicit.
4.4	 Regulations and Documentation
It would appear that Kent formally accepted its rights in "hard" IP in 1982, on the basis of
the 1977 Patent Act. The administration certainly treats "hard" IP generated by members
of the academic staff as its own to dispose of, unless the terms of industrial research
contracts specify otherwise. The Senior Assistant Registrar is not sure whether the Kent
relies on the terms of the 1977 Act to support its claim, or whether the University has, in
fact, instituted specific regulations:
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"... I've always said to anybody who has asked me that our rules require that ...
but I've a ghastly feeling that perhaps they don't!"
As yet, Kent has incorporated neither the 1977 Patent Act nor the 1988 Copyright Act
into its terms and conditions of employment:
"... People are subject to the Act, but you don't have to tell them they are subject
to it ..."
However, the administration recognises that it may be an advantage to get members of
staff to admit - by virtue of signing a contract in which it is explicit - that they are subject
to the two Acts. Kent has already issued one (ad hoc) contract which makes this explict
and sees this as creating a useful precedent.
The Senior Assistant Registrar has also ensured that all postgraduate students who generate
exploitable, "hard" IP assign any rights they might have to the University, irrespective of
how they are funded. This is now a condition of registration ", though the position of
undergraduates remains unclear.
Kent does not appear to have encapsulated in a dedicated document either its claims with
regard to IP, the action it requires on the part of members of staff/students who generate
IP, or the likely rewards. However, the Senior Assistant Registrar is now turning his
attention to ownership of IP in books written by members of the academic staff. Having
studied the 1988 Act, he believes the University should assert its ownership rights in such
cases and share in the royalties if they exceed a threshold, yet to be determined:
"... I've asked myself... why lard the scientists being treated differently from the
others? ..."
"... I'm going to nail our David Lodges to the ground ..."
Once this has been agreed on a University-wide basis (42) - and Kent believes it will be
advantageous for academics to agree ", the University may be in a position to issue
comprehensive documentation.
4.5	 Sanctions
At present, it is not clear whether there are any regulations at Kent which prohibit
researchers from transferring technology on their own initiative in a way which does not
financially benefit the University and may or may not financially benefit them as
individuals. It is no secret that in the past some academics have founded independent spin-
off companies to exploit IP they have generated 04). If it transpires this was in breach of
regulations, it is highly unlikely that the University would apply sanctions against them.
Moreover, if regulations are passed in due course, it is equally unlikely that sanctions
would be applied against future offenders:
"... I cannot conceive of a circumstance in which sanctions would be applied in
this University under the present leadership ... There's nobody who is going to
pull in this imaginary malcontent - and anyway, what sanctions have we got?
Especially ([he is a Professor already! Good cause? Oh, come on!"
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It is felt that this laissez-faire approach would not necessarily change dramatically with a
change of leadership:
"... That's not to say, of course, if we got a new Vice-Chancellor who was terribly
tough that sanctions wouldn't be applied. But even so, I don't think they would,
because people would simply up sticks and go ..."
There is a strong feeling in some quarters of the administration that the University is in a
vulnerable position, that valued members of the academic staff could easily take up posts
in the United States if they were offended.
5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
Despite having taken over responsibility for identifying, evaluating, protecting and
commercialising IP, the Senior Assistant Registrar has not seen all the documentation
relating to the Research Councils' offer to the University and the subsequent authorisation.
Some of the documents are not on file, most notably Kent's reply to the Kingman letter,
detailing the University's approach to handling the exploitation of IP arising out of
Research Council-funded projects. Despite a phone call to the SERC to establish what
Kent proposed, he has still not seen a copy of the University's response.
Sir Keith Joseph's statement - in which the Secretary of State expressed the hope that
universities would encourage researchers to exploit their discoveries themselves and
provide guidance and help for those who wished to do so - is not something that Kent has
been greatly concerned to interpret:
"... I suppose what we would have [understood] by it, had we actually articulated
any interpretation, was that i f a person did have something to exploit, then we
would wish them to do it through University channels rather than do it on their
own..."
5.2	 Identification
Kent's administration recognises it has accepted responsibility for an area about which it
lacks sufficient information. It accepts that a comprehensive technical audit is required but
has neither the time nor the expertise to do it. It has considered informally whether this is
something which might be delegated, perhaps to outside, private-sector consultants. There
is no single individual within the University with the necessary breadth of knowledge to
cover all the relevant disciplines and the administration feels that there are not enough
staff attached to each laboratory to allow it to nominate someone to cover individual
disciplines 6') . Moreover, this would imply an element of peer review which the
administration feels would be unacceptable. There are no local public-sector agencies
which could conduct a technical audit, and since it lost its monopoly, the BTG has stopped
visiting Kent every six months to trawl for IP.
It is evident that whilst the administration itself is forced to take a largely reactive rather
than a proactive approach, relying on researchers to recognise and "flag" exploitable IP is
certain to lead to opportunity costs. This is due partly to institutional ethos and partly to a
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long-standing failure to raise levels of awareness in even the most general way:
"... You could go into ... [a] senior common room and you wouldn't find more
than one academic who knew what IPR was ..."
This is a surprising remark, given that Kent has a law division with considerable expertise
in IP law (46).
During the two years that KSIP's new Managing Director was responsible for identifying
IP, he also recognised the magnitude of the problem:
" ... I got the impression that people were not aware of their obligations with
regard to IP inany (added emphasis) situation, let alone whether it was Research
Council funded ..."
The administration did not inform the academic community that the University had been
offered the opportunity to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects.
However, in mid-1986 it was proposed that once the terms of authorisation were agreed
with the Exploitation Scrutiny Group, the Chairman of KSIP would ensure that this
information was widely circulated (47)• There is no evidence to suggest that this was ever
done; it is possible that unforseen circumstances prevented it (").
This means that no documentation has been distributed since 1982, except to new staff
members. They have been expected to learn the University's policy on IP from this self-
same document, in which revenue-sharing is outlined in terms of a sliding scale which has
not kept pace with inflation and which, understandably, makes no mention of the removal
of the BTG's monopoly and the University's new responsibilities.
When the Senior Assistant Registrar took over responsibility in mid-1989, he tried to
address both the general level of awareness and this specific change means of a
University-wide mailshot. In his original three-page draft, he outlined what IP was, stated
the University's legal position, referred to the authorisation from the Research Councils
and indicated the importance of "flagging" IP before doing anything to prejudice the
ability to protect it. He gave descriptions of discoveries which were almost lost as an
exploitable resource due to premature publication. The proposed mailshot was couched in
a gently evangelistic tone:
" ... I was trying to get the good people out there to realise that a
University's IP is to it the same as a pound of bananas are to a greengrocer. It's
a very difficult idea to get across to people, especially in a humanities- and social
science-based University which fundamentally believes in freedom of information
II
In the event, the three-page letter was vetoed by an informal group which meets
periodically to discuss research grants (49) on the grounds that it was not "punchy" enough.
Instead, staff and students were sent a one-page letter during the summer of 1989. It was
reproduced, under the heading "Guidelines on Intellectual Property Rights", in the
University "Newsletter" in October 1989. Accompanying it was a reply from a lecturer in
the Faculty of Humanities, who dismissed it as the academic equivalent of junk mail, once
he realised it was not "a spoof, a witty squib directed at current trends" (50)• The Senior
Assistant Registrar describes the mailshot as "flippant, stupid and trivial" ... "like a
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camel, like an animal designed by a committee".
In KSIP's opinion, the problem was unlikely be solved by a single mailshot, in any case.
It needed a systematic, ongoing effort, with targetted rather than general reminders, some
of which should be addressed to the junior members of staff actually carrying out the
research. It remains to be seen whether the administration will adopt this kind of
systematic, ongoing approach. It has been suggested informally that principal investigators
should set up such systems, rather than the administration.
It also remains to be seen whether the administration will put into operation systems which
KSIP had set up to try and prevent researchers doing anything which will inadvertently
prejudice the ability to protect the IP they generate. In September 1989 the BTG gave a
presentation to reinforce the message of their pamphlet (51) which had been circulated to
everyone in the Faculties of Natural Sciences and Information Technology. The BTG has
expressed its willingness to do follow-up presentations, as have local patent agents, at no
cost to the University.
5.3	 Evaluation
Kent's approach to evaluating IP has varied according to who had responsibility for it. It
is the administration's impression that KSIP's first Managing Director made an instinctive
judgement as to the likely value of a discovery, after discussions with the relevant
academics:
"... you know, if the Professor of Applied Optics said it was a good 	 invention,
there is no reason why we shouldn't believe him ..."
He was unlikely to have asked the BTG or to have sought industry's evaluation of a
discovery:
"... If [discoveries] hadn't been Research Council-funded ... nothing would have
induced him to give it to the BTG. He had a very low opinion of them. Everyone
had a low opinion of BTG at that time ..."
"... I don't think he would ever have had things evaluated by outsiders. He
wouldn't have got anybody to sign a confidentiality agreement. He wasn't that sort
of person ..."
KSIP's third Managing Director also prefers not to immediately seek outside help in
evaluating IP (52):
"... I feel that before anything is offered to any outside agency, whoever they may
be - BTG, Research Corporation, IBM, ICI or whatever - it is really upto the
University (added emphasis) to know what they are about and what the
implications are. I feel it should be necessary for the University to be able to carry
out a preliminary evaluation itself..."
Since KSIP did not have the resources - either financial or in terms of personnel - to
commission private sector market analyses, this often involved the Managing Director
himself using his knowledge, experience and contacts to do a preliminary evaluation
himself ("). His tactic then was to test his evaluation by offering discoveries to the major
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players in the relevant industries, once a confidentiality agreement had been signed.
It remains to be seen how Kent's administration will go about evaluating potentially
exploitable IP. The Senior Assistant Registrar believes that when he is confronted with
something tangible to exploit, his first instinct will be to approach BTG -because at the
moment he knows of no other means: (54)
" ... I have only been nominally responsible for [this] for less than a year. We are
in a situation in which that was simply dumped on me, on top of everything else.
And frankly, I haven't had the time ..."
If BTG were not interested in the IP, the Senior Assistant Registrar would rely largely on
the scientific evaluation of the inventor(s) and a patent agent. He would consider obtaining
a market evaluation by offering the IP, under a confidentiality agreement, to a company
operating in the relevant sector. He has no knowledge of public or private sector
organisations which might provide a market evaluation and, in any case, he does not have
a budget to cover the cost.
5.4	 Protection
(i) Philosophy
Kent's approach to protecting IP has varied over the years, according to the views of the
person who was responsible for it. If academics "flagged" promising IP, KSIP's first
Managing Director liked to acquire full patents, wherever possible, irrespective of the
commercial potential of a discovery. As indicated in section 2.3 above, it is unclear
whether this represented a deliberate, long-term policy to build up a portfolio of strategic
and generic patents, or whether it was encouraged by the academics concerned due to
ignorance of the cost and/or self-interest.
KSIP's second Managing Director assumed little more than a "babysitting" role until a
permanent replacement could be found. From 1987 to 1989, when KSIP's third Managing
Director was responsible for IP, it was his policy to protect discoveries by patenting them,
wherever possible. He was keen to establish KSIP's ownership of IP and was firmly
against the practice of protecting IP by assigning ownership to a third party. For this
reason, KSIP never offered IP to the BTG once the University had been given the right to
exploit Research Council-funded discoveries as it saw fit. KSIP assigned IP ownership
vn)y when it was obliged to by the terms of a contract with industry:
"... [assigning] takes away from the University, or may take away from the
University, the ability to use that IP in a whole series of [situations]. The IP is no
longer owned by the University, but by the BTG [or company X] ..."
Researchers were not forced to comply with KSIP's drive to protect IP by patenting it,
however. In one case, a Professor working on a health-related project was sympathetic in
principle to the idea of patenting, but against the idea of charging companies a license fee
for the right to exploit the discovery, preferring to give the rights freely to anyone. In this
situation, KSIP felt there was no point in protecting the IP (55) ; it did not try to override
the Professor's scruples.
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Like the first, KSIP's third Managing Director also tended to patent IP irrespective of the
direct financial return which it might yield:
"... If... the patent might secure that invention as the first in a series which would
lead to other things, not necessarily commercially, it would be on that basis that I
would make the decision [to file].
"... in every case there have been no specc financial returns identified in the
way of royalties. There [have been] other positive spin-offs, indirectly ..." (56)
Based on this philosophy, KSIP made initial registrations more or less automatically:
"... It doesn't cost a lot - a couple of hundred pounds [a time]. It 	 is vital,
because invariably when the idea appears, people are wanting to publish. You
can't (original emphasis) say - I'm going to stop you publishing. [That] would be
trying, in a way, to suppress academic freedom. They may be going off to a
conference to give a paper ..."	 (57i
Similarly, it was common for full patent applications to be filed in a wide range of
countries, using the European Patent Convention and the Patent Co-operation Treaty.
As yet, there has been neither time nor a pressing need for the University to devise a
coherent policy on protecting and exploiting IP. This is something which the newly-
established Industrial & Commercial Policy Board should do in due course (58) . In the
meantime, the Senior Assistant Registrar has been left to make up his own mind. He sees
things rather differently:
" ... It is not the ownership which is important, it is whether or not 	 you can use
it ... That is the one thing I am absolutely clear about. It isn't who owns it. It is
who has got the right to use it ..."
He therefore has no objection to protecting IP by assigning it to a third party. His
approach is "just common sense". To date, common sense has suggested to him that a lot
of money could be saved by treating IP as secret know-how, rather than patenting it:
" ... I'm an anti-patenter, because I've never really seen why we should waste a lot
of money doing all those [applications]. Some companies ... are known not to be
in favour of patenting. You might just as well get to the marketplace first and sell
50,000 of these things before anybody else gets round to making one ..."
He recognises this might not be universally acceptable to the academic community:
"... I dare say some of the hawks in the Faculty of Social Sciences might be
agitated about it, if they knew what was happening ..."
(ii) Finance
KSIP's Managing Directors did not have to contend with a fixed patent budget; patenting
costs were simply absorbed by the company's other, revenue-generating activities.
However, KSIP's third Managing Director made a conscious effort to locate licensees and
recoup costs where he could.
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KSIP's revenue-generating activities longer support the costs of protecting IP. Despite
this, and despite the fact that Council has committed the University to assuming
responsibility for patenting costs, Kent still has no patent budget. This appears to be by
default rather than by design. Despite his conviction that secret know-how is the way to
proceed, the Senior Assistant Registrar accepts that a patent budget is needed:
II
... We should have one and I would like to have one and i f I had the time, I
would be beating heads around the corner to see i f I could get one ..."
He has already had to "struggle hard" to get the Finance Office to agree to pay for initial
registration of one invention.
The Senior Assistant Registrar would also like to introduce the concept that identifying,
evaluating, protecting and exploiting IP should become self-financing in due course, at
least as far as direct costs are concerned. (Costing in his time would create a precedent -
and therefore a political debate, given the way that the University has operated to date.)
Where direct costs are concerned, he points to the fact that the University has a portfolio
of around 10 full patents and several applications, the earliest of which dates from 1982.
He believes that if these were exploited more effectively, they would yield an income
which would offset future patenting costs.
(iii) Practicalities
Researchers with patentable IP were usually asked by KSIP to write a paper indicating the
significance of their discovery. This would be used by a patent agent as a basis for the
final specification, following detailed discussions with the researcher ( 59) . In the absence of
a patent budget, it is unclear whether a patent agent will now be employed, and if so,
what the relative contributions of the patent agent and researchers will be.
Both KSIP and the administration believe that in the interests of acquiring patents,
researchers should consider accepting some delay in publishing their findings. However,
academics have had have the right to decide whether or not to do this. The Senior
Assistant Registrar would like to take a more directive line, but he recognises that this
would be difficult to police and that he is unlikely to receive support from the Vice-
Chancellor for such a move.
KSIP endeavoured to reduce any delay on publishing to the shortest time possible -
indeed, it always tried to get industrial sponsors to explicitly agree to delaying publication
by no more than 90 days m . Now that the administration is responsible for IP, the exact
extent of any such delay will have to be negotiated. No maximum delay has been agreed,
though the rules on embargoing theses may be used as a model (61).
(iv) Ownership of Patents
After toying with the idea of vesting patents jointly in the name of the University and the
researcher, the administration has decided to continue KSIP's practice of vesting them
only in the University's name. In recent years, KSIP has been willing in principle to
waive/assign to the inventor(s) the University's rights in IP which it felt was not
promising enough to protect/continue protecting. In practice, its positive approach to
patenting meant that this was seldom needed; since 1983, KSIP has only once offered to
assign its rights in a patent to the academic inventor (62) . KSIP did not seek to recoup costs
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or share in the profits from IP which was subsequently successfully exploited. However,
the third Managing Director saw it as vital to "keep a line open" to the inventor, so that
the University might still have an opportunity to share in the exploitation, perhaps by
providing start-up capital, second-round funding, etc.
The Senior Assistant Registrar aims to do a "more ruthless" cost/benefit analysis of
whether it is worth protecting/continuing to protect IP. If not, he will offer to
waive/assign rights to the IP to the inventor(s). IP which has not yet been protected could
be offered within a matter of weeks, whereas it might take a couple of years to assign IP
which is the subject of a patent - "probably [due to] inertia, rather than anything else".
The University might consider trying to recoup its costs from any subsequent profits.
5.5	 Commercialisation
When KSIP's first Managing Director was responsible for IP, no attempt seems to have
been made to commercially exploit the discoveries made by Kent's academics. Discoveries
arising out of Research Council-funded projects were offered to the BTG, of course, but
few/none of these were taken up and exploited. By the time KSIP's third Managing
Director was appointed, there was no longer an obligation to offer IP to the BTG. Despite
his desire to see Kent's IP commercialised, his views on the disadvantages of assigning
have ensured that KSIP has not offered any discoveries to the BTG in the intervening
years.
(0	 Licensing
KSIP has preferred to license to an existing company with a track record:
If
... We are going the license route because in every case, there still requires to be
an ongoing connection with the University ..."
Researchers at Kent have been willing to help identify and approach potential licensees
and to act as consultants once the IP has been successfully licensed. KSIP has encouraged
this, despite the difficulties:
" ... The researcher is a very important person in the whole process. You can't do
it without them ... They are a liability, but as long as [they] realise they are a
liability and understand what their contribution is to the process, then it will work
II
However, so far academics have played no more than a technical support role in
determining which companies make suitable licensees and in conducting the actual
licensing negotiations. This is their choice, rather than KSIP's choice.
By the end of 1989, only two of KSIP's 20 patents (" had been exploited, though a
number of patents were the subject of ongoing negotiations. This may be due in part to the
rigorous examination of potential licensees which KSIP has made, particularly in company
start-up situations:
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"... If somebody wants a license from us to set up a new company, we've got to
know how strong that company is going to be sometime down the line. We want to
see what its projections are, what is business plan is ... I certainly would want to
see and study and ask a lot of questions about their business plan, about how they
were actually going to use that license ..."
Now that the administration is responsible for IP, however, it is likely that this rigorous
approach will be dropped:
"... I think at the moment the University would look at any option ..."
However, the administration is unlikely to grant licenses which confer any degree of
exclusivity:
"... I am dead against exclusive licenses ... the willingness of universities to give
exclusive licenses seems to me to be appalling and some, including those who have
got large offices, are doing it ..."
However, would-be academic entrepreneurs might be granted a sole license. With this
caveat, the administration believes it will consider any commercialisation route:
"... Nobody would start off by saying that X is a better route than Y. We would
start off by looking at the exigencies of the case and decide on that ..."
(ii) University Companies/Joint Ventures
One alternative is to use the IP as a basis for company start-up, with the University and
possibly the researcher having a stake in the company. Until recently, both the University
and the majority of researchers have fought shy of the financial implications of
entrepreneurial ventures, especially where "hard" IP is concerned. In general, the
University would have been happy to be given an equity stake, but was less willing to buy
one. However, the University recently participated in a joint venture of a different sort
with a member of the academic staff; within five years it got an 18-fold return on its
investment (". This may explain why, in 1989, the University was prepared for the first
time to purchase an equity stake in a joint venture between itself, a researcher and a
venture capitalist, exploiting IP (65) . The University may also have been swayed by the
support the project received from the KSIP's latest Chairman, a prominent businessman.
(iii)Academic Spin-Off Companies
To date, none of Kent's researchers is known to have formed an independent spin-off
company to exploit "hard" IP which he has generated. Kent is one of the few universities
which has never submitted an entry to the Academic Enterprise Competition (65) , nor
applied for a SMART award, nor competed for the Prince of Wales Award for Innovation
& Production. This is largely because, with one exception (see (65) for details), there has
apparently been no suitable IP with which to compete. It is difficult to determine why this
is. Kent's researchers certainly appear to prefer less entrepreneurial involvement in the
process of commercialising their IP. Some have considered company start-up, but have
had what KSIP regards as too proprietorial an approach for it to work:
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"... You get people who come along and say - we want to hold onto it all. I say -
well, look, I've got to be quite pragmatic with you and say [that] this doesn't
happen in reality ..."
KSIP's attitude to would-be academic entrepreneurs may also play a part: KSIP does not
take a sentimental approach to would-be academic entrepreneurs. KSIP's Managing




Kent describes itself as a "totally laissez-faire" University, though perhaps not to the
extent of Oxford or Cambridge. It is certainly a University with relatively few rules. This
gives academics considerable freedom to pursue their interests:
"... You could liken this University to an infinitely-sized enveloping sponge. In
other words, you can go off in any direction you like. Ultimately, the resistance
factor will get so great that you will have to stop. But there are no proscriptions
on the direction. And you can go quite a long way in any of them ..."
It is in this manner that a few of Kent's academics have become involved in
entrepreneurial activities. They were not responding to a University initiative or a putting
into practice a University policy - they were simply exercising the freedom to pursue their
interests. Some have chosen to operate within the University system. Whereas most of
Kent's centres/institutes/units were established to pursue purely academic goals, a few
have had - or come to have - a dual function, acting as the commercial arm of a particular
division or research group, too (see note " for details). Towards the end of the 1980s,
several more academic divisions established dedicated commercial arms (67)• This has
usually been on the initiative of the academic staff concerned rather than KSIP or the
administration. Similarly, it was the Director of one commercial unit, established in
1979/80, who proposed to the University that it should be spun off as a separate, wholly-
owned University company (68) . This proposal is currently being evaluated with the help of
the DTI.
A few of Kent's academics have founded independent spin-off companies. There has never
been a requirement to ask permission to found a company or even to notify the University
as a courtesy, but the administration feels that in earlier years companies were founded
covertly, whereas recently this has been done openly, with the knowledge of the Vice-
Chancellor ". The Senior Assistant Registrar believes the University should keep a
formal record of such activities, both for insurance purposes and to be able to "hold up its
head in the enterprise culture".
The more recent independent spin-off companies were set up by senior academics to
exploit "soft" IP in the shape of expertise, rather than "hard" products or processes. None
of them has been particularly successful, indeed, most of them have ceased trading (7'9 . A
number of younger, more junior academics have "flagged" their interest in setting up
companies, but have not yet taken the plunge:
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II
... Iris going to be their personal investment and they are very reluctant to do it
... They have felt that at the present time, they should continue to do what they
are doing and use that to gain more experience ... They (haven't] dropped the
idea entirely ..."
Despite no longer being responsible for IP, KSIP's Managing Director is keen to keep in
touch with these potential entrepreneurs, to provide encouragement and advice if and when
they decide to proceed. It is still part of the Managing Director's remit to "assist with
University companies and joint ventures". It was KSIP's encouragement which led recently
to the University's first joint venture with a member of the academic staff and venture
capitalists (see note (65) for details).
The administration takes a positive view of academic entrepreneurship, seeing it as a
means of generating income for the University. It has had qualms about the income which
successful academic entrepreneurs might derive from their business activities go, but has
decided to accept this as part and parcel of the process.
6.2	 Making Time
In principle, the administration supports the idea that academics who are trying to exploit
promising IP should be allowed to devote some time to the project. Kent prides itself on
being a flexible university and the administration can cite several instances in which it has
generously accommodated an individual's desire for extra time to work on a particular
project (72)• However, the administration may not always be given the opportunity to
demonstrate its support. In practice, it is the Laboratory Director who determines how
much time a researcher is allowed to devote to non-traditional activities such as company
start-up:
"... There is no such thing as a University policy on this ... If [the researcher]
went to the Director of his Lab and put it to him, then fit would] depend on the
personality of the Director and what he perceived as his interests ..."
The same situation obtains where consultancy activities are concerned. Kent has not
stipulated or even recommended a global limit; Laboratory Directors are free to impose
local limits or to respond to every proposal on an ad hoc basis. The Laboratory Director's
decision would usually be final, whatever kind of extra time a would-be academic
entrepreneur was seeking - whether it was consultancy time, a reduced teaching load,
relief from administrative or committee work, a part-time contract, leave of absence or a
sabbatical (73) . There have been instances when Laboratory Directors have refused such
requests g`°, but also occasions when they have backed the academic in his endeavours.
Provided the Laboratory Director approves, the administration itself is open to most
suggestions. Entrepreneurial academics could opt for part-time employment on part pay,
provided the Policy & Resources Committee agreed that the savings made could be used
to employ a part-time temporary lecturer. Part-time employment on full pay is also a
possibility:
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"... If an approach were made ... well, we could give it a try. We would try to
draft a paper and stick into the [Policy & Resources] Committee. We'd say X was
a real genius and had invented something that could make a lot of money - can we
have some extra money to cover him half-time? And depending on the case, we
might get it ... This University is pretty flexible.
"What I suspect might happen - its the first question I would ask - would be: Can
you fund it from the resources of the Lab? And, of course, they will all say no, but
it might be that they could, or some of them could. There would be a fair amount
of horse-trading going on but in the end, if the person were really keen on it, then
we would find a way of doing it ..."
This has, in fact, happened; an academic attached to the Electronics Laboratory was
allowed to work half-time on his "good idea" for a number of years. The administration
could imagine a situation where an academic had such a "splendid idea" that he would be
given full-time paid leave to develop and exploit it.
Unpaid leave of absence for one to two terms is another possibility. This could probably
be extended if necessary, provided a temporary lecturer could be found. In some quarters
of the administration, company start-up is also seen as an acceptable use of sabbaticals,
though this is not known to have happened. Kent's academics are entitled to one term in
every three years served. If, like many, would-be academic entrepreneurs had not taken
their full entitlement, this could be aggregated retrospectively.
Whichever option is chosen, the decision could be made fairly quickly through the
relevant parties convening an informal meeting. However, approval must formally be
given by the Laboratory Director, the Dean, the Faculty Board, Senate and Council in
turn.
6.3	 Other Resources
(i)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
In principle, the administration also supports the idea that academics trying to exploit
promising IP should have access to University resources. In practice, the extent to which
would-be academic entrepreneurs get access depends on local demand. Similarly, whether
or not they pay for use of resources depends on the resource in question. Secretarial and
technical support staff would probably have to be paid at the going rate, for instance. On
the other hand, the Finance Office would be unlikely to insist on charging the full market
rate for use of equipment or instrumentation. Moreover, the marginal cost might be
avoided if would-be academic entrepreneurs offered the University some kind of quid pro
quo, such as a modest share in the company. Telephone calls should in theory be paid
for - Kent recently installed a modern exchange which records the number dialled and the
cost of calls made from each extension. However, it is not clear who would take on the
task of separating calls made on company business from legitimate academic calls, if
academics themselves paid insufficient attention to using phone codes for private calls.
In practice, the attitude of the Laboratory Director may also determine whether or not
would-be academic entrepreneurs get access to resources and what kind of charge is
involved - if any. The administration believes that attitudes could vary considerably.
However, the avowed policy of the Faculty of Natural Sciences is to:
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If
.. . [give] scope to and [encourage] individual and group initiatives on the part
of staff members, wherever these are compatible with and may enhance the
University's teaching at undergraduate and postgraduate levels ..." (75)
(ii) Accommodation
Although Kent has a science park of sorts, it is not suitable for small start-up businesses
(70 , and there are no incubator units in Canterbury itself. For this reason, perhaps, the
administration feels that Kent's would-be academic entrepreneurs would be given
considerable help where accommodation is concerned. The University has sufficient space
that even academics granted two years leave of absence would not normally be asked to
vacate their office. Whether they were employed full-time or part-time, entrepreneurial
academics could probably count on the use of their office as a base from which to get
their company started. The administration would also look kindly on academics who were
granted leave of absence but continued to use their office and laboratory bench - unless
they wanted to bring in an outsider. In that case, they might be charged rent.
Alternatively, they could offer some sort of quid pro quo to the University.
It is not clear whether the academic community is actually aware of the administration's
views on using University accommodation for business purposes. Significantly, KSIP's
Managing Director is under the impression that academics are not allowed to run a
business from university premises. This impression derives not from published policy, but
from the fact that to date he knows of no academics who have run their businesses from
the campus. He believes the prevailing ethos is against such activities.
(iii) Financial Support
Kent has not set up any kind of seedcorn or innovation fund which would-be academic
entrepreneurs could approach for first-round funding. At the end of 1989, the University
had not made a direct financial contribution to any spin-off companies, with one
exception. A small sum was invested in a start-up company, a joint venture between a
member of the academic staff and a group of venture capitalists (see note (65)). This
investment was not motivated by a desire to promote technology transfer from the campus
to the economy. It was made for the same motive which governs the University's standard
investment programme: profit. The University was exploiting inside knowledge of a
situation which looked particularly promising and offered the opportunity to negotiate a
preferential deal.
Kent is not averse to the idea of being given an equity share in academic spin-off
companies in recognition of the resources which it has undoubtedly contributed to the
discovery of the IP being exploited - or in lieu of royalty payments. It may no longer be
averse to the idea of buying an equity share in such a company. However, it has not gone
out of its way to publicise this change of heart.
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
Whereas KSIP was equipped to provide business start-up advice to entrepreneurial
academics, the administration clearly is not:
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"... We certainly ought to have resources to do this, but we don't [have] ... I think
if an academic wanted to set up his own company, really it would be very much
upto him ..."
The administration is not concerned that academics spinning-off companies to exploit IP
might not exploit it as effectively as an existing company with a track record:
"... Considering the dismal record of this University in exploiting its IP, jilts IP
was exploited at all, I personally would be very happy ..."
The administration concedes that it could direct would-be academic entrepreneurs to the
new Business School for assistance, which would be free to charge for its advice. Unless a
joint venture with the University was proposed, any cost would have to be paid by the
academic, not the administration. In fact, at least one member of the Business School (see
(64)) would be happy to advise on business start-up and business plans as a colleague,
without making a charge. He feels this would present valuable investment and
entrepreneurial opportunities from which he personally could benefit. Moreover, in some
cases, he would recommend would-be academic entrepreneurs to approach the University
itself for additional start-up capital. The Senior Assistant Registrar made no mention of
directing would-be academic entrepreneurs to KSIP for assistance. KSIP's view is that,
despite its changed remit, it would still be happy to give would-be academic entrepreneurs
as much advice as it could, even to the extent of helping them draft their business plans.
KSIP would not seek anything in return for this level of advice, despite the demands on its
time which this might make. However, if academics wanted more assistance, KSIP might
suggest some kind of quid pro quo - or alternatively, refer them to one of the many local
enterprise agencies in Kent which offer free advice and assistance (78).
This is not an option which the administration is currently considering. It professes to be
"cagey" about institutions it knows nothing about and over which it has no control:
"... If... an academic came along to me with a bright idea which he wanted to
exploit, my gut feeling would be to keep it as tight as possible, as close as
possible, not to involve the state in any way, because I am deeply distrusul of
state bodies ...
"... If there were a grant, we could apply for it, but ... my instinct would be to do
it myself as far as possible ..."
"... If it were the case that one of [these] outside bodies really would put an
enormous amount of effort into it for nothing, then I would be intensely suspicious
II
...
The administrator concerned includes the economic development department of the local
council and local enterprise agencies in this category of institutions.
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7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Kent was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was "generally
satisfied" with the exploitation arrangements which the University had established. A
formal document was scheduled to follow, confirming the University's rights and
responsibilities to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects for a further
2 years. The situation was due to be reviewed again in 1992 after Kent had submitted its





Hull University started life as a University College in 1927, endowed principally by the
High Steward of Hull. Notwithstanding repeated attempts to be upgraded to a university, it
retained this status until 1954, when it was finally granted its Royal Charter. Hull is a late
example of a group of British universities commonly referred to as "civic" universities. In
"Look Back in Anger", John Osborne's famous character, Jimmy Porter, described post-
war "civic" universities as "white tile" rather than "red brick" universities. By this
analogy, Hull is a "white tile" university.
1.2	 Size
By the beginning of the 1980s Hull had become a medium-sized university by UK
standards. In 1981, however, the UGC advised the University to reduce by 17 per cent the
number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 1984/85. As Figure 2 revealed, this
was nearly four times the national average reduction and as a result of this, Hull's size
relative to certain other universities diminished somewhat in the course of the 1980s. At
the same time, the UGC announced that Hull's recurrent grant would be reduced by 20
per cent between 1980/81 and 1983/84; this was also above the national average.
Combined with the recommended reduction in student numbers, it is generally reckoned
that this placed Hull among the six worst afflicted universities in the UK at this time.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that Hull should increase its student numbers by 7.52 per cent
over the next four sessions ( 1). By 1988/89, however, Hull still had 9 per cent fewer
student FTEs than it had at the start of the decade (z . In terms of academic staff numbers
Hull ended the decade considerably slimmer than it started it, too ( 3). The University lost
at least 27 per cent of its full-time academic staff in the course of the 1980s (4) ; there was
a six-fold increase in the number of part-time staff in the same period. Most of these
losses were a direct result of the cuts imposed by the UGC in 1981.
Structurally, Hull ended the decade quite differently from the way it had set out. The four
Faculties of Arts, Science & Technology, Social Sciences and Law, comprising some 48
independent Departments and Institutes, were reorganised in 1987/88 into 14 Schools,
grouping together some 38 Departments (5) . This has left Hull with a balance - in terms of
student numbers - between the arts, the social sciences and the sciences 65) • This balance
was largely achieved by depleting a science base which was, in any case, never as
comprehensive as had originally been intended (7) . In 1985/86 the University closed the
original Departments of Physics and Applied Physics; many of the staff left, while others
were absorbed into the new School of Engineering & Computing, eventually forming the
basis of what is effectively a new Department of Applied Physics. In 1986/87 the
Departments of Biochemistry, Botany and Plant Zoology were merged to form the present
Department of Applied Biology, losing 14 members of staff in the process. In 1988/89 the
Department of Geology was closed as an Honours School, though some staff were kept on




Five of the 14 new Schools are dedicated to science subjects. The School of Mathematics
groups together the Departments of Applied Mathematics, Pure Mathematics and
Statistics. The School of Life Sciences comprises the Departments of Applied Biology and
Psychology and the Institute of Nursing Studies (8)• The School of Engineering &
Computing groups together the Departments of Applied Physics, Computer Science,
Electronic Engineering, Engineering Design & Manufacture. The School of Chemistry has
no sub-departments and the School of Earth Sciences is effectively the Department of
Geography (9).
On an aggregate basis, these five Schools accounted for 37 per cent of the university's
total academic/academic-related staff at the end of the 1980s ( m)• They were responsible
for around 34 per cent of Hull's undergraduates and 27 per cent of postgraduates (")•
As Figure 6a showed, in the UGC's 1985/86 assessment of universities' research
strengths in the natural sciences, engineering and technology, no subject areas were rated
as outstanding at Hull. One was assessed as above average, five as below average and
seven as average (n). It was suggested that if the ABRC's recommendations were ever
implemented, Hull would be assigned to the "T" category; accordingly, the University
would be able to offer "undergraduate and MSc teaching with associated scholarship and
research activity but without advanced research facilities" (13)•
As we can see from Figure 6b, the results of the UGC's 1988/89 research selectivity
exercise suggest that the situation had not significantly changed in the intervening years.
No units of assessment were awarded a "5", but two were awarded a "4", six got a "3"
and six were awarded a "2" (14) .
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
In 1984/85, Hull ranked 46th in terms of £ earned in external research grants and
contracts, 47th in terms of the percentage of its total recurrent income which this external
revenue represented. As Figure 41a shows, at 7.4 per cent in the year the Kingman letter
arrived, proportionately Hull's research grant and contract earnings were the lowest of the
universities participating in this study, though City's were only a percentage point higher
(u) . Departments in the Faculty of Science & Technology brought in just over £1.5m,
accounting for 94 per cent of the University's total income from research grants and
contracts m . By 1988/89, as we can see from Figure 41b, the five Schools had earned
nearly two thirds more than the Faculty of Science & Technology had in 1985, generating
close to £2.5m and accounting for over 92 per cent of the University's total income from
research grants and contracts (").
The pattern of sponsorship which the science base attracted changed significantly over
these four years, as Figures 345-346 show. Whereas the Research Councils and charities -
which usually grant ownership of IP to the University - provided 63 per cent of its
research grant and contract income in 1984/85, by 1988/89 this had fallen to just 40 per
cent. In contrast, there was a dramatic increase in the proportion of income provided by
industry/commerce - up from 8 per cent in 1984/85 to 31 per cent in 1988/89. There was
no change in the proportion of funding from central government, local government and
various overseas organisations, however.
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2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Prior to the late 1970s, Hull's administration showed no interest in identifying or
exploiting IP. This was not because there was no IP to exploit, but because the
administration and many senior academics felt it was an inappropriate activity for a
university:
"... We [were] an ivory tower and we [didn't] get ourselves involved in these
commercial things ..."
This attitude may have been influenced by what many of Hull's longer-established
academic staff perceived as a particularly hard struggle to attain University status (1
"ivory tower" view was not shared by everyone in the academic community, however.
Over the years a number of academics recognised the commercial potential of their
research discoveries and in some cases, brought them to the administration's attention.
Until the 1980s, though, the administration provided little moral and no practical support
for their attempts to transfer technology. In 1972 the University, like the NRDC, turned
down the opportunity to participate in the exploitation of a wide range of stable liquid
crystals. These had been developed under the guidance of a Reader in the Chemistry
Department whose activities were scorned by colleagues:
" ... When I started to do this exploitable work ... my fellow academics looked
down their silly long noses at me and said: why are you doing that sort of work?
We are academics! It was definitely beneath them ..."
The liquid crystals were subsequently used in the display panels of calculators, watches
and numerous other electronic instruments 9)
	 a direct result, the UK obtained a major
share of the world liquid crystal market, netting the academics concerned a considerable
annual income and the first Queen's Award for Technical Achievement ever to be awarded
to a university department (2°) . The university is estimated to have lost upwards of £0.25m
in royalties during the 1980s, though the liquid crystal research group itself has benefitted
for many years (21) . There are rumoured to be other examples - which yielded considerably
lower returns, however.
Hull's administration paid little more than lip-service to the 1977 Patent Act (2z and the
CVCP's 1978 report. Some of the "new breed of young professors" (23) who were
appointed around this time felt that the administration simply did not share their interest in
exploiting the university's expertise and inventions. Others felt that the administration was
sympathetic, but that it was handicapped by the attitude of certain senior, long-standing
members of the academic community.
In 1981, confronted by the prospect of Hull's recurrent grant being cut by a fifth within
three years, the administration was forced to rethink its attitude. Its change of heart was
reinforced in 1983 by two announcements - that significant earnings would no longer be
offset against the Exchequer grant ( 24) and that infrastructure costs for collaboration with
industry represented proper use of the university's general income. In practice, though,
Hull's administration felt that other activities had greater claim on its rapidly reducing
resources. Despite increasing pressure from academics in the Faculty of Science &




Instead, as an interim measure, Hull made its newly-appointed Personnel Officer
responsible for handling IP which was flagged by members of staff. Almost immediately,
he found himself trying to make initial registrations of IP which members of staff had
generated (35) . The University established a small Exploitation Fund (24 to cover the cost of
employing a patent agent to make initial registrations on its behalf since the Personnel
Officer felt he was working "pretty well in the dark". It also established a Seedcorn Fund
in the wake of the 1981 cuts. This was described as "pump-priming support for research
projects for which it might otherwise prove difficult to attract funds from outside sources
at an early stage" (Th but in practice it was meant to include development work, too. If
projects supported by the Seedcorn Fund were subsequently exploited commercially, the
University made no attempt to recoup its investment; recipients were simply asked to
submit a short report on the outcome of the project.
Hull made the Personnel Officer responsible for IP because it believed that if the
University was going to derive financial benefit from its "hard" IP, it would have to
amend its General Terms of Engagement (22). In 1983/84 the Personnel Committee formed
a Sub-Committee on Patents to consider how it should proceed. The Sub-Committee
comprised a mixed group of administrators and academics with experience of or interest in
IP c") . In keeping with the new Vice-Chancellor's view that policy formulation is
exclusively a management responsibility, Hull AUT was neither invited to participate nor
even informed that the University proposed to draft a patents policy. It was therefore
unable to contribute any of the information assembled by the AUT nationally. The Sub-
Committee on Patents spent nearly two years formulating its policy without formal
reference to what other UK universities were doing (34)) , though it did draw on the CVCP's
1978 report. The "University's Policy on Patents" was drafted by the Registrar and the
Personnel Officer and presented to the Personnel Committee in 1985/86.
In the meantime the administration had "gritted its teeth" and bowed to pressure from the
Faculty of Science & Technology to set up an industrial liaison office (ILO). Hull made
no attempt to obtain external financial support for its proposed ILO, assuming that it
would have to pay "a substantial salary" out of its own funds. This was the situation
when the Kingman letter arrived.
Hull was about to draft its proposed policy on patents and to submit it to Council. The
University had protected a handful of discoveries by means of initial registrations and was
in the process of trying to recruit its first IL Officer (3".
3 THE KINGMAN LETTER
Hull was not surprised to receive Sir John Kingman's letter. The administration perceived
it as part and parcel of a clearly emerging policy which it welcomed. Given its financial
difficulties, the administration did not for one moment consider rejecting the offer:
111
"... We were interested in any opportunity to capitalise on our work ..."
Indeed, the University was - and still is - disappointed that the same principle was not
simultaneously applied to all government Departments and funding bodies.
The Kingman letter arrived while the Sub-Committee on Patents was still deliberating.
Having decided to accept the offer, the administration did not regard it as an issue which
demanded a separate, dedicated decision-making process. It saw no reason to treat lP
arising out of Research Council-funded projects as different to any other IP, and the Sub-
Committee on Patents was already evolving a general IP policy. The Research Councils'
offer enhanced the validity of the Sub-Committee's efforts, since it was seen as greatly
increasing the likelihood that researchers would generate IP which belonged to the
University rather than to a third party.
Since the Sub-Committee on Patents felt it had already considered and resolved for itself
most of the issues which the Kingman letter raised, the University was in a position to
make a fairly swift response. The reply, drafted by the Personnel Officer, was accepted
without comment and Hull, together with ten other universities and colleges, had its
proposals accepted by the Exploitation Scrutiny Group in the second round of
deliberations. The letter of authorisation was sent on 3 November, 1986.
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Rationale
Hull's approach to IP and university/industry relations in general has been coloured to
some extent by the insights which the Registrar gained as a result of a 1985 study tour (32).
It was evident that, in contrast to the staff in some European universities, Hull's
academics did not need to be persuaded en masse about the benefits to be gained from
identifying and exploiting IP and from cultivating good relations with industry. On the
contrary: a number of young professors had already expressed frustration at the
administration's reluctance to accept there were benefits. This meant that Hull had more
freedom than some UK universities to recruit its ILO from outside the education sector
(33)
It was also evident to Hull that though the University had many of the disciplines which
seemed likely to generate exploitable IP (3 ) and a decidedly applied ethos (3.5), the size of
the science base was likely to limit the quantity of exploitable IP. Therefore, there were
no immediate grounds for setting up a large support unit (.36).
It was also clear that any unit given the responsibility to exploit IP and cultivate
productive relations with industry should be hampered as little as possible by universities'
traditional, slow decision-making processes. Members of the Sub-Committee on Patents
contributed to the discussion about the most appropriate structure. They concurred that
there should be ...
" ... as little structure as possible ... [not] an elaborate, bureaucratic organisation
... one point of contact, one approachable person ..."
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4.2	 Structures
Having decided this, Hull advertised and re-advertised the post of ILO and was still not
impressed by the applicants. In February 1985 however, the Treasurer heard through
business contacts 07) about a marketing manager in a major company who wished to
undertake some form of "community service" prior to early retirement. Since the company
concerned was prepared to second him for two years, he started work in the newly-formed
Industrial & Commercial Development Agency (ICDA) the following week, reporting
directly to the Registrar m . After two years, the University took him onto its own
payroll, on administrative grade 5 (39) . In 1989/90 the ICDA had three full-time members
of staff: an ICDA Officer, an assistant and one secretary. The ICDA did not at that time
have a self-funding requirement. It was effectively an administrative service activity, the
existence of which should be justifiable in terms of the increase in external revenue which
it should generate 6 0)• As yet it was not subject to formal income generation targets.
(ii)	 It was envisaged that the Exploitation Fund, established a couple of years earlier,
would in time become a rolling fund, replenished by the income from selling IPR. Hull
accepted that this was a very long-term objective:
"... How long did BTG's [main] winner take? Ten years! It's a long lead time ..."
Agreements made at the end of the 1980s were scheduled to generate minimum annual
income of £50,000 in 1991/92 and 1992/93 from one piece of IP alone. However, to date
income of this order from IP has been the exception rather than the rule. It is not entirely
clear what the current, true balance of the Exploitation Fund is, since the administration
failed to alert the ICDA Officer to its existence. As a result, for five years the cost of
patents was borne by the ICDA's annual operating budget of ca. £15,000, which was
intended for promotional activities. The ICDA Officer eventually recouped the bulk of
these costs. Having done that, he was under the impression that the Exploitation Fund still
contained around £12,000. This would suggest that Hull had spent some £8,000 on patents
over a six or seven year period.
4.3	 Policy
Given the change to the original job specification " and the unanticipated speed with
which the ICDA Officer took up his post, the Registrar did not have time to flesh out a
comprehensive remit before he started work. He was asked simply to facilitate technology
transfer, to foster relations between the University and industry and to substantially
increase the university's research grant and contract income, but left largely to his own
devices as to how he went about it. With the exception of the university's policy on
patents, drafted by the Sub-Committee on Patents, there was little in the way of policy to
guide him.
In the intervening years the ICDA Officer has been instrumental in the formulation of a
number of new policies. He has done this both informally and formally, through
membership of committees and working parties. In the five years since he was appointed,
he has encouraged the University to make far more wide-ranging claims where IP is
concerned. Until 1990, Hull's policy on IP focussed entirely on "hard", patentable IP in
the form of inventions. The University made no claims vis-a-vis "soft" IP in the form of
expertise/know-how and no claims vis-a-vis copyright in computer software. If the
recommendations of a recent working party are adopted (42), the university's claims will
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extend to these areas, too. Moreover, since tactics have been proposed which are likely to
reduce the quantity of "outside work" done by members of the academic staff, there will
be less opportunity for academics to to argue that IP was generated in the course of
research commissioned by a third party - over which the University has no claim.
4.4	 Regulations and Documentation
Hull's administration did not circulate any documentation relating to IP until 1987, chiefly
because it did not have a agreed policy until then. In March 1986 the Sub-Committee on
Patents submitted a draft policy on patents first to the Personnel Committee and then to
the Joint Consultative Committee with Hull AUT, which was not satisfied with the
document:
"... They appeared to want to impose [it], to say - this is how it is going to be
from now on. We said - well, hang on a minute, this is a matter we need to
negotiate.
"... We wanted to ensure that there was adequate negotiation between the
member of staff and the University, so that the University didn't [operate] as a
force majeure'..."
Where the division of royalties was concerned, Hull AUT felt that the University wa
"doing itself down":
"... They didn't seem to understand the basic principles ... We weren't primarily
concerned with making our members into millionaires. We wanted our members to
get a fak reward for what they were doing and therefore we concentrated heavily
in the division of royalties on making sure that the first £40,000, or f80,000 if it
was more than two people, goes heavily towards the individual and when it
becomes a real money-spinner, then the University starts gaining ..."
Hull AUT was also concerned that the proposed policy statement did not make provision
for arbitration in the event of a dispute between the University and the inventor(s). With
appropriate amendments, which included provision that all research students should be
subject to the same policy as members of staff, agreement with the local AUT was
reached in February 1987. "The University's Policy on Patents" outlines the steps which
researchers should take if they think they have discovered something commercially
exploitable. It describes the circumstances to be taken into account when determining the
contribution made by various parties. The formulae which govern the division of royalties
take up an entire A4 page and are reproduced in Appendix G.
This document does not have the status of a Statute, an Ordinance or a Regulation. It is a
policy statement which derives its authority from the fact that it was agreed between the
University and the local AUT on the basis of "a relevant collective agreement, as defined
in the Patents Act 1977, Section 40 [6]". The statement duly quotes Sections 39 [1] and
Section 40 [6] of the Act. Despite its original intention, Hull has never amended its
General Terms of Engagement of Academic Staff (43) . The statement was circulated to all
members of staff in 1987. It has been included in the documentation sent to new members
of staff in the intervening years.
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The proposed new policy on IP, in which the University claims far more extensive rights
04), has been circulated in the form of the working party's final report. Since Hull AUT is
taking legal advice on some of the proposals, it remains to be seen how far the
university's claims regarding the ownership and exploitation of IP will extend. Once
agreement has been reached, the administration proposes to update the draft section on IP
in part 1 of its new Research Handbook.
4.5	 Incentives
Hull has established a number of incentives to encourage academics to identify IP, to
develop it into something exploitable, and to help ensure that it is exploited. Some of are
aimed at individual members of staff, others at Deans.
(i)	 Financial Incentives (Individuals)
At the level of the individual academic, the incentives are all "positive". In keeping with
the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, inventors are not rewarded for flagging IP or for
helping to protect it. They are rewarded only if it is successfully exploited. Given that
many discoveries cannot be commercially exploited until some development work has been
done, Hull's administration sees the Seedcorn Fund as a valuable financial incentive to
think in terms of applications, although this is not its sole purpose. In 1989/90, for
instance, the Seedcorn Fund distributed some £15,000 in support of ten projects 05),
several of which had potential commercial application. However, the Research Committee
(46), which administers the Seedcorn Fund, decided that from 1990/91 the money would be
better spent on postgraduate fellowships. The ICDA Officer believes he can find
alternative sources of funding, without too many strings attached:
"... There are so many ways these days of getting money for someone with
anything like a reasonable record or an established position in the Department ..."
In 1986 Hull devised a very complex sliding scale to govern the distribution of royalties
(4") from discoveries which are successfully exploited. Expressed in algebraic equations
(see Appendix G), it appears to vary the proportion which inventors receive according to
how many inventors there were ("), to who pays the patenting costs (49) , and to the extent
to which the University contributes financially and/or administratively to the exploitation
process (5°) . It also appears that in some cases, the sliding scale operates on the basis of
absolute income, whereas in others it operates on the basis of annual income bands which
are supposed to be index-linked to the index of retail prices for all items excluding food,
with February 1987 as the baseline.
The diverse formulae used in the 1987 document introduce considerable variations into the
financial rewards which might accrue to academics as a result of having made a successful
invention. This could presumably influence the mechanism by which academics prefer to
see their discoveries exploited 00.
The formulae governing the division of income from IP are unchanged in the proposed
new policy on IP, but significantly the income bands are exactly the same as those listed
in the 1987 document. Contrary to the agreement, they have not been index-linked,
indeed, all references to index-linking have been removed. It is not clear whether this is
deliberate or in error.
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The ICDA Officer believes that many academics regard the division of income from IP as
a very positive incentive:
" ... A lot of members of the academic staff are a bit more optimistic thanl am
that the crock of gold is there ..."
(ii)	 Career Progression
Hull's administration believes that today time spent by academics in flagging, helping
develop and exploit IP is viewed positively when it comes to promotion. This was
certainly not the case in the past. Such activities would not have impeded promotion, but
they would have been discounted:
"... If somebody had an arrangement with an industrial firm, a consultancy on the
side, well, good luck to him. He's [had] his reward there. He's not going to get a
Senior Lectureship as well ..."
The memorandum (52) relating to promotion to Senior Lecturer in the 1990/91 session
indicates that the Promotions Committee is interested in the contribution made by
candidates to:
teaching, course preparation and examining;
original and scholarly work;
management and administration of the School and development of the
School and the University;
successful efforts to generate and develop new activities in co-
operation with outside organisations and industry and in the field of
continuing education;
service within and outside the university.
Candidates for promotion from Lecturer grade A to Lecturer grade B are not expected to
have made contributions in the last two areas, however. Guidelines issued to candidates
indicate that they should include under the heading "Research Activities":
preparation of applications for funds and contracts and patent
applications;
apparatus and instruments constructed.
Under the heading "Work Outside the University" they should include among other things:
services to industry and commerce;
consultancies in research and teaching.
The promotions criteria and accompanying guidelines are fairly explicit when it comes to
IP which has been protected by a patent, but no mention is made of IP protected by
secrecy agreements or assignation. Moreover, it is not clear what weight is attached to
patent applications compared to, say, publications/conference papers/reports. The Senior
Personnel Officer believes that Hull's Promotions Committee would not want to be tied to
a formal system of weighting and that, in any case, any decision about the value of patents
relative to publications would trigger a lively debate on campus. At present, the
administrator compiling Hull's Annual Report on Research sidesteps the issue by including
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patents/copyrights/computer software or languages/engineering designs/musical
compositions and paintings/sculptures etc under the general heading "Publications", but
listing them under a separate sub-heading, "Other Public Output" 0).
It is not clear where academics should locate IP which is successfully exploited in their
application for promotion, or where an entrepreneurial academic who was exploiting his
discoveries himself should locate such activities. Does company start-up come under
"services to industry and commerce" or, if it is a joint venture with the University, should
it come under "the development of the School and the University"? At present, candidates
have to use their judgement where this is concerned and hope that their vision of how
their career should progress does not conflict with the Promotions Committee's.
(iii)	 Financial Incentives (Departments)
In theory, Deans of School at Hull have a particularly strong incentive to encourage
academics in member Departments to flag potentially exploitable IP, to try to develop it
into something exploitable, and to help ensure that it is exploited. From 1990/91, all
Schools are subject to agreed income generation targets which amount to roughly 5 per
cent of their UFC allocation over the next five years. It is not proposed to directly
penalise Schools which do not achieve their targets, but there will be indirect penalties
through the formula funding mechanism ( 54). Targets have been set for four categories of
income (') and although the administration recognises that income from IP is highly
unpredictable, it is expected that the five science-based Schools should be able to derive
some income from IP. To date, however, IP has generated very little income for any
Department. Moreover, it is not yet clear how Departments will benefit from any IP they
generate. It is intended that a percentage of the university's share of income from IP
should revert to the Department which generated it, in much the same way that research
overheads are divided between the University centrally and the Department which
generated them (515). However, not one of the university's statements of policy vis-a-vis IP
has confirmed this, let alone indicated what percentage Departments will receive. Nor do
the latest proposals address this question (57).
4.6	 Sanctions
Hull's administration knows that some academics in the University have taken out patents
in their own names, both before the 1977 Patent Act and afterwards. In the absence of a
regulatory framework - ie. appropriately amended General Terms of Engagement - the
University felt that there was little it could do about it. In fact, even now the
administration is not sure that it could do much about academics who, for whatever
reason, patented their discoveries in their name alone. It faces the same problems if it
should discover that academics have exploited IP clandestinely, to their sole advantage:
"... We have no system for disciplining academic staff, short of sacking [them] ..."
This is not seen as appropriate, given the present contractual situation.
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5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Identification
Neither the administration nor the ICDA Officer made any effort to widely publicise the
offer made in the Kingman letter. The information appears to have been given formally
only to the six senior academics who helped draft the "University's Policy on Patents".
Nor was any effort made to publicise the university's subsequent authorisation from the
Research Councils. This was not mentioned in the "Bulletin", the University newsletter
("), either. The only document to be circulated was the second version of the university's
patent policy, amended following negotiations with the AUT. Despite having received
authorisation from the Research Councils just three or four months earlier, the University
did not take the opportunity to draw academics'attention to the fact that they were no
longer obliged to contact the BTG to discuss IP arising out of Research Council-funded
projects. In the intervening years neither the administration nor the ICDA Officer has sent
members of staff written reminders of the rights and responsibilities which the University
accepted relating to IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects.
Indeed, with the exception of the 1987 document, there has been little written indication
of the university's aspirations vis-a-vis IP, whatever its origin. Despite this, the
administration is confident that the academic community is aware of the university's
rights, responsibilities and aspirations. It believes Hull's academics are adept at
recognising practical applications of discoveries arising out of even the most "pure"
research project - and acting upon that recognition:
"... [We are] confident that they have an eye on the main chance ..."
The ICDA Officer is less confident about awareness levels, but it believes that the spoken
word is more effective than written reminders:
"... There is an assumption in universities that people can read, which is not
always well-founded ... We quite clearly have a lot of illiterate members of staff
who don't read anything ..." 09)
"... I spend most of my time on the hoof It's the only way to operate ...
There are undoubtedly Departmental "blackspots" where the ICDA has a low or non-
existent profile. Significantly, the ICDA Officer has no record of Hull's entries to the
Academic Enterprise Competition (6°) . Failure to win the Competition need not imply that
the IP concerned or the plans to exploit it were worthless, yet it is not clear whether either
project has fallen by the wayside or whether the IP is being exploited with or without the
University's knowledge.
The ICDA Officer concedes that it has been difficult to get the message across to new
members of staff, especially research staff on short-term contracts. This particular
problem is one of many addressed by the working party which the ICDA Officer joined in
1988. The working party has proposed a "fail-safe" solution, namely exempting members
of staff on research grades from the copyright waiver which the University volunteers
vis-a-vis literary, scientific or musical compositions produced by other members of the
academic staff (6". Research Fellows/Assistants will not be allowed to publish without
permission from their principal investigator/HoD.,If this recommendation is adopted, it
118
will be included in a section on "Ownership and Exploitation of Research Results and
Patents" in the new Research Handbook, due to be circulated to all members of the
academic staff in the 1990/91 session. The Research Handbook was compiled by a Senior
Assistant Registrar. It is to be hoped that the ICDA Officer vetted the section on
"Ownership and Exploitation of Research Results and Patents" before the Handbook was
circulated, since the draft version states that the NRDC has first right of refusal on
inventions and other results of commercial value arising out of research supported by the
Research Councils (62) !
Tactics to positively raise the awareness of all new members of staff - perhaps by means
of a presentation on IP at the staff induction programme - have not been considered. Nor
has the possibility of reinforcing the awareness of existing members of staff by
incorporating a session on IP in the academic staff development programme (63) .
However, in 1989/90 the ICDA Officer set up a series of university-wide seminars dealing
with research issues, including IP (64) . These were attended by about 10 per cent of the
academic staff. In an attempt to make academics more aware of the prerequisites of the
patenting system, the ICDA Officer also invited researchers to attend the DTI's "Patents
Roadshow", held in Hull in June 1990. It was attended by six academics from the
Department of Engineering Design & Manufacture and one from the Department of
Applied Physics. A similar lack of interest was experienced by the University library a
year earlier, when it tried to hold a patents information evening; as a result, the event was
cancelled.
All the ICDA Officer's tactics are geared towards one thing - persuading researchers to
tell him about their discoveries before they tell anybody else. The ICDA Officer relies
almost entirely on academics themselves taking the initiative. He does not feel it can
institute further "fail-safe" systems, given his present resources. The Finance Office is
happy to make applications for research grants 655) available for the ICDA Officer to
scrutinise so that it is aware of potential IP at the earliest stage. However, the ICDA
Officer has neither the time nor the expertise to make it worthwhile doing this routinely.
Equally, the ICDA Officer sees little value in reading interim or final reports. The ICDA
Officer sometimes attends presentations which researchers make to their funding body but
he regards this as "a very rough and ready method". He has considered a number of
possible solutions to the problem but none has yet seemed workable:
"... I'm not very keen on having six learned people sitting round a table once a
month examining things that have been put forward. I couldn't stomach that. I
wouldn't be able to sit there. I think there would be violent disagreements. Would
the chemists understand what the electronic engineers were saying, and vice
versa? ..."
Given this situation, the ICDA Officer recognises the value of using outside organisations
to trawl for IP. "Innovation" (66) is seen as a useful tool since entries are expressed in
language which can be understood by the layman. By virtue of acting as gatekeeper for
forwarding the forms, the ICDA Officer has already been able to identify one exploitable
discovery and a number of others which may be worth pursuing. These academics chose
to confide to "Innovation" rather than to the ICDA Officer, but he does not see this as a
failure on its part:
"... You've got to keep fworking] at this in different ways ..."
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The ICDA Officer has allowed the BTG to continue its customary twice-yearly visits,
though he is sceptical about the value of it. This is due partly to perceived failings in the
organisation of the BTG and partly to the attitude of Hull's academics 07). Similarly, the
ICDA Officer has signed enabling agreements with the Research Corporation. However,
he does not give access to any of the more recently-founded organisations, having no way
to check their credentials and fearing they might identify a promising discovery, arrange
for it to be developed and never get in touch again.
5.2	 Evaluation
Despite his marketing background, the ICDA Officer is generally unable to obtain an
independent assessment of the market value of a discovery. The budget does not stretch
to paying for private sector evaluations and there are no local public sector organisations
with this sort of remit. The BTG and the Research Coporation are the only organisations
which will provide a free and supposedly unbiased market evaluation. However, as a
result of the NRDC's rejection of liquid crystals (see note ( 19) for details), Hull's
academics have little faith in the BTG's pronouncements. Despite the fact that this
happened 18 years earlier, there is a tendency for Hull's academics to try and prove the
BTG wrong once again by attempting to develop and exploit their discoveries themselves
". The Research Corporation has a different kind of image problem: it is not a known
quantity as far as the academic community is concerned.
Confronted by these constraints, the ICDA Officer's strategy is often to file an initial
registration if the researcher concerned believes that his discovery is promising and
patentable. If a partner is found to develop and exploit the discovery, the ICDA Officer
relies entirely on that company's market evaluation. This is not the optimum situation, but
as long as the University includes a reversion clause as part of any agreement, the ICDA
Officer is not too concerned:
"... It would not be in [a company's] interest to play down the value of [the
discovery] because that just puts up the percentage we would ask for. Round the
other way, we could be conned. They could say - look, this is going to sell
millions and 1 per cent of .Elm is worth having. But they know they are going to
sell £10,000-[worth] and I per cent of .170,000 is nothing. If one has a reversion
clause, though, that's certainly a safeguard ..."
5.3	 Protection
(i)	 Philosophy
If a discovery is seen as likely to have market value, it is Hull's policy to try and get it
protected in some way. If it is possible to acquire patent protection, the ICDA Officer sees
this - or even an initial registration - as lending credibility. However, the University has
no principled objection to protecting its IP by assigning it or by marketing it as secret
know-how. Any of these mechanisms are permissible, provided they do not prevent
researchers from publishing their discoveries within a reasonable period; Hull's Charter
prevents it from agreeing to unreasonable prohibitions on publication (69) . From the ICDA
Officer's perspective, there can be advantages in assigning IP or selling it as secret know-
how: it is often easier to persuade a company to take responsibility for protecting the
discovery - by patent or by secrecy - than to recoup patenting costs which the University
has already borne. On the other hand, while this strategy may be more cost-effective in
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the short term, the ICDA Officer believes that in the long term, it is "more prone to
accident".
Originally, it was proposed that a standing Sub-Committee on Patents should decide
whether or not to protect a discovery - and if so, by what means. It was originally
envisaged that the Sub-Committee would be alerted to the problem by the Registrar "as
soon as practicable" and that members of the academic staff would be "directed" what to
do (70). In the second version of the University's patents policy, the University specifies
that it will "take the necessary steps to discuss the matter with the member of staff and
other parties involved ... within six months" (71). In practice, this has never happened,
since the ICDA Officer dislikes working with committees:
"... It was upto me - and I've never called [the Sub-Committed together ...
Nobody has said anything ..."
At Hull IP is unlikely to be protected by any mechanism unless the researcher agrees. The
ICDA Officer tries to come to a concensus with researchers about whether to delay
exploiting the discovery intellectually - via publication - in the interests of exploiting it
commercially. There has been no disagreement to date about the best course of action (72).
If there ever were, the ICDA Officer feels sure that ...
"... the University would back the member of staff If he felt his career was going
to be advanced by early publication and [he] was prepared to jeopardise some
potential, future, long-term income, then we would say - fine. We would be
prepared to back that ..."
Where there is a choice between protecting a discovery by patent, secrecy or assignation,
researchers effectively have the final right of decision about this, too, since an initial
registration is likely to allow them to publish sooner rather than later. Despite the dangers
of early registration, the ICDA Officer believes this is the correct strategy for a University
to pursue, given the difficulties of preventing inadvertent disclosure.
(ii) Finance
Because the ICDA Officer did not discover the existence of the Exploitation Fund until he
had already been in post for five years, he has had a relatively limited sum to spend on
patenting - ie. whatever proportion of his £15,000 annual budget he felt he could devote to
it. Confronted by this constraint, the ICDA Officer has opted to pursue a liberal strategy
where initial registrations are concerned. This has been done as economically as possible,
however.
(iii) Practicalities
If it appears that acquiring a patent will be relatively straightforward, the researcher is
asked to submit a "DIY" application, for which the University pays. If acquiring a patent
is deemed to be particularly urgent or complex, the academics concerned are asked to visit
the university's patent agent and to draft the initial specification in the light of the
resulting discussion. The patent agent then translates the draft into the appropriate register.
In each case, the procedure will be determined on the basis of a discussion between the
researcher and the ICDA Officer. To date, around a quarter of Hull's initial registrations
have been in the form of "DIY" specifications drafted by the academic without reference
121
to a patent agent:
"... unhappily we've been tending to go the more expensive way as things get
more complicated ..."
Academics are expected to find the time to write patent specifications. If their existing
workload makes it impossible to do this fairly quickly, they could try to negotiate a
temporary easing of their schedule with their HoD, but this would be entirely at his
discretion (Th . The ICDA Officer plays no part in such negotiations.
(iv)	 Ownership
Successsive versions of "the University's Policy on Patents" have stated unequivocally that
patents will be jointly vested in the name of the University and the inventor(s). In
practice, the ICDA Officer has vested every patent in the name of the University alone,
unless the inventor specifically requests joint vestment. This has happened only once, to
date. According to the ICDA Officer, vesting patents in the University alone is:
"... an easier way of handling things administratively. I can do it from here
without having to involve a lot of other people ..."
Whereas researchers have a considerable say in how their IP is initially protected, they
have little direct influence on the decision whether or not to acquire full patent protection.
The reason for this is entirely pragmatic: the sheer cost of acquiring full patent protection
deters the ICDA Officer from being speculative beyond the first stage of the process,
despite the University's desire to avoid a repetition of the liquid crystals debacle:
"... It is very difficult to pick the winners and I would be concerned about using
scarce University resources [speculatively] ..."
The ICDA Officer will only proceed with a full application once a partner has committed
itself to developing a discovery or it is very likely that a firm commitment will be made
within twelve months or so of the initial registration (74)• Between 20 and 30 per cent of
initial registrations are left to lapse because these conditions cannot be fulfilled. Academics
may be able to influence the situation indirectly, by helping to identify partners and being
persuasive. In rare cases, they may be able to influence the situation directly by attracting
the capital to start a company to develop and exploit their discovery. Given the level of
academic salaries, academics are unlikely to be able to bear the cost of full patent
protection without substantial financial backing.
Hull's patent policy explicitly states that if the University elects not to participate in the
development or exploitation of a discovery, it will waive all its rights in the IP, retaining
no interest whatsoever. A decision can be reached within weeks rather than months.
Although the ICDA Officer would not invest money in discoveries which had been
assigned to the inventors, it would still refer them to appropriate sources of advice on
protecting and exploiting it. The ICDA Officer would be motivated by a desire to maintain
a good relationship with the academics concerned, to enourage them to bring their next
discovery to his attention. Since the introduction of the patent policy, however, not one
researcher has sought to acquire the rights to discoveries which the ICDA Officer has
decided not to pursue.
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If the ICDA Officer feels there are grounds for acquiring full patent protection, the
University applies to those countries which its patent agents recommend. This usually
includes the US, Japan and several European countries. In Europe the ICDA Officer
tends to use the EPC route because the expenditure is slower and there is a greater chance
of identifying licensees before heavy expenditure occurs.
The ICDA Officer does not believe its pragmatic, short-term approach to patenting is
likely to change in the forseeable future:
"... If we were enjoying revenue from our previous [patents], I think naturally we
would tend to be more speculative. But I'm not the greatest optimist about the
potential of this University - or any University, for that matter - to earn vast sums
of money from IP ..."
5.4	 Commercialisation
Where it has retained rights to its IP, Hull has had no principled objection in the past to it
being exploited by a third party or by an independent academic spin-off company.
Recently, the University has expanded its options by adding University companies and
joint ventures to the list of mechanisms which might be used to commercialise IP. In
practice, all these mechanisms have been used, but during the 1980s well over 90 per
cent of the university's IP has been licensed to third parties.
(i)	 Academic Spin-off Companies
Since the late 1970s academics at Hull have been founding/co-founding "hard" companies
to exploit IP which was discovered in the University. In one case dating from the late
1970s the academic concerned proceeded to exploit his discoveries without informing the
University centrally and without establishing whether or not the University might claim
ownership of the IP (75) . Several others established that at that time the University had no
wish to participate in the exploitation; they therefore had no need of a license. One has set
up a company more recently, but has negotiated an agreement whereby he alone owns the
copyright on the software which he produces and markets. To date, no academics have
acquired a license from the University to exploit their discoveries.
In future, it is less likely that academics will commercially exploit their research
discoveries by means of independent spin-off companies. With the exception of income
from goods and services sold to academic entrepreneurs, the benefit to the University
from these companies has largely been non-financial to date. They have brought kudos to
the University for having bridged the university/industry divide and a source of industrial
placements for students. In the absence of license agreements, none of the "hard"
academic spin-off companies has generated a royalty income for the University. None of
the academics who have spun-off independent companies has admitted to exceeding the
personal earnings limit and covenanted the excess to the University. It is impossible to
establish whether their earnings have genuinely been too low, whether they have failed to
declare all their earnings or whether they are simply unaware of the rules. No
comprehensive staff handbook has been issued at Hull since the mid-1970s and attempts to
distribute updated sections have not been entirely successful.
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(ii)	 University Companies/Joint Ventures
In 1988/89 the University responded positively to a member of staff's proposal to embark
on a joint venture (10 . The administration saw it as in keeping with its policy of
"involvement, as opposed to non-involvement" as well as a potential source of income.
Senior members of the administration have become so enthusiastic about the concept of
joint ventures that they have considered making the university's participation (Th a
condition of permission to found a company. To date, however, only one joint venture
with a member of the academic staff has been set up. At the ICDA Officer's behest, this
particular enterprise has been structured as a joint venture between the academic and the
university's holding company rather than a joint venture with the University itself:
"... The chances of being associated with a roaring success and making tons and
tons of money against the chances of either being at best involved in a time-
consuming, non-productive operation - or at worst getting caught up in something
which is a loss-maker, with all the problems that occasions - I'm afraid I'm a bit
cynical ... Therefore I think arm's length is probably best ..."
Knowing that some British universities have lost a considerable amount of money through
failing to set up an arm's length relationship, the administration was happy to agree cm.
The ICDA Officer believes there are other considerations to take into account:
"... I would be reluctant for the University to be a partner in setting up a
relationship with a member of staff, as opposed to a holding company of the
University which is not governed by the University ... I can't see how the
University, through Senate and Council and all that paraphernalia, could ever
come to an arrangement with a member of staff
"... I think you can have a clash of interests [between] the University and the
member of staff over matters academic ... Those people in the University who have
anything to do with discussions with a member of staff clearly have a concern
about some academic aspect of the arrangement.
"I think that as long as [the academic] gets agreement from his Dean of School
that it will not interfere with his other duties, then fine. The Dean of School gives
it his papal blessing, then [the academic] can come across and talk to Hull Unico
and set it up on a proper commercial basis ..."
The ICDA Officer also believes that a holding company is less inhibiting to academics:
"... You can have problems of sheer size. You've got the University ... and a little
one-person company and the whole thing is a total mismatch.
"Hull Unico is a very small unit which is known to be a commercial operation
which is divorced from the academic side of the University entirely. It is not
[governed by] its statutes and so on and can therefore talk on a more equitable
basis with a member of staff..."
124
Hull Unico was originally set up in 1985 in order to benefit from grants awarded by the
DTI (79) . It was founded specifically to develop laser micro-soldering, the principles of
which had been established by a research team in the Department of Electronic
Engineering. Hull Unico soon assumed the status of a wholly-owned University holding
company (". In the same year it established its first subsidiary (E) to exploit IP which
arose out of research carried out by the Institute of Estuarine & Coastal Studies (IECS) for
a regional water authority. In the ICDA Officer's view, this venture was not sufficiently
well thought out:
"... I think it was [set up] in a flush of enthusiasm. It was a good idea for the
University to be seen to be having these entrepreneurial characters working under
the banner of the University but really doing their own [thing] ..."
Since the subsidiary was located 150 miles away, the ICDA Officer later encouraged the
founders to organise a management buy-out ( 82); this was completed in 1988. At present,
Hull Unico has only one other subsidiary (83) . The existence of the company has not been
highly publicised either within or outside the University because of its limited activity.
The ICDA Officer has considered winding up the company to save on auditors' fees,
insurance costs etc. If that happened, it is not clear how the University could participate at
arm's length in joint ventures with members of the academic staff.
(iii)	 Licensing
Academics at Hull who do not have entrepreneurial leanings are given considerably less
scope to contribute to the process of commercialising their discoveries than some of their
colleagues in other universities. The ICDA Officer's knowledge of the market is better
than that of many University IL0s, given his lifelong career in the business. He feels he
has no need of directories like Dun & Bradstreet and relies less than many ILOs on
researchers' knowledge of companies operating in their field. Moreover, he prefers to
make the approach to potential licensees himself; the researcher may be present, but only
in an advisory capacity. Similarly, despite having no previous experience, the ICDA
Officer negotiates the terms of the license agreement ( 84). He will discuss strategy with the
researcher beforehand, but he alone conducts the negotiations. If the researcher is
present - and he need not be - it is only in an advisory capacity:
"... I think it is easier for me to backtrack on too extreme a position without
compromising the relationship between the academic and the company. [That] is
much more important than my relationship. One must not damage that. If the
company thinks the academic is a hard-nosed, grasping so-and-so, they won't have
a good consultancy relationship. If they think I am, it doesn't really matter ..."
Non-entrepreneurial academics are expected to support the commercialisation process
academically, through contract research or private consultancy.
The administration tries to include details of IP which is being commercially exploited in
the Annual Report on Research Information. An annual memorandum asks Deans of
School to pass on details of license agreements. Spin-off companies are not mentioned,
however. Despite the omission, the administration would be happy to include details of
ventures in which the University has a hand. It would be reluctant to name independent
spin-off companies, however, in case they did not stem from a University activity.





Hull has had a policy on academic entrepreneurship for a number of years, but until
1990 - when major policy changes were proposed - it was never made explicit. Since the
mid-1970s the administration has distinguished between academics who choose to be
entrepreneurial within the University system and those who prefer to pursue their business
interests outside the conventional framework of the University. Academics have been
expected to understand that the latter comes under the general heading of "outside work"
(85) The relevant regulations required them to seek written permission for any external
activity, whether it was starting a company, doing private consultancy work or whatever.
It was irrelevant whether the proposed company was intended to exploit
expertise/inventions arising out of the academic's work for the University or
skills/interests which have no connection with the University. Equally, it was irrelevant
whether the academic proposed to set up an independent company or a joint venture with
the university/the university's holding company.
Permission to do outside work is granted/denied by the Vice-Chancellor, following advice
from the Registrar. Hull has been concerned less about the type of outside work than
about the extent to which it might impinge on a member of staff's primary academic
commitments. Since the mid-1970s Hull has sought to control this by imposing an
earnings limit, rather than a time limit, a rule which could theoretically constrain junior
academics more than their senior colleagues ("). In the administration's view, it is unlikely
to have constrained anyone in practice, since the income they derived personally from
their companies was liable to be negligible unless they were very successful.
By 1989/90 the University had given permission to around a dozen academics to found
independent companies to exploit expertise/inventions (". In some cases, permission was
granted retrospectively, after the administration had gently jogged the academic's memory:
"... I would say - I believe you've set up a company; would you mind asking for
permission? ... It's a question of whether it is advisable to use a big stick and beat
the naughty academic on the head. We've taken a fairly relaxed view so far ..."
In 1989/90, one academic spin-off company was technically operating without permission,
a situation which the ICDA Officer felt was causing controversy in parts of the University
and putting the HoD in an invidious situation ("). Given its relaxed attitude during the
1970s and 1980s, the administration believes it is unlikely that academics from Hull have
ever run companies secretly.
The administration says that it does not necessarily look fo a financial return on the
activities of its entrepreneurial academics. However, since the late 1980s it has grown
increasingly interested in the concept of joint ventures with members of the academic staff
trying to exploit "hard" IP (".
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It is not clear whether this is in the spirit of supporting technology transfer or for hard-
nosed financial reasons. Certainly, the administration has sought to safeguard its
investment by means of a non-executive seat on the board. Its (unwilling) representative
has been the ICDA Officer:
/The  academic] is working on it full-time. He's got his own cronies. I will be
invited along to all meetings ... but i f I actually want to poke my nose in, I know
very well I could very easily be [diverted]. I've got no chance at all ... unless he
wants me to. And the only reason he'll want me to is because he's in trouble.
"I'm rather scared of being the non-executive director of this fioint venture]
because the amount of time I can devote to it [is minimal].
"... If it all goes wrong ... I think my colleagues on the academic side
perceive me [as having a managerial input], but I think they are being a bit naive
The ICDA Officer agrees in principle with the administration's desire to benefit financially
from academics' business activities:
II
" . It [is] a great pity - and we have seen it in the case of [company X] - if a
member of staff has a very good idea, goes out and makes money out of it and the
University doesn't make a penny. I think the University should encourage its
members of staff to be entrepreneurial - it has to - [but] it has to have the
opportunity of taking a stake in some small way in that person's [company] ..."
In practice, the ICDA Officer does not believe the University could afford to adopt an
open-door policy which would commit it to acquiring an equity stake every time an
academic proposed setting up a "hard" company - nor should it, even if it could afford to:
"... On balance, I think ... universities should be cautious. That doesn't mean to
say that if it was a real winner, we wouldn't go for it ..."
The ICDA Officer felt there were other, less risky ways for the University to benefit
financially from academics' business activities, whether they were running "hard" or
"soft" companies - ways which could be applied more consistently.
The ICDA Officer was a member of a working party which is recommending what
amounts to a radical change in the university's policy vis-a-vis academic entrepreneurship
in the 1990s. The proposed changes are not presented in terms of a policy specifically
relating to academic entrepreneurship, though some members of the administration admit
that this is at least part of the underlying rationale ( 9'). They are presented as logical
changes in the context of the university's global approach to income generation now that
Schools are required to achieve income generation targets. In keeping with the UFC, the
working party recognised three categories of income and analysed the benefit to the
University from each. Work for industry and commerce which is not subject to a research
contract with the University - ie. consultancy work - is seen as "carr[ying] no research
benefits for the University" (92). Therefore, the working party argues, it should be
undertaken only if there is a proper commercial return - ie. a minimum of £250 per day
(or £40 per hour pro-rata) (c)• For every day's outside work done by members of the
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academic staff - and the working party recommends a maximum of 45 days per year - it is
proposed that £125 should be paid into the university's central funds (94) , irrespective of
which company the work was done for and how much was earned:
"... In fairness, the same rules must apply when members of staff undertake paid
work on behalf of an outside firm or company in which they have a share or
interest ..." (95)
It is also proposed to renegotiate certain agreements already entered into with existing
members of staff, since the administration wishes to be seen to treat every member of staff
in the same way. This desire has its roots in the controversy which one particular
academic spin-off company has generated on campus:
"... There's a subterranean feeling that certain guys are not pulling their weight in
the Department and making money on the side. They are ripping off their
colleagues who carry the heat and burden of the day in the Department. That
feeling is abroad and not only in relation to spin-off companies.
"There's an illusion that they are making money, when they are not. There's a bit
of a feeling of resentment [about] all sorts of off-shore operations. We hope that
the application of the [new] rules will help clear the air ..."
Both the ICDA Officer and senior members of the administration still profess to be in
favour of academic entrepreneurship:
"... It helps to anchor us in the real world ..."
Effectively, however, they are proposing to tax would-be academic entrepreneurs at the
rate of £125 per day from the moment they start trying to set up a company. Some
members of the administration would like to deduct this sum from the academic's salary at
source if it was not forthcoming, but senior members recognise this would lead to
complications vis-a-vis the Inland Revenue. Others are concerned that the proposed charge
will deter academics from founding the kind of spin-off companies with which the
University has been keen to associate itself in the past.
The working party has omitted to include a precise definition of "45 days per year", so it
is not clear whether academics who try to restrict their company start-up activities to
evenings and weekends could avoid incurring this charge. Since the Registrar takes the
view that the University "owns members of the academic staff 365 days a year, 24 hours a
day", this may depend on the negotiating skills of Hull AUT, which is taking legal advice.
Whatever the outcome, the Registrar accepts that the University may have to consider
alternative strategies for some academic entrepreneurs, some form of quid pro quo.
The situation of academics who choose to be entrepreneurial within the University system
is also changing. In the past, they have been relatively free to set up units acting as the
commercial arm of their Department, exploiting its expertise and resources. Several
commercially-oriented units were founded during the 1980s (". The ICDA Officer felt
initially that it would be more appropriate if they were run by professionals rather than by
academics:
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" If you have a Department which is able to provide a service to the outside
community, it is much better to concentrate that service within a commercial
enterprise which is headed up by someone who stands or falls by fits] success -
rather than diffuse it amongst twenty academics. That one person who is running it
can go and talk to his academics and pull them in, if he wants to, on specc
cases. Then you always have a point of contact and he can handle the business
without disrupting the academic programme. Yet people in the Department will
know what Ad is doing. That's the best of both worlds ..."
Recently, he has changed his view:
"... as soon as you strip the School of running it, then you've lost the incentive to
do it ... I think it is better for a School to have ownership of this activity ..."
It remains to be seen whether which approach will prevail. Despite the fact that Deans are
now required to accept full responsibility for Schools' devolved budgets 67) and to ensure
that agreed annual income generation targets are met, neither Schools nor Departments are
allowed to establish commercially-oriented units without permission from the
administration. They are required to submit detailed business plans. This is no easy task,
given that they are not free to determine how such units will be run. The administration
reserves the right to decide whether a professional manager should be brought in or
whether the Department can deploy an entrepreneurial member of staff as manager. The
administration tends to the view that such units need to be run by:
" ... someone whose life depends upon it ... It's a question of [whether] we can
arrive at a situation in which [an academic's] life depends on it being successful
The time taken to resolve such questions is causing considerable frustration among some
more entrepreneurial members of staff.
6.2	 Making Time
Under the old policy and the proposed new policy, if would-be academic entrepreneurs
decide to try and set up a company while still employed full-time, they may be able to
devote time to it which they might otherwise devote to conventional consultancy activities
("). If they want to devote more of their working week than this allows to their business,
the administration expects academic entrepreneurs to negotiate a part-time, pro-rata
contract or arrange for temporary unpaid leave of absence. It does not support the idea of
being flexible about an academic entrepreneur's workload, even if he is engaged in a joint
venture with the University. The administration does not view joint ventures as a
legitimate University activity, but as a separate, outside activity - though it admits that it
has not yet given this proper consideration.
Applications for leave of absence e") will not be considered unless they are supported by
the Dean of School. Academics are expected to spend leave of absence in a way which the
Dean of School regards as "consonant with professional development". The administration
believes that most Deans would approve requests from members of staff who proposed to
exploit their research discoveries commercially (1".
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Leave of absence is granted/denied by the Staff Resources Committee, which considers the
extent to which Departmental research, teaching and examination commitments can be
covered duing the period of leave - and whether any substitute or extra help would be
required for the period concerned. If the Committee considers a replacement is necessary,
this must be put to the Staffing Committee. Leave of absence is granted for a year in most
instances, or two years if circumstances merit it. If it took longer than anticipated to
establish a spin-off company to the point where the academic could reduce his input, the
University would be very reluctant to grant a third year's leave of absence. It would be
concerned about where the academic's commitment really lay and whether he still
identified sufficiently with the university's objectives.
None of Hull's would-be academic entrepreneurs has yet requested leave of absence to get
their company up and running. If any did, it is not clear how the University would handle
contributions to the University Superannuation Scheme. For the first year, Hull usually
pays both the employer's and the employee's contributions. Academics who are earning
while they are absent are usually required to reimburse their share of the contributions
every three months, in arrears. If they are not earning, the Personnel Office sometimes
agrees to bear the cost of both contributions.
Several of Hull's academic entrepreneurs have managed to get their businesses up and
running and fulfil their academic commitments on a full-time basis. In some - but not all -
cases, the academic has had a partner who have played a more active part in the business.
In another, the business was sold-on after a number of years. A few academics have left
the University in order to devote themselves to the business °°°. The administration does
not believe that any of them left because pressure was put on them to make a choice.
6.3	 Other Resources
The administration is against the idea of academics running businesses from University
premises ( 102), since there is already considerable pressure on space. Since the opening of
the university's science park in 1985 °", Hull's academic entrepreneurs have been
expected to operate from a site adjacent to the campus or from entirely independent
premises. In 1989/90 there were eleven incubator units on the science park, all occupied.
The nearest university-based alternatives were at Leeds or Bradford. However, incubator
units and larger units could be rented from Hull City Council for somewhat cheaper rents
(1", while there were also private business parks for somewhat higher rents
Academics wishing to use equipment or instrumentation in pursuit of their business
activities are expected to hire them at the full market rate, subject to availability. They are
expected to compete for the use of equipment/instrumentation on the same basis as any
other business. The administration prefers it if academic entrepreneurs do not use the
university's hard-pressed secretarial or technical support staff, but if they do, they are
expected to pay the full market rate for their services. In the ICDA Officer's opinion, the
University has no choice but to charge academics the full market rate if it wishes to
conform to the recommendations of the Hanham Report ow . Since universities are
"notoriously bad" at calculating real costs and since their overheads are relatively low, the
ICDA Officer feels that, in fact, academic entrepreneurs are probably getting a bargain.
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In one way, Hull's academic entrepreneurs have an indisputed advantage over other
commercial concerns. The ICDA Officer believes they should be granted exclusive
licenses, even though its normal policy is to try and negotiate non-exclusive licenses with
third parties:
" ... if the University is going to encourage a member of staff to get out there and
do his own thing ... we should be as flexible and supportive as possible. [There is]
no point in ... putting all sorts of obstacles against him doing it successfully.
"... you want to give the guy a chance and be prepared, unlike an ordinary
commercial license, to let him get off the ground, to nurture him before you
extract your pound offlesh ..."
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
Whether academics propose to found independent spin-off companies or joint ventures
with the University, the ICDA Officer feels it should try to ensure they get the right kind
of business start-up advice. The University does not believe it has a legal or financial
responsibility towards would-be academic entrepreneurs, but it does feel a sense of moral
responsibility. The ICDA Officer does his best to warn academics that they are unlikely to
have all the skills needed to run a successful, high-tech business:
"... Most people who come along understand that they need financial support.
What [they] underestimate ... is the marketing support. Marketing [is seen as]
something anyone can do. There's no skill or expertise. That's what people think
... As long as you've got someone adding the figures up and you've got a bright
idea, marketing just falls of the back of a lorry ..."
In 1986, funded by the DTI, the University launched a scheme designed to help small
businesses in the Hull and Grimsby area ( 107). It is administered by the ICDA, which does
not itself act as a troubleshooter for specific businesses. Instead, it refers small businesses
to appropriate sources of advice. These might be within or outside the University.
Academic entrepreneurs are treated in the same way and are referred to patent agents,
accountants, commercial lawyers, the city's Economic and Property Department etc, as
required.
The ICDA Officer has mixed feelings about sending would-be academic entrepreneurs to
talk to colleagues who established their businesses earlier:
"... Some of the experiences of members of staff with spin-off companies might not
have been as rosy as they thought it was going to be. Therefore, their attitude
might be depressing rather than [encouraging" There's a difference between
understanding the realities and being thoroughly depressed ..."
However, the ICDA Officer concedes it might be worth sending those just starting out to
talk to those academic entrepreneurs whom he sees as successful.
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7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Hull was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was "generally
satisfied" with the arrangements established. A formal document was scheduled to follow,
confirming the University's rights and responsibilities to exploit IP arising out of Research
Council-funded projects for a further 2 years. The situation was due to be reviewed again
in 1992 after Hull had submitted its fifth annual report (l").
8	 POLICY AND PRACTICE AS PERCEIVED BY HEADS OF
DEPARTMENT AND DEANS
8.1	 Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and Response to the Kingman Letter
(i) Awareness of the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
All six interviewees at Hull reported that they had been aware - at the time - of the
removal of the BTG's monopoly, though few could remember exactly how they had
learned about it. One °') surmised that he had read about it in "The Times", while three
believed (incorrectly) that this information had been formally circulated to all HoDs
by the University. Only two could remember clearly how they had learned of it; one (c.)
reported that he had been been involved in the University's Sub-Committee on Patents,
which was asked to consider whether acceptance of the Research Councils' offer would
require policy changes; the other 05 had learned of the offer when the university which
formerly employed him decided (for a brief period) that it could not afford the cost of
patent protection and that staff themselves should therefore pay those costs if they felt it
was worthwhile.
Two interviewees (De' E) spontaneously that they had been more aware of the
removal of the BTG's monopoly than of the Research Councils' offer, though both added
that they had deduced what the implications were for the University and their department.
(ii) Attitudes to the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research Councils'
Offer
Questioned about their attitude at the time to the removal of the BTG's monopoly and the
Research Councils' offer, three of the six (". B'
 D.) said they had had no real opinion, since
it was difficult to see what relevance it had to their particular disciplines. One (") added
that then, as now, most research findings in his discipline were regarded as public
property; he would not expect them to be commercially exploited.
Two interviewees said that they had welcomed the Research Councils' offer, though one
(E") remarked that since his department was already attracting a high proportion of funding
from industry, rather than the relevant Research Council, staff were already thinking in
commercial terms and the idea of taking on the BTG's former role was not "such a big
step". The other (F) explained his support for the change in terms of the NRDC's - and
hence the BTG's - very poor reputation; he added that he himself had little experience of
the NRDC, but he knew a lot of people who had and that was enough for him.
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(iii)	 Perceptions of the University's Motivation in Accepting the Research Councils'
Offer
All six interviewees appeared to feel that Hull had been right to accept the Research
Councils' offer, though one (") said he had been - and still was - concerned about the long-
term implications; his department had developed a number of mutually beneficial
relationships with various organisations which exploited IP of all sorts - relationships
which operated on an informal quid pro quo basis; he feared that sooner or later these
would be jeopardised by demands from the University for departmental IP to be exploited
on a formal, contractual basis in exchange for money which many of these organisations
did not have at their disposal.
All six felt that, in accepting the Research Councils' offer, the University had been
motivated by one overriding objective - generating additional revenue. This was variously
described as "getting a slice of the action" (El% "establishing a wider funding base" (E.),
"protecting the University" (D.) and "losing less money through the judgements of the
IVRDC' 0) . Only three interviewees suggested that the University might have had
secondary motives - namely, encouraging contact with industry ( B), gaining access to new
research ideas 0”, transferring technology more effectively (1).) and generating publicity -
thereby gaining a better reputation (").
(iv)	 Awareness of and Views on the Process of Determining the University's Response
to the Research Councils' Offer
None of the interviewees knew that the University's response to the Kingman letter had
effectively been determined by the Registrar alone and drafted by the Personnel Officer,
capitalising on his legal background. The interviewee who had been consulted on the
possible need to modify University policy - by virtue of his involvement in the Sub-
Committee on Patents (c.) - had assumed two things: firstly that his views had influenced
the University's decision to accept the Research Councils' offer and secondly that he had
been consulted in his capacity as HoD. He pointed out that at that time, prior to the
establishment of Schools, HoDs had had managerial responsibility and added: "If I hadn't
been consulted, I would have been frothing at the mouth, certainly". A fellow interviewee
(1).) also felt that this is what should have happened - if only for reasons of widely
disseminating the information. Another 0) said that every effort should have been made to
consult not only HoDs but also all members of staff who had relevant experience.
However, another (E") said:
"... Universities are funny places. They are supposed to consult everybody. But I
think probably not. I don't think everybody would have had worthwhile things to
say about it and it would get more confused. I think you must just go for the
people who have a definite input ..."
This view was echoed by a fellow interviewee ( 13), who said that although he felt a little
aggrieved at not being consulted, the University had doubtless followed the most sensible
procedure. Another (") suggested that even if the University had embarked upon a wider
consultation process, it is doubtful whether the outcome would have been any different.
He added: "[All this] doesn't really seem to be part of our world, but it is consistent with
our perceptions of being part of this University", concluding that this particular episode
did not disturb him any more than other symptoms of his department's relationship with
the University.
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8.2	 Identifying Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)
	
Views on the Likelihood of Different Disciplines Generating Exploitable
IP
Asked whether they thought the particular spread of science and technology disciplines in
a university had an influence on the amount of exploitable IP which might be identified,
five interviewees felt that some disciplines were currently more likely than others to
generate exploitable IP - though one ( A) declined to specify which and another (c")
suggested that this was a matter of fact rather than potential. The third (D") suggested that
"the hard sciences" were likely to be the most productive - partly because staff in those
disciplines have got used to the idea that research results might be commercially as well as
intellectually exploitable. The fourth ('') cited chemical engineering and electronic
engineering as the most likely to generate exploitable IP, while electrical engineering and
civil engineering were, in his view, far less likely to - and physics was not particularly
likely to. The fifth (E") opted for "the more applied areas", citing engineering and medical
disciplines, especially biotechnology, as the most likely to generate exploitable IP and
mathematics and geography as the least likely. In his view, however, it was not simply a
matter of individual disciplines; the breadth of disciplines in any one university played a
part, too, which meant that Hull, with its unusually small science base, was less likely as
a whole to generate commercially exploitable IP. This view was echoed by another
interviewee (B), who added that it was essential to have sound physics and chemistry
departments, since physics in particular was the basis of all science - and Hull had
contracted, indeed, almost destroyed its physics capabilities at one point.
Despite this pessimistic view, two interviewees (c. Es) felt that the research bias of their
own department was likely to generate more exploitable IP than similar departments in
other universities. One (E") attributed this to the nature of the department's particular sub-
disciplinary interests and strengths, while the other ( c") attributed it to the characteristics of
the staff in his department: "We happen to have got our human chemistry at a very high
pitch ... It's this human chemistry that has made it happen". Equally important, in his
view, was the age profile of his department, which had an unusually high proportion of
30-35 year olds:
"... If you end up with a department full of people who have been around for 20-
30 years and they're in the 55-60 age bracket and they were doing great things in
their thirties, you can't kick them out all of a sudden. But if you've got 70 per cent
of your department aged 50+, you're in trouble. Scientific productivity is a
function of age - and also scepticism and complacency. I feel a bit like that - you
know, oh, God, not another bloody ladder to climb after you've done it several
times ..."
Four interviewees (A' B. 	 thought that the research bias in their particular departments
was likely to generate less exploitable IP than similar departments in other universities.
One (') explained this in terms of the fact that the subject areas covered by his department
cut across traditional departmental boundaries - and while one subject area was just as
likely as elsewhere to generate exploitable IP, another was far less likely to. Another ('')
added that in many respects, his was a very "applied" discipline; however, the department
as a whole had no wish to be labelled as "applied", staff preferring to project themselves
as "a pure science department which solves problems for people".
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(ii)	 Awareness of the University's Wish to Identify IP
Asked how aware they thought staff in their department were about the University's wish
to identify potentially exploitable IP, one interviewee (B) characterised his staff as unaware,
with the exception of himself - because the question did not arise in connection with their
research. Another (Ea) rated staff awareness as "five on a scale often", adding that the
exploitation of IP was not something they worried about too much. The third (1)*) described
his staff as "aware intellectually but not entrepreneurially" , with one or two exceptions,
while the fourth PI said that his staff were aware of the University's wish in this respect,
but less so than he was. He attributed this to the fact that the University had done little to
inform the academic community as a whole of its interest in identifying IP; he himself was
aware of the University's interests because he was privy to its strategy papers. The fifth (F)
said that IP was not uppermost in the minds of his staff, but they were nonetheless aware,
while the sixth (A) described his staff as "aware but disgruntled", adding:
"... If [the University] provided everything we needed to do our job, then anything
we produced as a result must reasonably be theirs. But as they don't provide
everything we need to do the job, people feel - is this fair?"
(iii)	 Responsibility for Identifying IP
Five of the six interviewees felt that their staff would take a positive view of being asked
to "flag" potentially exploitable IP, though one (') qualified his answer, observing that his
staff would be positive to the extent that the goal in question was achievable. If there were
a conflict between, say, devoting time and energy to increasing income from IPR as
opposed to new research grants/contracts, staff might prefer to put their energy into
obtaining new research grants/contracts - and he would accede to market forces.
The sixth interviewee (1'1 felt that the attitude of his staff was "neutral". Every School had
participated in discussions with the administration concerning the need to generate
exploitable IP; over the previous two years this had been presented to the academic
community as a necessity, a matter of survival - and his staff accepted this, though few
evinced any enthusiasm for the exploitation of IP per se.
Asked whether they thought the ICDA Officer should adopt a proactive or a reactive
approach to identifying IP, two interviewees (A. B) opted for reactive. One (B) thought that
most "inventors" would recognise the fact that they had invented something, while the
other (A) felt that the University had not thought through the implications of a proactive
approach:
"... If [the ICDA Officer] takes a proactive approach, [the University] has to sort
out a lot of other things at the same time. We have to start outlining job
specifications and organising the situation so that you have a structure to that
employment. If the University did that, they'd actually get less effort out of people
than they do with the present system.
"If you look at the number of hours worked by university staff, they are actually
going down ... The average stuck at 60 hours per week for many years, and now
it has come right down. Here you gave people what looked like an unstructured
life and they filled it up to the full, whereas if you start asking them - What have
you done today? Does that belong to me? , - people will say - Well, I've done what
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I'm meant to do today, so I can go home.
"So, I think reactive is the best bet ..."
Another interviewee (c.) thought that the ICDA Officer should try to pursue a strategy
midway between proactive and reactive:
" ... A proactive role or [he] would find things done behind 'his] back too readily.
So, [he] needs to be upfront, saying - Don't forget, you're on our patch and we
pay your salary at the end of the month, so we want a slice of your action. But
Mel needs to react and respond sensitively ..."
However, three interviewees said they felt the ICDA Officer should adopt a proactive
approach to identifying IP. Definitions of what constituted being "proactive" ranged from
the ICDA Officer himself going around departments reminding staff of the University's
policy and encouraging them to start looking for IP themselves 0:'`, E*) to getting himself
intimately acquainted with the research activities of each department ('), to bringing in
outsiders to trawl for IP - and not always the same outsiders (E*) , so that the interest value
to members of staff was maintained at a reasonable level. The general feeling was that he
should do these things considerably more often and more widely than he had to date. One
interviewee (') also suggested that the ICDA Officer and the administration needed to co-
operate on the development of a systematic approach which would enable him (ie. the
ICDA Officer) to identify and follow up new research grants as well as contracts.
(iv)
	 Strategies for Identifying IP
Two interviewees (c''' " rejected the idea of scrutinising projects at the proposal stage; one
(c") commented that it was simply too soon to tell, while the other (y) felt that making a
judgement at this stage that there was no exploitable IP was likely to induce a negative
attitude to the possibility from the outset. Another interviewee (") rejected the idea at both
the proposal stage and the interim and/or final report stage, on the basis that the ICDA
Officer did not have the ability and it was not an appropriate task for the in-School
research committee or the University research committee; he saw both committees as a
forum for informing colleagues about research being undertaken in the School and the
University respectively and formulating future research strategy, not as groups which
should proactively deal with the outcome of research already completed.
His views were diametrically opposed to those of several interviewees. One (') thought that
the University should establish a "flying squad" -to examine every aspect of research
proposals, from pricing to cross-disciplinary input to various logistical implications - and
IPR. The "flying squad" would consist of a team of people from which an appropriate
sub-set would be selected to deal with each proposal. This same team would then follow
the progress of the project where an award was made. This particular interviewee reported
that he had already tried to gain support for this idea, but that it had not been positively
received ... "I just haven't been sufficiently persuasive". Another (B) thought that the
University research committee should occupy itself with "the finished product of research
in the widest sense", which he defined as including not only the identification of IP but
also quality assurance. A fellow interviewee (E") thought that scrutinising for IP could be a
useful job for his in-School research committee, since it was important to "sell" research
as well as to stimulate it. A similar view was expressed by a fourth interviewee (Ea) , who
felt that his in-School research committee could oversee the identification of IP at the
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interim and/or final report stage; scrutiny could be delegated to HoDs or research group
leaders, who would be required to report to the Dean from time to time. Asked whether
he had given the matter some thought prior to being interviewed, this particular
interviewee said:
"... No, not until you came! I think it is something we have to think about and that
is the sort of thing which would be encouraged if there was a more proactive
[approach] from the University itself. If it came forward, then we would also go
forward to make sure we were doing our bit ..."
He added that it was mainly a question of structures or mechanisms; the University's
desire to identify IP had been accepted, but the University had not given Schools a pointer
with regard to how best to go about it. He was unaware of the fact that the Registrar had
decided that scrutinising research proposals was part of the ICDA Officer's remit, a
decision which another interviewee (c") characterised as:
" ... the Registrar being stupid again. He sits at his desk and takes a decision, and
having taken that decision, he assumes it will all happen. He ignores the fact that
[the ICDA Officer] can't do the job because he can't understand it. So, he's set up
a mechanism. As for the fact that the mechanism doesn't work, he says - Well,
don't confuse me with the facts ..."
The first two interviewees (A. ') felt that the people "on the ground, actually doing the
research" were the best people to identify potentially exploitable IP; in their view, the
most effective way to identify IP was to encourage "self-policing".
Asked to consider a number of "fail-safe" mechanisms for identifying IP, five interviewees
rejected the idea of scrutinising drafts of papers before submitting them to journals.
Similar objections were cited, for instance:
"... Who would understand [these papers'? ... We've just had a peer review
exercise and it is quite obvious from some groups that peers did not have a wide
enough view of their own subject area, let alone other people's ..." (")
Attention was also drawn to the inevitable delay which this would impose on academics'
efforts to publish, though one (c") suggested that a compromise might be for academics to
lodge with the University a copy of papers despatched to journals, so that the time it took
for the paper to be published could be utilised to scrutinise for IP which might have been
overlooked. This interviewee, who had been a member of the Sub-Committee on Patents,
was clearly unaware that, where patentable IP was concerned, sending them to journals
would constitute disclosure, even though they had not actually been published.
The sixth interviewee (') remarked that there was a need for more effective education
about the prerequisites of UK intellectual property law and what constituted disclosure; in
addition, however, submitting drafts of papers before despatching them to journals was a
good fail-safe system which he hoped academics would accept if it was proposed.
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8.3	 Ownership of Intellectual Property Created by Academics
Asked whether they thought it was more appropriate for IP to belong to the University or
the academic(s) who created it, two interviewees ( 1'.1?) said they thought that academics
should be treated like any other employee. One (F) said that academics may think they are
different, but in his discipline, in particular, there really was no difference at all. The
other (B) justified his view by equating academics with any other professional person whose
function was to give service to the community at large - only in this case, service took the
form of generating additional revenue to help maintain the standards of the academic
community in particular.
One interviewee (") said he thought there should be shared ownership, arguing that
academics were usually enabled to create IP by the infrastructure provided by
universities - and universities should therefore share ownership of resulting IP. He added
that it was debatable whether this could be justified in the case of Hull University,
however: "Really, we've not been put in the position to do the job".
Two interviewees felt that academics should explicitly be excluded from the provisions of
the 1977 Patent Act. One (1)) argued that patent ownership should be on the same basis as
copyright in universities: academics should have sole ownership, though universities
should share in the proceeds where they had provided essential resources. The other (c"")
saw universities as collections of individuals who were more likely to perform effectively
if they were given the flexibility to have their IP exploited as they saw fit:
Giving to the individual the greatest flexibility is going to provide the greatest
incentive for that person to perform. I can see no virtue in the employer, just
because the University is the employer, taking IP which [it] cannot really
commercially exploit ..."
In his view, ownership of IP should be the subject of the domestic contractual law of each
individual university, rather than determined by national law.
One interviewee (" was of the opinion that it made no difference whether the academic(s)
concerned or the University owned the IP they created, since the outcome would be
identical.
8.4	 Protecting Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)	 Attitude to Protecting IP Created by Academics
All six interviewees agreed in principle with the broad concept of protecting IP generated
by academic research. One (1)a) remarked that it offered the possibility of generating an
income for the University which was independent of both the UGC and industry, adding:
"Anyone who has been through the past two years here always has that at the back of
their mind". Another (c.) observed:
"... There's no doubt that any academic who does not file a patent and
subsequently finds that the work that has been published in the public domain has
resulted in a multi-million dollar business is going to kick himself..."
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When asked to consider the fact that UK universities are not legally obliged to patent
patentable IP, that they have the right to protect it by treating it as secret know-how
instead, two interviewees (A. ') said that they were opposed to this course of action. Both
argued that this was contrary to the function of a university. One (I') commented:
"... If the thing is exploitable, they should be open about it. We are supposed to
be a seat of learning and we should communicate what we [discover]. Supposing
you were a musician and you wrote a score. Should you keep it secret? Of course
not! Other people should enjoy it ..."
The other (A) angrily recounted his own experience of a Government department refusing
to let him publish any aspect of a report which it had commissioned. A third interviewee
P) described the impact of secrecy in his Department:
"... we've got major activity in two very jealous commercial areas, and there is
work going on in this Department behind closed doors ... I would much prefer
when I get visitors to the Department to be able to walk them around the
Department, [whereas] I have to go around in a furtive way. I get into hot water
with my colleagues when I take someone like yourself into the [..] lab. They come
upto me afterwards and say - You do realise, don't you, that we need notice of
this and that we're under obligation to our sponsor ... We're being torn apart!"
One interviewee 0') had no opinion on the subject of secret know-how, never having
thought about it before; on reflection, he came to the conclusion that it was the
University's responsibility to patent, where possible. Just two interviewees ( Es, F) felt there
might be circumstances where secret know-how was justifiable. One (') said: "There must
be times when the University would be wise to emulate industrial companies", while the
other °) thought the question should be determined by what exactly the University was
trying to protect; if it was a process which could not be uncovered by dint of analysis,
secret know-how was feasible; if not, it was not worth considering.
Four interviewees (A ' E. D. E) concluded that patenting was preferable if there was a choice.
However, one (c.) felt that patenting was not necessarily a panacea:
"... When I was a career academic in the 20-30 [age] bracket, I submitted two
patent applications and thought it was a great novelty to do that. Having
experienced the patenting process, I became an anti-convert to patenting and I
said - Never again will I talk to those guys, because it inhibited me. And that must
still happen today ..."
(ii)	 Who Decides Whether and How to Protect IP Created by Academics?
Only one of the interviewees 0) knew what the University's practice was in relation to
who decides whether and how to protect IP created by academics - a practice which he
supported. Upon being told that in practice the academic(s) concerned were allowed to
decide, the other five also indicated that they agreed with this. One P) remarked: "To
inhibit a super piece of work being published - of Nobel Prize winning calibre - [would]
cause a lot of emotion ..." , while another (``) observed cynically: "If a committee thought
that one up, all they were doing was commenting on the reality of the situation, rather
than inventing rules"; in his view, if academics wished to disclose their research findings,
they could always find a way to do so and the University could do nothing about it.
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(iii)	 Attitude to the Logistics of Protecting IP By Patent
None of the interviewees questioned the University's policy of asking academics to draft
patent specifications themselves, unless it was sufficiently complex to warrant a
preliminary chat with a patent agent; none of them appeared to know about the existence
of the Exploitation Fund, either.
Asked how they would respond to members of staff who requested a temporary adjustment
to their workload in order to facilitate the process of drafting a patent specification, the
interviewees expressed differing views. Two (B. ') said that they would try to temporarily
reduce the member of staff's workload. One ( B) commented:
"... I think that in most departments, if you have someone who is really going
places, I think automatically the department takes steps to alleviate his workload,
because this is just as important as teaching ..."
He conceded that there were members of staff in his department who would object to
being asked to take on extra work while someone else drafted a patent specification, but
added that active researchers in the department often used School meetings to gripe about
those who were were doing little or no work in addition to their teaching and to urge them
to do more, so those objecting would receive little sympathy. The other ( 1 ) observed:
" ... The general practice I adopt is that if people have a lot of outside work or
administration to handle, I tend to reduce their teaching load ..."
In his view, patent specifications demanded the same flexibility, though it was possible
that some members of staff might not see it that way:
"... It has never been tested. I don't think in theory anyone would object. I think it
would have to be projected in theory first and discussed ..."
He indicated that if it ever became necessary, he would "raise the issue of the common
good", focussing on benefits to the department, such as prestige, status and additional
revenue. This was not a long-term solution, however; he likened drafting a patent
specification to writing research proposals and remarked that he and a fellow Dean had
been trying to persuade the University to provide the resources needed for administrative
assistance, in order to facilitate such activities, adding: "This may come some time in the
next two years, otherwise something will have to give".
Another interviewee (A) made the same analogy between writing research proposals and
drafting patent specifications, but said that his staff would simply have to find the extra
time. The department had already tried to equalise workloads by giving researchers less
teaching to do, and was actively working towards a modular approach to courses, to give
greater flexibility. Another three interviewees (cs. E. said that staff in their department
would simply have to find the extra time to draft a patent specification. One (" did not
think that his staff would resent this, since most would perceive it to be part of the process
of doing research; however, if, in time, it became so burdensome that "something else had
to give", he would lobby the administration to come up with a better mechanism. Another
(c") felt that the incentive of some additional income should be sufficient motivation for
staff in his department to get on with drafting their patent specification without whingeing:
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"... My view would be that notwithstanding a very high workload, if there is
another incentive, such as IPR and consequential personal income, then get on
with it. If you think I'm being bloody-minded, remember that the workload of the
individual is itself profiled according to their past track record of activity. So, I
have two or three members of staff who have an extraordinary research workload
and gradually and gently I've been easing off their teaching commitments. This is
done in a way which is not contentious and not too visible. Occasionally, when
[complaints] crop up, I say to the individual - Look, you get that kind of research
activity and you, too, can have a lighter teaching load ..."
The third (F.) was less optimistic, judging that the expectation that they should simply find
the extra time could deter some hard-pressed members of staff from drafting patent
specifications, with the result that the University could fail to capitalise on an IP
opportunity.
8.5	 Entrepreneurially Exploiting Intellectual Property Created by
Academics
(i)	 Exploiting "Hard" Intellectual Property
Asked to give their views on the idea of exploiting "hard" IP entrepreneurially, instead of
automatically licensing it to an existing company, most interviewees seemed to signify
approval of the idea. Nearly every interviewee referred spontaneously to one or more of
the independent spin-off companies founded by members of the academic staff at Hull,
whose entrepreneurial activities they seemed to follow with some interest. One (E")
characterised two outgoing members of the academic staff as "millionaires" (a claim
subsequently dismissed by the two academics in question) and said:
" ... All of these people have done everything that was required of them and much
more. The fact that they were doing these other things really enhanced their
businesses ..."
In his view, Hull's academic entrepreneurs provided very effective role models for the
academic community, in stark contrast to the situation at the large civic university where
he was previously employed - where having a company was "not the thing to do". This
view was diametrically opposed to that of another interviewee a”, who felt that in the past
companies started by academics had caused significant problems at Hull:
"... Upto three or four years ago there was a problem here, where in fact there
were companies within departments and the boundary between the companies and
the department's research was blurred ...
"This has happened. I can assure you that this did go on. Individuals were
running companies ... Let me put it like this. Supposing I set myself up as a
company here in [this department] and then I took on personal contracts. I could
come in, I could use the University's mainframe computer - because I wouldn't tell
anybody. And I could even use research students. I could set the project up in such
a way that I could exploit people.
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"Now, there was a tendency in British universities to have companies within
departments. And I think that what happened here was that the University decided
to kick the companies out. Because I think it was bad for the departments. I used
the word "blurred" because if a guy is sitting in his office - is he really working
for the University or the company? ... What I am really saying about this blurring
of department and company is ... the laboratories. Why should company X get
advice or instrumentation or chemicals or something in University time and then
sell it as a company. That must be wrong ..."
Some interviewees distinguished between different types of entrepreneurial venture which
could be set up to exploit "hard" IP. One (A) felt that independent academic spin-off
companies were better than joint ventures, precisely because they were independent:
"... I am suspicious [of the University]. I think it is wanting a little stake for a big
pay-off... If you look at it from the staff member's point of view, why are they
interested in investing in you? It is because they want to own you, not because
they want to see your venture be particularly successful ... That's the thing that
comes across all the time. We are going to control you. We are going to make
sure we get every penny out of you. It isn't in the line that - let's go forth together
and really make things happen and we'll all be rich. It isn't like that at all ... It is
actually to keep tabs on you ..."
He added:
"... Just associating with [the University] would be the kiss of death! It is the
decision of how you play things. Becuse it is quite clear that small companies have
all sorts of ways of coping with problems like tax and the way that the books are
actually made up ... And the University would stifle that completely ... I don't
think they could be seen to be associated with anything that was less than proper,
even if what was being done was legal. It would really mean that you were in a
straightjacket. They would have a view - and if it was [the ICDA Officer]'s view,
heaven help you - of how a business ought to be run. And they would have the
University bureaucracy view that, you know, you have to have double insurance on
absolutely everything before you made a move out of the door.
"And I don't think young companies work like that at all. They take big risks and I
think that they ... it is a pity all this is being recorded. I think they actually have
to launder their money in a way which makes it worthwhile them continuing ..."
For similar reasons, this particular interviewee was even more sceptical about wholly-
owned university companies. He also felt that academic staff should not be drawn into
involvement with university companies unless their contracts were rewritten; since such
activities constituted neither teaching, research nor administration, academics who got
involved with university companies were liable to find that this interfered with their career
progression.
Three interviewees	 Ea) said that they were in favour of the idea of the University
participating in joint ventures with members of staff to exploit "hard" IP. The first (1')
explained his support in terms of the increased revenue-generating potential which joint
ventures should offer. The next (Ds) remarked that joint ventures demonstrated that the
University was actively interested in technology transfer - something which it had signally
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failed to demonstrate in the past; he attributed this to the University's long-standing
tendency to be "ultra-cautious". The last (E*) felt that the University's participation in a
joint venture with a member of staff should result in the whole being greater than the sum
of the parts:
"... then we get what we hope are the skills of the individual person in this sort of
commercial environment, backed by something he wouldn't otherwise have. It's a
lot harder to set something going yourself than if you've got a university behind
you, financially, morally or whatever else. It does help. It also helps the new little
company to have a better image when it goes out to collect money ..."
This same interviewee also felt there could be a down side to joint ventures - namely "the
heavy hand of the University restraining [the company] from making quick decisions".
However, at the level of the individual academics involved, he did not foresee major
problems, since one of the strengths of Hull University was its "immense flexibility".
Another interviewee (') said that he did not really know enough about joint ventures -
either in principle or in practice - to be able to judge; however, joint ventures sounded as
though they were consistent with his views on the kind of activities which the University
should support.
Three interviewees 0, D.' VI were also in favour of the idea of the University itself setting
up wholly-owned companies to exploit "hard" IP - indeed, one (E.) regarded university
companies as preferable to joint ventures with members of the academic staff in one
respect:
" ... A university is a funny place. It is not the best sort of organisation to be doing
commercial things. And therefore it needs a different organisation, something that
is not encumbered by the university system or even the Registrar - especially the
Registrar! So, I think it definitely needs an organisation which works differently
and quickly and knows what it is doing ..."
This particular interviewee was aware of the existence of Hull Unico, but felt that the
University had not made the most of it:
"... you see, it hasn't actually done much. It's a very small thing. The one or two
things it has done under its auspices have then virtually become separate
subsidiaries ..."
In his view, once the University was prepared to be serious about its wholly-owned
company, the company should be given a higher public profile - both internally and
externally. This same sentiment was echoed by another interviewee (B) , who saw university
companies as a vehicle for getting a good return on IP - and for advertising the
University's capabilities.
However, a fellow interviewee (F) was of the opinion that if the company started by his
former university was anything to go by, he was against the idea of wholly-owned
university companies. Further questioning revealed that he was specifically against the
idea of "umbrella" companies which tried to assume responsibility for the exploitation of
every IP opportunity which arose, rather than dedicated companies. It also transpired that
he was against the idea of university companies which were founded "for the sake of it"
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and run by people from industry who did not understand academia. In his view, such
companies should evolve naturally, run by the academics whose IP they were exploiting;
academics could develop business and marketing skills, and could be assisted by
professionals, if required.
(ii)	 Exploiting "Soft" Intellectual Property
Interviewees were asked for their views on three mechanisms by which academics could
exploit "soft" IP: personal consultancy, commercial arms of departments and various types
of spin-off company.
Asked about their attitude to members of their staff doing personal consultancy, one
interviewee (F.) said that there was no such thing as personal consultancy in his department;
50 per cent of his staff did consultancy, but it was all done in-house. Another ( B) reported
that all the consultancy in his department was done on an in-house basis, too, with the
exception of a single member of staff who had a special arrangement - ie. only 10 per cent
or so of his staff did personal consultancy. A third (" was unsure about the difference
between personal and in-house consultancy and had no real idea how many of his staff did
either, since he had only recently been appointed and had yet to find out; he hazarded a
guess that around a third probably did some consultancy of one sort or the other. A fellow
interviewee (12") thought that very few of his staff did personal consultancy - and that what
they did probably took up no more than 5 per cent of their time. These responses
contrasted strongly with those of the other two interviewees. One (" reported that 75 per
cent of his department - all but the very young - did personal consultancy, and 50 per cent
did so regularly. The other (A) said that all his staff had done some personal consultancy,
though it was not clear how regularly they did it. Neither thought that any of their staff
were doing more personal consultancy than they were supposed to, whereas one of the
former group (Ds) expressed concern about the amount of in-house consultancy which some
members of his staff were doing.
Most interviewees felt there were advantages and disadvantages to their staff doing
consultancy - personal or in-house. Only one ( 1') felt "there could never be a negative
affect", though another (F) thought that the only negative affect was on his staff's personal
life; he worried about the pressure which extensive consultancy inflicted on family life and
its impact on the divorce rate. It was suggested by the other five that extensive personal
consultancy could result in people losing sight of the primary objectives of their employer
impact negatively upon their teaching performance
	 Ds' ", their research
performance (Ell , their publication rate (c." . Da. " and their administrative responsibilities (c*,
El) , and lead to neglect of postgraduate students (A. ". One interviewee (" observed that
he had already experienced a couple of instances of these kinds of affect in his own
department; in one case, this had involved a senior professor. He also referred to an
academic at another UK university who was alleged to have infringed the intellectual
property rights of a student in pursuit of his consultancy interests - which had led to a 25-
year court case.
On the other hand, most interviewees felt that consultancy could also have a positive
affect; it could make life much more interesting for academics (B), could evolve new and
valuable partnerships with industry (Da), lead to the blurring of the divide between
universities and industry - long overdue in some subject areas (Ds) , and provide a source of
novel and relevant teaching material for undergraduate courses (A' Fp.
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Although two interviewees (B ' F) reported that most/all the consultancy in their department
was done on an in-house basis, only one of the two (B) reported that his department had set
up a commercial arm to market the expertise of various members of staff. The commercial
arm had no dedicated staff or accommodation; it was a purely notional organisation; the
staff who contributed to it made no personal gain; it was all done for the gain of their
discipline. Another interviewee (Es) reported that a commercial arm had been set up in his
department in response to a certain research group being overwhelmed with requests from
industry; it had started off with one dedicated technician who had to generate his own
salary and had expanded to take in a general manager, who worked on the same basis.
The commercial arm used all the department's equipment and instrumentation gratis: "For
the moment we want to treat it as favourably as we can to get it off the ground". In order
not to incur the charge of unfair competition, the department allowed a rival compay on
the neighbouring science park to purchase materials through the department, made the
entrepreneur an honorary lecturer and collaborated with him, where possible.
Another interviewee (1)") reported that his department had considered establishing a
commercial arm, but felt it would be competing with a multi-disciplinary entity which
acted as the quasi-commercial arm of several departments. He added:
"... There's no formal agreement at the moment. It's just a gentlemen's
agreement, and since there will be no gentlemen in 1991 when [self-financing
budget centres] come into effect, I think there may be problems!"
A fellow interviewee (") reported that some years earlier a member of his department had
set up an independent spin-off company which provided the kind of consultancy service
which a departmental commercial arm might provide. At the time, income generation had
not been seen as a legitimate departmental activity; now that it was, the experience of the
member of staff concerned had shown how much effort and capital the department would
have to put into establishing a bona fide commercial arm; in his view, the independent
spin-off company represented a far better mechanism for exploiting the department's
expertise.
Only one interviewee (') was sceptical about the net value of a departmental commercial
arm - on the grounds that it was difficult for the HoD to maintain sufficient control over
it; moreover, he feared he might lose the close contact he now enjoyed with members of
his staff if they became involved.
Asked what they felt about the tendency for academics who do extensive consultancy to
set up in business, all six interviewees felt that this was a positive side effect. One (1”
suggested enthusiastically that it would have a very beneficial affect on the entrepreneur's
academic's teaching. Another (F) said - less enthusiastically - that if this was what it took
to enable universities to survive today and in the future, it was to be welcomed. A third (A)
remarked on the benefits which he felt an entrepreneurial member of staff brought to his
department:
"... Mr. X] has a very astute policy that the bread and butter stuff is done by his
company but all the research is done by the Department. So, he acts as a sub-
contractor to the Department. We have a research assistant at the moment who is
employed by the University, who is actually part of a contract that was negotiated
by [Dr. X] with [a government department] ..."
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Three interviewees did not unequivocally embrace the idea of academic entrepreneurship
however. One (De) felt that exploiting "soft" IP entrepreneurially could easily impede an
academic's career progression. This particular interviewee mentioned that he was very
worried about an entrepreneurial member of his staff for precisely this reason:
" ... He has been working on the company since he arrived in Hull two years ago
... It has certainly affected his ability to produce the books which he should have
been producing. I am concerned that the effort he has put into setting up the
company will not be taken into account in the overall assessment ..."
Another (Ee) described academic entrepreneurship engendered in this manner as "a two-
edged sword":
" ... There are certainly undesirable things about too much entrepreneurship. It's
nice to have that sort of attitude but you mustn't have too much of it. It doesn't fit.
If you want to make a department like this tick, you want people to do things
because they want to and can see that it is good for the department. If you get a
guy who says - Well, I'm only going to do it i f I get so much money for it or i f I
only spend so much time ... That sort of attitude - too much of it doesn't work ..."
This particular interviewee said that he had already had occasion to talk to a member of
staff who had adopted this attitude, but pointed out that he had little recourse beyond that;
there were no disciplinary procedures which covered attitude problems and if you tried to
"hedge a person in", he was liable to become a departmental malcontent.
The third (c") felt that the academic entrepreneurship was not a side effect of doing
extensive consultancy, but a direct effect; the two were "geared together very tightly". He
added:
" ... People who are most likely to do [extensive consultancy] are going to be the
most successful, by definition. If the most successful start up companies, then they
[concentrate on] that and sacrifice the department, spend more time there than
they should do. The University will eventually wake up to the fact, and then, of
course, they are on a loser anyway, because they'll clear off So, the net result is -
you lose your best people. If it was very visible, it would be a major concern ..."




All six interviewees agreed with the University's policy of leaving to the discretion of the
relevant Dean the amount of time which academics were allowed to devote to their
entrepreneurial activities. All six professed to be sympathetic to the needs of academic
entrepreneurs in this respect - though one (1') felt that his sympathy would be ill-placed if
there were no return to the University. The interviewees exhibited less concensus when it
came to putting their sympathy into practice, however.
Three interviewees indicated that they would be prepared to formally reschedule or reduce
the member of staff's workload for a limited period in order to help them start up a
company to exploit research discoveries or expertise. One (B) said that it was important not
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to lose the would-be entrepreneur as an academic resource to the department; for this
reason, he thought he would first try to reduce their administrative burden. If this was not
sufficient, he would see whether he could temporarily reduce other aspects of the would-
be entrepreneur's workload. Another ( I') observed that there were two or three big
administrative jobs in his School; these were done by all members of staff on a strict, two-
year rotation basis; if a would-be entrepreneur had done at least one stint, he would try to
arrange upto two years with no administrative responsibility at all. Reduced committee
work would be more difficult, since everyone had ongoing responsibilities, but a
temporary rescheduling of the would-be entrepreneur's teaching load might be possible,
given enough notice. A third (E*) observed that there was not much of an administrative
workload to reduce in his School, and that what there was tended to be done by the Dean
and two senior professors; accordingly, the easiest way to help academic entrepreneurs
would be to temporarily reduce their laboratory work; this was the most time-consuming
aspect of the job and could be reduced "at a stroke". It would be harder to reduce
someone's teaching schedule, since some lecture courses were highly specialised;
however, with 3-4 months' notice, less specialised courses could be rescheduled or given
by another member of staff on a temporary basis.
Two interviewees felt that they could not temporarily reduce or reschedule a member of
staff's workload in the interests of company start-up. One (F) characterised this as
impossible logistically, while the other (c.) said it would be less problematical to
accommodate academic entrepreneurs' need for time by means of a part-time contract or
complete leave of absence - an option which he might suggest if the academic concerned
did not broach the idea himself. The remaining interviewee ( A) reported that an academic
entrepreneur in his department tended to reschedule his workload on his own initiative,
rather than formally ask for it to be rescheduled or reduced. He added that staff were
always free to trade lectures with fellow members of staff on a purely informal basis; he
would only consent to this being done on a more formal basis if the member of staff in
question provided - from one source or another - sufficient funding to pay for teaching
support.
Five of the six interviewees (A.'''. E, responded positively to the idea of temporarily
giving would-be entrepreneurs a part-time contract or complete leave of absence - though
most emphasised that sabbaticals should not be used for this purpose and several had
caveats. The sixth (1).) said that he would counsel against temporarily giving would-be
academic entrepreneurs a part-time contract or complete leave of absence because it was
not clear whether the University would release the funds saved to enable the department to
pay for a temporary lecturer. This particular interviewee seemed to be unaware that
departmental use of salary savings was guaranteed at Hull - as was a fellow interviewee
(A) , who remarked that he would not support applications for a part-time contract or leave
of absence unless he was given a guarantee in this respect; if he had this guarantee,
however, he would be very supportive:
"... I am very conscious of the spin-off that comes from these things. That the
image of the Department is enhanced. They come back with new knowledge, as
well. So that is all to the good of the Department ..."
Two interviewees (B.c.) felt that it was important to give academic entrepreneurs the
assurance that if their business activities did not work out, or they grew weary of them,
they could return to the academic fold on a full-time basis; one ( c*) suggested that the
University should continue paying academic entrepreneurs' pension contributions during
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their absence/partial absence. Another (" said that he would be sympathetic to a
temporary part-time arrangement or complete leave of absence, provided the academic
concerned was engaged on "a worthwhile project"; he would need to assure himself that
the project was in the interests not only of business success but also the would-be
entrepreneur's career development; he would also want to assess how likely it was that the
School might benefit indirectly from the member of staff's business activities - through
new research ideas - and eventually funding, consultancy opportunities - or simply bathing
in the reflected glory; he felt that the ICDA Officer should be able to help him to make
these judgements. A fourth interviewee (F) indicated that for him, "temporary" implied
leave of absence of just one term; a year would create tremendous difficulties since the
department needed at least one year's notice to reorganise the timing of highly specialised
optional courses.
(ii)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications,
Accommodation
Only one interviewee 0) appeared to be aware that the University was prepared in
principle to let entrepreneurial academics have access to all these facilities except on-
campus accommodation, provided they paid the full, market rate for them.
Upon hearing that this was the University's policy, several interviewees signified their
approval of the University making such facilities available to academic entrepreneurs. One
(1)*) remarked: "People do need some sort of backing ... stimulus, support". Another (E.)
commented that it would be helpful if the University got around to communicating this
policy to members of staff:
"... it would be nice if we could have [something] which actually promotes the fact
that [the University] is in a position to encourage people, that this is something
they want to do. There's been nothing to tell us that ..."
This same interviewee thought that the University should be more flexible with regard to
accommodation in the start-up phase - despite considerable pressure on accommodation -
since the smallest offices on the science park were far too big. Looking around his own
office, he observed: "You can always find niche by constructing walls. With a bit of
thought, it's surprising what you can do". This sentiment was echoed by a fellow
interviewee (", who revealed that he had flown in the face of policy and persuaded the
University to let a member of his staff locate his start-up company in departmental
accommodation: "It is a matter of convenience to have the company just ten or twelve
yards away".
There was less of a concensus about the basis on which the University made these
facilities available to academic entrepreneurs. Two interviewees ( c" F) broadly agreed with
the University's policy. One (') said he thought that Hull could not afford to charge a
marginal rate, because of the opportunity costs; in his department, for example, there was
an ongoing commitment to industrial research which meant that if an investigation moved
in a certain direction, equipment and instrumentation might have to be turned over to the
project at very short notice. The other (c's) indicated that what the University construed to
be the full, market rate might not be enough in his department, particularly if there was
competition from industry for the use of equipment or instrumentation: "I think, to be
perfectly honest, we would be filthy capitalists and accept the highest bid".
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This contrasted with the view of a fellow interviewee (E'") who suggested that the
University should be as flexible as possible both about the facilities it provided academic
entrepreneurs and the basis upon which it made them available. It contrasted even more
strongly with the attitude of another interviewee (DI) , who felt that it was important to help
would-be academic entrepreneurs in the start-up phase; he had turned a blind eye to phone
calls made by an entrepreneurial member of staff trying to establish his business and had
let him use equipment and instrumentation without charge: "That's entirely between him
and 1". As far as this interviewee was concerned, the University's Finance Office knew
nothing about it and he did not intend to advertise his idiosyncratic approach; his support
had reaped dividends in so far as the company was now "on its feet" and had its own
phone line and its own secretary. He felt that when Schools were obliged to become self-
financing, it would no longer be possible to adopt this supportive approach: "Things will
get a lot more hard-headed then".
One interviewee (1` ) questioned the University's right to formulate this kind of policy
centrally:
" ... I think the University has got double standards. Because it is saying that as a
cost centre, the Department must be responsible for covering its own costs and as
a first step towards a cost centre, we've been allocated our entitlement to space ...
I don't see how they can give it to us and make us responsible for it, and then
claim control over it ... If we are given the accommodation, we can use it as we
think fit. And if we want to create a big disco floor in this Department and
everybody living in little rabbit hutches, that would be within our remit, I think.
"... So, for example, we have a retired professor in this Department who does a
full teaching load for free. We give him an office, a phone, and anything he wants
II
Several interviewees distinguished between in-principle support for the University's policy
and actually providing various forms of support in practice. One (B) remarked that he had
no facilities to provide, apart from use of the mainframe computer "which is free,
anyway". Another (c..) said that his department was "grossly undersecretaried", with the
result that it might not be possible for entrepreneurial members of staff to arrange to pay
departmental secretaries overtime to work for their company; it would probably be
necessary to bring in a dedicated secretary. However, technical support staff could
probably do such work on an overtime basis since their work was "less strenuous by
nature". However, the HoD of a neighbouring department (') reported that technical staff
were at a premium and could not be made available to academic entrepreneurs; on the
other hand, he might be able to make accommodation available, despite the general
pressure on accommodation. Another interviewee (" observed that his department's
commercial arm exerted tremendous pressure on equipment and instrumentation, with the
result that it might be difficult to make either available to academic entrepreneurs.
(iii)	 Financial Support
Few interviewees appeared to be aware that Hull had recently decided it was prepared in
principle to provide a measure of financial support for academic entrepreneurs - either in
the form of the seedcorn fund or in the form of equity - and prepared, too, to help solicit
venture capital from external sources.
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Upon hearing that this was the University's policy, four interviewees ( B, D. ' E. ' F) said that
they were in favour of the University taking equity in academic spin-off companies,
though one (g) remarked that the viability of the company should be carefully vetted first
and another ms) said that the University should always have a minority share-holding - ie.
a maximum of 30 per cent. Where the seedcorn fund was concerned, one interviewee (F)
thought that for projects with commercial potential, the University should create an
innovation fund which made serious sums of money available. Another interviewee (Ds)
suggested that Hull should also consider making soft loans to academic entrepreneurs,
observing that an academic entrepreneur in his department had asked for a departmental
loan to acquire a vital piece of equipment:
"... I could have provided it but it was difficult. So, I think that maybe that sort of
situation should be argued out centrally at the admin level, rather than in [the]
School ..."
A fellow interviewee ("), who was not in favour of the University taking equity in
academic spin-off companies, thought that the University should either provide certain
forms of advice to academic entrepreneurs ("basic accounting principles, basic marketing,
advertising") - or, they should finance the cost of bringing them in from outside.
8.7	 Incentives and Disincentives
(i)	 Exploitation of "Soft" IP
As we have seen, until the beginning of the 1990-91 session, the amount of personal
consultancy done by academics at Hull University was limited by the amount of money
which they earned from it, rather than the amount of time devoted to it. Academics could
earn upto 25 per cent of their gross salary without being "taxed" by the University; sums
in excess of 25 per cent were supposed to be covenanted to the University but none ever
were. From 1990-91, however, the time academics might devote to exploiting expertise
via consultancy and/or spin-off companies was limited to 45 days per year and the
University proposed to "tax" members of staff at the rate of £125 per day, irrespective of
what they earned.
None of those interviewed initially (') knew exactly how the earnings limit was calculated
and one (1).) was unaware that there was a limit of any kind. When told the basis upon
which the limit and the "tax" (if appropriate) was calculated and asked whether they
agreed with it, two interviewees (1)" . " felt unable to express an opinion on the subject.
One (B) remarked that he felt the University's approach was right, but could not say why.
Only one interviewee (es) gave a coherent (though ambivalent) response to this line of
questioning:
"... If your income starts to become greater from outside than inside, your
loyalties are going to change, so the employer does need to keep an eye on that.
Not necessarily interfere, but keep an eye out ..."
"... There's another argument which says that income should not matter, time
should, and if you can double your salary by working an extra hour per week,
good luck to you!"
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The two respondents whose interviews were conducted/completed nine months later (17, A)
were aware of both the old and the new scheme, having attended a presentation on the
subject. The former (F) claimed that the new scheme had broadly been modelled on a
system which had operated in his department since he had been appointed HoD some
years earlier. Not surprisingly, this particular interviewee was in favour of those aspects
of the new scheme which resembled his own; however, he strongly disagreed with the
"division of the spoils" which the University had decided upon; since he permitted his staff
to do consultancy only in the evenings or at weekends, he saw no reason why the
University should expect a cut of £125 per day, given that it was not losing any staff time
between Monday and Friday during the hours of 9-5. The latter (do felt that the University
was employing "a sort of Noddy accountant's model" of academic life which was a major
disincentive to individuals wishing to exploit "soft" IP by means of personal or in-house
consultancy or spin-off companies. Moreover, in his view, this would rebound on the
department as a whole:
"... If we have got an income generation target and we could meet it if two or
three people were able to exploit some offer that had been made to them, then the
Department as a whole would be wise to actually enable them to exploit that, in
order that the Department's target could be met ..."
In his view, the limit of 45 days per year per person should be taken as a departmental
average; individuals who did a lot of consultancy could trade off against those who did
little or none - though this was a matter for the department as a whole to regulate, rather
than the individuals concerned. Alternatively, the University could grasp the nettle and
rethink the question of academic contracts:
"... The system I like is one I have come across in Portugal, where you can opt to
be a full-time lecturer, in which case you are owned body and soul by the
institution, so if you do contract work, you are just an employee of the institution
[and get nothing extra]. Or you can choose to fulfil your duties to the university,
which are defined - and it is teaching, primarily, and you draw only 70 per cent of
your salary [and keep what you make from other activities] ..."
The interviewees demonstrated considerably greater awareness of the impact of
consultancy on promotion prospects. Five knew that the University had recently taken the
view that consultancy should be a criterion for promotion, even though this was not
formally articulated in the promotions criteria; only one (E*) was unaware of this. Opinions
were divided as to whether this was a change for the better. One interviewee (B) expressed
concern, saying that he thought the University should be very cautious about the extent to
which it was prepared to reward consultancy activities in terms of promotion:
"... I wouldn't ever like to get to the situation where, if Joe Bloggs brings in .ffm,
he gets himself a Chair. I would object to that, very much so ..."
Three interviewees (1‘ c. ' F) were unequivocally in favour of the University's volte face, but
two (c" . F) were concerned about the fact that the change had not been formally
documented. One (`'`) said:
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"... Hopefully, consultancy does [count as a criterion for promotion]. I'm told by
the Vice-Chancellor that it does now - informally. I'm a little sceptical about that,
but very definitely I think that it should do.
"... But there again, you've got to be watchful because a person who does not
have the benefit of that might argue - You're rewarding the person twice ..."
(ii)	 Exploitation of "Hard" IP
All six interviewees were aware that the University had instituted financial incentives to
encourage members of staff to "flag" potentially exploitable IP, though none could quote
the percentage split. When told how the University divided income from the exploitation
of "hard" IP, one interviewee 0') described it as an appropriate reward for "very hard
work" - and therefore an effective incentive at the level of the individual. Another m said
that in his department, this was certainly an effective incentive - so much so that, as HoD,
he felt that this was one area where the department should stand aside and let the
University split the proceeds with the individual(s) alone - a view which he felt was shared
by most members of staff. However, several interviewees were sceptical. One (E*)
remarked: "... My impression is that there might be a policy at the University but there
are not many examples of it fin practice]". He felt that the University should circulate
brief case histories, so that staff could relate to other members of staff who had actually
benefitted. Another (c.) observed that in contrast to the old system, the percentage split
could hardly be construed as an incentive:
" ... The Registrar didn't tell you what was there before - which was practically
nothing. So, looking at it from the academic's point of view, the academic might
say - Before, I used to take it all. Now the University asks for half. Why?
"What is going to happen, of course, is that it is going to be driven underground.
[The University] might think that is [the new system] but I can tell you that it won't
happen. Staff regard it as an intrusion (original emphasis), though they can't
defend it logically. The logic is - Hell, you work for us, mate. You are probably
sitting in your office doing this, so we want a slice of the action ..."
This particular interviewee felt that the University could have created far more effective
incentives:
"... I can think now of some incentives that would work. Given the opportunity to
specify incentives, then I would certainly create a more competitive environment -
even a cut-throat environment, in which people could work ..."
A related sentiment was expressed by another interviewee ("):
"... What they really ought to do is make this a wonderful place to work, facilities
which excite people to do things - and then you'd get all sorts of spin-offs. It is a
question of atmosphere. The current atmosphere, through the political climate, is
not such as to generate the enthusiasm that has been generated in the past. And in
the past, I don't think people would have asked questions like - Does this belong
to me or does it belong to the University? Whereas they would now. [In the past]
they would have been thrilled to see it on the market. The staff [today] are
reflecting a policy that has been forced upon them by government ..."
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The department's share of income from the exploitation of IP was not perceived to be a
signficant incentive, either, despite looming income generation targets. One interviewee
(Fs) felt that the department's share of any income from the exploitation of "hard" IP was
too hypothetical to be an effective incentive. Another (°") felt that the exploitation of
"hard" IP would have very little impact on his department's income generation target and
even if it did, the University would doubtless raise his target the following year. A third
('') conceded that the prospect of the department sharing in income from the exploitation
of "hard" IP generated by a member of staff might concentrate his mind, but it was very
doubtful whether it would have any real impact on junior members of staff who were
divorced from the realities of issues like income generation targets. In his view, the
introduction of profiled salaries - on the US model - would constitute a far more effective
incentive at both the individual and the departmental level.
Four interviewees did not appear to be aware that taking the trouble to "flag" potentially
exploitable IP had recently come to be regarded by the University as a criterion for
promotion. One a') retorted: "That's news to me!" and added that it had not encouraged
academics to list patents and copyright material on their CVs. Only two (c.. F)
demonstrated awareness of this change of attitude on the part of the University; one (F)
observed that appraisal in his department formally assessed contributions to the creation of
IP - of every sort, not simply patents; he believed that the promotions committee also took
such contributions into account - albeit in a less quantitative manner - even though this
change had not been formally documented anywhere. The notion that "flagging"
exploitable IP should now be a criterion for promotion was not challenged by any of the
interviewees; however, only two ( c.s• 'I indicated that they were positively in favour of this
change.
When asked whether they thought entrepreneurial exploitation of "hard" IP arising from
research was taken into account by the promotions committee, only one interviewee (")
demonstrated awareness of the University's current approach; he reported that the public
statement was that such activities would have a positive impact on promotion, but only as
an extra, not instead of more traditional activities like research. Asked whether they
thought that entrepreneurial exploitation of IP should be a criterion for promotion, not one
interviewee disagreed with this approach. One (F") commented that academic
entrepreneurship was not a measure of performance, but it was probably an indicator that
if you were entrepreneurial, you were likely to be good at other activities which the
University valued. Another (I)) suggested that any activity which benefitted the community
should be rewarded. A third (") said: "I think that we have got to go for the team player
and if somebody is good for the University, the University ought to promote them". A
similar sentiment was expressed by a fellow interviewee (F) who remarked that since
universities as institutions were being forced to become more entrepreneurial, it was
appropriate to reward individual members of staff who did likewise.
The last two informants - whose interviews were conducted/completed nine months after
the others - were critical of Hull's proposed new "tax" on academics who chose to exploit
their research discoveries entrepreneurially. One (") remarked:
ft
... I can't imagine that anybody would be willing to put the effort that is required
into building up a company on the terms that the University has offered. My
friends in commerce literally laugh. They wouldn't go near it. [They] think it is
just a joke ..."
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The other (') conceded that the University might have the moral right to "tax"
entrepreneurial members of staff even at the stage where they were sitting in their offices
mulling over the germ of an entrepreneurial idea; however, in his view it had no right to





Liverpool is one of a group of British universities commonly referred to as "civic"
universities. Founded as a University College in 1881, in 1884 the Liverpool was admitted
as one of the constituent colleges of the Victoria University, which had been incorporated
by Royal Charter in 1880 following a petition from Owens College, Manchester.
Liverpool was upgraded to full university status in its own right in 1903.
1.2	 Size
At the beginning of the 1980s Liverpool was the seventh largest monolithic university in
Britain, judged by the number of student FTEs. In 1981 Liverpool was advised by the
UGC in 1981 to reduce the number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 2 per cent
within the next three sessions. This was well below the national average, as Figure 2
revealed. At the same time the UGC announced that Liverpool's recurrent grant was to be
reduced by 16 per cent by 1983/84. As we can see from Figure 2, this was close to the
national average. By most methods of reckoning, therefore, Liverpool falls into the least
afflicted group of universities in terms of resulting hardship.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that Liverpool should increase its student numbers by just over
1 per cent over the next four sessions, less than the national average (1)• By the end of the
decade, Liverpool had just under 4 per cent more students than it had at the beginning (3).
Despite this relatively low increase, Liverpool retained its position as Britain's seventh
largest monolithic university, judged on the basis of student FTEs. Moreover, despite the
cuts, by the end of the 1980s Liverpool had increased its full-time academic/academic-
related staff by nearly 9 per cent, while the number of part-timers had increased by a
factor of twelve (3) . Structurally, too, Liverpool ended the decade much as it began, with
eight Faculties comprising over 60 Departments. There were slightly fewer than at the
beginning of the decade, owing to the merger/closure of a number of Departments; most
of these were in response to UGC subject reviews, rather than the cuts (4)•
1.3	 Science Base
Liverpool prides itself on its particularly comprehensive science base. In 1988-89 the
Faculty of Science itself grouped together the Departments of Biochemistry, Pure
Mathematics, Applied Mathematics & Theoretical Physics, Statistics & Computational
Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, Computer Sciences and Earth Sciences. In the same
year, several departments merged to become Environmental & Evolutionary Biology,
though some staff moved to Genetics & Microbiology. The Faculty of Engineering
comprised the Departments of Civil Engineering, Electrical Engineering & Electronics,
Industrial Studies, Materials Science & Engineering and Mechanical Engineering. For a
comprehensive list of Departments in the Faculties of Medicine and Veterinary Science,
see note (5).
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These four Faculties accounted for 70 per cent of the academic community in the 1988/89
session. They were responsible for 51 per cent of Liverpool's undergraduates and 78 per
cent of registered research students (8)•
In the UGC's 1986 assessment of universities' research strengths in the natural sciences,
engineering and technology, Liverpool was rated 6th best in the UK (7). As Figure 6a
shows, one subject area was rated as outstanding, eight as above average, ten as average
and seven as below average ( 8). It was suggested that if the ABRC's recommendations
(ABRC, 1987) had been implemented, Liverpool would be assigned to the "X" category;
accordingly, the University would be able to offer "teaching across a broad range of fields
and substantial research activity in particular fields, in some cases in collaboration with
others" (9).
In the 1988/89 research selectivity exercise, as we can see from Figure 6b, three "units of
assessment" in the natural sciences, engineering and technology received a "5" rating, four
received a "4", five received a "3", four received a "2" and one received a "1" (19).
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
As Figure 41a shows, in 1984/85 Liverpool ranked 13th in terms of £ earned in external
research grants and contracts, but 33rd in terms of the percentage of its total recurrent
income which this external revenue represented - 11.5 per cent ("). The Faculties of
Science, Engineering, Medicine and Veterinary Science brought in close to £6.4m,
accounting for 94 per cent of the University's total income from research grants and
contracts ( 1'). As we can see from Figure 41b, by 1988/89 these four Faculties had more
than doubled their 1985 earnings, generating close to £14m, accounting for 92 per cent of
the University's total income from research grants and contracts (13).
The pattern of sponsorship which Liverpool's science base attracted differed somewhat
from the pattern four years earlier, as Figures 345-346 show. The proportion of funding
received from the Research Councils and charities fell from 69 per cent in 1984/85 to 63
per cent in 1988/89, while the proportion of funding from industry/commerce increased
from 9 per cent to 15 per cent over the same period. The proportion of funding from
central government, local government and various overseas organisations was unchanged
at 22 per cent.
2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Liverpool has an IP portfolio which dates back to 1954. This is not a sign that the
administration or the academic community took an active interest in seeking out and
exploiting IP. It is more a record of individual researchers who recognised that their
discoveries might be exploitable and felt they should inform the administration. Others
may have recognised the potential of their work but not seen the need to involve the
centre; they were under no legal obligation to do so. Academics who thought in terms of
protection and exploitation were in the minority, however. Since the 1940s, Liverpool has
tended to be a very "pure" University (14).
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Prior to the late 1970s the administration did not regard the exploitation of IP as part of
its remit. This was probably due in part at least to the attitude of the then Registrar ".
Academics who did come forward with potentially exploitable IP were inevitably told:
"... Dr. Bloggs, if you can do something, please do!"
Academics were free to exploit their discoveries themselves or arrange for an existing
company to exploit them, as they saw fit. The only requirement was that those intending
to found a business should notify the Outside Work Committee. If patent costs were
incurred, upto the late 1970s they were not borne centrally. Inventors were obliged to try
to find the money from Departmental budgets or, failing that, pay for it themselves. If the
discovery generated an income, the administration expected the academics concerned to
return sufficient money to the University to cover any outlay which had been made by the
Department (1 	 did not expect to make a profit on academics' exploitative
efforts: the University's rights in the IP were unclear in law and at that time it contributed
little or nothing to the exploitation process. Its role was usually limited to signing
agreements on behalf of researchers if industrial partners were unwilling to deal with them
as an individuals.
2.2	 Policy
Liverpool's first coherent policy on "hard" IP dates from 1977/78. It was triggered by two
simultaneous events. Firstly, the newly-established Research Committee alerted the
University to the possibility of generating an income from exploiting the IP which it now
appeared to own, following the 1977 Patent Act. Secondly, the CVCP's 1977 report on IP
arrived on the Registrar's desk. Liverpool did not set up working parties or invite
consultation on the terms of its policy; it simply adopted the CVCP's recommendations
wholesale.
1	 2.3	 Practice
Adopting this policy did not signal an immediate change in the administration's attitude to
"hard" IP, nor that of most of the academic community:
"... there was no imperative to act on the revised position. Other things were still
of a higher priority ..."
This changed abruptly in 1981, following the UGC's announcement of a sizeable cut in
the University's recurrent grant. Members of the administration ...
"... raised their heads above the parapet and said - where else can we [raise]
some money?"
It was then accepted that "hard" IP offered a long-term means of increasing the
University's income. It was also recognised that it was important to be seen to be
contributing to the nation's wealth. Liverpool had already started to market IP in its
"softer" forms. In 1979/80 the University had appointed a new Assistant Registrar
whose remit was to capitalise on the University's resources and skills by bringing in new
contract research and consultancy work. He was located in the Research Development
Advisory Service (RDAS) and reported to the Academic Secretary, whose belief in the
importance of good relations with industry was largely responsible for the new post being
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created (. As its name suggests, when it was originally established in 1977, RDAS was
seen as an administrative service, supported from the Registrar's budget. The research
development advisory function continued to be supported in this way, but the new
industrial liaison function was largely funded by the Wolfson Foundation ( 19). Although it
was part of the new Assistant Registrar's remit to generate an income, it was never
proposed that this should become a self-financing activity.
The RDAS was not originally intended to handle "hard" IP. This was the (unofficial)
responsibility of the HoD of the Department of Industrial Studies m . A co-founder of the
University Directors of Industrial Liaison (UDIL), the university ILOs' umbrella
organisation, he started giving advice to the Faculty of Engineering. Eventually, when
academics from other Faculties notified the Academic Secretary of their discoveries, they
were directed to talk to him. In practice, being located in the Faculty of Engineering, he
did not proactively encourage the exploitation of IP originating in other Faculties:
" ... The Faculty structure fled to] a series of independent empires, so that people
in Science did not necessarily speak to anybody in Engineering, and vice versa ..."
When he retired from this position in the early 1980s, the administration recognised the
value of providing advice centrally. The remit of the RDAS was extended accordingly,
with the Assistant Registrar assuming responsibility for "hard" as well as "soft" LP.
2.4	 Guidance
Despite having a policy on IP in its "harder" forms and a desire to benefit the University
by exploiting such IP, Liverpool had little practical experience. Decisions regarding patent
applications were taken initially by the forerunner of the Senior Management Team (21),
based on material provided by the inventor, his HoD, the Assistant Registrar and the
Chairman of the Research Committee. The Assistant Registrar tried to acquire skills which
he did not initially have, attending courses on IP ownership, transferring ownership and
licensing; he also became a member of the UK Licensing Executives Society (UK).
In the course of 1981/82 the Academic Secretary and a senior Pro-Vice-Chancellor paid
visits to a number of UK universities, together with the new Assistant Registrar, who had
become Liverpool's UDIL representative. They concentrated on the major civic
universities:
" ... The general view was [that] it was not appropriate for us to go and look at
what Salford was doing because their situation and their subject mix was totally
different from ours ..."
These visits led to the conclusion being drawn that universities operated in quite diverse
ways, but without any noticeable difference in results. The new Assistant Registrar drafted
a paper, "University Interaction with Industry", which made specific recommendations
regarding tactics as well as overall strategy. These were accepted and subsequently
endorsed by Senate.
2.5	 Regulations and Documentation
Liverpool did not amend its Terms and Conditions of Service to explicitly incorporate a
statement of the rights it was claiming in IP generated by members of the academic staff;
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nor was this mentioned in its letter of appointment. The University felt that amending its
Terms and Conditions of Service would require extensive negotiations and that the number
of cases arising would not justify the likely aggravation.
Liverpool outlined the IP rights it felt it had and indicated its interest in exercising them in
a revised edition of the Handbook for Academic & Academic-Related Staff (staff
handbook). This first came into circulation in 1977/78. The underlying rationale and the
University's policy vis-a-vis IP were explained in greater detail in a new Research
Handbook, produced at the same time on behalf of the Research Committee. This
incorporated the salient points of the CVCP's 1977 report. In 1981/82 the entry in the
Research Handbook was updated by the new Assistant Registrar. He gave specific advice
on the procedures which academics should follow if they thought they had discovered
something potentially exploitable.
2.6	 Structures
Having set up what amounted to a fledgling, in-house technology transfer division, in
1985 Liverpool set up a wholly-owned University company which had the potential to
exploit IP - primarily "hard" but also "soft" - as opportunities arose. The idea was
proposed by the then Academic Secretary, who felt there were a number of projects which
might be exploited directly, yielding a greater income for the University than if they were
exploited indirectly. Though the President of Council was sceptical (n), the idea was
supported by the new, Acting Vice-Chancellor (23), an engineer:
"... We were being abjured by the government to be more entrepreneurial, so we
thought we had better have a University company..."
The University provided the company, University of Liverpool Technological & Research
Applications Ltd (ULTRA), with capital of £0.25m from its private funds (24). A lay
officer was appointed as company chairman and a recruitment agency was used to
headhunt a suitable CEO. The man subsequently appointed was a Liverpool graduate, a
chemist with considerable entrepreneurial experience. Having identified around 15 suitable
projects, he in turn appointed a marketing and a financial manager to help progress them.
It was intended that ULTRA should act as a holding company and form subsidiaries as
required. As an incentive to the academic community to participate wholeheartedly in the
exploitation of their IP, the University eventually agreed they should be given a 49 per
cent share of the equity in any subsidiary which was formed.
This was the situation in 1985 when the Kingman letter arrived. The administration had
moved from disinterest in IP to an interest in identifying, protecting and exploiting it.
Having established the RDAS in 1977 to promote "soft" IP, in the early 1980s its remit
was extended to include the transfer of "hard" IP. Between 1954 and 1985 the University
had acquired some half a dozen patents in its own name. A further 15-20 discoveries had
been assigned to the NRDC/BTG and a handful to private or public companies. The
NRDC/BTG had also rejected a number of suggestions, which the RDAS also chose not to
pursue. On average the RDAS was handling half a dozen IP opportunities each year (Li) . It
was anticipated that in due course, once it started to operate, ULTRA would be able to
exploit a dozen or more IP opportunities.
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3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
Knowing that the BTG's monopoly was to be revoked, Liverpool had already guessed that
universities themselves would be offered the opportunity to exploit IP arising out of
Research Council projects. Liverpool's expectations were based on the view that if the
BTG had not succeeded, no alternative central body was likely to do so, either. When the
Kingman letter arrived, the University had no hesitation in accepting the offer. Liverpool
saw it as a means to generate an income which had no strings attached to it, which might
eventually help the University have more control over its own destiny. It was also seen as
politically advisable, though following the appointment of the new Vice-Chancellor in
1985, there was a genuine and growing interest in technology transfer as a way for the
University to help regenerate the local community.
Liverpool already had a detailed policy on IP, which had been publicised not long before.
It was necessary only to extend the existing policy to include discoveries arising out of
Research Council-funded projects and to ensure that practically, the University could meet
the eleven criteria laid down by the Research Councils. The Assistant Registrar drafted the
reply to the Kingman letter. Liverpool was among the first 33 universities and colleges
whose reply was accepted, after further clarification, by the Exploitation Scrutiny Group.
The letter of authorisation was sent on 23 July, 1986.
Liverpool's acceptance of the Research Councils' offer was not seen as controversial by
the academic community - largely because "it filtered in at a very low level of perception".
This was just one of a series of changes which the University was undergoing at the time.
The Jarratt Report (CVCP, 1985) had been published only two months prior to the
removal of the BTG's monopoly. Major changes which both preceded (7-') and followed
this were occupying people's attention. Even if this had not been the case, the idea that the
University was effectively taking over from the BTG was unlikely to cause controversy:
"... We have never had a particularly strong interaction with the BTG. Our
royalty income from the BTG is [about] £3 a year after tax! We had maybe 20
[items] registered [prior to] the transfer, but they didn't do anything with them.
"Most people hadn't really gathered what the BTG was. They had seen 1VRDC on
the back of their SERC forms - if they bothered to read them. Except in one or two
places, it had no profile at all ..."
For those few academics who had encountered the NRDC or the BTG, the experience was
not particularly positive; their discoveries were not exploited. Some duly published their
results, only to find the idea picked up and exploited by industry without any benefit to
themselves or to the University.
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Structures
Largely at the initiative of the then Academic Secretary, in 1987 Liverpool decided to
expand the RDAS. The Planning & Resources Committee agreed to establish a larger,
integrated office which would handle both research, industrial liaison and IP. This was
intended to achieve four principal objectives:
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* helping academics increase the level of external research funding,
particularly from Research Councils, charities, industry and the EEC;
* maximising the overhead income from external research funding;
* maximising the University's exploitation of its IP;
* raising the University's profile with industry, government Departments
and the UGC in relation to its links with industry.
The new Office of Research Services & Industrial Liaison (ORSIL) started work at the
beginning of 1988. In 1989/90 ORSIL was staffed by three full-time officers cro and three
secretaries, compared to RDAS' one officer and two secretaries. One of the three officers
is the Senior Assistant Registrar (2.8) and the other is ORSIL's Director. Liverpool
appointed as Director (29) a long-standing member of the academic staff, previously Sub-
Dean of the Science Faculty. The Director was appointed on grade 5, though by 1990 this
had become equivalent in practice to a grade 6 appointment.
In 1989/90 ORSIL's reporting structure was fairly complex: the Director reported to the
Academic Secretary regarding the research support aspect of the office's work, and to the
Director of Finance, the senior academic and the senior lay officer regarding the EC,
industrial liaison and IP matters. In some cases, he reported directly to the Registrar or
the Vice-Chancellor. It was envisaged that if the Director and the Senior Assistant
Registrar made good judgements, ORSIL should eventually become self-funding. There
was, however, no formal requirement for the Office to achieve this by a target date.
Towards the end of the 1980s the University set up a Commercial Opportunities Group,
known informally as "the Billington group", after John Billington, a member of
Liverpool's Council. After expressing concern at a Council meeting about whether
Liverpool should be setting up campus companies, he was requested by the President of
Council to set up an informal group to advise the University. In 1989/90 the Commercial
Opportunities Group consisted of John Billington himself, the local manager of 3i and the
former, Acting Vice-Chancellor. Effectively, its role was to vet commercial propositions
which were put to the University and indicate whether the University should support
them - financially or in any other way.
4.2	 Rationale
Despite the size of the University, in 1989/90 ORSIL did not have a dedicated IP officer.
Ideally, it would have liked to have an officer who could concentrate on proactively
seeking out IP, but felt that financial constraints made this unlikely for the forseeable
future, particularly as handling IP is not ORSIL'S primary objective m:
"... [We] recognise that in global University terms, (a) it is a very long-term
investment, (b) it's a very risky investment and (c) the University has much more
pressing needs on its purse ..."
Financial considerations certainly play a part in Liverpool's rationale vis-a-vis IP, but
from the Academic Secretary's perspective it is less a question of competing constituencies
than of limited expectations vis-a-vis IP:
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"... The danger is that, in imagining there may be [a] very large [amount of] IP
across the University and setting up all sorts of hares running to identify and
secure these, when it comes to the crunch there are very few really important
exploitable ideas ..."
In his view, the identification and exploitation of IP is a "relatively minor" activity, seen
in the context of all the University's other activities (31) • In fact, there has been a
significant increase in the amount of IP which the RDAS and ORSIL have had to evaluate,
protect and exploit since 1985. This is due largely to the increase in the proportion of
research funding provided by industry in the intervening years. ORSIL believes there is
potential for Research Council-funded projects to generate exploitable IP, but that it will
take a considerable amount of time and resources to identify, evaluate and realise. There
may be less potential than the goverment or the Research Councils imagine, however:
"... by sending [proposals] out to general peer review, if it is academics who are
doing the peer review, then exploitation is not going to be a prime consideration.
It is still going to be the science ..."
4.3	 Regulations and Documentation
The University's claims, policy and procedures relating to IP are documented exclusively
in the staff handbook. This states the University's claim to ownership of "all the results of
research which has been supported by the University", including notes and specimens °.
Members of staff are required to seek the University's permission before making use of
their research results in any way, including publication 03)• Permission to exploit research
results intellectually is generally given by the principal investigator and/or the HoD after
they have checked the terms of the grant/contract with ORSIL. Permission to exploit
commercially is granted exclusively by ORSIL.
The staff handbook indicates that the University is "keen to see that all inventions and
discoveries which are capable of commercial exploitation are suitably protected, for
example, by patent" (34). It is made clear that commercially exploitable IP could also take
the form of computer software or know-how. The staff handbook explains that the
University has rights in IP arising out of projects funded by the Research Councils and
most of the major charities, as well as projects which the University itself has funded. It
adds that where industry sponsors contract research, the costs of patenting are normally
borne by the companies concerned.
The staff handbook goes on to outline in detail the procedure - agreed with Liverpool
AUT - which staff and students should follow if they believe they have discovered
something commercially exploitable. ORSIL recognises that neither the staff handbook nor
the Research Handbook give sufficient information on the dangers of disclosure, nor,
indeed, on what constitutes "disclosure". It is likely that information of this sort will be
assembled at some time in the future in a document will outline in greater detail policy
and practice vis-a-vis patenting.
Finally, the staff handbook discusses ways in which IP might be exploited, the minimum
contribution towards the exploitation process which members of staff are expected to make
and the compensation they might receive as a result. It specifies that the University will
give "a fair share" of any resulting income with the researcher, after direct costs have
been covered. Nine criteria are listed which will be taken into account to determine what
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constitutes "a fair share" (").
Liverpool has still not amended its Terms and Conditions of Service, for the reasons
outlined in section 2.5 above. It still bases its claims on the 1977 Patent Act, bolstered by
a collective agreement with the local AUT. As the local AUT sees it, this is quite in
keeping with a more general policy: the University issues short contracts which specify the
absolute minimum and it tends to rely on updates of the staff handbook and on the AUT to
communicate agreements of all sorts - including pay increases - to its members, rather
than communicating them centrally to all members of staff or revising the Terms and
Conditions of Service.
4.4	 Incentives
The administration recognises the need to counteract an institutional ethos which has not
encouraged academics to think in terms of the commercial potential of their research
findings. It has introduced two incentives.
(i) Financial
In keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, academics at Liverpool receive no
personal financial reward for bringing potentially exploitable IP to ORSIL's attention.
They are rewarded only if the IP is successfully and profitably commercialised - and they
may have some say in how it is commercialised. Despite the cautious terms in which the
staff handbook outlines the income split, in practice, the University usually splits the
revenue from IP on a 50:50 basis with the researcher(s) concerned. This is "not written in
tablets of stone", but where ORSIL has taken on most or all of the burden of arranging
the exploitation process, this division has usually been agreed in practice.
Liverpool has also provided an incentive for HoDs to encourage members of their
Department to flag IP. The residue of the income is split evenly between the University
centrally and the Department. It is upto the HoD how such income is spent. At the
moment, this is largely a hypothetical incentive, since none of Liverpool's EP has yet
generated a significant income. It is, moreover, less strong an incentive than a
Department's share of overheads on research grants/contracts (345).
(ii) Career Progression
By the mid-1980s, the number of academics doing contract research and consultancy for
industry/commerce had grown considerably. Many of these were unable to publish their
research output owing to restrictions imposed by the sponsors, or, at best, able only to
point to patents in which they were the named inventor. Discussion of this problem led to
general agreement that such people should not be penalised by the promotion system (37).
ORSIL believes that the problem has now been overcome:
" ... A guy with no academic papers but fourteen patents stands as good a chance
as somebody with fourteen academic papers and no patents ..."
If this is a genuine change, it has certainly not been explicitly documented. The criteria
for promotion make no reference to IP of any sort, or to license arrangements,
collaboration with ULTRA or spin-off companies. Promotion from Lecturer A to Lecturer
B indicates simply that applicants should have "performed satisfactorily the teaching and
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other professional and departmental duties allocated ... and [have] a satisfactory level of
research activity" (38) , Criteria for the award of discretionary points on the Lecturer B
scale indicate that applicants should demonstrate "competent performance" in two of the
following areas, in one of which there should be evidence of "a major contribution":
* administration/management;
* teaching;
* involvement with appropriate outside organisations;
* research.
The document (39) adds that research activity should be demonstrated by refereed
publications or work within professional organisations. It also indicates that involvement
with appropriate outside organisations should have led to a major contribution to the
academic area concerned or "to the well-being or reputation of the University". It is not
clear whether full patents count as refereed publications, or whether entrepreneurial
involvement in the exploitation of that patent would count as a major contribution to the
well-being or reputation of the University. Criteria for promotion to Senior Lecturer are
even less explicit. They are "concerned with excellence in teaching, research and
administration and, more recently, with professional distinction and related matters".
Applicants should support their claim by "published evidence such as book reviews,
citations and similar material"; moreover, "particular recognition will be given to external
awards and other forms of external recognition" (4°) . Again, it is not clear where patents or
IP of other sorts figure in this list.
4.5	 Sanctions
If academics inadvertently disclose exploitable IP, there is no sanction which Liverpool
could apply, nor would it wish to devise one, even if the IP concerned might have yielded
a considerable income. If ORSIL discovered that individual academics were deliberately
withholding information about exploitable discoveries due to an "open publication"
philosophy, it would point out fairly forcefully that universities are funded less and less
from the public purse:
"... We have to look after ourselves and if, by giving this away, [a researcher] has
lost us the opportunity to save so many jobs, well, that's on his conscience ..."
Academics who withhold information with a view to exploiting their discoveries
themselves are a different matter. ORSIL knows from experience that this sometimes
happens and that it will only find out by chance ( 41) - perhaps by virtue of "the Rolls in the
car park". ORSIL's response is invariably pragmatic, determined in this case by the
financial implications:
"... The bigger the .£ sign, the more energy ....
ORSIL would try to persuade the researcher concerned to retrospectively assign his
property to the University. If persuasion failed and it was worth it, ORSIL would consider
taking legal action. It would be upto the appropriate section of the administration to decide
whether this should be accompanied by disciplinary procedures, on the basis that the
person concerned had breached the terms of a collective agreement. ORSIL regards these
procedures as "fairly toothless"; it is unlikely to involve more than an interview with the
Vice-Chancellor, unless the University was prepared to institute "good cause"
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proceedings. This might not be the sensible solution:
" ... If at the same time as feathering his own nest he was a brilliant academic with
a world-wide reputation, would we want to?"
ORSIL would adopt the same pragmatic stance towards academics who wished to
challenge the University's presumed ownership of IP which they had generated:
"... If Dr. Bloggs firmly believed he was the sole owner of this thing and it 'had]
nothing to do with the University and if it's going to make him a few E, we might
say - well, we reserve our position but we're not going to fight about it.
"On the other hand, if he had come up with nuclear magnetic resonance, for
instance, we would say - we'll get our lawyers onto you and you can get yours
and we fight it out ..."
5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
Sir Keith Joseph's statement - in which the Secretary of State expressed the hope that
universities would encourage academics to exploit their discoveries themselves and give
help and guidance to those who wished to do so - was not greatly at odds with Liverpool's
approach to exploiting IP at the time. As an institution, Liverpool was in the process of
embracing the enterprise culture, partly for its own benefit, partly for the benefit of the
surrounding community. Through ULTRA it was in the process of providing a framework
within which entrepreneurial academics could function without having to take all the risks
and acquire all the necessary skills. By allocating them a 49 per cent share of the equity in
any companies which were formed, Liverpool was trying to provide an incentive for
academics not just to "flag" IP but also to get involved in exploiting it entrepreneurially.
In the intervening years, however, Liverpool has come to view the government's hopes as
unrealistic.
5.2	 Identification
When agreeing to establish ORSIL, the Planning & Resources Committee noted that in
order to achieve its objectives, ORSIL would have to "persuade the academic staff of the
need to exploit the University's IP" (42) • In saying this, the Committee recognised that
institutional ethos has encouraged researchers at Liverpool to focus on exploiting their
research results intellectually and to neglect thoughts of how they might be exploited
commercially. There are signs that the ethos has changed in the course of the 1980s,
though perhaps less than in many other institutions over the same period m . Nonetheless,
persuading the academic community of the value of commercially exploiting IP is vital,
given that ORSIL has to rely heavily on academics themselves bringing their discoveries
to its attention:
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"... One of the problems we face is the fact that there is a clear statement [of
policy] ... but there is nobody to see that it is implemented. We don't actually
have the resources to go around each Department and say - right, what have you
got that might be inventive?
"... We have to rely on people actually coming forward..."
Confronted by a ratio of two officers to over 1,200 academics, ORSIL devised a number
of tactics for raising and maintaining awareness of IP, particularly IP arising out of
Research Council-funded projects, since it was anxious not to lose its newly-acquired
rights (44) . When the University received its letter of authorisation in 1986, the RDAS
informed every member of staff in the Faculties of Science, Engineering, Medicine and
Veterinary Science by letter; it also sent a letter to the designated Research Correspondent
in every other Department, with a request to circulate it. It did not immediately use the
University newsletter, "Precinct", to tell the academic community that the University had
effectively taken over from the BTG:
" ... [Precinct] is not an organ for disseminating policy or even information of that
sort. It is much more concerned with newsy academic issues ..."
However, towards the end of a special issue of the newsletter devoted to "Resources and
Research", dated June 1987, a section headed "Exploitation of Research Council
Inventions" detailed the removal of the NRDC's (sic) right of first refusal and the
University's authorisation to assume ownership of and responsibility for the exploitation of
"inventions or commercially valuable results" arising out of Research Council-funded
projects.
From January 1990, this information was included in the staff handbook which stated
clearly that the rights in any commercially applicable results of research funded by the
Research Councils and many, but not all, of the major charities, were vested in the
University. Prior to this, ORSIL reminded HoDs by means of a yearly memorandum to
each Department, soliciting information which forms the basis of the University's annual
return to the Research Councils. This is a practice which ORSIL plans to continue, even if
the Scrutiny Group decides it no longer requires a detailed annual return.
ORSIL has devised a number of tactics for reminding the academic community about IP in
general, however it was funded. Some are written reminders, others involve face to face
contact. Some are produced in-house, others involve publications or expertise brought in
from outside. Some are already being implemented, others are due to be implemented
shortly. ORSIL reportedly prides itself on attention to detail. When the BTG circulated its
pamphlet on patents (45) to selected members of staff, for instance, ORSIL obtained extra
copies and circulated them to those who had not received them directly. ORSIL has made
formal presentations on IP as part of the staff development programme and at the
induction course for new members of staff; however, neither are compulsory ( 4'). There
are plans to produce a twice-yearly, dedicated, 2-4 page research supplement to the
University newsletter which would also cover IP 01)• It is also proposed to stage a series
of open seminars on IP in 1990/91, perhaps with invited speakers ("). This is liable to be
repeated fairly regularly, since ORSIL knows from experience that it is difficult enough to
get academics to grasp what constitutes "disclosure", let alone to retain that understanding(49).
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ORSIL feels it is important to tackle the problem at different organisational levels, since
levels of awareness vary considerably from one Department to another. This can be a
function of size:
"... If you have a small Department of, say, ten people and five or six are fairly
active, then the other four will know about it ..."
It can also be a function of ethos. This is less problematical now that HoDs are appointed
for a fixed period of 3 or 5 years (5°), but the attitude of the HoD can still have an affect,
as ORSIL knows from experience (51):
"... if the HoD is agin it, then it is that much harder. It is more likely to deter the
staff in what I would regard as the second wave, not the key types, the
entrepreneurs ..."
ORSIL tries to send an officer to attend Faculty meetings or local research committee
meetings since these provide a platform for a less formal reminder about the importance of
exploiting IP. In future, ORSIL plans to target groups of academics by status (HoDs,
Research Correspondents, research group leaders, principal investigators etc) and by
subject grouping (medics, engineers etc). ORSIL hopes that these combined tactics will
raise and maintain a general awareness of IP in a reasonable proportion of the academic
staff.
Discovering what individual members of staff are doing is more problematical. ORSIL
takes every opportunity it can to mix with staff. Meetings tend to take place in
Departments rather than in its own offices, for instance, and ORSIL tries to meet people
who visit the University from relevant outside organisations, since this also provides an
opportunity to meet members of Liverpool's staff and learn what they are doing. In
theory, ORSIL could overcome some of the problems created by its staff shortage through
devolving to existing local structures the responsibility for proactively seeking out IP. In
1986, for instance, each Faculty set up an in-house research committee at the request of
the (university-wide) Research Sub-Committee m . Although the Research Sub-Committee
periodically refers matters for comment, essentially these in-house research committees
operate independently. This makes it difficult for ORSIL to devolve responsibility:
"... If we suggested it, it would have to come via the Academic Committee, and I
think the Academic Committee has a number of other bridges to build before it
would consider this particular activity ..." 03)
In an effort to reduce the risk inherent in relying on academics to flag their research
discoveries, ORSIL tries to scrutinise research reports at the interim or final report stage,
consciously following the example of Duke University in the United States:
"... they've got a team of about ten people who read all the proposals. If we
could, it would be very nice ... but if you're going to [do] this, you've got to have
somebody who appreciates reasonably well what they are reading ..."
Given its staffing level, ORSIL manages to scrutinise no more than a quarter of the
research reports which the University generates each year, capitalising on the two officers'
expertise in chemistry and electrical engineering. In the past, this was a less time-.
consuming procedure because the University's annual research report gave a two-page
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summary of each Department's activities; this has recently been reduced to a list of
publications. Since it is part of ORSIL's remit to "overcome organisational or institutional
obstacles" 04) to identifying and exploiting IP, it plans to step into the breach by producing
an annual report on the commercial activities of each Department. The report will cover
"hard" and "soft" IP, however its discovery was funded.
ORSIL would like to be able to ask academics to submit drafts of papers for scrutiny
before submitting them to journals. Practically, it recognises that this is out of the
question, partly due to staff shortages and partly because it is quite foreign to the ethos of
the institution:
"... It would smack of a limitation of academic freedom ..."
In 1989/90 ORSIL had not yet brought in outside organisations to trawl for IP, apart from
the BTG which continued to pay visits every six months or so. ORSIL also established a
relationship with 3i Research Exploitation Ltd, formerly the Research Corporation;
however, this agency preferred to be brought in to do a comprehensive technical audit
which ORSIL did not feel the University could afford ('). ORSIL was also considering
developing a relationship with DTE. Liverpool has learned from experience that so far, it
has only managed to scratch the surface when it comes to discovering IP which is
exploitable (5').
5.3	 Evaluation
Where potentially patentable IP is concerned, ORSIL first tries to establish whether the
discovery is likely to embody an inventive step. In making this judgement, it relies largely
on the inventor(s) and informal advice from a patent agent.
For all types of IP, ORSIL's main concern is to try to get some idea of its market value.
Initially it tries to do this by speaking to the relevant HoD; since few of Liverpool's HoDs
have worked in industry, however, they may not have the necessary knowledge. The
University has links with local industry and with the City, partly through former members
of staff " and partly through contract research/consultancy which has had a successful
outcome. ORSIL sometimes approaches contacts like these for an initial assessment, in
confidence. It might also approach the Director of the Merseyside Innovation Centre, the
University's equivalent of a science park. If none of these sources has the relevant
knowledge, ORSIL feels its options are limited. Venture capitalists require a product to be
fairly well defined before they will give an opinion. In ORSIL's view, it is risky to make
a discovery known to industry at such an early stage, since it may not be possible to
protect it adequately. The north west of England does not have the kind of public sector
agencies which operate in Scotland and the north east of England and which can evaluate
discoveries. ORSIL feels that unless the IP has been protected, it is unwise to commission
a private sector evaluation, despite the expertise which is undoubtedly available:
"... What you really want to find is an organisation which can, in secrecy, look
your idea and give you an honest opinion as to whether or not it is valuable - and
you can do that in complete safety. That limits the organisations dramatically. It
comes down, in fact, to the BTG, the Research Corporation and DTE ..."
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As a result, in 1988/89 ORSIL asked BTG to evaluate around 14 discoveries, almost half
the IP identified during that period. In the other cases, where the IP was not previously
obligated and was patentable, ORSIL tended to file an initial registration -in order to be




As the staff handbook indicates, Liverpool is interested in protecting exploitable IP. If IP
is not obligated to a sponsor (58) , this may mean acquiring patent protection or, in some
cases, treating it as secret know-how. In principle, ORSIL prefers to acquire patent
protection, where possible:
"... If a patent has been granted, then you have something tangible to sell ... You
have got something that is invented ..."
However, if a company wishing to exploit a given discovery were against patenting,
ORSIL would agree not to proceed with a full patent application, provided certain
conditions were met:
"... The University will never accept complete secrecy ... It will always insist on
the right to publish and the right of access to theses, though we are quite happy to
accept a time-limit. There can be secrecy for a year or two ..."
If the researchers concerned agree, ORSIL is prepared to protect their discovery by
assigning the IP to an industrial partner, rather than retaining ownership. ORSIL does not
regard retaining ownership as vital, provided the agreement is carefully written:
"... Whether we assign or license? In most cases the license is exclusive, so to all
intents and purposes, it is the same as an assignment ...
"Even in an assignment, it will be subject to some sort of control. It's not an
absolute right - [not] here you are, end of story ..."
IP may be assigned to an industrial partner, but it is increasingly being assigned to the
BTG or a similar organisation (59):
"... The majority [of academics] prefers us to follow the BTG-type route. They
don't want to be that much involved. It's too much hassle. They want to get on
with their research.
"Yes, it would be nice to pick up a few .£ at the end of the day ... But the majority
don't want to be involved at the company level ..."
(ii) Finance
Liverpool is willing to support a fairly speculative and wide-ranging programme of initial .
registrations. This means that if ORSIL believes it is not worth protecting a discovery, but
the researcher is adamant that it is, an initial registration will probably be made:
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"... I'm happy to miss the .£300-1:500. I'd rather risk it, run it for a year and see
if anything comes of it than scrap it now ..."
On the other hand, ORSIL may simply cover the cost of the researcher registering the
discovery himself
Where full applications are concerned, ORSIL is far more cautious. It would be unusual to
proceed to a full application unless there were strong indications that a company was
interested in exploiting a discovery, or that it was unusually promising. To a certain
extent, the decision depends on the technology concerned. If is biotechnology, the
University recognises that it might have to wait 15-20 years for a return and that the
patenting procedure is unlikely to be smooth:
"... In biotechnology, you are constantly fighting objections. There aren't enough
examiners and it is so easy to raise objections ... You have to be prepared for a
long, hard battle ..."
ORSIL itself has the authority to decide whether or not to proceed to a full application,
whereas the RDAS did not; if in doubt, it seeks the view of the Senior Management
Team. ORSIL usually applies initially for a UK patent. This might be followed by
individual national patents in the countries suggested by the patent agent, taking into
account potential markets. ORSIL generally avoids using the European Patent Convention
or the Patent Co-Operation Treaty, because of the cost. Moreover, overseas applications
are filed only if the IP looks very promising:
"... The University still takes the view that in most cases, it should not itself
undertake a major overseas patent filing programme, because of the expense ..."
ORSIL believes that in 1988/89 it spent between £70,000 and £80,000 per year m on all
the direct costs associated with patenting. This includes initial registrations, full
applications, renewal fees m and employing a patent agent:
"... We have always taken the view that it is appropriate and good practice to use
a chartered patent agent. This office has never written and filed its own patents,
simply because experience at other places and advice from the BTG and so on has
shown that they do actually earn their [fee] ..."
The University's patents bill has occasioned frequent comment from the Director of
Finance as well as a question from the President of Council. The IP protected to date is
unlikely to generate a significant royalty stream for some years. In the short-term, ORSIL
would "defend vigorously" the need to spend at this rate, pointing out that it makes every
effort to offload ongoing costs onto licensees.
(iii)	 Practicalities
Once they have flagged their discoveries, academics contribute relatively little to the
process of protecting their IP. They may be able to influence the decision about whether
to protect it - and how. Beyond that, their contribution is generally limited to providing a
short description of their discovery, which the patent agent uses as a basis for discussion
prior to writing the patent specification. Occasionally, academics choose to help draft the
specification.
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In theory, since the University claims ownership of all research results, the final right of
decision in a publish/patent conflict situation rests with the University. This is indicated in
the staff handbook (63) . However, it has never been tested in practice:
"... We have had no real clashes [regarding] exploitation [versus] publication. We
explain to the people what has to be done and the majority accepts it quite happily
II
...
ORSIL does not agree with UDIL's proposal that academics should be asked to withhold
publication for upto five years (UDIL, 1988). However, it recognises the dangers of
patenting too early. ORSIL generally asks academics to delay publication for around a
year, on average. ORSIL believes that in many cases, academics are unlikely to want to
publish their findings because they are too specific or too trivial to gain them any kudos.
There could be cases, of course, where there is a strong incentive to publish - and to
publish soon. It is not clear what might happen in practice if, once an academic had
flagged his discovery, there were a conflict between his desire to disclose it and ORSIL's
desire for a delay in order to protect it. ORSIL would probably ask the Senior
Management Team to arbitrate. In normal circumstances, ORSIL itself decides whether to
file an initial registration in the UK, following advice from a patent agent; unlike the
RDAS, ORSIL is not obliged to seek permission from the Senior Management Team.
(iv)	 Ownership
Prior to 1977/78, academics themselves decided in whose name to vest patents. Some
vested patents in their own name, others in the name of their Department, and others still
in the University's name. In some cases they made joint vestments. Since 1977/78, patents
have been vested solely in the University's name, despite the fact that the policy laid down
in the staff handbook indicates that patents will be jointly owned by the University and the
academic(s) who generated the IP.
If the University does not wish to participate in the exploitation of a discovery, the staff
handbook states that "the benefit of it shall belong as between him/her and the University
exclusively to the member of staff'. This is not something which has happened since the
late 1970s (", however, and is unlikely to happen in future. In general, ORSEL prefers to
retain ownership of such IP. Even if it did waive/assign its rights in favour of the
inventor(s), Liverpool would retain a small financial interest to cover the cost of the
resources which the University contributed towards the discovery.
5.5	 Commercialisation
Where it retains ownership of its IP, Liverpool has no principled objection to exploiting it
via licensing to a third party, a University company, a joint venture ( 65) or an independent
academic spin-off company. In practice, little of Liverpool's IP has been exploited by the
more entrepreneurial of these routes.
(i)	 University Companies
Due to unforseen difficulties (66) , ULTRA managed to exploit only two or three of the 15
or so projects originally identified. Although ULTRA was intended to act as a holding
company, forming subsidiaries as required, in practice this did not happen. ULTRA set up
only two companies; one of these has been spun-off ( 67) and the future of the other remains
171
to be determined (68) . Instead, ULTRA itself started to market products in two main areas
(69) . This limited product range was a consequence, ULTRA's second Managing Director
(7°) felt, of the essentially non-entrepreneurial character of Liverpool's academics. In his
view, it was significant that one of ULTRA's product ranges arose out of the
entrepreneurial inclinations of a technician, rather than a member of the academic staff. In
ORSIL's view, academics did not regard what ULTRA had to offer as a good deal. For a
variety of reasons, ULTRA was wound up in the 1989/90 session.
The University has decided instead to form separate companies to exploit specific
opportunities as they emerge. So far, two such companies have been founded, both
resulting from the entrepreneurial activities of non-academic, rather than academic staff
(71).
(ii) Joint Ventures
As yet, Liverpool has not participated in joint ventures with members of the academic
staff to exploit "hard" IP. The University is not against the idea in principle but, partly on
the advice of the Commercial Opportunities Group, it has been extremely cautious to date.
In ORSIL's view, the University's attitude to risk inhibits it from being very
entrepreneurial:
"... The University ... does not take risks. That is a clear policy. Jr is not in the
business of taking risks. We are not a commercial organisation. If you want a
personal view on whether that restricts us, the answer is yes. My view is that we
ought to take some risks. I have a more enterprising - or perhaps entrepreneurial -
attitude. I fully accept the [University's] reasons, though. It has the ultimate
responsibility, so [its] caution will be greater ..."
(iii) Independent Academic Spin-Off Companies
Liverpool has not reneged on its commitment to support entrepreneurial academics, but
ORSIL does not encourage them. In the section of the staff handbook dealing with
exploitation routes, there is no mention of academic spin-off companies. oRsrL is not
against academic entrepreneurship per se, but it believes that there are very few academics
who could found viable "hard" companies:
"... There are ... very few individuals who would actually have sufficient
entrepreneurial skills that we would be happy to say - ok, go and do your own
thing. Just keep us informed and send us a cheque. Most of them would actually
be grateful for the sort of experience and assistance we can give.
"Of those whom we deal with, a high percentage have a very hazy perception of
patenting, licensing, exploitation -what it means, how you do it, the practicalities
"
As indicated in the staff handbook, ORSIL has the final right of decision as to how a
discovery is exploited in) . This is a right which it tries to exercise subtly, however.
Ostensibly the decision is made in consultation with the researchers concerned, but ORSIL
lobbies fairly efficiently to get them to appreciate why, in the main, assigning or licensing
their discovery to an existing company is likely to yield greater returns for less trouble. If
a researcher persists in wanting to set up a company, ORSIL makes an ad hoc judgement.
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It tries to weigh the pros and cons - the academic's enthusiasm versus his perceived ability
and the difference in the likely income to the University from the academic's as opposed
to ORSIL's preferred route. Because it is a relatively new organisation and is anxious to
have "satisfied customers", ORSIL believes it is sometimes worthwhile agreeing to
arrangements which will yield a lower financial return than might otherwise be obtained.
This has already happened on at least one occasion:
"... [Professor X] can come up with sensible deals. At times, we could do better,
but it's the way he operates.
"... He does not like us becoming too involved. With people like him, we stand
back and say - look, we are here if you want to use us ... He'd resent [any other
approach] ..."
ORSIL also tries to take into account the contribution each route might make to local
economic development:
"... The University as an institution is committed to community assistance. If we've
got a guy who wants to set up a company from which he will benefit [as] the only
employee, then we regard that in rather a different light to the guy who is going
out and setting up a company which will employ ten people ..."
This is seldom easy to gauge. ORSIL recognises that companies can do a great deal worse
- or better - than their business plans projected. If in doubt, ORSIL refers the problem to
the Senior Management Team or to the Commercial Opportunities Group.
In practice, few academics approach ORSIL wanting to found independent spin-off
companies. It is not clear whether ORSIL's reluctance deters people, or whether they are
simply not interested in the first place. ORSIL itself believes the latter is the case, but
concedes this may be a false impression:
" ... The truly entrepreneurial ones may well be doing their own thing and we may
never know!"
ULTRA's second Managing Director believed there was evidence to suggest that there is
some degree of "black market" activity. Moreover, quite a few of Liverpool's academics
have submitted entries to the Academic Enterprise Competition (73) . Although ORSIL
distributes the entry forms for this and similar competitions, academics do not require the
University's permission to enter and none have approached ORSIL for help drafting their
entries. ORSIL was aware of only one entry - because it won third prize 64).
(iv)	 Licensing
Most of Liverpool's IP is exploited via licensing or assigning. Liverpool's academics play
a part in this process by helping to identify potential licensees. ORSIL invariably starts
with academics' suggestions before moving onto other companies with which the
University has a connection ° 	 tapping local databases (76). Since ORSIL recognises the
value of personal contacts, it is often the academic who makes the initial approach to a
company. However, academics play only a supportive role in the actual license
negotiations, which are conducted by the Senior Assistant Registrar, since he is a member
of the UK Licensing Executives Society. Liverpool is prepared to grant exclusive licenses
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with worldwide rights:
"... We don't have the effort to go out and look for multiple licensees. If we find
one company which seems prepared to do a reasonable job, then it gets it - away
you go, subject to some sort of provision of either minimum royalties or a return
in the event of non-exploitation within a mininum time ..."
Liverpool also allows licensees to choose the companies which they sub-license to -
provided the University is guaranteed a reasonable percentage of the resulting income.
Once a deal has been struck, the academic's role is liable to be limited to consultancy or
further contract research:
"... In general our outside partners would not want our staff involved
[commercially] ... They feel, quite fairly I think, that the majority of academics
have no experience in this field ..."
6	 ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
6.1	 Policy
Liverpool claims not to have a formal policy vis-a-vis academic entrepreneurship. It is an
issue which has never been formally discussed. ORSIL does not believe there would be
any virtue in formulating an official policy, since this might be unnecessarily limiting:
"... We are [dealing with] a lot of talented individuals who have a wide variety of
ideas. We want to be as _flexible as possible with them ..."
Custom and practice suggest, however, that certain types of academic entrepreneurship are
more positively regarded than others. A few academics have channelled their
entrepreneurial energies into projects within the University system, by setting up
commercially-oriented units, institutes or centres cm . The first of these (78), dating from
1974, benefitted the academics who participated in it through increased opportunities for
consultancy work. It also benefitted the University centrally, in so far as academics were
obliged to pay a percentage of their earnings to the University. However, the Department
in which it was located felt it did not benefit financially: the profits were all ploughed
back into expanding the unit itself. The unit in question has now been forcibly spun-off as
a private company ("). Academics founding such units nowadays are required to adhere to
strict accounting procedures and operate with a small management committee which
reports to a board of directors. The University is open to the idea of supporting such
projects from its private funds and has actually done so (", though some requests have
been rejected following advice from the recently-formed Commercial Opportunities
Group.
Two groups of academics from two different Departments tried to take advantage of the
framework provided by ULTRA. This was not entirely successful. One company has been
spun-off as an independent company (see (67)) and one of the academics from the other
group has since left the University to devote his time to running completely independent
spin-off companies which he has either set up or taken over.
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Several academics opted to operate outside the University and its company from the
beginning, founding completely independent companies to exploit expertise and/or
products. The University benefits financially from the entrepreneurial activities of those
who are still employed as academics. Academics are required to seek permission from the
Outside Work Committee ( 81 ) to set up companies. Permission is granted, subject to the
would-be entrepreneur giving the University the right to examine the company's accounts.
Those running "soft", R&D-based companies are obliged to pay 15 per cent of their
annual profits to the University and to show their accounts, if required. In principle,
"hard" companies wholly-owned by members of the academic staff are also expected to
pay 15 per cent of their annual profits to the University - though ORSIL recognises that it
could be counter-effective to prevent the company from reinvesting that profit in the
business. Academics who participate in "hard" companies with outsiders are expected to
pay 25 per cent of any director's fees, royalties, dividends etc they receive to the
University, in the same way that anyone doing consultancy must pay this percentage to the
University. Both of these types of academic entrepreneurship are seen as benefitting the
University in non-financial ways, too.
A few of Liverpool's academics have become involved in businesses which are not
connected with their University work m . This is viewed less positively. Often, since the
business is registered in the spouse's name, the academic concerned has not sought
permission and in at least one case, the extra responsibility has had a detrimental affect on
the academic's work for the University (").
ORSIL believes that researchers who try to combine the role of academic with the role of
entrepreneur are liable to do justice to neither:
"... Members of staff who are still here in their tenured posts do not, in general,
fit into a company structure very well. They don't have the appetite ... To be
successful in business [you] must be hungry. You're unlikely to be hungry if you
are in an established job. There is a limit to how much time you can give to your
company. If you are running your company [well], then one would query why you
still have your University job ..."
As far as ORSIL knows, none of Liverpool's academic entrepreneurs has left to pursue a
full-time career in business, other than one who took voluntary advantage of the early
retirement scheme which operated during the late 1980s. It knows of only one who opted
for a part-time contract. ORSIL knows of half a dozen or so academics who have founded
independent companies to exploit "soft" IP in the form of expertise. It has a more positive
view of these academics' chances of running a viable company and doing their job.
6.2	 Making Time
Even though ORSIL has the power to grant or withhold permission for researchers to
exploit "hard" IP entrepreneurially, if it does grant permission, it has no control over the
amount of time which they can devote to the enterprise. If academics felt they needed
more than evenings, weekends and the day a week consultancy time which is usual at
Liverpool ("), they would have to negotiate with their HoD. In fact, if they wanted a
constant day per week, this might also be a matter to discuss with their HoD. A request to
devote time to an independent spin-off company would not necessarily be sympathetically
received, ORSIL believes:
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"... [We] can think of many Departments [which] would be sympathetic ... and
many which wouldn't be, where the HoD would be worried that the other staff
would very much be against that member of staff They would see it as going off
earning money at their expense, because they [were] having to cover ..."
Moreover, ORSIL is aware that some HoDs have been frustrated by what they see as an
over-commitment on the part of some academics to outside activities. Academics trying to
set up a joint venture with the University via ULTRA ran the risk of being viewed in the
same light. ORSIL believes that if ULTRA had progressed as planned, their
entrepreneurial efforts might have come to be seen as a bona fide University activity, but
this did not happen.
There are three types of leave of absence at Liverpool: study leave, special leave of
absence and leave for ad hoc purposes. The staff handbook indicates that study leave of a
term or more is for "research or other approved academic purposes". Special leave is
generally for a shorter period and is designed to allow staff to attend courses/conferences
"or similar meetings connected with their work or the advancement of knowledge in their
subject". There is no guidance as to the kind of ad hoc purposes for which leave of
absence might be granted (88) . ORSIL suspects that a request for leave of absence in order
to set up a company would be viewed sympathetically by the Leave of Absence Committee
(86) which, unusually, includes a number of lay members as well as University officers;
ORSIL is unsure because the situation has never arisen. At present, Liverpool has no
mechanism for granting leave for ad hoc purposes on full pay. The staff handbook makes
no mention of part-time contracts; however, there is a precedent where company start-up
is concerned.
Applicants for leave of absence must have the support of their HoD and must indicate to
the Committee how their academic commitments will be covered and whether any
substitute or extra help will be needed by their Department. In reaching its decision, the
Committee takes account of any success applicants may have had in obtaining financial
support, either in whole or in part, for the period of their leave.
Liverpool has no policy governing the pension contributions of academics taking leave of
absence. Custom and practice suggests that for the twelve months, would-be academic
entrepreneurs would probably be expected to pay the employee's contribution themselves.
They might also have to pay the employer's contribution. The Leave of Absence
Committee would probably reach an ad hoc solution, taking into account the overall cost
to the University, if any, of providing a substitute.
6.3	 Other Resources
(i)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
ORSIL does not believe it is right to provide academics trying to exploit their discoveries
by means of independent spin-off companies with cheap resources:
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"... they have elected to go into the hard outside world and the sooner they learn
the lessons of that world, the better.
"It would [also] be wrong for the University to underpin their operation, because
the University ... could be losing [through] losing the efforts of that member of
staff..."
This is why academics with wholly-owned companies are asked to pay 15 per cent of their
annual profit to the University. For those who are exploiting "hard" IP, this is in addition
to any royalties due.
Where resources are concerned, ORSIL asks would-be academic entrepreneurs to write a
paper detailing their needs for their business activities and the implications for their
Department. The paper must have the approval of the HoD, so that he knows exactly what
demands are being made of him. If it is purely a question of equipment/instrumentation,
technical/secretarial support staff and communications, it is likely that these three parties -
the academic, his HoD and ORSIL - can approve the package. ORSIL would expect
academics founding independent spin-off companies to pay the full commercial rate, or as
close to it as possible, for all these resources - including telephone calls (".
(ii) Accommodation
The only exception is the use of existing accommodation, the use of which is also agreed
generally between the academic concerned, his HoD and ORSIL:
" ... It can sometimes be in the University's interest, both in a real sense and a
political sense, to have a company there. For example, a young company might
want to go fin] for a DTI SMART award. It's in the University's interests in the
political arena to be seen to be supporting that ..."
Additional accommodation, over and above the Department's allocation, is a matter for
the adminstration to decide centrally. If this is a problem, or if they simply wish to locate
off-campus, Liverpool's academics have the option of locating renting space in Liverpool's
equivalent of a science park, the Merseyside Innovation Centre (88) . This is located
adjacent to the campus, and offers not only advice to start-up companies (89) but
competitive rents and lease terms (".
If there is a waiting list for the Merseyside Innovation Centre, which is currently planning
a major expansion, Liverpool's academics could try for space in two other "parks" which
are located fairly close to the University ".
(iii) Finance
Liverpool has chosen not to establish a formal seedcorn fund to provide first-round
funding for academic spin-off companies. It does not see this as an appropriate activity for
a University, preferring to fund research or the early stages of development. If academics
propose to set up an entrepreneurial venture within the framework of the University -
perhaps an institute/unit/centre - ORSIL would ask them to write a formal paper detailing
their objectives and their needs. The paper would be scrutinised by the Commercial
Opportunities Group. It would then go before the Academic Committee 6'2) after the Vice-
Chancellor had seen it. The Academic Committee would make recommendations to the
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Policy & Resources Committee, which has the final right of decision. To date, few such
ventures have succeeded in obtaining financial support from the University.
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
ORSIL feels that it has a moral responsibility to give its entrepreneurial academics as
much as assistance as it can, whatever type of entrepreneurship they are pursuing. ORSIL
is anxious to ensure that technology is transferred efficiently and staff lay neither
themselves nor the University open to criticism. Neither of ORSIL's officers have business
start-up or consolidation skills, but they currently have access to two, more or less "in-
house" sources of assistance: the Commercial Opportunities Group and the Director of the
Merseyside Innovation Centre. When time permits, ORSIL intends to compile a complete
record of Liverpool's academic entrepreneurs, partly as a management tool, but partly to
act as a resource for those just starting out. ORSIL also believes that the academic
Departments contain pools of expertise which could be tapped:
"... One of our fond hopes is that each University could [become] a Peat
Marwick...
Again, when time permits, it would like to construct a database of such expertise, which
would-be academic entrepreneurs could access directly.
ORSIL also maintains contacts with local economic Departments, enterprise trusts and
venture capitalists (93). It regrets the absence of the kind of regional public sector agency
which exists in the north east of England and Scotland. There are bodies like the
Merseyside Enterprise Board and the Merseyside Development Corporation. However,
ORSIL finds that the university usually acts as a resource for these organisations, rather
than the other way around.
ORSIL would also recommend would-be academic entrepreneurs to find an experienced
partner, rather than go it completely alone:
"... Most academic staff are totally unaware of the piY'alls [of manufacturing and
marketing a product]. We would nearly always advise them to try and find a
partner who knows the market, has established outlets and who's got the back-up
facilities ..."
7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Liverpool was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was satisfied
with the exploitation arrangements which the University had established. A formal
document was scheduled to follow, confirming the University's rights and responsibilities
to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects for an indefinite period.




	 POLICY AND PRACTICE AS PERCEIVED BY HEADS OF
DEPARTMENT AND DEANS
8.1	 Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and Response to the Kingman Letter
(i) Awareness of the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
Until the question was put to them, two of the HoDs interviewed were unaware that the
BTG had had a monopoly over IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects - and
hence unaware of the Research Councils' offer, let alone its significance. One (e) was not
working within the UK university system at the time. The other ( B) was not only working
at the University, but was also HoD at the time; he attributed his ignorance to the fact that
until a couple of months prior to being interviewed, the characteristics of his discipline
were such that he had no reason to pay attention to IPR matters. The other four HoDs
interviewed (A. I). E ' reported that they had known about the removal of the BTG's
monopoly and the Research Councils' offer at the time - though they had no recollection
of how they learned this. Two thought they had probably read about it in the press, while
the other two were confident that the University would have circulated the information to
them in their capacity as HoD. The two Deans interviewed (1,2) said that they had been
aware of the removal of the BTG's monopoly and the Research Councils' offer at the
time; one (A) was certain that the SERC had sent him a copy of the Kingman letter,
asserting that he could visualise it; the other presumed that the University must have
circulated the information to him in his capacity as HoD.
(ii) Attitudes to the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
Questioned about their attitude at the time to the removal of the BTG's monopoly and the
Research Councils' offer, both Deans and all four HoDs who knew about it reported that
they had supported the idea, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm. One HoD (A) said
he had been particularly keen, since he felt "very bitter" about the NRDC, which had
refused to fight a challenge to a US patent application on one of his inventions; as a
result, it was manufactured in the US without a licence and neither he nor his department
had received any compensation. One of the Deans ( 2) reported that he had been in favour
of the idea because the BTG had such a bad reputation; he had gained this impression
from colleagues rather than from personal experience, however. The others said they
favoured the proposed new arrangements because they "sounded sound", or "sounded a
resonance", or made universities "relevant to what is going on". At the same time, two
interviewees (1'1' 2) expressed reservations, saying that it was important that the right people
assumed responsibility for IP, since by definition academics were not entrepreneurial and
were therefore not the best people to make a success of the proposed new arrangements.
(iii) Perceptions of the University's Motivation in Accepting the Research
Councils' Offer
Six interviewees (A, B, C, D, E, 2) felt that the University's decision to accept the Research
Councils' offer had been motivated purely by thoughts of financial advantage. One asked:
"What other motive could one attribute to them?" Another interviewee (') suggested that
accepting the offer was intended to be "a signal of the University being relevant", while
the last (1) said that on reflection, the University had probably thought it could get things
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done faster than the BTG.
(iv)	 Awareness of and Views on the Process of Determining the University's
Response to the Research Councils' Offer
Views differed on right way to determine the University's response to the Research
Councils' offer. Three HoDs (B.C. ') thought that academics who were "in the business of
inventing things" ... academics who were "dealing with inventions" should have been
consulted. One (c) added that the views of HoDs should also have been sought, a sentiment
echoed by another HoD (EP). Yet another (1 ) suggested that the Senate should have
determined the University's response. One of the Deans ( 2) thought that members of the
Research Sub-Committee, the Chairman of Academic Committee and a few senior officers
(Pro-Vice- Chancellors) should have been consulted; the other ( 1) felt "the people at the
top" should have been consulted because they had a much better idea of what was the best
thing for the University. One HoD ® broadly concurred with this view, suggesting it
should have been the Vice-Chancellor and the Academic Secretary who determined the
University's response - guided by the Assistant Registrar from the RDAS.
When told who actually determined the University's response, six interviewees expressed
satisfaction with this modus operandi. Three HoDs (". D' F) suggested that a quick response
had probably been required, while another three (". C. ' 1 suggested that in view of all the
external initiatives which had hit the University since 1985, it was not surprising that the
University was now in favour of making "an executive response", rather than work
through the traditional democratic processes. One (E) remarked that it was necessary to
have faith that decision-makers would contact people "at the coalface" and seek their
opinions. Another (1) added that the then Academic Secretary was a person who "took
these matters pretty seriously", having come from a university which was strongly
associated with industry, and that the Assistant Registrar from the RDAS had always given
good advice. However, one interviewee (2) expressed surprise that such a narrow group
had determined the University's response, while another (11) disagreed completely with the
modus operandi adopted, seeing the situation as one which required a "professional
decision".
8.2
	 Identifying Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)	 Views on the Likelihood of Different Disciplines Generating Exploitable
I	 IP
Asked whether they thought the particular spread of science and technology disciplines in
a university had an influence on the amount of exploitable IP which might be generated,
four HoDs (". B. C. ") felt that some disciplines were currently more likely to generate
exploitable IP than others; information technology, immunology and microbiology
appeared to them to fall into this category. However, two (8.c) suggested that universities
with a more comprehensive spread of disciplines might be less likely to generate
exploitable IP than less comprehensive universities, where it would be easier to devote
effort and resources to this kind of activity in a more focussed way.
The two Deans and the remaining HoDs thought that the particular spread of disciplines
per se had no influence on the amount of exploitable IP which might be generated. One (F)
felt that the organisation of the various disciplines might have an influence, however. In
his view, IP was most likely to arise at the interface between disciplines; if there was too
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much compartmentalisation, academics from different disciplines would only converse by
chance, rather than by design. This particular HoD welcomed Liverpool's move towards
grouping Departments informally into Schools, which cut across Faculty boundaries in
some cases. Another (a) argued that the amount of exploitable IP generated was a function
of the calibre of the members of staff, that departments with "lots of good ideas and
entrepreneurial people" would be most likely to generate exploitable IP, irrespective of the
discipline. The two Deans expressed similar views. One (2) said that the amount of
exploitable IP generated was directly related to the level of activity of the staff in a given
Department and the calibre of that activity; a good rating in the research selectivity
exercises was indicative of lots of activity - and lots of potential for IP. The other (1)
suggested that the ethos of the University influenced the amount of exploitable IP
generated:
"... getting the right sort of thinking in the University ... thinking about what ... I
mean, that is the whole point about being enterprising and entrepreneurial. It is
your outlook, not what is available ..."
(ii) Awareness of the University's Wish to Identify IP
Asked how aware they thought staff in their department were of the University's wish to
identify potentially exploitable IP, two HoDs judged that their staff were not at all aware.
One (a) felt that his staff were all as ignorant as he was. The other (F) suggested that his
staff were unaware because they were oriented towards the department's aspirations,
rather than the University's; in his view, his staff had become disenchanted with the
concept of "the University" as a result of the ever-increasing stream of demands
emanating from the centre since 1984-85.
The other four HoDs judged that their staff were reasonably aware. One ( c) commented
that he always copied circulars on this subject to his staff. Two (`' ,1)) remarked that general
levels of awareness had increased as a result of most members of staff joining a major
departmental research group. The last ( E.) attributed the level of awareness in his
department to the fact that many members of staff had done contract research for industry.
The two Deans judged that staff in their Faculties were not very aware of the University's
wish to identify IP. One (2) suggested this was because it was something they virtually
never heard about. The other (1) distinguished between intellectual awareness and
emotional awareness; in his view, staff might be intellectually aware, but they were not
emotionally aware of the University's wish, with the result that it was not at the forefront
of their minds.
(iii) Responsibility for Identifying IP
Two of the four HoDs who judged that their staff were reasonably aware of the
University's wish to identify IP (''`, a) felt that their staff would take a positive view of
being asked to "flag" potentially exploitable research results; indeed, one (A) complained
that some of his staff had too positive an attitude, that they sometimes persuaded the
University to patent IP which he did not think was worth protecting. The other two felt
that their staff resented having this onus put upon them, but that they begrudgingly
accepted it in view of the financial constraints under which the University was operating.
One (c) said:
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"... They don't like it, but it is part of the university system. The Government has
taken so much money out of the system that they know it will collapse unless they
go and ferret about for money ..."
The other (D) said:
"... we are all pretty well aware of our entrepreneurial responsibilities now. I
think that uptil now, it has been more involved with the generation of research
income rather than having exploitable results at the end of those periods. But I
think we are all pretty well aware about that ..."
One of the Deans (1) expressed similar a similar view:
"... I mean, it seems to me no more responsibility than getting research [funding]
... I mean, once you get into the mood of looking for money, it is as easy as
falling off a wall, in a sort of way. I mean, I'll put it bluntly. Once you get into
the mood of applying for research grants, it is straightforward. Or writing a
paper. It is all part of this whole matter of... I mean, it is all a matter of being
constantly vigilant ..."
One of the HoDs who judged that their staff were not at all aware of the University's wish
to identify IP (B) felt that they would probably take a positive view of being asked to "flag"
potentially exploitable research results - if they knew about it, adding: "There is enough in
the sub-culture of universities these days to realise that an entrepreneurial instinct is
encouraged". The other (F) did not think his staff would take a positive attitude, even if
they knew about it. He said:
"... They contact [ORSIL] for all sorts of advice, but mainly in terms of
procedures for developing University contracts ... They are willing to use the
procedures because they can't operate in any other way. But I don't think they see
it as a benefit to the University. They see it as a benefit to the Department and
their [own] immediate needs. They are not motivated by the fact that the University
is generating an income from it ... Because ... there is a rather iconoclastic view
in the Department that the UFC ought to be [providing] it ..."
The other Dean (2) expressed a similar view, suggesting that unless staff in his Faculty
could grasp the real benefits of "flagging" potentially exploitable research results, they
would simply resent it as an extra burden being placed upon them.
Three interviewees (A. ir, 2) said that responsibility for identifying IP should rest equally - if
not principally - with the ILO; all three felt the ILO should adopt a proactive rather than a
reactive approach to the task. One (A) felt that the ILO could be more proactive than he
had been to date - for example, by organising a seminar on IP as part of the staff
development programme and targetting younger researchers, rather than established ones.
Three interviewees (D. E ' 1) felt that in an ideal world, the ILO should adopt a proactive
approach, but that this was not practicable, given the size of the University. One (Bp
suggested that ORSIL should concentrate on consciousness-raising instead, on
"develop[ind the climate to know that [staff] should go and talk to them if they have
questions in this area". The Dean (1) proposed that a more effective modus operandi would
be to delegate this responsibility to departments; he envisaged a technology transfer
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correspondent being appointed and trained, as a parallel activity to departmental research
correspondents.
The other two interviewees felt that the ILO should take a purely reactive approach. One
(B) said there was no point in "bombarding" his particular department with "stuff about
patent agents and filing"; he added that he would not encourage his staff to talk to
members of ORSIL about applications of their research interests. In his view, ORSIL
should restrict itself to talking about research funding; everything else was a waste of
time. The other (c) simply felt that it was not practicable for the ILO or his staff to trawl
around several hundred academics looking for potentially exploitable research results;
moreover, even if it were, staff would perceive it as "pestering".
(iv)	 Strategies for Identifying IP
Asked to consider whether formally scrutinising research proposals, interim and/or final
reports would be a useful strategy for identifying potentially exploitable IP, one of the
Deans a) commented that the University would need to find a "fairly special person" to
make a success of the job. One HoD (c) doubted whether anyone had the necessary ability,
because it is so difficult to know what constitutes exploitable IP. He cited the case of
Cesar Milstein, whose monoclonal antibodies were not patented because a panel of experts
brought together by the MRC did not think they were worth protecting - a judgement
which transpired to be nearly as unfortunate as Oxford University's decision not to patent
penicillin. Three HoDs (''' D felt it would certainly be a waste of time and effort for the
staff of the IL office to do this, since they lacked the necessary expertise; another (B)
suggested that the staff of the IL office should scrutinise selectively, only within their own
disciplines. Only one HoD (`') thought that scrutinising research proposals, interim and/or
final reports centrally was a good idea - because in his view, academics are not business-
oriented and have no eye for what is commercial.
None of the HoDs or Deans thought that this was a task which should be devolved to
Faculty research committees - either because it was outwith the remit of the committee, or
because committee members would resent having this burden placed upon them. However,
several thought it was a task which could be devolved down to a departmental level. One
HoD a) suggested that it could be productive to ask the appropriate Professor to act as a
scrutineer - which would have the added advantage of enabling professorial staff to find
out what was going on in a very large department where communication was "a
nightmare". One of the Deans a) suggested that the HoD might use the annual appraisal
system to ascertain whether staff were generating potentially exploitable I'. Most felt it
was the responsibility of research group leaders, who should be alert with regard to
exploitation - and who should encourage alertness in their colleagues, too.
Asked to consider whether formally scrutinising drafts of papers before submission to
journals would be a useful strategy for identifying potentially exploitable IP, five
interviewees (B, C, E, 1.2) responded very negatively, describing the idea variously as
"horrendous", "a complete waste of time" and "an absolute non-starter". One recalled that
he had been obliged to do this when working for an American charity; in his experience,
the scrutineers tended to think a research result looked "exciting", only to decide several
months later that it was not; in the meantime, publication had been delayed. Several
commented that staff in their department wrote 50-70 papers a year, so on logistical
grounds alone, it was out of the question. Another remarked that there was enough paper
floating around the system as it was, while yet another was against the idea of the
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University or the department forcing individual academics to submit drafts of papers to
anyone for any reason.
One HoD (11.) felt that in principle, it was a worthwhile strategy for someone in the
department to scrutinise drafts of papers; in practice, though, he thought it would present
administrative difficulties which would be impossible to overcome. Only two (/`''')
responded positively to the idea; both felt that research group leaders should act as
scrutineers for papers emanating from their own group - though informally, rather than
formally. One (''') pointed out that in any case, no well-regulated research group should
allow individual members to publish without the research group leader's permission - or
without the research group leader having quality-controlled the paper.
8.3	 Ownership of Intellectual Property Created by Academics
Asked whether they thought it was more appropriate for IP to belong to the University or
to the academic(s) who created it, four interviewees ("•11,1',1) said that it should belong to
the University. All but one explained their answer in terms of the fact that the University
provided the environment in which the IP was created; the other ( t) commented that there
was no longer a tremendous difference between researchers working in industry and those
working in academia - so there was no reason for UK patent law to distinguish between
them.
Two interviewees (c.2) suggested that joint ownership might be the most appropriate. The
HoD acknowledged that the University supplied the environment, but he pointed out that
the University did not supply the ideas, that academics themselves assumed responsibility
for the direction of their work. He added: "It seems almost blood-sucking to let someone
make a discovery and then take it away from him and not give him any rights
whatsoever".
The two remaining HoDs (D.E.) felt that the IP should belong to the academic(s) who
created it. One a)) observed (erroneously) that the University's policy made it clear that it
would assert sole ownership and added:
"... It does seem perhaps a little bit strange that if I, as a member of staff, come
up with a brilliant idea which had enormous potential for exploitation, this could
be whisked out of my hands without the slightest by your leave ..."
The other commented that if the University was prepared to assume responsibility for
protecting and arranging the exploitation of the IP - and the associated costs, yet give half
the proceeds to the academic(s), this was probably "the best of all worlds" from their
perspective.
8.4	 Protecting Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)	 Attitude to Protecting IP Created by Academics
Seven interviewees (A, B. C. D. F, 1, 2) agreed in principle with the general concept of
"protecting" IP generated by academic research, as did both Deans. Two ( A•11) explained
this in terms of national interest:
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"... I think there is everything to be said for stopping the Americans - and I would
say the Germans next, the French, the Japanese and everybody else - getting our
ideas before we do ..."
"... I think if one stood out against it, then I think you ... I think the hawks of this
world would get you ..."
Another (F) explained his support for the concept in terms of the benefit to the University:
"... Well, because, you know, if there is an honest penny to be turned by the
University, that is obviously a reasonable way of doing it ..."
Several drew attention to associated problems, however. For instance, one ( c) observed
that world-wide patents were the only ones which companies could not get around, and
that the cost (financially and in terms of the temporary but doubtless lengthy restrictions
on publication) meant that universities should be highly selective about protecting IP in
this manner.
The other interviewee (E) was against the general concept of "protecting" IP generated by
academic research, saying:
"... It would kill, in my view, the development of science and engineering. At
present, I feel I can go anywhere in the world in any laboratory in the world (sic)
and openly talk to the people, I mean, the top people in charge of the
laboratories, about research we are doing now or what we will be doing next year
or what we did last year, with no problems at all. We share information
backwards and forwards like that by correspondence ... and so on. If what you
are suggesting came to pass, all that would go and I think it would just kill it ..."
When asked to consider the fact that universities are not legally obliged to patent
patentable IP, that they have the right to "protect" it by treating it as secret know-how
instead, this same HoD (E) expressed surprise and concern, saying that he had no idea that
the law allowed the University to dictate that a research discovery should be kept secret.
Another (I?) was of the opinion that secret know-how militated against the idea of what a
university stood for. One of the Deans ( 2) felt it was appropriate to distinguish between
publicly- and privately-funded research; in his view, it would be wrong to allow research
discoveries which had been publicly-funded to be "hived off' as secret know-how. One
HoD (c) suggested that the decision to treat a discovery as secret know-how should be
made by the academic(s) concerned, not the University, since they, rather than the
University, would have to suffer the restrictive consequences. Another (") suggested that
the correct approach was not difficult to determine:
"... If you have a good idea that is workable and there is some national value in
protecting it [by treating it as secret know-how], then you should protect it. If you
have any other kind of good idea that will do something for the national
reputation, the reputation of your university, then you should not [protect] it. You
should publish it ..."
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Two interviewees (11.1) had no problem with the idea of treating academic research
discoveries as secret know-how, suggesting that the end justifies the means. The Dean
remarked that if the University wanted to act as a resource to the community, this was a
price which might sometimes have to be paid; he added that it was not so different from,
say, a member of the Faculty of Law giving advice on a criminal matter - which would
clearly have to be kept secret.
However, half the interviewees (12' E. F, 2) concluded that if there was a choice, patenting IP
was preferable to treating it as secret know-how.
(ii) Who Decides Whether and How to Protect IP Created by Academics?
Only one of the interviewees (1) was correct in his estimation of how the University
proposed to handle a situation in which the IL office and the academic(s) concerned
disagreed about whether and how to protect IP which they had generated - ie. the Senior
Management Team would be called upon to decide. Three interviewees (1), E, 2) guessed that
the Vice-Chancellor would reserve the right to decide, while another (B) suggested that in
the final analysis, if the Vice-Chancellor and the academic(s) concerned were at
loggerheads over this question, the Chancellor would be called in to arbitrate. One HoD (F)
confessed to having no idea how the University would handle this, while the remaining
two (A. c) observed that in reality, whatever the University decided, the academic(s)
concerned could decide, since it would be impossible for the University to prevent them
from publishing, if they were so minded.
Three HoDs (''' D. F) felt it was appropriate for the University (ie. the Senior Management
Team) to make this kind of decision, provided the academic(s) concerned were given a
genuine and fair hearing. One m suggested that taking the decision centrally would result
in a better decision, since academics were frequently unable to see the value of what they
were doing and were therefore a poor judge of matters commercial. The other three HoDs
(A, C, 
E) disagreed; all three felt that the academic(s) concerned should have the right to
make the final decision. One (E) indicated that he would be "terribly unhappy" if academics
could be overruled in this way. The other two were not unduly concerned, however; both
felt that in practice, it would be impossible for the University to prevent academics from
publishing - indeed, one (c) remarked that if necessary, he would instruct his staff how to
get around the University's ruling.
The Deans were loathe to agree or disagree. One (2) expressed concern about the danger to
academic freedom if the University chose to prevent academics from publishing; he
conceded, however, that the climate had changed during the previous decade, with the
result that everybody in the University was "hugely conscious" of the need to generate an
income.
(iii) Attitude to the Logistics of Protecting IP By Patent
None of the interviewees took issue with the University's policy of immediately bringing
in a patent agent to draft patent specifications - unless the academic(s) concerned preferred
to produce the first draft themselves. However, two HoDs felt that, having voluntarily
assumed this responsibility, academics should simply find the time to produce the requisite
patent specification, without being assisted by their colleagues. One ('') suggested that if
they were motivated enough to report their discovery to the IL office and to assume
responsibility, it should not present a problem. The other (E) saw no reason for other
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members of his staff to help the academic(s) concerned to reap 50 per cent of the resulting
profits.
A third HoD (") said that in practice, his staff would probably have to find the time, too,
though where some members of staff were concerned he would be sympathetic to the idea
of a temporary reduction in their workload, if at all possible. He recalled that he had once
been given a month off undergraduate teaching by his HoD to help him produce seven
research proposals; in his view, the department was still run on the basis of this kind of
"practical common sense". Another (1)) remarked that everyone in the department had a
heavy workload, and it would be wrong for anyone to automatically expect colleagues to
assume part of their workload just because their research results happened to be potentially
exploitable. On the other hand, he was sympathetic to the idea of trying to help by
temporarily reducing lecturing and administrative commitments - if the case warranted it;
he observed that the spirit of the department was sufficiently good that, if asked face to
face to help out, no member of staff was likely to turn him down.
Only one HoD (c) indicated that he would be prepared to formally create the time for the
academic(s) concerned to draft their patent specification - if it was "something terribly
exciting". In his view, the department was big enough to give someone the equivalent of a
brief sabbatical, in order to do the job well. He acknowledged that members of staff who
were asked to undertake extra work were likely to be resentful; he indicated that he would
make sure the extra work was shouldered by those who could not or would not generate
an income for the department.
One of the Deans (1) felt that drafting a patent specification should not be singled out as a
task requiring more assistance than any other. However, he was also of the opinion that
departments needed to be altogether more flexible than most of them were - "standing in
for each other at the drop of a hat"; in his view, most members of staff in the Faculty
needed to make "an intellectual and emotional jump" and see the value to be gained from
helping out - eg. gaining insights into another specialist area through temporarily teaching
outside their own specialisation.
8.5
	
Entrepreneurially Exploiting IP Created by Academics
(i)	 Exploiting "Hard" Intellectual Property
Asked to give their views on the idea of exploiting "hard" IP entrepreneurially instead of
licensing it to an existing company, five interviewees (A.B. '. B ' F) signified their approval-
in-principal, while three (I).1.1) were more ambivalent. One (B) remarked that Liverpool had
started to discuss this idea - and the idea of a science park - as far back as the 1970s, but
that it had "missed the boat" through being too cautious; unlike certain other universities,
Liverpool had not been prepared to "[go] ahead, pick up the ball and run with it" until
well into the 1980s. He attributed this to the ambivalence of the Vice-Chancellor of the
time. Another (") commented that, thanks to its lay officers, the University was still too
cautious; in his view, the University should show a degree of imagination and take £5m
from its investment income and invest it in its staff on a high-risk basis - recognising that
it might "blow it all" - but on the other hand, it might make £100m. A third ( c) observed
that the University was full of plant and equipment which was lying around unused for
half the year when it could be exploited commercially, as long as the University had first
call on it. He recalled visiting another UK university which had built itself an unusually
picturesque staff house; it was rented out on Saturdays as a location for wedding
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receptions - a concept which he had found very strange until he thought about the
advantages.
Some interviewees were equally in favour of independent academic spin-off companies,
joint ventures and university companies. One (E) commented that in a such a large
university with such diverse disciplines, it was essential to be able to "develop companies"
by as many different mechanisms as possible. Other interviewees felt that some types of
spin-off company were more appropriate than others. One (6) was in favour of university
companies and joint ventures with members of staff but was less happy about independent
academic spin-off companies. He felt that if a company did well, it was certain to impinge
on the academic's departmental responsibilities; in the end, the academic would be forced
to choose between
the University and the company. He was concerned not about losing a member of staff but
about how long it might take before it became obvious that making a choice was
desirable - because the academic concerned was writing fewer and fewer papers and
obliging colleagues to shoulder his responsibilities. Conversely, one of the Deans ( 2) was
happy about the idea of independent academic spin-off companies, but less enthusiastic
about joint ventures and university companies; in his view, academics should be
encouraged to go out and be "buccaneers", but this should be done at arms' length. He
acknowledged that the University's latest joint venture had apparently been a tremendous
success; he attributed this to the fact that the technology to be exploited was extremely
simple and that everyone had wanted the venture to succeed, with the result that
considerable time and money was devoted to the project. He did not see how the
University could afford to devote that much time and money to a whole series of joint
ventures and university companies.
One HoD (1)) confessed that he had long been mildly curious about the benefits and
penalties of exploiting "hard" IP entrepreneurially, but that he had never found the time to
indulge his curiosity. The other Dean ( 2) admitted that he had never devoted much thought
to such questions, either.
(ii)	 Exploiting "Soft" Intellectual Property
Interviewees were asked for their views on three mechanisms by which academics could
exploit "soft" IP: personal consultancy, commercial arms of departments and various types
of spin-off company.
As we have seen, by custom and practice academic staff at Liverpool are allowed upto a
day a week for personal consultancy - which two of the HoDs and F1 did not know. Only
one of the Deans (2) was unequivocally in favour of haying a time limit, though one HoD
(12) remarked that it was not unreasonable to have one. Another HoD (E) suggested there
should be a guideline, rather than an absolute time limit, because some members of staff
could comfortably handle more consultancy work, while others would be hard pressed to
do half as much. Two interviewees (11. 1) felt it was simply not tenable to impose an
arbitrary time limit. In the Dean's view, academics should be treated like adults and
allowed to decide for themselves how much consultancy they should do; if they did too
much and their work suffered, this should be made clear to them at their annual appraisal.
He felt that imposing a time limit reflected the University's "dog in the manger attitude"
to academics who earned money over and above their salary, rather than genuine concern
about the possible affect on their work. Two HoDs F) said that it was not the amount of
personal consultancy which could present a problem so much as the type; both stressed
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that they actively discouraged "routine" or "bread and butter" consultancy, but not
consultancy which was liable to yield contract research in an area which the department
wanted to develop (it) or otherwise unattainable data and the resources to exploit it a).
Reactions to the particular time limit specified by the University varied tremendously. One
HoD (c) suggested that if staff could get paid for upto 20 per cent of their time from
outside sources, this was surely to be encouraged? He also asked how the time limit
should be interpreted, given that most of his staff were working about 100 hours a week.
Another ar) expressed concern about the high proportion of the working week which the
University time limit allowed his staff to devote to personal consultancy. One of the Deans
(2) felt that a day a week should be regarded as the upper limit, rather than the norm.
Another HoD (") described the limit as "a figment of the Vice-Chancellor's imagination",
because he could not think of a single member of the department who had done anywhere
near that much personal consultancy. Asked what proportion of their staff actually did
personal consultancy, HoDs' estimates varied considerably. One (cl said that only 5 per
cent of his department currently did personal consultancy, while another (1') suggested that
in his department it was closer to 25 per cent. Two felt (B. ' that between 33 and 50 per
cent of their department would do some personal consultancy over the course of a year.
One (B) was unable to put a figure on it. All six HoDs emphasised that none of their staff
ever devoted to personal consultancy anywhere near a day a week, averaged out over the
year. Indeed, one a') reported that his staff spent no more than a day a year on it. Another
(") estimated that his staff did no more than a week a year, adding that his was a "pure"
department in which personal consultancy was "frowned upon".
Most interviewees acknowledged that there were advantages and disadvantages to their
staff doing personal consultancy. It was suggested that personal consultancy could have a
negative impact on their interest in discovering and understanding new knowledge ( c), their
ability to do research (B), their publication rate (A. E. E' 2) , the attention which they paid to
students (B. E' 2) , their administrative workload a) - or that it would simply mean that they
were not around when they should be ( A)• On the other hand, it could also yield valuable
connections (B), provide access to facilities which the University could not afford (c),
enable staff to gain new expertise ( B), open their minds to what goes on outside academia
(1)), provide new material for undergraduate classes (B) , suggest new research areas (B), -
and bring contract research money into the Department (B. c).
Only one of the HoDs interviewed a) reported that his department had set up a
commercial arm - in fact, two - to market the expertise of various members of staff. The
other five felt that a commercial arm would not be appropriate in their department. One (A)
said that his staff were already working "fiat out" and there was no point in creating a
mechanism which would bring in even more work. Two (1). E.) said that staff were efficient
enough at attracting consultancy work without the need for a formal mechanism. Another
(B) referred to this as a "tetchy subject", explaining that similar departments in other
universities had set up commercial arms to market routine test facilities - which made a lot
of money but which diverted people's energies from academically productive projects.
Only one (c) indicated that the department might set up a commercial arm in the forseeable
future - to market both equipment and expertise.
The first HoD (1) recalled how he had inherited two commercial arms which had been
created on the strength of a "bottom-up" rather than a "top-down" initiative - though both
had the University's blessing. Both did academic research as well as commercial
consultancy and both were gaining an international reputation; however, each operated on
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an appreciably different basis. The first had a dedicated technician and secretary and paid
individual members of staff a daily consultancy fee to do consultancy work as and when
required. The second ploughed all its consultancy income back into the unit and used it to
pay for a temporary lecturer so that the senior lecturer involved could devote more time to
marketing staff expertise. Each had been the cause of considerable resentment within the
department. In the HoD's view, the second enabled "a flush of young post-does" to go
through the department, which was a tremendous asset. One of the Deans (1) felt that
neither model was a good one, since neither directly benefitted the host department
financially; this was his principal criticism of the commercial arm of another department
which had been set up in the 1970s, which the University spun-off as a separate company
at the end of the 1980s.
Asked what they felt about the idea that academics who do a lot of consultancy tend
eventually to set up their own business, one HoD (A) remarked that it was nonsense for
anyone to imagine that academics sit around all day waiting for things to do, and that
becoming an academic entrepreneur was simply one of the options open to them:
"... I would have said that half the academics in this Department ... without any
entrepreneurship at all, they are working 50-hour weeks. So, I don't see any
reason why anybody should consider that they should, apart from doing admin,
teaching, research, sitting on ... well, in my case, 35 committees, they should
really be expected to be entrepreneurs as well ..."
In his view, academic entrepreneurship was to be regarded positively only if an academic
wanted to devote extra hours to it, and if it was for the benefit of the area.
Despite their concern about the disadvantages of extensive consultancy, several HoDs
claimed they saw academic entrepreneurship as a positive side effect of it. One (11)
described academic start-up companies as one of the important contributions a university
could make to the outside world. Another (I)) felt that if staff chose to exploit their
expertise via an independent academic spin-off company, this might solve the problem of
them undertaking so much consultancy that it impacted on the work of the department as a
whole. He pointed out that an independent academic spin-off company had no
responsibility for teaching, administration or research; it could concentrate wholly on
consultancy, if it chose to, recruiting other staff to keep up with demand, if necessary.
The two Deans also felt that if there was an association between extensive consultancy and
academic entrepreneurship, this was no bad thing; it was to the national advantage if
academics got involved in wealth-creating activities ( 2) and if they ended up leaving the
University, this should bring new blood into the University ( 1). Only one HoD (1 suggested
that an association between extensive consultancy and academic entrepreneurship might be
a cause for concern - though he felt it was probably wrong to generalise. This particular
HoD based his views on knowledge of academics from other universities but from his
discipline who had become entrepreneurs:
"... it is almost invariably to the detriment of the department and the university
and the students, particularly. They are not such useful, flexible university
servants, you know, at a departmental level, as they are when they are not doing
this sort of thing ..."
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8.6	 Support for Entrepreneurial Academics
(i)	 Time
None of the HoDs and Deans interviewed took issue with the idea of would-be academic
entrepreneurs devoting the time they normally spent on consultancy to trying to start up a
company to exploit their research discoveries/expertise; as we have seen, though, staff in
these particular departments apparently devoted considerably less time to consultancy than
the day per week which they were allowed.
There was less of a concensus over the idea of helping academics start a company to
exploit their research discoveries/expertise by formally reducing their workload for a
period while continuing to pay their full salary. Four HoDs were against this idea. One (A)
argued that company start-up was nothing to do with an academic's primary
responsibilities, which he saw as teaching and research; he would therefore resist
suggestions that such activities should constitute part of a member of staff's departmental
workload, even on a temporary basis, unless the Vice-Chancellor requested such an
arrangement. Should that ever happen, he did not envisage any logistical problem, since
his was a large department in which the same courses were taught for many years; as a
result, it was not difficult to find another member of staff to stand in for someone at short
notice. A fellow HoD (') took the opposite view, claiming that formally reducing a
member of staffs normal workload for a period would present him with a major logistical
problem; setting up a workable sabbatical system in his department had been "a major
struggle", even though it was essential for the development of individual members of staff.
Since it it had been so difficult to achieve the flexibility required for this traditional
university activity, this particular HoD indicated he would prefer not to ask staff to adopt
an even more flexible modus operandi, whatever the reason. A third HoD (p) remarked
that he would not be sympathetic towards members of staff who wanted partial remission
of departmental duties in order to devote time to company start-up - or, indeed, to any
activity done of their own volition and for their own benefit. He made no distinction
between academics wishing to start up independent spin-off companies and those who
might be involved in joint venture with the University, classing the latter as "more in line
with the man who is doing work [on] his initiative, for his own benefit, rather than a man
doing work for the department". However, if the company interacted with the department
and financially benefitted the department - in the long term at least, then he would be
prepared to include such entrepreneurial activities in his assessment of the overall load
carried by the member(s) of staff concerned; the scale of the reduction would take account
of the extent to which the member(s) of staff concerned benefitted personally from the
company, not just the benefit to the department. The fourth HoD (c) felt that even if the
department was likely to benefit financially from a member of staffs entrepreneurial
activities, it was inappropriate to reduce their normal departmental duties so that they
could devote more time to business:
"... the payback to the University is not ... the payback may be a bit financial, but
you are not going to get an intellectual trade back from these sort of companies ...
Salford is [a university] that is into these sort of things ... Salford were (sic) a
downtrodden university which needed to get money in, okay? They did get money
in this way, but the level of academic achievement at Salford - academic as
opposed to getting money from industrialists - is very small ..."
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This particular HoD also thought that helping staff with their entrepreneurial ventures in
this way would trigger a conflict of interests:
"... in the end, when you get involved in these companies, it becomes all-
embracing and your raison d'etre is not academic. I think that they have moved
outside the university sphere ..."
Two HoDs were open to the idea of formally reducing a member of staff's workload for a
period to help them to start a company up to exploit their research discoveries/expertise.
One (B) argued that logistically it was no different to organising sabbaticals, and that it
should not be difficult to get other people to shoulder a would-be academic entrepreneur's
teaching and supervision for a while; however, he would only sanction this on condition
that the University gave both moral and financial support to the department. One of the
Deans (2) also argued that the University should consider providing financial support to
cover the cost of bringing in a part-time lecturer, to prevent colleagues from becoming
resentful about the extra burden they would otherwise have to bear. However, the other
Dean (1) was sceptical about the extent to which a reduction in an individual's teaching
load need burden fellow members of the department. He remarked that academics have a
tendency to "over-teach" and that temporarily reducing a would-be academic
entrepreneur's workload would provide an ideal opportunity for the department to rethink
how it went about its teaching. He added that someone who was trying to become an
academic entrepreneur should be treated in the same way as a member of staff who
wanted to work in industry for a spell, or become an MP; academic entrepreneurship was
yet another manifestation of the links increasingly being forged between the University
and the community. As such, he felt it was not something to be decided purely at a
departmental level; the Senior Management Team should also be involved. The other HoD
(E.) was of the view that temporarily reducing a member of staff's workload to help them to
start up a company should certainly be considered - if the University or the department
stood to gain in the longer term from the entrepreneurial activities of the member(s) of
staff concerned.
The two Deans felt that switching would-be academic entrepreneurs to a part-time contract
for a period was preferable to temporarily reducing their workload but continuing to pay
them on a full-time basis. One (2) remarked that you could always get would-be academic
entrepreneurs to devote the hours they worked in the University to cover essential teaching
and departmental administration. The other 0) commented that a part-time contract was a
particularly appropriate mechanism to employ with regard to would-be academic
entrepreneurs, because it helped promote the movement of people into and out of the
University, thus preventing stagnation.
Three HoDs were in favour of this means of supporting would-be academic entrepreneurs,
too, despite perceived difficulties. One (") said that the early retirement scheme had
demonstrated that part-time contracts offered an acceptable solution to the problem of
retaining the skills of members of staff who wished to pursue interests outside the
framework of the University. Another (c) pointed out that academics were already being
seconded on a part-time basis to departments like continuing education, where the
objective was to earn money for the University by low-grade activities such as teaching,
not to engage in high-grade academic activities. In his view, this was certainly justifiable
in the case of individuals whose research was faltering, whose allegiance to the department
would not be compromised, who could be relied upon to fulfil their remaining
departmental commitments; it might also be wise to sanction part-time contracts for
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dynamic researchers, since people were more productive if you helped them to follow the
route which they wished to travel. The third HoD (E) felt that options like this should
certainly be in the University's "armoury of possibilities" , despite attendant difficulties.
The other three HoDs did not regard switching would-be academic entrepreneurs to a part-
time contract for a period as preferable to temporarily reducing their normal workload but
continuing to pay them on a full-time basis - largely because of the attendant difficulties.
One (El) pointed out that although the University had originally envisaged HoDs having
maximum flexibility when devolved budgets were introduced, in practice this flexibility
had not materialised. HoDs were forced to work towards savings targets imposed by the
centre, with the result that they could not necessarily use the salary saved to provide
teaching cover for members of staff who wished to switch to a part-time contract; in
individual cases, the University might occasionally be persuaded to agree to a HoD using
the salary saved, but there would inevitably be a considerable time-lag before the
department could get permission to do so. The same point was made by two fellow HoDs
(".1) ; one (1r) added that, even if the University agreed to a temporary, part-time
appointment, it would insist on appointing someone on the lecturer scale - which usually
meant a low-calibre appointment. This particular HoD felt that complete leave of absence
might be marginally less problematical, because the calibre of full-time temporary staff
tended to be higher; however, they were usually inexperienced when it came to
departmental administration, whether they were full-time or part-time.
Most HoDs interviewed indicated that granting would-be academic entrepreneurs complete
leave of absence was equally problematical. Nonetheless, several felt they should be
supportive, upto a point. One (c) observed that his attitude would depend on the type of
company which the would-be academic entrepreneur wished to set up; he did not have a
positive view of "widget-producing companies" because they involved "no academic input
whatsoever". Two (11•1)) said they would support a request for complete leave of absence
for a maximum of one year, but would not endorse an extension to the agreed period of
absence. One (11) described extensions as "a sort of nightmare scenario" and added:
"... If somebody said - I want to go for a [further] year to set up this commercial
enterprise, then I think there is a very severe question mark against them in terms
of their future in the department" ...
In his opinion, the priorities of would-be academic entrepreneurs who took leave of
absence would soon conflict with the priorities of the department. One of the Deans (1) saw
this quite differently, suggesting that HoDs should not only support applications from
would-be academic entrepreneurs for complete leave of absence, but should also lobby for
an extension to previously agreed periods of absence, provided they had concrete evidence
of what the academic and his company were trying to achieve. He added:
"... a bit of change of identity is what is needed. I mean, what people don't worry
about is people getting ossified. I mean, people have been in this University for 30
years! I've been here myself [for] 20 years now. You know, although I move
around, it's not the same as actually changing job. Really changing job ..."
One HoD (''`) was very much in favour - in principle - of academics being given complete
leave of absence for entrepreneurial purposes. He said:
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"... I asked [the Vice-Chancellor] thfis] question: If you want to do something for
Liverpool, what you should do is allow the fifteen best entrepreneurs in the
University to get out there and be entrepreneurs. And he said that he was totally
in favour of that and had never refused anybody permission ..."
In practice, though, he indicated he would find it hard to support members of staff in his
department who wished to pursue this course, because the University did nothing to
facilitate this process - either from the department's perspective or the would-be academic
entrepreneur's:
"... I mean, the sort of things that I thought would be a good idea is if the person
could actually do that but stay in the pension scheme and maintain tenure ...
Keeping the chance to come back, to minimise the risk to them personally. So, (fit
goes wrong, they have got a job to come back to ..."
The other Dean a) thought that granting complete leave of absence to would-be academic
entrepreneurs would present serious logistical problems in most departments in the Faculty
- unless the HoD was adroit enough to find a way around them. In principle, he was not
against the idea - or against extending previously agreed periods of absence, provided it
did not lower the morale of the department; in practice, he thought that the entrepreneurial
academic's relationship with fellow members of the department was probably crucial -
particularly if the University was not prepared to help out the department with financial
support.
(ii)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications,
Accommodation
None of the HoDs or Deans interviewed was aware that the University was prepared in
principle to let entrepreneurial academics have access to these facilities, provided they
paid the full, market rate for all of them except existing accommodation, for which no
charge was made.
Upon hearing that this was the University's policy, four HoDs (8,c, o, '') and one of the
Deans a) signified their approval. One a.) added that he had just independently introduced a
similar set of regulations within his department to govern the use of departmental
resources for contract research; this had been necessary to avert "head-on rows" about
using them for non-traditional purposes. Nonetheless, this particular HoD felt there should
be an element of departmental pump-priming in the start-up phase, in order to help get
entrepreneurial ventures like academic spin-off companies or commercial units off the
ground: "I [would] say: this technician is at your disposal. Let's see if we can make a go
of it". One of the Deans a) thought that whether this sort of pump-priming was done as
consciously as this or not, entrepreneurial academics inevitably benefitted from the
University's witting or unwitting generosity during the start-up phase:
"... Businesses don't go from not being in existence to being in existence.
Somebody doesn't pay [nothing] and then suddenly start paying immediately the
activity starts. There is usually a gradual change ..."
He felt that, within reason, the University should be happy to be supportive in this way:
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"... I think that in most cases it is in the University's interest to retain good
relations with people of this sort ... I am pretty sure that if you sour relations
early on, then, you know, if success does come to that individual, the University
would not benefit from longer-term collaboration and cross-fertilisation in research
support [in] the way it could have done if it kept good relations ..."
Another HoD (E) expressed similar views, saying he thought that the University's
insistence on charging the full, market rate could militate against academic entrepreneurs
getting their company off the ground. He advocated flexibility, especially if the University
stood to gain from the company in one way or another in the longer term. The other Dean
(1) argued in favour of a flexible approach, too, suggesting that the University should judge
the charges to be paid for use of such facilities on a case-by-case basis, taking account of
individual circumstances. Another HoD (c) pointed to the advantages inherent in receiving
a quid pro quo in kind, or as an indirect financial benefit, rather than a direct financial
benefit.
Only one HoD (A) felt that the University's policy of charging the full, market rate would
present a problem in practice - because of the relatively small size and portability of the
equipment and instrumentation used in his discipline:
"... If a person wants to use a high-speed oscilloscope, he will nip into the next
lab and borrow one. Nobody will say - what do you need it for? Because, you
know, equipment circulates around at an enormous rate. I've no idea where it is
"...
(iii)	 Financial Support
None of the HoDs and Deans interviewed was aware that the University was not prepared
to provide financial support for entrepreneurial academics in the form of an innovation
grant or a "soft" loan or equity. Upon hearing that this was the University's policy, one of
the Deans (2' speculated about the University's reasons, concluding that it was probably
insufficiently experienced in such matters as to be confident that it would not lose a lot of
money. A HoD (B) felt it was typical of the University's extremely cautious attitude and
added:
"... I find that difficult. I think it depends on what it is. If someone said - look,
I've just got a new anti-AIDS drug and I've tested it against this retrovirus and it
does work, I think the University would be crazy not to put money into it ... If you
have got a good guy with a good idea and a good background, fine. Back him!"
The other Dean (') commented that if he were Vice-Chancellor, he would establish an
innovation fund - precisely for this kind of purpose, while another HoD (E) thought that the
University should not rule out the possibility of putting money into academic spin-off
companies. He added that he saw no distinction between the University getting a return on
research discoveries via royalties from patents which it paid for and getting a return via a
company set up to exploit research discoveries - in which it had an equity stake. Several
interviewees (A ' B' 2) added the caveat that in general, the University should decide whether
or not to provide financial support for entrepreneurial academics on the basis of the same
objective criteria which it employed with regard to its conventional investment activities.
Only two (A. c) felt that another, less objective criterion should be taken into account -
namely the value to the community of investing , in a spin-off company located in
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Liverpool.
Just one HoD (11) spoke against the idea of providing any kind of financial support for
entrepreneurial academics, saying that funding was so short for "so many pressing, urgent
needs of the University's own activities", the University was right not to make this a
priority.
8.7
	 Incentives and Disincentives
(i)	 Exploitation of "Soft" IP
None of the HoDs or Deans interviewed knew whether Liverpool imposed an earnings
limit on academics who choose to exploit their expertise via personal consultancy, though
one (A) suggested that the University would be unhappy if anyone reported earning more
than 20 per cent of their salary from personal consultancy. All but one felt that there was
no need for an earnings limit, because the crucial point was not how much academics
earned from extra-mural activities, but the amount of time they devoted to them; two
remarked that if an academic could do his job well and earn lots of money from personal
consultancy, "jolly good" (c) and "best of luck to him" (ED . Just one HoD (I') suggested that
an earnings limit might have value, in so far as it would define what constituted excessive,
obtrusive consultancy; in view of academics' different earning power, it would need to be
a guideline rather than a hard and fast rule, however.
All the interviewees except one (1) knew that the University levied a "tax" on academics'
earnings from personal consultancy, but only three (A.D. ') knew that the "tax rate" was
currently 25 per cent. Two (c.2) had no idea what the "tax rate" was, while two believed it
was still 10 or 20 per cent	 Five (11. C, D. E. F, 1) agreed in principle with Liverpool's
policy of levying a "tax", but three (c. D. E.) felt it was rather a high percentage rate, even
though it covered the cost of professional liability insurance. Some interviewees (C.1).1)
could not articulate why they were in favour of the University levying this "tax", while
others (D. ') said the University had to cover the cost of the professional liability insurance
it conferred on academics. One (E.) regarded the "tax" as compensation to the University
for time spent on non-academic activities, though he added the caveat that the University
should distinguish between "bread and butter" consultancy and consultancy which, by
virtue of breaking new ground, could be regarded as perfectly legitimate university work.
Two interviewees (( .2) disagreed completely with the principle of levying a "tax". Both
regarded it as a major disincentive to doing consultancy. Both felt that as long as
academics paid for the resources they used, the University should acknowledge the
benefits it reaped from individuals doing personal consultancy. One (2) pointed out that
most departments in the Faculty would be even more-hard pressed to identify real-world
undergraduate projects if they could not draw upon problems solved by individual
members of staff acting as consultants. The other said:
"... [the University] should not clobber those people who are bringing in large
research grants and are pump-priming those research grants with very small bits
of consultancy, which is what is happening in almost every group in the School ...
I invariably found that if somebody phoned and said - can we have a chat about
something, within a year's time I'd have a big research grant to look at that thing.
So, for instance, I think I got four or five Alvey grants by that. Every single one
came that way. Of the three son-of-Alvey-type programmes, every single one came
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that way. But ([the University is so short-sighted as to think that I am going to
spend my own time on a Sunday working to give them 25 per cent, then it's quite
clear that I won't do it ..."
Opinions were divided as to whether consultancy was one of the criteria for promotion.
Four HoDs CD, E) said they believed that consultancy was taken into account; one (12)
reported that he remembered this being discussed at the highest level in the mid-1980s,
and a formal decision being taken that it should count. Another (27) felt that "creative
consultancy" was taken into account, while "bread and butter consultancy" was
discounted. One Dean (1) said that consultancy would only be taken into account if the case
was properly argued, while the other (2) was sceptical about consultancy playing any part
at all in the committee's deliberations. The remaining HoD (") was certain that consultancy
was not taken into account, no matter what the University's policy said; as a result, he
went out of his way to deter young academics from doing consultancy - or short courses,
or anything but research:
"... my advice to every young member of staff is - concentrate on your research. If
you must do other things, do them ([you've got time. But ([you have got the time,
my suspicion is that you are not going to get promoted ..."
Most interviewees felt that consultancy should count as a criterion for promotion, but that
it should carry less weight than publications or a good track record in bringing in research
income. One (12) said that consultancy was an indicator of an academic's external standing,
while another (c) felt it was a service to the community.
(ii)	 Exploitation of "Hard" IP
Three interviewees (13' C, did not seem to know that the University had instituted financial
incentives to encourage members of staff to "flag" potentially exploitable IP - though they
knew about the percentage split of overheads between the centre and the department. Four(1), E, 1.2) were aware that the University split the income from the exploitation of "hard" IP
between the academic(s) concerned, the department and the centre, but were unaware of
the relevant percentages. One (") accurately detailed the split between the BTG and the
University, but did not know how the University split the proceeds.
When told how the University divided income from the exploitation of "hard" IP, none of
the interviewees felt that the 25 per cent which went to the department would act as an
incentive to HoDs to encourage members of staff to "flag" potentially exploitable research
results. One (1') pointed out that it was an insignificant percentage when compared to the
90 per cent which departments retained in overheads. Another (") said that in principle it
was "nice for heads of department to get a bit of soft money kicking around from the
exploitation of IP"; in practice, it was a meaningless incentive; the centre gave money
with one hand but took it away with the other, marking it down as departmental savings.
One (c) remarked that as a matter of course he encouraged members of staff to "flag"
potentially exploitable research results, irrespective of this supposed incentive; in his view,
it was not really an incentive, in any case, since there was no guaranteed reward for
someone taking the trouble to notify the University. Another (12) doubted it was worth
HoDs trying to encourage their staff since, unlike their counterparts in France, British
academics were motivated by the intrinsic value of their research, rather than by the
thought of deriving an income from it. This particular HoD felt that if their research
happened to generate an income, academics in his department would probably want the
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money to be spent on their research group, rather than keep it personally. Four
interviewees (B. E, F. 2) thought that this was a very individual thing, that some academics
would want their personal share of income from IP to go to their research group, while
others would prefer to put it towards the ubiquitous BMW. Two (A' 1) felt their staff
would - and should - want to keep their personal share of the income, whereas another 07)
regarded this as a corrupting influence:
" ... I think that is really a rather dangerous route. I suspect a lot of people would
be [swayed by the prospect of generating an income] ... It wouldn't be serendipity
next time round, would it?"
Only three interviewees (A. D. E) were aware that it was Liverpool's policy to levy a "tax"
on the income which academics make personally from entrepreneurially exploiting "hard"
IP arising from their research - though none of them knew the basis upon which this "tax"
liability was calculated. Upon hearing that it was either 15 per cent of the company's
annual profit or 25 per cent of the income paid to the academic entrepreneur personally,
one HoD a.) felt it was appropriate for the University to be recompensed in this way:
"... I don't regard an academic as employed from 9-5. I regard him as employed
seven days a week and therefore the commitment to the University is bound to be
diluted in some way if they are doing that ..."
Two HoDs (Lc initially applauded the University's flexibility vis-a-vis the way in which
the "tax" was calculated; on reflection, both came to the conclusion that since the
University was not taking any of the risk, it should not expect to share in either the
company's or the individual's profit. One of the Deans a) expressed the latter view
initially but decided on reflection that it was fair to "tax" academics with companies on
the same basis as those who did consultancy without sheltering behind a company
framework. Three interviewees (c. E' 1) said they had not formed an opinion about this;
after further reflection one (B) made the same analogy with the "tax" on consultancy. The
remaining HoD (A) pointed out that it was possible to circumvent this "tax" if the
circumstances warranted it; he cited an instance of a would-be academic entrepreneur who
approached the Vice-Chancellor directly and was told at the end of the discussion: "...
good on you, don't tell anybody".
Four interviewees (B. F. 1,2) said they had no idea whether academics who took the trouble
to "flag" potentially exploitable IP were liable to be rewarded in terms of promotion. Only
two (A. m knew that the promotions criteria made no reference to the protection or
exploitation of IP. One (A) interpreted this as an indication that academics' contributions to
technology transfer would not be taken into account, while the other ( E') felt that the
promotions committee would take account of commercial success, as well as academic
success. A fellow HoD (c) said that on the basis of past experience, the University was
certainly prepared to promote staff who generated a large income for the University - by
whatever means, while the remaining HoD (B) was of the opinion that IP played no part in
the criteria for promotion. Asked whether they thought that IP which was successfully
protected and/or exploited should be a criterion for promotion, only two interviewees gave
an unequivocal answer. One al said he would be "horrified" if this was regarded as
important by the promotions committee. The other a) felt it should depend on the calibre
of the IP and the academic's contribution towards its successful exploitation; one patent
might be worth twenty papers in refereed journals - or it might be insignificant; an
academic who had driven his discovery forward, in a fiercely competitive situation could
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be regarded as demonstrating ability on an international scale.
Asked whether they thought entrepreneurial exploitation of "hard" IP arising from
research was taken into account by the promotions committee, one of the Deans 0) felt it
would be seen as negative, since it was bound to divert academics from the activities
which were rewarded by promotion. One HoD ( I?) thought that entrepreneurial exploitation
of "hard" IP was an outside activity which had no bearing on the promotions process,
while the other Dean (1) thought the promotions committee would take the view that there
was less of an intellectual case to be made for business activities than for consultancy or
patenting. Another HoD 0.0 simply said:
" ... If [a] guy is bringing in a large research income and is publishing and his
teaching is adequate, we can get him promoted. If he is a good teacher and a
superb entrepreneur, we can't ..."
A fellow HoD (E.) thought that it depended on the membership of the promotions
committee; some people might wish to discount activities which generated an income for
the academics concerned on the grounds that they had already had one reward. Only one
HoD (1'9 felt that entrepreneurial activity would be included in the criteria for promotion.
Asked whether entrepreneurially exploiting IP should be a criterion for promotion, one
interviewee (') dismissed this as a purely extra-mural activity, while another (1) said that
academic entrepreneurs were already getting a financial reward and he would not lose any
sleep if their business activities were not taken into account. However, one HoD (1)) said
that entrepreneurial exploitation of IP should be a criterion for promotion because it
enhanced the image and status of the university in the community, while a second (B) felt
that in some cases, an academic's entrepreneurial activities could benefit the department
and the university, as well as the community. This particular HoD said that in principle he
would lobby for the promotion of academic entrepreneurs who fitted this description, but
observed: "in the kind of culture I live in, in the Faculty of [..], the case would have to





Strathclyde University's roots go back to 1795, when the John Anderson, Professor of
Natural Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, bequeathed the bulk of his property to the
public "for the good of mankind and the improvement of science in an institution to be known
as 'Anderson's University". Anderson's Institution, known subsequently as Anderson's
University and then Anderson's College, was the first of a number of institutions providing
a technical education in Glasgow. In 1886 these were amalgamated into the Glasgow and
West of Scotland Technical College. In 1912 King George V directed that it should be known
in future as the Royal Technical College. In 1913 the Royal Technical College was affiliated
with the University of Glasgow and in 1919 it was recognised as a University College by the
newly-founded University Grants Committee. In 1956 it was renamed the Royal College of
Science and Technology, while in 1964 it merged with the Scottish College of Commerce,
whose roots go back to 1845. One month later, in June 1964, it received its Charter as the
University of Strathclyde. Strathclyde is usually equated with the former Colleges of
Advanced Technology which were raised to university status in 1966.
1.2	 Size
By the beginning of the 1980s Strathclyde was a medium-sized university by UK standards,
measured in terms of student FTEs. In 1981 Strathclyde was advised by the UGC in 1981 to
reduce the number of home students registered in 1979/80 by 4 per cent within the next three
sessions. As Figure 2 revealed, this was slightly below the national average, but at the time
Strathclyde was already recruiting 12 per cent of its students from overseas, which was
slightly above the national average. At the same time the UGC announced that Strathclyde's
recurrent grant would be reduced by 18 per cent between 1980/81 and 1983/84. As we can
see from Figure 2, this was slightly above the national average. By most methods of
reckoning, then, Strathclyde was treated neither particularly harshly nor particularly leniently
by the UGC.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that Strathclyde should increase its student numbers by 10.03 per
cent over the next four sessions (1) . In fact, Strathclyde managed to increase its student intake
by some 20 per cent over the decade (3) . Over the course of the 1980s, Strathclyde was also
able to increase its full-time academic/academic-related staff by around 12 per cent, while the
number of part-timers increased by a factor of three over the same period ( 3). In the process,
Strathclyde increased its size relative to certain other universities during the 1980s.
Structurally, Strathclyde underwent a number of changes during the course of the 1980s. It
started the decade with the four Schools provided for in its Charter: Science, Engineering,
Arts & Social Sciences and Architecture. During the 1980s Strathclyde reorganised the first
three into Faculties of the same name and established a separate Business School, while the
former School of Architecture merged with the Department of Building Science and became
part of the Faculty of Engineering.
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1.3	 Science Base
In 1988/89 the Faculty of Science incorporated ten Departments: Mathematics, Physics &
Applied Physics, Computing Science, Chemistry, Applied Geology, Bioscience &
Biotechnology, Pharmacy, Physiology & Pharmacology - and Statistics, which was founded
prior to the start of the 1989/90 session, but did not entail the acquisition of new staff (4)• The
Faculty of Engineering grouped together six Departments: Design, Manufacture &
Engineering Management, Mechanical & Process Engineering, Electronic & Electrical
Engineering, Civil Engineering & Environmental Health, Mineral Resources Engineering and
Architecture & Building Science.
On an aggregate basis these 15 Departments accounted for about 60 per cent of the
University's academic/academic-related staff at the end of the 1980s (5) • They were
responsible for 57 per cent of Strathclyde's undergraduates and 76 per cent of registered
research students (6).
As we can see from Figure 6a, in the UGC's 1985/86 assessment of universities' research
strengths in the natural sciences, engineering and technology, no subject areas at Strathclyde
were rated as outstanding, five were rated as above average, six as average and seven as
below average 0 . It was suggested that if the ABRC's recommendations were ever
implemented, Strathclyde would be assigned to the "X" category; accordingly, the university
would be able to offer "teaching across a broad range of fields and substantial research
activity in particular fields, in some cases in collaboration with others" (g)•
Figure 6b shows that in the 1988/1989 assessment of universities' research strengths in the
natural sciences, engineering and technology, one "unit of assessment" was awarded a "5",
four were awarded a "4", nine were awarded a "3", five were awarded a "2" and four were
awarded a "1" (9)•
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
Figure 41a reveals that in 1984/85, Strathclyde ranked 11th in terms of £ earned in external
research grants and contracts, but 23rd in terms of the percentage of its total income which
this external revenue represented, namely 14.9 per cent ( m)• In that year Departments in what
are now the Faculties of Science and Engineering brought in over £5m, accounting for close
to 80 per cent of the university's total income from research grants and contracts ("). By
1988/89, as we can see from Figure 41b, these same Departments had nearly doubled their
1985 earnings, generating over £10m and accounting for 82 per cent of the university's total
income from research grants and contracts (0 . The University as a whole was attracting more
external research grant and contract income than any UK university without a medical school
(13) .
Although the science base was able to maintain - indeed, slightly increase -its share of the
University's total external research and contract funding, the pattern of sponsorship which it
attracted was noticeably different from the pattern four years earlier, as we can see by
comparing Figures 345 and 346. There was a significant drop in the proportion of funding
received from industry/commerce - indeed, in 1988/89 this sector contributed less in terms
of hard £ than it had in 1984/85. In contrast, there was a significant increase in the
proportion of funding from local authorities, "all other sources" - and some increase from the
EC, too; this is difficult to quantify since the EC was not treated as a separate
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category in 1984/85. The proportion of funding from the Research Councils and charities -
which usually grant ownership of IP to the University - showed little change. In 1984/85 they
contributed 39 per cent of the research grant and contract income earned by the science base.
By 1988/89, the proportion had risen marginally - to 40 per cent. In the same year, the
participating universities attracted no more or proportionately less funding from the Research
Councils and charities than they had four years earlier.
2	 HISTORY OF IP EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Strathclyde's interest in both industrial liaison and technology transfer dates back to the
1960s. In fact, where industrial liaison was concerned, the University was continuing a
tradition started by the Royal College of Science & Technology. The Royal College had
appointed two part-time ILOs at the beginning of the 1960s (14)•
2.2	 Structures
(i) "Soft" IP
Once it became a university, Strathclyde appointed two full-time IL0s, who reported to the
HoD of the Business Studies Department. In 1968 they were replaced by two new ILOs - both
with industrial experience (1 who were asked to report to the HoD of the Production
Engineering Department. Their remit was to make "soft" IP - ie. the expertise of University
staff - available to solve industry's problems. It was seen as a service which the University -
and several other HEIs in Scotland " - provided, not as an opportunity to make money. The
ILOs in all these institutions were part-funded by the Ministry of Technology, which
contributed close to 000,000 to Strathclyde alone ".
(ii) "Hard" IP
The University does not appear to have inherited a patent portfolio from the Royal College.
However, due largely to the influence of a former Bursar, "a very shrewd businessman",
Strathclyde was quick to recognise the long-term value of identifying, evaluating, protecting
and exploiting "hard" IP. Although this was not part of the ILOs' remit, initially the
University did not set up a dedicated/partly dedicated structure to identify, evaluate and
protect IP. The onus was on individual researchers to flag potentially exploitable research
discoveries. The Bursar's office " would try to evaluate them by seeking the opinion of a
patent agent and peers within the University:
"... It [was] an instinctive judgement by him and perhaps one or two senior
academics [whom] he talked to casually ..."
Strathclyde's first patent application dates back to 1972. The size of the University's patent
portfolio by 1984 " suggests that Strathclyde adopted a fairly liberal stance towards
protecting IP which academics "flagged":
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" ... Anybody coming forward with what seemed like a reasonable invention could be
fairly sure that it would be treated seriously and would receive protection if it looked
half worthwhile ..."
(iii)	 Development and Exploitation
Strathclyde did set up a structure dedicated to developing promising research discoveries into
products or processes which could be exploited commercially. It was able to do this as a
result of financial support provided by the Ministry of Technology. In 1968 (2°) it established
the Centre for Industrial Innovation (CID with its own laboratory and workshop, in its own,
purpose-built building. The CII was the first university-wide unit in the UK to try to
systematically develop and exploit "hard" IP. It had departmental status but unlike other
departments, it had a manager and a devolved budget. It was not part of the existing School
structure and it reported to the Court (21).
In 1973/74, Government funding for this programme was axed without warning. Strathclyde
immediately terminated its industrial liaison activities, but was obliged to retain the two
industrial liaison officers (n). The University decided to try and keep the CLI going on a
largely self-funding basis. In its heyday, the CII employed close to 30 full-time members of
staff. This was reduced to single figures in the early 1980s, following the downturn in the
economy.
In 1983, Strathclyde's new Principal closed down the CII, believing that it was not the best
mechanism to achieve the University's objectives. The CII had found, to its cost, that
marketing the products and processes it had developed was no easy matter. However, it was
not simply a question of financial viability:
"... The fatal flaw was that by the time it had acquired four or five projects, it
became very inward-looking. That was its task. It dedicated its resources to having
some sort of success with those [projects]. It tended to reject or rebuff anybody else
who came along who wanted to add to its projects. It was fully stretched.
"... people ... were very upset that their own particular work - which they
regarded, of course, as being very important, as 'having] potential value (and they
were probably right) ... and disappointed that the University, through its CH
operation, just gave them the cold shoulder, wouldn't take any interest. And there was
nobody else who had the time or willingness to help ..."
"... [the CH] lost the sympathy of the academic staff They ended up saying that it
was no use to anybody, a burden on the University ..."
(iv)	 Interregnum
Responsibility for ensuring that "hard" IP was developed and exploited passed back to the
Bursar's office, which pursued a policy of retaining ownership of IP rather than assigning it.
The Deputy Bursar actively sought out licensees and demonstrated an ability to negotiate
business-like agreements to exploit "hard" IP. This included Strathclyde's single most
successful discovery to date - the drug "Atracurium" (22). Moreover, although he concentrated
initially on licensing to existing companies, by the early 1980s he had licensed IP to one joint
venture started at CII's initiative and to two spin-off companies founded by members of the
academic staff. Indeed, he was instrumental in turning what might have been independent
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spin-off companies into joint ventures, with the University providing a proportion of the start-
up capital required (24) .
Despite their jaundiced view of the CII, members of the academic staff were still bringing
new discoveries to the administration's attention. The University commissioned consultants
to advise it on how best to exploit its IP and provide a service to industry (25) . As a result of
their report, two separate structures were established.
(iv)	 "Soft" IP Revisited
Since the service provided by the ILOs had come to an end nearly ten years earlier,
Strathclyde Technology Transfer Ltd (STT) was set up at the end of 1983 to identify areas
of technological need, to employ its own full-time consultants in these areas and to contract
members of the academic staff as an additional consultancy resource when needed. Although
STT was primarily designed to market Strathclyde's service capability, it was also intended
to market its research capability. STT was backed by a grant of £187,000 over three years
from the Scottish Development Agency and the University. It was expected to be self-
financing by the fourth year and reported to a Board of Directors on which the University had
a majority. Its Chairman was a lay member of Court.
(vi)	 "Hard" IP Revisited
Early in 1984 Strathclyde set up R&D Services (RDS) to handle "hard" IP more effectively
than the CII had. Strathclyde was able to fully support RDS from general funds (2') - unlike
the CII, it was effectively funded by the UGC from the recurrent grant. Initially, RDS was
staffed by a Director (27), a Deputy Director (28) and one secretary. The RDS's budget was
determined each year by Court at the same time as the administration budget was set - ie.
RDS was funded separately from both the academic and the administrative budget. This
reflected RDS's unique status, sitting between the administration and the academic sector.
The decision to set up RDS, its remit and approach were determined by the new Principal
alone, not by a University committee or working party. His vision for RDS was strongly
influenced by a series of conferences which he attended ("), and by the negative impact which
the CII had had on the academic community. RDS was very much the Principal's "baby" and
the Director, appointed in March 1984 on administrative grade 6, reported directly to the
Principal.
2.3	 Policy
It was the Principal's wish that RDS should operate - and be seen to operate - in a very
different way to the CII. This was the rationale underlying a number of policy decisions
which he took. Firstly, no member of the academic community was obliged to use RDS to
get his discovery evaluated, protected and exploited (30):
"... [in 1984] the attitude was: the C11 was a failure. Here's the Principal setting
up a new R&D Services Department - the same thing by a different name. Another
financial burden that the University has to carry. This means that [fewer] academics
will be employed and more administrators instead.
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"The atmosphere was really quite negative and ... ([the Principal had said: you will
do this, you will use this - by law ... there would have been some very long debates
in Senate. Whereas [RDS] was presented as a voluntary organisation [which] had to
earn fits] spurs ..."
Secondly, in order to attract academics to use RDS, it was given a remit which was
considerably wider than CII's. RDS was made responsible for all aspects of external research
grants and contracts - from providing extensive information on sources of funding (31) to
costing projects, drafting proposals, negotiating contracts and administering successful
grants/contracts. Prior to this, Strathclyde's contribution had been limited to administering
successful grants/contracts, a service provided by the Bursar's office.
Thirdly, if academics chose to bring a discovery to RDS' attention, they would not be
rebuffed - nor would their discovery be "taken away" from them. The manner in which it was
evaluated, protected and exploited would be decided by concensus and implemented on the
basis of teamwork. They could benefit from access to RDS' patent budget, from RDS'
negotiation skills, even from RDS' business skills.
This reflects the fourth policy decision: RDS should be far more proactive, indeed, far more
entrepreneurial than its predecessor:
"...[the Principal] realised it was a business activity to transfer [technology]. It
wasn't liaison. It wasn't just a question of acting as an intermediary. It was going out
and doing the business. That's what he saw ..."
2.4	 Incentives
Strathclyde - and the Royal College before it - had always relied almost exclusively on
individual researchers having sufficient awareness, interest and initiative to consider the
commercial value of their discoveries and to tell the appropriate authority if anything looked
promising. From the earliest days the University had instituted a simple financial incentive
to encourage individual researchers to do this: all revenues generated by the exploitation of
their discovery were shared after reimbursement of costs on a 50:50 basis between the
inventor(s) and the University, with no upper limit. Since five or six discoveries were
generating an income of around £300,000 p.a. by the mid-1980s, this was a very real
incentive for a handful of researchers. They were the lucky ones; there is little doubt that
CII's inability to deal with more than a certain number of projects sometimes led to IP being
squandered and researchers being denied their just reward. For most researchers, though, it
was not only a hypothetical incentive; many were not even aware it existed.
2.5	 Regulations and Documentation
Despite its long-standing interest in "hard" IP, Strathclyde did not produce a dedicated
document which summarised the University's policy vis-a-vis IP. Academics were obliged to
deduce it from isolated paragraphs and sentences in the Staff Handbook. The 1978 Staff
Handbook, for instance, reflected the University's focus at that time on "hard" IP. It indicated
that - on the basis of practice (32) - the University made a claim over "inventions and
developments for which members of staff [were] responsible". It intimated that this might
include inventions and developments arising from certain types of outside employment, too.
It was stated that "no public disclosure should be made in respect of any invention until the
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possibility of obtaining patent protection has been considered by the University and the
inventor(s)" c"). It was unclear who had the final right of decision in a publish/patent conflict.
The Staff Handbook stated that, even if a patent application had already been filed, academics
were expected to assign to the University their "rights and interest in the invention in
consideration for which the University binds itself to share with the inventor(s) any royalty
income which may arise from exploitation of the invention". The basis on which the royalty
income was shared was outlined elsewhere (34) . It was indicated that the CII was responsible
for "actively pursu[ing] the further development and commercial exploitation of the invention
... in consultation with and with the participation of the inventor(s)".
These were the only written references to IP; Strathclyde's terms and conditions of
employment made no reference to IP.
3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
When Sir John Kingman's letter arrived, Strathclyde's Principal passed it straight to the
Director of RDS, asking how the University should respond. This was more a question of
courtesy and detail than a fundamental question about whether Strathclyde should accept the
Research Councils' offer. Neither the Principal nor the Director of RDS had the slightest
hesitation in accepting the offer:
"... [It] fitted our policy very tightly and I had no difficulty persuading ... it was
instinctive to the Principal that we should go it alone ..."
For some time Strathclyde had been dissatisfied with its existing relationship with the BTG:
" ... I used to object, in the old days, to the University's having effectively to
bundle up the year's research results and send them off down to the BTG, who would
take six months to say no to 99.9 per cent of them. A thoroughly negative process!"
... and had already been trying to take the initiative:
"... We [had already been] knocking on BTG's doorand saying - are you going to
say yes or are you going to say no, because if you are going to say no, we want to
run with it ..."
The Director of RDS drafted a 4-5 page response to the Kingman letter, which was duly
approved by the Joint Management Committee (-35) . Together with 33 other universities and
colleges, Strathclyde's proposals were accepted by the Scrutiny Group in its first round of
deliberations. The letter of authorisation was sent on 23 July 1986.
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4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Structures
(i)	 "Soft" IP
In the intervening years, one of the structures set up in 1983/84 in the wake of the
consultancy report has been wound up. The business plan proposed for STT presumed that
the University would allow it to employ its own, full-time consultants. In fact, experience of
CII deterred the University from following this recommendation. Strathclyde decided that all
consultancy work should be undertaken by members of the academic staff. Since they
expected to be paid at rates close to those which SIT was able to charge, SIT had to operate
on very reduced margins. Moreover, its volume of work was inhibited by the University's
ruling that no member of staff should spend more than 25 days per year on consultancy.
Although STrs service activities became self-financing by the fourth year, as required (36),
reduced margins obliged it to sub-contract to RDS the marketing of the University's research
capability. Moreover, STT was not popular in the Departments:
" ... The biggest inhibition to operating within [ST/TI was the fact that we were
seen to be spongers on their activities. There we were, taking their percentage ..."
In 1989 Strathclyde established an Enterprise Office, which is designed to achieve certain of
SIT's objectives in a different way. Instead of dealing only with individual academics, the
Enterprise Office will try to encourage suitable groups of academics to provide a service by
exploiting their expertise collaboratively. These groups form what Strathclyde refers to as
"business units" (37) within Departments, with profits shared between members of the group
and the Department. The Enterprise Office is a central overhead on the University (38.) , but
the cost is perceived less clearly at the Departmental level than S'frs 50 per cent was. Like
RDS, academics use the Enterprise Office because they choose to, not because they are
obliged to.
(ii)	 "Hard" IP
In the intervening years, RDS has expanded considerably. In 1989/90 it had a Director, a
Deputy Director, a Liaison Officer, a Marketing Officer, a Contracts Officer and - from 1987
- the only dedicated IPR Officer in a UK university, an internal appointment (39) . There were
also two administrative assistants plus secretarial support. RDS was originally treated as a
service activity and fully funded by the University. It is still treated as a service activity
which currently costs Strathclyde around £0.3m p.a. However, when the LPR Officer was
appointed, it was agreed that within five years, the identification, evaluation, protection and
exploitation of IP should become a self-financing activity. Having a dedicated IPR Officer
makes it possible to gauge the cost fairly accurately (4°). It is a substantial cost; when the IPR
Officer assumed responsibility for the University's patent portfolio, patenting costs alone were
running at £140,000 p.a. However, management of the University's patent portfolio, as
opposed to administration of it, has already generated savings of around £70,000 p.a. (4)•
RDS envisages no problem in meeting this particular target; within 12 months of being
appointed, the IPR Officer had generated his own salary from newly-identified IP (42) •
 RDS
does not believe it will require another "Atracurium" to cover all the direct costs connected
with identifying, evaluating, protecting and exploiting IP:
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"... The chances of coming up with "Atracurium II" are statistically quite remote,
but one could build a portfolio of licenses, some quite modest, which - over a period
of 5, 6, 7 years - would approach [the earnings from] "Atracurium" ..."
Strathclyde has no plans to make RDS as a whole self-financing:
" ... It's not arithmetic that you can do very sensibly because if we were to set up
RDS as a small company [paying] for itself, [we] would have to take a commission
off projects. [We] would be a successful or an unsuccessful company depending on
whether [we] took 20, 30 or 40 per cent commission.
"[RDS] is not a company. Its just a construction. Therefore, doing the bottom line
calculation is just meaningless. I think it is foolish of organisations like mine to
pretend that they run a business, when in fact the bulk of the business is carried out
by the academic staff..."
4.2	 Regulations and Documentation
Strathclyde does not state anywhere what constitutes IP or the basis of the University's claims
over it. Moreover, neither the Staff Handbook for 1989/90 nor the terms and conditions under
which academics are appointed make reference to the 1977 Patent Act or the 1988 Copyright,
Designs and Patent Act. The Guidelines which are given to new appointees simply state that
they will be required to assign to the University all rights in IP which they generate, without
indicating the basis on which this assertion is made. Neither RDS nor Strathclyde's
administration see an immediate need to be more specific. In the light of legal advice,
Strathclyde believes it would not have to go to court to enforce its rights as an employer over
members of staff who were contravening them. If, at some future date, the terms and
conditions of appointment are redrafted, RDS would consider including a reference to the
1977 Patent Act, however.
Nor does RDS see the necessity for a dedicated document which outlines the different types
of IP and summarises its policy vis-a-vis identifying, evaluating, protecting and exploiting IP:
II
... [We] would resist putting it down in detail because you are then coming up
with definitions that are capable of being disputed or argued [about] ..."
Academics who are not in close contact with RDS are still obliged to deduce from the Staff
Handbook what to do if they believe they have discovered something exploitable. The current
Staff Handbook has changed in only one respect since 1978: it refers to "the Research &
Development Office" (sic) instead of CII. However, the Personnel Office has drafted more
detailed information on Strathclyde's policy and practice vis-a-vis exploitation of research
results for inclusion in the next edition of the Staff Handbook. This indicates that the
University owns all IPR generated by its employees in the course of their duties but that it
waives its rights to copyright in respect of academic articles, journals and books. It reminds
members of staff that the University has authority to exploit all inventions arising from
Research Council sponsorship. It states that members of staff are required to "execute all
documents which may be required relating to exploitation, including an inventorship
declaration document in respect of patentable inventions". It adds that the interests of the
University and researchers should be preserved with regard to the development and
commercialisation of research, but - "notwithstanding the academic requirement to publish" -
academics should consider the possibility of commercialising their discoveries before
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dislosing them publicly in written, oral or other form. Discussions with industry should take





Strathclyde still has only one formal incentive to encourage the academic community to think
in terms of the commercial potential of their research discoveries and take appropriate steps -
a financial incentive. However, during the course of 1989/90, following recommendations
from the IPR Officer, there were changes in the way that this incentive operates. The IPR
Officer was concerned about the fact that the University centrally kept 50 per cent of the
revenue, instead of sharing it with the Department which generated the IP:
"... I said it had to be [changed] or else my job [was] impossible. In my job I
target HoDs as extremely important players. Without their assistance ... they can say
- no, we're not taking this project on ..."
Since the University returns a proportion of overheads to Departments ( 43), RDS regarded this
as "a complete anomaly". Initially, the IPR Officer proposed a 40:40:20 split between the
inventor(s), the centre and the Department. Later, he suggested that some form of sliding
scale be incorporated, to prevent the income from IP creating "haves" and "have-nots" in the
University:
"... If you take the Department of Pharmacy - if there were a 40:40:20 split [with
no sliding scale], they would be getting £200,000 in addition to everything else they
got. Because you couldn't cut it off arbitrarily. Then it wouldn't be an incentive any
more ..." (44)
A working party was established to examine IP and revenue-sharing arrangements (45) . Its
report was accepted first by the University Management Group and then, in April 1990, by
Court. Details of the new scheme were announced in the following university newsletter (46).
(ii) Career Progression
RDS is also under pressure from the academic community to lobby for changes in the
promotions criteria, which do not formally take account of the effort involved in identifying,
evaluating, protecting and helping exploit IP - or in doing contract research for industry. RDS
believes that in practice some of this is taken into account:
"... If somebody has got good commercial contacts and has a number of patents
that are being exploited and hence has published a number of papers, it's a natural
reaction that that will be taken into account.
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"There is a lot of pressure on us. It is a very active topic. They say that
Strathclyde University is very much a high quality interface with industry, that staff
are being encouraged to do all sorts of things in conjunction with industry, patents
included, and they would be all the more willing to do it if this was formally
recognised.
"They want a kind of balance. They do training courses for industry, and that's
not really taken into account. If you go and work for industry, you end up with less
academic papers, perhaps ..."
RDS feels that where IP is concerned, any changes would need to be handled very sensitively:
" ... If a very vigorous promotions aspect was incorporated into the system for
someone who was doing very well generating commercial interest in the University,
that might be sneered at. It might be counter-productive. You know - I'm carrying this
lecture load and you're going off to do your bit in the commercial world ... I'm as
worthwhile as you are - and there you are getting a professorship whilst I'm carrying
a load. It would have to be very delicate ..."
RDS is not lobbying for IP-related work to be explicitly included in the promotions criteria,
despite the fact that it sees development, protection, licensing and forming companies as "part
and parcel of the continuation of research" and quite in keeping with the University's
Charter. It feels researchers should be rewarded for doing this - but that there are two kinds
of reward: "academic brownie points" and "commercial brownie points which tend to come
in the form of £1-notes". Researchers should recognise that, the further down the exploitation
route they go, unless they publish their discoveries, the reward changes character accordingly.
Where spin-off companies are concerned, academics should make an informed choice:
N ... Those people who have spun-off companies somewhat ruefully say that it
queers their academic career, rather than supports it ..."
" ... You either follow an academic career or, if you go and run a company or get
involved with your own company, you're following a different career to your peers
... It's difficult to claim you are both a full-blooded academic and a full-blooded
entrepreneur ... What you lose on your academic career, you're going to gain - with
the Jaguar parked outside your office -from your commercial career. You can't have
all things ..."
(iii)	 Flexibility
There is, perhaps, a third incentive. RDS believes that the way it operates - as opposed to the
way the CII operated - should encourage academics to bring research discoveries to its
attention. It is a very flexible organisation which can take over much of the exploitation
process, if that is what an academic wants. Equally, it will involve academics in every stage
of the exploitation process, if that is what they want.
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4.4	 Sanctions
If an academic chose to publish a potentially exploitable research discovery instead of first
bringing it to RDS' attention and having it protected in some manner, Strathclyde would
regard that as his choice:
" ... Nothing would happen. It would be regarded as an academic freedom. It's a
tradition that if somebody wants to publish their work, they are free to do so ..."
In some cases RDS would consider that it had failed in its mission and would immediately
"do missionary work" to reinforce the point that one can often both protect and publish.
However, there would be no question of sanctions:
" I get more from the system if I seem always to be balancing my commercial
disciplines against academic freedom. I'm seen to participate in that debate and I'm
seen to be part of the balancing mechanism. If! work in that way, I get much more
acceptance and co-operation from academic staff If I'm seen as strictly commercial,
then they are always at arms' length from me. They always think: he's working
because he's got a bottom line he's got to toe ... We've always [worked] through
debate and discussion rather than saying - here's a bit of paper, it's got Court
authorisation and you will do this ..."
On the other hand, if it was found that a researcher had used IP which he generated for his
own or another company's benefit, excluding the University, it would be dealt with at the
highest level. This has already happened once:
" ... The Principal has given him reprimands. The Dean of Faculty has given very
aggressive reprimands academically. The Principal has looked at both the academic
side and the commercial side. I've given him an inquisition in this office. We've gone
through it in detail ..."
In this situation, Strathclyde did not cite the 1977 Patent Act. It simply stated that as an
employer - and as a contractor to the SERC - it had ownership of the invention.
The IPR Officer believes that where software is concerned, this is probably a frequent
occurrence; it would be naive not to think so. He feels that Strathclyde's approach should
always be to recoup what it can commercially. However, neither RDS nor the University sees
it as grounds for dismissing the member of staff.
5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
It could be argued that Strathclyde's approach to identifying, evaluating, protecting and
exploiting IP operates in precisely the way that Sir Keith Joseph envisaged. The Secretary of
State expressed the hope that universities would encourage academics to exploit their
discoveries themselves and give help and guidance to those who wished to do so. Strathclyde
certainly believes it is fundamentally wrong to "take away" a researcher's discovery and
handle it "out of sight". It sees it as essential for academics to be "deeply involved" in the
transfer of their technology, and to support and guide them in their efforts, whether this
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involves licensing to an existing company or to a start-up company founded specifically to
exploit the IP in question.
However, the Secretary of State's statement left considerable scope for interpretation. It was
discussed at some length at Strathclyde, which saw it as naive:
"... We threw out the literal interpretation, which mean that they should all
become mini R&D Services and form companies themselves.
"If we allowed that to happen, we recognised we would have chaos on our hands
... There [would be] too much enthusiastic ignorance. People would be making an
awful mess of it. We said that exploitation carried out on the back of commercial
innocence [and] ill-conceived agreements could end up in lawsuits for everybody, or
at the very best, major disappointments. At worst we could be taken to court for not
fulfilling our agreements ..."
Strathclyde encourages academics to become involved in exploiting their discoveries. It
supports and guides them. However, the University never delegates or relinquishes authority
to a member of the academic staff 07).
5.2	 Identification
Despite having a dedicated IPR Officer, the ratio of RDS staff to academic staff means that
Strathclyde still has to rely heavily on researchers bringing potentially exploitable discoveries
to its attention. RDS' tactics - which concentrate on information/ awareness raising - are
geared to making this happen. Informal, rather than formal tactics are regarded as the most
effective, as are non-bureaucratic rather than bureaucratic ones:
II
... you can lead an academic almost anywhere but you can't push them ..."
The academic community at Strathclyde was not immediately informed about the removal of
the BTG's monopoly, the Research Councils' offer or the Strathclyde's response, though
"anyone who was an active player in IP at that time was told [informally]" . However, when
the IPR Officer was appointed in December 1987, he used the University newsletter to
explain that the post had been created in response to the University being given rights over
and responsibility for IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects. When Research
Council grants are awarded, the IPR Officer sends a standard memorandum to grant holders,
reminding them of the conditions under which projects are funded, in particular the conditions
relating to commercial exploitation. Grant holders are asked to arrange a meeting with the
IPR Officer "to discuss the potential for the exploitation of the results from this project". At
present, academics whose research is funded from other sources do not receive targeted
reminders of this nature.
In general, the IPR Officer believes that face-to-face reminders are more effective than "junk
mail". He has instituted a seminar programme which is designed both to raise his profile and
raise awareness of IP. He has concentrated on specific Faculties, or specific Departments
within a Faculty, rather than a University-wide programme. He encourages HoDs to invite
him into Departments to give seminars. Attendance is voluntary but they are usually given
over sandwiches at lunchtime to avoid conflicting with other commitments. The IPR Officer
recognises that not everyone shares his "burning interest" in IP and tries to keep the seminars
"light". He has two major objectives. The first is to describe different types of IP, to outline
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the five different ways in which IP can be protected, according to type, and to emphasise that
publishing and patenting need not be mutually exclusive. The second is to change the attitude
of the 25-30 per cent of the academic community which does not see the need to think about
exploiting IP:
/The ones who say] - I don't get involved in any of this company stuff Money
is dirty. Let me get it from the SERC. These people are unaware of condition (13a).
Even the Research Councils insist, they make it an obligation that you must think
about commercial exploitation, you must think about money, this dirty stuff that
nobody wants to touch ..."
The IPR Officer feels he is able to get this message across more successfully because he
himself has been a scientist:
"... It's a really important aspect of it that I am not some sort of cold, grey
administrator. I might look that way now, but 1[am] a scientist who [has become] an
administrator. So, I know what it is like. I [was] in the Department for 17 years ...
I know [all about] trying to get on with the job ..."
RDS does not believe that certain subject areas within the science base are necessarily more
likely than others to generate exploitable IP:
"... It comes down very much, I think, to the style of a particular Department and
the Head of that Department ... The Bioengineering Unit ... happens to be very
applications-oriented and there is always a steady stream of patentable material
coming through it ..."
"... If [someone] were to come and say - of course, IT is a key area, I would say
that kind of analysis is nonsense. It just so happens that IT doesn't produce a great
deal of IP for licensing. But the same positions filled by a different type of academic
... I think it could be a flood ..."
Strathclyde has not tried to raise the academic community's awareness of IP on a University-
wide basis. The IPR Officer has not contributed a session on r p to the University's Staff
Development Programme; nor has he considered speaking at the Staff Induction Programme.
Ideally, RDS would like to implement one or two fail-safe mechanisms, such as scrutinising
research reports for potentially exploitable IP which the researchers have not flagged, for one
reason or another. RDS holds copies of all interim and final reports and tries to ensure that
they are read before they are sent to sponsors. However:
"... I wouldn't want to imply that we held a working party meeting with one or
two selected academics to go through them thoroughly.
"... I wish we did [but] it's labour-intensive [and] it requires a knowledge of the
subject to spot what's important ..."
Neither does RDS ask academics to submit drafts of papers for scrutiny before sending them
for publication, though it is something which the IPR Officer has considered. At present,
RDS does not have the resources to employ sufficient people with the requisite
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skills to do it.
RDS does not feel this is something which could be formally delegated to Faculties or
Departments, even though some are beginning to institute local research committees:
" . . . I would very much hesitate to give Departments or Faculties more formal tasks
at this time. They would just react against it. They are so over-burdened with all sorts
of reporting mechanisms and financial controls these days that one more would be
very badly received. So, I don't do it that way ..."
Instead, RDS tries to keep abreast of research discoveries through regular communication
with research groups and HoDs. In some Departments individual researchers have been
nominated to or voluntarily assumed the role of interface between the Department and RDS.
Strathclyde is also open to the idea of giving access to certain outside organisations to trawl
for IP. The University has a confidentiality agreement with DTE; it made an approach to 31
Research Exploitation Ltd (in its former incarnation as the Research Corporation) but heard
no more. RDS makes a spare office, telephones and secretarial support available to the BTG's
representative whenever he is in Glasgow. In return, the BTG minutes for RDS' benefit every
discussion it has with researchers at Strathclyde.
5.3	 Evaluation
Whilst Strathclyde relies on its patent agents to gauge the novelty value of "hard" IP, it is
very selective about seeking the help of outside agencies when it comes to assessing the
market value. RDS feels that it cannot justify the cost unless the market appears to be large
and diverse. If that is the case, RDS uses private sector consultants with expertise in the
relevant area, with financial assistance from the SDA. It does not generally use the SDA's
own staff to evaluate discoveries.
Otherwise, Strathclyde relies heavily on the opinion of the researcher who generated the IP:
"... we have an advantage over many universities in that awareness of the market
is as high here as anywhere, because of the long tradition of working with industry.
A lot of the academic staff have had some experience of industry.
"Quite a number of people who come to see us have a view of the market, the
scope of the marketplace for their technology. That's not to say, of course, that we
don't also get those who have absolutely no idea at all ..."
In that event, RDS tends not to worry about the market value. It relies on the inventor(s) to
give it some indication of likely commercial applications of the discovery:
"... If somebody says - yes, I think this is the biggest thing since the motor car, we
take his word for it, essentially ..."
RDS does not routinely check with the academic's HoD in case this is perceived as
patronising:
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"... Politically, it's a very sensitive issue, that. You've got to be politically
sensitive in this job ..."
This would only happen if the academic concerned were younger, less experienced and more
used to being supervised. If RDS feels that older academics are not fully aware of possible
commercial applications, it might occasionally discuss the discovery with his colleagues,
rather than his superiors. In practice, RDS often arrives at some idea of the market value of
a discovery later on, once it has filed an initial registration and set about finding a corporate
partner.




Strathclyde's policy vis-a-vis its IP is to retain ownership and protect it - if this can be done
in a manner which is acceptable to both the academic who generated it and the industrial
partner. This means that Strathclyde rarely assigns IPR and where "hard" IP is concerned,
if it is possible to patent, RDS prefers this to treating it as secret know-how. There is one
exception - live cell lines:
"... We prefer to keep our cell lines secret and licence them as such. We feel that
the patent route is capable of abuse ..." (48)
Otherwise, RDS will only countenance secret know-how agreements if the publishing
embargo is no longer than 2 years - and if the researcher agrees. RDS regards UDIL's
recommendation of a 5-year maximum as far too long. However, RDS concedes that it is in
business and that everything is negotiable.
(ii) Practicalities
The University has no formal limit on delays in publishing. If a major corporation proposed
a 3-year embargo in exchange for £0.5m, RDS would ask the academic concerned if he could
live with that - and be guided by his reply. If researchers feel the need to publish at once,
they may. If their discovery is patentable, RDS asks if they would consider delaying for 4
weeks so that an initial registration can be filed first. RDS recognises that, in commercial
terms, this is not the optimum situation:
"... The compromise that we end up with, of course, is that we take out an instant
patent application to allow them to speak at a conference ... It means that we patent
early and we can't withdraw and refile. I think that is a compromise we have to
live with.
"It's a hard fact that universities ... usually patent too early because of the
compromises they make ..."
In RDS' experience, fewer than 40 per cent of researchers will agree to keeping their
discovery quiet for 12 months - and succeed in doing it. This means that more often than not,
the University cannot abort its initial registration and reapply, thereby preserving its
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priority date and presenting a stronger patent specification.
Strathclyde asks academic inventors to help draft patent specifications, so that they are
involved at every stage; it is also cheaper. The patent agent is brought in for a preliminary
dialogue about potential applications, following which reseachers find the time to produce an
initial 10-15 page draft. This is then refined by the patent agent. RDS usually patents via the
Patent Co-operation Treaty, since this is cheaper in the short-term. It works on the principle
of delaying expenditure for as long as possible. It also feels that the Patent Co-operation
Treaty offers an advantage in not having to decide until the last minute on the countries in
which to file.
(iii)	 Finance
RDS has the authority to decide whether or not to file a patent application. It pursues a fairly
liberal policy of initial registrations and refilings. Whereas researchers have a considerable
say in whether their IP is protected and how, they have less influence on the decision whether
to acquire full patent protection. It is unusual for RDS to proceed if there is no sign of an
industrial partner on the horizon.
Strathclyde's annual patent expenditure is currently running at between £70,000 and £80,000
p.a. Each year RDS agrees the amount in each budget heading with the Bursar's office.
However, since it has virament between budget headings, it sometimes exceeds its patents
allocation:
"... It is quite a major task to manage the patent budget. Patents are unforgiving.
It's very easy to overspend - particularly, we discovered, when you have company
formation, where the patents form the basis of the company. Somebody has to protect
[them] and keep [them] going until the brand new company has got the money to do
that [itself]. You can go through some fairly painful phases with small companies
before you get repaid ..."
Moreover, the ratio of applications to patents granted tends to be high (49) . Because of the
unpredictability surrounding patents, RDS tries not to poach on its patents budget to support
other activities. Ideally, RDS would like to have the increase in is patent budget linked to the
increase in income which the portfolio is yielding. However, current financial stringencies
mean that at best, the budget is linked to inflation.
For reasons of expense, Strathclyde does not insure its patent portfolio against litigation. RDS
recognises that this leaves it in a vulnerable position. The University would not formally
challenge a company which was apparently abusing its IPR unless it was certain where it
stood. It has already tried informally, via its patent agent, to challenge a Japanese company.
The company wrote back saying - prove it!
(iv)	 Ownership
Strathclyde vests its patents solely in the University's name. However, if it has no interest at
all in a discovery or it decides to abandon fruitless efforts at exploitation RDS automatically
writes to inventors to tell them. On behalf of the University, RDS offers to waive or assign
its rights, as appropriate. There is no official time-scale laid down for doing this, however.
Strathclyde does not retain any interest in IPR which it has waived or assigned in this
situation. It recognises that this is perhaps not the best commercial practice, but it believes
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that trying to recoup its costs would "rattle" academics. In any case, RDS is not aware of any
researchers ignoring its negative evaluation and proceeding with a full application on their
own initiative.
5.5	 Commercialisation
(i) Independent Academic Spin-Off Companies
During the late 1970s and early 1980s Strathclyde licensed its IP to existing companies -
small and large - and to companies founded/co-founded and run by the academics who
generated the IP. This second commercialisation route proved to be fraught with difficulties.
(ii) Joint Ventures
Whilst Strathclyde has not altogether ruled out commercialising IP by this route, it prefers
to license to joint ventures between academics and the University which have been set up with
RDS' guidance and which are run by a professional CEO. Between March 1984 and the end
of 1989 Strathclyde had helped spin-off about a dozen joint ventures on this basis. In each
case, the companies were formed on the initiative of and as a result of a considerable amount
of work on the part of the researchers whose IP they were designed to exploit. Since 1984
Strathclyde has only once licensed IP to an independent spin-off company - ie. one set up
and run by its academic founders/co-founder; from RDS' perspective, it did not transpire to
be a successful partnership.
(iii) University Companies
If company start-up is an appropriate way to exploit a piece of IP - yet the researchers
concerned do not have entrepreneurial inclinations, Strathclyde would not consider forming
a dedicated, wholly-owned campus company to exploit it. There are two main reasons for
this. Firstly, it is seldom possible for the University to provide all the capital required.
Moreover, as a matter of principle, the University prefers to spread the risk between a
number of partners. It does not wish to acquire majority shareholdings. Secondly, if the
academic staff who generated the IP do not wish to be involved in company start-up, RDS
sees no value in trying to do it without them:
"... Trying to get a small company set up and funded with an academic who is
really not that interested does not turn on your venture capitalists ..."
"... We rely on the initiative of academic staff to spin-out the results of their
research. It is their technology. If they wish to do it, we'll support them ... If the
academic staff concerned [do] not wish to form a company, we wouldn't form a
company. It's their business ..."
Strathclyde forms wholly-owned campus companies only if it feels it needs a limited liability
buffer. These are effectively shell companies, to which it may assign its IP:
... [We do this only] if we have a funny feeling up our spine that we ought to
limit the liability ..."
Strathclyde's objective is not to walk away from mistakes it makes:
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... We don't form [such] a company to do something wrong and then get out by
the back door ... But what you can walk away from is vindictiveness on the part of
people one is dealing with. If, for example, you've got technology in this buffer and
you license that to a joint venture or some other company. Suppose they misbehaved
and would not fulfil their side of the agreement. Then you have the right to terminate.
And you clo terminate! The chances are that if that company is misbehaving over one
thing, it will misbehave over the next thing. It will serve injunctions and just mess
about in the courts, just try to frighten you into withdrawing your termination. It's
very nice then to have a limited liability company. You can just raise two fingers and
walk away ..."
(iv) Licensing
Strathclyde licenses a considerable proportion of its IP to existing companies. Because
researchers use RDS on a purely voluntary basis, they are free to approach potential licensees
on their own initiative - and free to conduct the license negotiations themselves. Since RDS
alone has the authority to sign license agreements, researchers must involve RDS at the end
of the process, but what they have negotiated is accepted as a fait accompli.
If researchers choose to involve RDS at an earlier stage, they are encouraged to identify a few
likely candidates for a license agreement. Where there is no positive response, RDS and the
researchers try to identify a further 20-25 candidates, using an in-house database. If that fails,
a further one hundred or so are identified, and so on. The IPR Officer prefers to make the
first approach to potential licensees himself, to ensure that discussions take place within a
proper framework, using a confidentiality agreement. If it becomes necessary to approach a
large number of companies, RDS may send a dedicated brochure bearing the legend "A New
Product Opportunity", together with details of the product, the projected markets and any
development requirements ('). As a matter of course, RDS regularly distributes to industry
copies of "Report", a quarterly review of all industrially-relevant research taking place in the
University. In addition, RDS is planning to distribute a "Report"-style publication which
concentrates on specific areas, eg. semi-conductors.
Once a confidentiality agreement is in place, researchers are encouraged to play as active a
part as they can in "selling" their discovery. Researchers also form an integral part of the
team which negotiates the terms of the license agreement:
"... [We] brief and help them. We want them present, because ... the credibility of
the technology is often in the hands of the academic. [This] Office has no credibility
in science ..."
RDS concedes that academics can sometimes handicap the negotiation process but regards this
as a risk which it must take:
" They can also be of great benefit ... A good majority, once they have been
through the process once, second time around they are old hands. They are 90 per
cent of the way with you. They are more ready to introduce technology to you, to
bring forward companies who are going to be licensees ... Involving them in this way
means that [our] team of 8 becomes a team of 80 ..."
Strathclyde tends to let the technology determine the nature of the license agreement:
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" ... Exclusivity has a price and is negotiated away with care, very much
determined by whether we think there is a single market sector - in which case it is
much more likely to be exclusive and we'll get a better price for it.
"But if it is multi-sector ... [or] if there were 20 large companies who could
benefit from it, I think we would be very wary about locking ourselves into an
exclusive deal with one.
"However well you write your license agreement, if they shelve your technology,
getting it back can be messy even if you have a termination clause ..."
(v)	 BTG
Strathclyde does not rule out exploiting its IP by means of the BTG:
" ... We use them selectively ... What we are doing now is to present them with
four or five situations a year, which we have well researched and maybe taken out
patent applications on - and then decided: this is better handled by the BTG. I invite
them to come and bid for the business. And they respond to it. They always come ..."
6	 ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
6.1	 Policy
Until the late 1980s, Strathclyde did not have a formal policy vis-a-vis academic
entrepreneurship. It was something which the University had supported in principle for a
number of years. This was discreetly articulated in the Staff Handbook throughout the 1970s
(51) . In the 1980s it was articulated fairly forcefully by the new Principal at meetings of Court,
seminars and conferences, both inside and outside the University. During the course of 1989,
it was given formal expression for the first time, not as a stand-alone policy but as one of the
Business Venture Group's (52) stated objectives. Strathclyde is now formally committed to
"encouraglind staff to form spin-out companies and inculcat[ing] an enterprise culture" and
to "investfingl in selected ventures to earn dividend income and capital growth where this is
seen as the optimum means of achieving commercial development" (53)•
Committed to paper in broad brushstroke form, Strathclyde's policy on academic
entrepreneurship via RDS and the Business Venture Group has been formally communicated
to the academic staff. During 1989/90 RDS also set about formulating a policy to govern
academics who choose to be entrepreneurial within the university system, via research
institutes/centre/units etc. This was not scheduled to be debated by Court until the following
session.
RDS expects both policies to provoke controversy, since some senior academics - members
of Court - have already expressed doubts:
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"... initially there wasn't a great deal of controversy. Or if there was, it wasn't
articulated very well. It has really come about in the last 2-3 years, with financial
cutbacks and budgets which are very tight. Then, to see the Business Ventures Group
spending money on individual members of staff exploiting their projects and forming
new companies and potentially making gain - that was seen as a little bit
[questionable] ..."
RDS made a presentation on the Business Venture Group's activities at the annual meeting
of Court, portraying the money spent on academic spin-off companies as an investment rather
than a drain on resources. RDS recognises that it will probably have to conduct similar
exercises at Departmental level:
"... It's the old situation in a university. When you are doing something like this,
you've got to promote it ten times more aggressively internally than you do outside
Moreover, RDS knows from experience that personal jealousies are likely to influence the
attitude of some academics (54) .
Until the mid-1980s the University paid more attention to ensuring that academic
entrepreneurs conformed to the conditions of Outside Employment approved by Court in
1971, than to the mechanisms by means of which they pursued their entrepreneurial activities.
At Strathclyde, academic entrepreneurship has manifested itself in a number of different ways
over the years. Several academics have been instrumental in setting up units/institutes/centres
which function as the commercial arm of their Department/School/Faculty ("). Although they
are not obliged to formally ask permission, in practice they usually seek financial support.
In order to get that, they are obliged to present a viable business plan to RDS/the Enterprise
Office. Moreover, they would have to operate at full commercial cost and repay part of their
profits to the host Department. These academics chose to be entrepreneurial within the
university system and this is a model which the new Enterprise Office is now hoping to
promote where "soft" IP is concerned.
There has been no opportunity at Strathclyde to pursue entrepreneurial activities outside the
conventional framework of the University, yet under the umbrella of a wholly-owned campus
company, or a subsidiary of a wholly-owned campus company. However, towards the end
of the 1970s two companies were formed by academics to exploit "hard" IP which they had
generated. They were both independent in the sense that the academic concerned assumed the
role of CEO. From a financial perspective, they were effectively joint ventures. There were
also independent spin-off companies set up by academics to exploit "soft" IP; however, some
simply provided a framework for offsetting the costs of consultancy against tax.
It was not until RDS was founded that anyone paid serious attention to the mechanisms by
means of which academics pursued their entrepreneurial activities. In the intervening years
RDS has evolved a coherent policy, informed by experience of failure and success.
Strathclyde is now reluctant to allow academics to exploit "hard" IP which they have
generated via independent spin-off companies or even joint ventures with the University/a
third party, unless they assume a role other than that of CEO.
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"... I don't regard these companies as being viable if they're run by the
academics. They don't have the business experience. Equally, you can't get the level
of investment you want from outside sources on the basis of an academic CEO.
You've got to bring in somebody with a track record ..."
Since Strathclyde is committed both to encouraging academic spin-off companies and to
members of staff using RDS because they choose to, not because they are obliged to, this is
not a hard and fast rule. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that academics going it
alone would be granted rights to exploit the IP they had generated. They would have to
convince the University - in practice, the Principal and RDS - that their company was "an
adequate vehicle". Moreover, they would have to explain why they did not want to benefit
from the resources at RDS' disposal.
If RDS is involved and an academic presents a "half viable" proposition - which includes a
realistic assessment of his contribution - he is likely to receive RDS' support. That support,
whether it is tangible or intangible, is given on three conditions. Firstly, RDS requires
between 20 and 25 per cent of the equity to be allocated to the University gratis. Secondly,
Strathclyde reserves the right to appoint a non-executive member to the board. Thirdly, RDS
insists on companies making their accounts and other relevant management information
available. RDS feels that if it is aware of impending difficulties, it may be able to avert
disasters and avoid crisis management.
Academics who participate in joint ventures with the University are usually allocated - gratis -
a share of the equity. The proportion depends on the size of the start-up operation (515) . It also
depends on the view of the investors in the company:
"... Some are more generous than others. Some understand very well the need to
motivate academic staff in the early years. They set them the challenge - do well with
your first round offunding and you hold a large chunk of the company. Spend money
like water and come back for second, third and fourth [round funding] and it must
[get] diluted. The generosity is for phase I. The generosity seldom goes beyond phase
..."
The details of RDS' policies have not been committed to paper - nor are they likely to be:
"... [We] find it much better to have face-to-face contacts with the relevant people.
There are so many variations on the theme which could take place in the University,
it is not too clever for the centre to be too cut and dried about what can be done and
what can't be done. There's always somebody who comes along and says - you never
thought of this, did you? And yet when you see it, it is first class ..."
Moreover:
"... people just do not sit down in universities and read and digest complicated
documents. They just don't. You can send paperwork round till you are blue in the
face and nobody has ever heard of anything. But the people that we talk to and
involve in things that relate specifically to them ... they listen and they learn. That
is the best way of communicating the University's policy ..."
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6.2	 Business Start-Up Advice
RDS probably has more extensive in-house sources of business expertise than most such
university units. The full benefit of that expertise is made available to all entrepreneurial
academics, including those who might be given permission to set up and run "hard" spin-off
companies independently. RDS does not subscribe to the "all or nothing" philosophy,
preferring always to "work things round to a more balanced position". It also advises
academics running "soft", R&D-based companies. RDS is motivated by a perceived need to
ensure that staff do not place themselves in a conflict of interests, something which is known
to have happened at least once.
Where joint ventures are concerned, RDS acts as stage manager. It assigns the different roles,
explaining what is needed, why it is needed and how to do it. As far as possible, would-be
academic entrepreneurs are given carefully controlled tasks, such as preparing a business
plan, doing patent searches, market research, helping locate a CEO etc (57)• It is a highly
interactive process. RDS' long-term objective is to create a business-literate academic
community at Strathclyde through action learning. In RDS' view, there is already a significant
number of business-literate academics.
Once the company has been set up and the CEO appointed, Strathclyde exercises no further
control. RDS can only hope it has made a wise appointment. It has made one mistake to date,
but has around a dozen successes to offset against it.
6.3	 Making Time
If academics want to help set up a company to exploit their research discoveries, RDS'
agreement depends on their readiness to devote the necessary time to it. Strathclyde allows
academics 25 days a year for consultancy activities, but RDS does not see this, combined with
evenings and weekends, as a realistic approach:
"... It would be hopeless. I would not recommend that kind of company founding
In RDS' view, this level of activity should be reserved for the pre-start-up phase, before
anyone is committed to proceeding. Equally, RDS sees no value in making minor adjustments
to an academic's teaching load or administrative load, etc. It encourages academics to
negotiate three years' Leave of Absence, which also allows the Department to appoint a
temporary lecturer of a higher calibre than a shorter period generally attracts. Would-be
entrepreneurs are never released for 100 per cent of their time; this is not seen as necessary
since they do not assume the role of CEO. It is usual to negotiate a part-time contract, with
the academic retaining perhaps 30 to 50 per cent of his workload. Since he is still an
employee of the University, his pension plan is unaffected. Whatever proportion of the week
he works, the would-be entrepreneur receives his full salary and the company pays the
University for the time it has bought out. Since Departments have fully devolved budgets,
they are free to spend the money as they see fit.
Since there may also be non-financial considerations to take into account, the decision is taken
by an extraordinary meeting of the Faculty Board 0 , which will agree only if the would-be
entrepreneur's colleagues support the application. RDS prefers to have a rolling one-year
notice built into the arrangement, in case it takes longer than anticipated to establish the spin-
off company to the point where the academic can reduce his input and his departure his
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critical to the success of the company. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult to
negotiate due to growing pressures on staff:student numbers. RDS does not participate in the
negotiations:
"... It is quite a sensitive area. I usually do a certain amount of lobbying, but I do
it discreetly. I stand back because I regard it very much as something which
academics must sort out between themselves. I find that it is detrimental i f I step in
and say there are good commercial reasons why this chap should be given it. They
all say - well, there is an even better academic one why he shouldn't. So, I leave
them to discuss it amongst themselves and I wait for them to turn round to me and
say - we've had our discussion. Is the commercial justification really worth it? Then
I'm invited to say my piece.
All of Strathclyde's academic entrepreneurs have returned to their Department after three
years because they want to do research more than they want to run a business. A few opt to
continue having foot in both worlds, with a permanent part-time contract. In RDS' view, that
is an arrangement which works to everyone's advantage.
6.4	 Other Resources
(i) Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
Strathclyde is happy for academic entrepreneurs to have access to equipment, instrumentation,
provided they pay the full market rate for them. RDS' constant refrain is "no hidden
subsidies", for sound business reasons:
II
... It is very unlikely that these companies will survive on their first tranche of
funding. After a couple of years, when they have begun to trade ... they are going to
need a second round of funding [either] to survive or to change gear.
"If at that point you bring in a venture capitalist and say you want an extra £0. 5m
... and you say you are worth backing because you are now breaking into the real
world and making it by yourselves, the venture capitalist says - but you are
subsidised, you aren't a real company!
"You lose an awful lot of credibility. What they want to see is somebody who has
survived in the hard world and has a commercial head on their shoulders ..."
Equally, Strathclyde expects its academic entrepreneurs to instal a separate company telephone
line and to provide their own secretaries and technical support staff, though in some
Departments, if the pressure on existing staff is not too great, they may be able to buy part
of their time.
For all these resources, the full market rate is usually determined locally, by the Department
concerned, rather than centrally.
(ii) Accommodation
Due to pressure on space, Strathclyde has not allowed academics to pursue their business
activities on-campus. Those who have tried have soon been "stamped on": they have been
presented with a pro-rata bill of £20 per sq.ft. per year. Together with Glasgow
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University, Strathclyde was instrumental in co-founding the West of Scotland Science Park
(59) . This is located several miles away, but presents a considerably cheaper option 0°) . Several
of Strathclyde's spin-off companies located there once they had established themselves.
However, if there was a waiting list, or if people were deterred by the distance, or the units
were simply too big, until 1990 they were obliged to pay local commercial rents.
In January 1990 Strathclyde opened an incubator unit (61) on campus:
"... We wanted something on campus which would allow ... members of staff to
begin to explore commercial opportunities. They can have very small amounts of
cheap space which progressively gets more expensive, till they get thrown out after
three years. They buy meeting rooms, conference rooms, secretarial services etc as
they use them ..."
The reasons for setting up the incubator unit, its modus operandi and its opening were all
documented in the university newsletter (62) . By the end of 1989/90, ten of the twenty the units
had been let. Although not intended as an exclusive resource for academic spin-off
companies, all the occupants fell into that category.
(iii) Finance
Since the end of the 1970s, Strathclyde has effectively provided part of the start-up capital
for academic spin-off companies. This has usually come about because the University felt
obliged to fund development work which could not attract funding from other sources. It
proved to be an expensive way of proceeding. In 1984/85, at the insistence of the Bursar, a
Commercial Development Fund was created and minuted by the University Court. Strathclyde
finances the fund privately, rather than out of its UFC grant. It is replenished in part by
"royalty income from those ventures in which investment from the Fund has directly generated
IP" (" .
The University is now consciously acting as a minor venture capitalist. Where company start-
up is seen as the optimum means of achieving commercial development, it is prepared to
invest from £5,000 to £50,000, thereby helping solve the problem of raising sums smaller
than £100,000. This is first-round funding, usually provided in the form of equity, giving the
University a maximum stake of 50 per cent. The University has no interest in a controlling
stake:
"... We are not in business to run businesses. We haven't got the mentality or the
management structure ..."
Alternatively, it may be provided in the form of preferential shares or convertible loans - at
commercial rates. The return to the University is limited to royalties, dividends and the
eventual sale of the company or its stake in the company:
"... We look to exit at some stage in the future but we take a fairly soft line on that.
We are not venture capitalists in that sense. If it hurt the company for us to extract ourselves,
we wouldn't do it ..."
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Strathclyde looks for no return on academic entrepreneurs' personal income from their
company activities. In part, this reflects the fact that it does not take a percentage of
academics' earnings from arms' length consultancy activities, despite extending
professional liability/indemnity insurance to them. However, it is more than a question of
being consistent:
"... We say - good luck to them! We expect them to earn a lot more ...,,
RDS' final contribution to the process of helping academics found companies to exploit
their research discoveries is to locate external sources of funding. To date, it has been
adept at raising investment capital, both for first-round and subsequent- round funding.
However, RDS would not shoulder that particular burden unless the University's share-
holding warranted it.
7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In August 1990 Strathclyde was informed that the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was
satisfied with the exploitation arrangements which the University had established. A
formal document was scheduled to follow, confirming the University's rights to IP arising
out of Research Council-funded projects for an indefinite period. Strathclyde is now
required only to report inventions to the Exploitation Scrutiny Group.
8	 POLICY AND PRACTICE AS PERCEIVED BY HEADS OF
DEPARTMENT AND DEANS
8.1	 Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and Response to the Kingman Letter
(i)	 Awareness of the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
Six out of the seven interviewees at Strathclyde reported that they had been aware of the
removal of the BTG's monopoly in 1985; the seventh (1) said he had known nothing about
it until the question was put to him in the course of being interviewed for this study. One
of the six (B) recollected reading about the removal of the BTG's monopoly in the press,
while another (") said he had been on the University's Research Committee at the time and
had heard about it through RDS which used to report to the Research Committee; a third
HoD (c) thought he had been told about it directly by RDS staff. The other three
interviewees had no clear recollection how they learned about the removal of the BTG's
monopoly, but each assumed that the information would eventually have percolated down
to their level in the department by the usual means.
Only five interviewees (A, C. I), E, 2) knew that at the same time the Research Councils had
offered the University the chance to assume the rights and responsibilities previously held
by the BTG. One HoD (B) reported that he had wondered about the implications of the
removal of the BTG's monopoly; despite being a well-established HoD at the time, he had
not heard about the Research Councils' offer - either then or during the intervening years.
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(ii) Attitudes to the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
Questioned about their attitude at the time to the removal of the BTG's monopoly and the
Research Councils' offer, three of the five said they had welcomed it. One characterised it
as "a move in the right direction" (E) ; another (c) felt that where the exploitation of IP was
concerned, the more input the University and individual departments could have, the
better; the last (p) pointed out that the University had a good relationship with a large
number of industrial collaborators and that since the appointment of the present Director
of RDS in 1984 its approach had been just as professional as the BTG's - so why have
intermediary organisation adding another layer of discussion and bureaucracy?
Two of the five reported that they had not been particularly enthusiastic. One (2) attributed
this to his lack of experience and interest in the exploitation of IP; the other (") said he had
perceived patenting to be a highly technical and expensive activity - and he had also
wondered whether Strathclyde (or any UK university) had the necessary expertise to
market inventions.
(iii) Perceptions of the University's Motivation in Accepting the Research
Councils' Offer
Nonetheless, all seven interviewees felt that the University had been right to accept the
Research Councils' offer. Asked what they thought the University's motivation had been,
three 1). 2) described it as just the kind of entrepreneurial opportunity which the Principal
relished. One (11) said:
"... it's very much in the entrepreneurial style of [the Principal]. I mean, I think
that is just the kind of challenge he would fancy and he thinks that the rest of us
should fancy. I think he is probably right in that ... I think the University's
motivation is really ... a kind of recognition that the world [was] changing under
Thatcher and entrepreneurial activities were going to be rewarded. And really, if
something is on offer, you should take it ..."
Three (is, c.1) felt it was entirely in keeping with Strathclyde's tradition of being involved in
technology transfer. One (1) said:
"... I cannot conceive of [Strathclyde not accepting the offer] ... We are supposed
to be a technological university. That means we are somewhere between a
straightforwardly academic institution and the marketplace ..."
One HoD (c) pointed out that for a number of years Strathclyde had been putting pressure
on the Research Councils to give it the freedom to make its own decisions about the
exploitation of IP, while another (LI) said people genuinely felt that they could operate more
efficiently than the BTG, which had been so slow that it had undoubtedly missed
commercial opportunities.
Only two interviewees (c.1) suggested that Strathclyde had been motivated by the chance to
get "a bigger slice of the cake".
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(iv)	 Awareness of and Views on the Process of Determining the University's
Response to the Research Councils' Offer
None of the interviewees knew that the University's response to the Kingman letter had
been determined by the Principal in consultation with the Director of RDS alone and
ratified by Court retrospectively. Three (c. E.2) thought the the ILO would have helped the
University Management Group to draft recommendations for submission to Court, which
would have formally determined the appropriate response. One (D) thought that there would
have been a wider consultation process initially - but omitted to specify who should have
been consulted. Another (ID thought the initial consultation process should have extended to
senior administrators and Deans, while a third (A) felt that the matter should have been
debated by Senate and Court, not just rubber-stamped. The remaining interviewee ( 1) felt
there was really no need for a decision-making process:
"... I think it is obvious that if somebody hands you the right, you take it - because
potentially there's a large amount of money fin it] ..."
On learning what actually happened, one HoD ( 8) simply said that it was typical of the
Principal's style of management, while two interviewees (c.11 declared that they weren't
concerned, since the Director of RDS was involved in the decision and they would
probably have made the same decision themselves. Two (D' E.1 sought to explain it by
suggesting that the decision probably had to be taken quickly and that in any case, it was
not possible to involve the departments in every decision. Another (2) doubted whether it
was true that the Principal had taken the decision in consultation with the Director of RDS
alone; he then sought to explain this in terms of the fact that the University Management
Group was only just coming into being in 1985, that the management structure of the
University had been in a suspended state at the time. Only one HoD (A) maintained his
original position, saying that it should have been debated by Senate and Court in view of
the wider issues and ramifications associated with it.
8.2	 Identifying Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)
	 Views on the Likelihood of Different Disciplines Generating Exploitable
IP
Asked whether they thought the particular spread of science and technology disciplines in
a university had an influence on the amount of exploitable IP which might be identified,
five HoDs felt that some disciplines were currently more likely to generate exploitable lP
than others. The disciplines they singled out ranged from electronics and electrical
engineering (A, C. D), information technology (A. E) and computer science (A. c. P to molecular
genetics (A) , the biosciences (D. E) and pharmacy (A. E) . Two also singled out disciplines
which they thought were currently less likely to generate exploitable IP, namely
mathematics (D), statistics (D), the population dynamics area of physics 0) mechanical
engineering (E.) and civil engineering (D).
The two Deans thought the amount of exploitable IP identified was more likely to be
influenced by the extent to which the staff in a university's science and technology base
had an applied outlook ( 1) and had developed a relationship with industry a); the first said
that very "academic" departments would also generate exploitable IP - but they would not
recognise the fact. The remaining HoD ( D) suggested that the amount of exploitable IP
identified was a function of excellence; in his view, if a university concentrated its
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resources on those areas in which it excelled, it was more likely that those areas would
generate exploitable IP.
Where Strathclyde itself was concerned, two HoDs felt that the research bias of their own
department was likely to generate more exploitable IP than similar departments in other
universities. They attributed this to concern with "real-world problems" rather than
historical or theoretical scholarship and the emphasis on applied or industrially-funded
research. Another said that, given his department's emphasis on industrial research, it
should generate more exploitable research than similar departments elsewhere; in fact,
however, much of this research concerned the development of ideas initiated elsewhere.
This particular HoD found it ironic that in the 1980s most of the novel, patented IP
emanating from universities had come from departments oriented towards fundamental
research. A fellow HoD (0 remarked that his department had already generated IPR which
had earned more for the University than similar departments anywhere in the world had
earned; however, this had been due to chance and in other respects, he could think of
several sister departments in other universities which were just as likely as his to do so.
One HoD felt it was impossible to answer this question, since it depended less on the
department than on the individuals who belonged to it.
(ii) Awareness of the University's Wish to Identify IP
Asked how aware they thought staff in their department were about the University's wish
to identify potentially exploitable IP, only one HoD (1)) said he felt this was very widely
known. Another (c) thought that those members of staff capable of generating exploitable
IP were very aware, whilst a third (E) said that his staff were reasonably well aware, but
did not really think it applied to them. The other two (" ,13) judged their staff to be no more
than "vaguely aware".
The two Deans took a more optimistic view, saying that the staff in their Faculties were
"all very aware" a) or "pretty aware" owing to all the publicity there had been (2).
(iii) Responsibility for Identifying IP
All but one of the HoDs questioned felt that their staff would take a very positive or
reasonably positive view of being asked to "flag" potentially exploitable research results.
The other (E.) said that his staff would be positive, but for the pressure of time:
"... the more interesting staff are just beaten into the ground. I mean, I'm not
complaining when I say this, but I work a 12-14 hour day five days a week and
probably a 4-5 hour day on Saturday and Sunday. And that goes on year after
year. Now, I'm not unique in that. A lot of staff are working pretty well like that.
And that is just to cope with their duties and the things you have to do, and to
make sure the ship stays reasonably well afloat. To find time in there that you
would need to find if you were going to take an idea and pursue it a bit to see if it
was exploitable, there just isn't time. And I think that is one of the major
problems. If there was a little bit more slack in the system, I suspect - given the
climate today - because the climate is better for it, you know ... ten years ago we
didn't have the climate for it in universities. Well, unfortunately, now that we've
got the climate for it, there's no slack in the system ..."
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One of the Deans (1) claimed that, unlike staff in other Faculties, those in his Faculty
would normally go to RDS immediately if they thought they had an exploitable idea. The
other (2) lent credence to this view, saying that, with certain exceptions, the staff in his
Faculty probably had a negative attitude to being asked to "flag" IP. He characterised
them as suspicious of activities conducted at the centre instead of in departments,
suggesting that this attitude stemmed from the fact that the allocation of resources was
now explicit; staff could now see what proportion of the overall budget was consumed by
the centre.
All the interviewees but one felt that the Director of RDS should adopt a proactive
approach to identifying IP. Definitions of what constituted being "proactive" varied
considerably, however. One 01) assigned the Director of RDS a strategic role, saying that
he should furnish the University with a vision of the research and development it should
pursue over the next decade. The others defined it variously as spotting corporate
opportunities and bringing people together to capitalise on them a)), keeping track of what
was happening in departments ( I), educating staff about the benefits of IP and encouraging
them to generate more (c) and making face-to-face presentations at departmental meetings
to overcome academics' tendency to bin information conveyed on paper (2) • One (E)
suggested that the Director of RDS should restrict himself to jogging people's memory
now and then about the value of IP; staff would regard anything more as "someone in
administration pestering them when they are so busy". Just one interviewee (") felt that the
Director of RDS should adopt a reactive approach to identifying IP; in his view, trying to
ferret out IP would be a waste of time, though "the occasional ra-ra session to remind
people" might be worthwhile.
Three interviewees (c. D. E.) felt that the Director of RDS was "doing quite a good job" and
being "reasonably proactive", while another three 01 ' 1,2) said that he could be a lot more
proactive. All three said they recognised that the Director of RDS was constrained by the
resources available (ie. time and staff). One (11) felt that more resources should be made
available to facilitate professional management of the University's research. Another a)
observed that RDS had made tremendous efforts to keep abreast of what was happening in
the Faculty; he welcomed the University's promise of sufficient resources to permit RDS
to make two or three more appointments.
(iv)	 Strategies for Identifying IP
All but one interviewee a) dismissed the idea of research proposals, interim and/or final 
reports being scrutinised for IP which might have been overlooked by the researchers
involved. The reasons given ranged from the immense amount of time it would take (''' E.
1) , the need to maintain confidentiality on industrial projects (''' c) and the difficulty of
finding scrutineers with the requisite expertise (''` .c.12) to scepticism about the return on the
time and resources invested (E.1) . One (1) said he did not believe that new science often led
to new technology - and hence to new IP.
Most interviewees also responded very negatively to the idea of scrutinising drafts of
papers before submitting them to journals. They cited similar objections and added a few
more. One (I) remarked that it would upset academics because it would delay publication
by at least a month - and probably longer if exploitable IP was identified; in his view, it
would be a counter-productive exercise. This was echoed by another (p) , who said:
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"... If we want to get more exploitable IP, we need to get more encouragement for
people to do work. We don't need to add additional filters and dampers on their
ability to communicate ..."
However, one interviewee (c) said that, if a way could be found to scrutinise papers
quickly - within one to two weeks of submitting them, it would be to the University's
benefit to institute this kind of safety net. Another (A) remarked that everybody had a
mortgage to pay and that many people would be happy to have their papers scrutinised in
this way, if it could be done efficiently; he suggested it might be worthwhile introducing
this kind of scrutiny on a voluntary basis.
8.3	 Ownership of Intellectual Property Created by Academics
Asked whether they thought it was more appropriate for IP to belong to the University or
the academic(s) who created it, only two interviewees (c. °) answered unequivocally that
the University should own it. In the view of one ( D), research was generally conducted in
teams in universities; if one individual - for instance, the team leader - claimed ownership
of a discovery, this would be very demotivating for junior staff. This problem would be
overcome if the University was deemed to own the IP, because it had the same
relationship with every member of staff and could ensure that team leaders only benefitted
financially from the exploitation of IP if they had genuinely contributed to its generation.
The other (c) felt that the University should own the IP because it provided the facilities
required to generate it and should get a reasonable return on its investment.
Two interviewees (A.2) were unhappy with the idea that the University could claim
"blanket" ownership of IP which was connected with one's work - indeed, one (A)
commented: "I'm really interested that you are so positive about this. I think there is
certainly a lot of doubt in academics' minds". Both distinguished between IP which could
not have been generated without the use of University facilities and IP which was
generated independently - eg. by the mathematician sitting in his bath and dreaming up a
significant equation or by academics working at home in the evenings and weekends. In
the former situation, both thought the IP should belong to the University; in the latter, it
should belong to the individual academic.
One HoD (g) did not believe that UK intellectual property law awarded ownership of EP
generated by academics to their employer. If he was mistaken and it did, in his view it
was wrong:
"... I think academics do work in a different way from industrialists. I mean,
having been in both camps ... as an industrialist, you are usually working on a
product or some artefact for your company which is their bread and butter. And so
you do that. You are paid to do it. There is often much more of a total effort
involved in anything that is done. Whereas academics have the freedom to work in
... wherever they care. They are not directed in their activity and many of them
will spend long hours of their own time pursuing things they are interested in with
usually very little help or very little support from the University. In those
circumstances, I think it would be very difficult to say that the University has an
absolute right to that activity ..."
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8.4	 Protecting Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)	 Attitude to Protecting IP Created by Academics
Three HoDs (A' C' 1:9 said that they supported the concept of protecting IP generated by
academic research. All three HoDs explained their support in terms of the various benefits
conferred by protecting IP:
"... I think both at the personal and national level, you know, if we don't try to
protect something and develop it in Britain and Scotland, it will end up in Japan
or Germany •••" (A)
"... there is inevitably going to be a delay in communicating results but I don't
think that these days anyone could consider British academic institutions as
charitable foundations that can simply afford to do things and let everybody else
take what they like. If we were being given totally altruistic funding, then I might
say something different, but the situation is not like that. I think that we have to be
able to exploit what we produce at least to some extent for our own benefit and
then see that the information becomes public ..."
One of the Deans (2) disagreed with the concept of protecting IP generated by academic
research - on the ground that the results of academic research should be admitted to the
public domain. The other ( 1) felt it was a matter of individual choice; he remarked that he
personally never got involved with formal consultancy agreements so that he was never
prevented from talking openly about his work - but he would not necessarily expect other
academics to see this the same way. One HoD (E.) reported that had never thought about
this, adding that he therefore had no opinion.
When asked to consider the fact that UK universities are not legally obliged to patent
patentable IP, that they have the right to protect it by treating it as secret know-how
instead, three interviewees (C. D.2) said that they were opposed to this course of action. One
(I)) remarked that if there was a choice, neither the academic nor the University was
entitled to treat a discovery as secret know-how. Another (c) recalled that the University
had just formally decided to resist pressure from industry for an indefinite moratorium on
doctoral theses, adding:
"... I'd be very unhappy about having my ideas sat on by my employer, if I
deemed that they should be patented ..."
A third (E) declared that he could not see why a company would want IP to be treated as
secret know-how rather than patented, where there was a choice, since it was very
difficult in academia to prevent ideas from "leaking out". The other Dean (1) suggested that
treating something as secret know-how might be acceptable provided sufficient money
changed hands as recompense - of which the academic(s) concerned should receive a
significant share. Only one interviewee (A) accepted the idea of protecting lP by treating it
as secret know-how - provided the academic(s) concerned were happy with the terms of
the agreement. In his view, unless you had tremendous confidence in a patent and were
prepared to spend Emillions to defend it, treating it as secret know-how was "smarter";
for this reason, he did not feel that patenting was necessarily preferable to secret know-
how. He also commented:
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"... I think probably from the academic point of view, if he was getting a good
deal from a company, the fact that a patent is a publication in one sense wouldn't
be very important. I suppose the question of public funding comes in, but I would
have said ... if you are dealing with a UK company, then the public interest may
well be served better by letting it be developed by a UK-based company than
putting it in the public domain and, even on a license basis, (letting it] go abroad
II
. . .
The other interviewees all felt that patenting was preferable if there was a choice.
(ii) Who Decides Whether and How to Protect IP Generated by Academics?
Three interviewees (".c.2) believed (correctly) that academic(s) who generate exploitable IP
have the right to decide whether their IP should be protected - and how, if there is a
choice. Two believed (incorrectly) that these decisions would be taken either by the
Director of RDS (E), the University Management Group (E) or the Principal (D), while
another (2) thought that the University Management Group should arbitrate if there was a
conflict between the wishes of the Director of RDS and those of the academic(s) who
generated the IP in question.
Three HoDs (c• I). E.) agreed with the University's policy. The two Deans were more
ambivalent. One (I) remarked that as an academic he would resent the Director of RDS or
some other representative of the University telling him he could not publish his research
findings because of their commercial value; on the other hand, as Dean he felt that the
University should reserve the right to do just this, if the commercial value of the IPR
warranted it. In his opinion, Strathclyde should start to be more directive about this than it
had been to date - because the University needed additional income. A similar view was
expressed by another HoD (")• The other Dean (2) said that while he was all in favour of
academics putting their research discoveries into the public domain, the University
Management Group should possibly impose a period of restraint if it looked as though
opportunities for profit might be lost. Upon reflection, however, he opted for the
academic(s) concerned having the right of final decision.
(iii) Attitude to the Logistics of Protecting IP By Patent
None of the HoDs or Deans interviewed questioned the University's policy of paying a
patent agent to write patent specifications, rather than ask academics themselves to
produce the first draft - unless they particularly wanted to. However, one HoD remarked
that the University should be selective, in order to avoid running up a huge bill. It was his
impression that Strathclyde had spent as much as £0.25m a year on patenting costs at one
time; in fact, the University's largest annual expenditure on patents was £120,000.
Asked how they would respond to members of staff who volunteered to produce a first
draft requesting a temporary adjustment to their workload in order to facilitate this
process, the HoDs expressed differing views. One (p) said that he had no objection to
members of staff reaching informal agreements to stand in for each other, without
involving him. In his view, formally reducing someone's workload would be impossible
because IP was too unpredictable to allow for rational planning; the best he could offer
was increased secretarial support. Two ( c. E) said that their response would depend on the
merits of the case; both indicated that if it was important to patent a discovery quickly, a
way would be found to let the academic concerned to devote the requisite time to drafting
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the patent specification - particularly if exploitation of the IP was liable to yield the
department substantial revenue. One (B) suggested that he would informally arrange for the
work in question to be dispersed among the other members of staff, while the other (c)
preferred a more formal approach; he added that this was no different to providing cover
for colleagues who were away conducting research. However, both HoDs had caveats:
one (c) commented that the research selectivity exercise due in 1994 (sic) might make
people less willing to be flexible, while the other (B) said that his staff would be less
willing to take on the extra work if it meant that some members of staff benefitted
financially, while others did not; in his view, the University's recent decision to share any
revenue with the department made this less problematical.
One of the Deans (2) was not optimistic about the prospect of HoDs in his Faculty
responding sympathetically to requests for a temporary reduction in their workload while
the petitioner drafted a patent specification:
"... I don't want to give you a gloomy picture of HoDs within the University - it's
not true. But there have been examples, I think, where the career of an individual
member of staff hasn't meant all that much to their HoD. In those very rare
circumstances, there ought to be some appeal against their decision ..."
He suggested that the Director of RDS should speak to the HoD on behalf of the
inventor(s) and indicate the importance of the discovery in question.
8.5	 Entrepreneurially Exploiting Intellectual Property Created by
Academics
Exploiting "Hard" Intellectual Property
Asked to give their views on the idea of exploiting "hard" IP entrepreneurially, instead of
automatically licensing it to an existing company, HoDs and Deans signified qualified
approval of the idea. All seven agreed with Strathclyde's policy of refusing to allow
"hard" IP to be exploited via independent academic spin-off companies - but gave different
reasons. One HoD (c) remarked that scientists were amateurs when it came to business and
that it was good to see that the University was learning from its earlier mistakes. Another
(19 echoed this view, saying that if the University was to be believed, independent
academic spin-off companies had been "very poorly successful" and were not an effective
way to exploit "hard" IP. One of the Deans 0) commented that he did not believe
academics could serve two masters; academic entrepreneurs could not run two things at
the same time unless they were "very, very talented and very energetic". The other Dean
(2) made a similar response, saying:
"... [An] analogy [is] someone trying to run a practice at the same time as being
engaged in the University. It is almost impossible not to give the practice priority
... The fact is that the external world exerts certain pressures and [doesn't]
observe the rhythms of the University ..."
Three interviewees (". B.2) were concerned about individual academics exploiting either
"hard" or "soft" IP for private gain when University resources had contributed to the
creation of the IP in question.
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The University's policy of becoming involved in joint ventures with academics who
generated "hard" IP met with the approval of most interviewees, though with a number of
caveats. One of the Deans (1) thought this was a good way to exploit "hard" IP, provided it
remained a peripheral University activity - notwithstanding the fact that many of the
companies in Silicon Valley in California had spun out from local universities and that the
UK company Barr & Stroud had been founded by two academics from Leeds University.
One HoD (") spoke against the University's practice of emulating venture capitalists by
devoting large sums of money to joint ventures with members of staff. He felt that the
University should set aside around £100,000 for such activities and should "recycle" this
sum, rather than continually expand it. In his view, this would "bring discipline" to a
system ...
"... where there are always tremendous pressures to keep pumping in more money
once somebody has backed a certain project ... These entrepreneurial-type people
are exactly people who can convince those who are ready to be convinced that just
another £10,000, just another .£100,000 will make it commercial and the
University is going to make millions out of it. And that's the danger area ... I just
feel that our involvement as a University ... public money should be kept quite
modest and once you go beyond that, then one should leave it to the supposed
experts who are people like the Scottish Development Agency and the venture
capitalists ..."
This particular HoD believed that the University's policy had resulted largely in losses and
it was time for RDS to draw up a balance sheet and present it to both Senate and Council;
he felt it was not at all clear that either was in possession of the facts. This sentiment was
echoed by another HoD (D), who commented that members of the Business Ventures Group
had "red faces" on account of their poor investment record - "but not so red because they
have not been outside, in public".
One HoD (D) was ambivalent about the idea of joint ventures between members of staff
and the University. On the one hand, he said that in principle he would prefer academics
to focus on academic work, rather than divert their energies into commercialising their
research findings; on the other hand, he remarked:
"... I don't believe in limiting people's opportunities. The University has two jobs,
in the crudest sense. There's the overall academic jobs and there's things that
arrive ... [transferred] into the community, which can be products, just as much as
knowledge. I don't see why i[people have something that needs chasing up, we
shouldn't give them the chance to. Because there is no doubt that if we don't give
people the chance to chase them, they won't work ..."
One HoD (c) was not in favour of the idea of exploiting "hard" IP by means of joint
ventures between the academic(s) concerned and the University. He felt that the joint
ventures established to date had not lived upto everyone's expectations; in his view, the
business world was extraordinarily complex and the University was no less amateurish
than academics. He also expressed concern about the potential for conflicts of interest of
the kind witnessed in the US, where academic entrepreneurs had been members of
committees regulating drugs produced by companies in which they had an interest - with
the result that the US College of Pharmacy was being investigated by the US government.
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Most interviewees seemed to be unaware that the University had eschewed the idea of
setting up wholly-owned companies to exploit "hard" IP - indeed, one ( 1) believed
(incorrectly) that many of the joint ventures established by the University were actually
wholly-owned companies. None of the interviewees had clear views on the question of
wholly-owned companies.
(ii)	 Exploiting "Soft" Intellectual Property
Interviewees were asked for their views on the three mechanisms by which academics
could exploit "soft" IP: personal consultancy and commercial arms of departments, as well
as various types of spin-off company.
As we have seen, Strathclyde imposes a limit of 25 days per year on the amount of time
which academics may devote to personal consultancy. Only one interviewee ( 2) disagreed
in principle with the idea of imposing a limit, saying:
"... I think for those who do and want to do [consultancy], it could be extremely
beneficial, because it gets them away from the sort of grind that academic life has
become ... A few days out of the office here and there, a different environment ..."
He added:
" ... I think there are many academics who are very good at it and it is very
important that the University sector has more of an impact [on], or at least an
input to technology, industry and commerce. So, I don't like to limit it as long as
... I mean, that may be the entire research role of a member of staff And don't
forget that, very crudely, the UFC funding is 60 per cent for teaching and 40 per
cent for research ..."
The five HoDs agreed in principle that there should be a limit, though two (A. E) thought it
should be regarded as a guideline, rather than an absolute limit and one (c) remarked that a
global limit was a crude instrument in so far as it made no distinction between revenue-
earning consultancy and consultancy of a scholarly nature. The other Dean ( 2) agreed in
principle with the idea of a limit, too; in practice, though, he felt it was difficult to reach
an acceptable definition of what was meant by 25 days, difficult to monitor even if a
definition could be established - and therefore open to abuse - particularly by HoDs:
"... Genuinely, I think, the abuse tends to occur at the top of the ladder, rather
than the rungs below. Because it can be controlled, by and large, by HoDs, in so
far as anyone can, but no-one controls the controllers ..."
Two HoDs (''' Es) thought that a limit of 25 days per year was on the generous side, while
another (E.) saw it as academic, since none of his staff did anywhere near that much
consultancy. Asked what proportion of their staff actually did personal consultancy, two
HoDs (". E.) suggested that it was around 50 per cent, while another two (B. I') thought it was
closer to 20 per cent; the last (0
 estimated that 10 per cent of his staff did consultancy.
Only one HoD (12) felt that some members of his staff (around 10 per cent) were probably
exceeding the limit.
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Most HoDs perceived advantages in their staff doing personal consultancy. Only two cited
examples of the disadvantages they perceived to be associated with extensive consultancy.
One (10 said it led to neglect of students while the second ( c) felt it led to the neglect of
scholarly research:
"... If you are consulting and making money, you can't be doing scholarly
research at the same time, on the whole. And I can think of certain areas where
I'm sure that the UFC ratings were linked to large-scale consultancy work. I can
think of a number of faculties, for example, or departments in faculties throughout
the UK where the first selectivity exercise caught a lot of people on the hop ..."
The others observed that consultancy was often the first link in a chain which led
eventually to large contract research projects for the department (A• D) , that staff could only
benefit from interacting with scientists in industry (I)) and that academics had a moral duty
to do consultancy (B):
"... There's too many people in universities think that the taxpayer owes them a
living and I think they have to go out there and show what we can do for society -
and actually do it ..."
However, this particular HoD was against the idea of personal consultancy, arguing that
staff develop expertise by virtue of being in the University - and they should therefore be
required to do all their consultancy in-house for the benefit of the department. A similar
view was expressed by one of the Deans (2) , who said that the University should require
all consultancy to be done in-house and levy an overhead so that the academic community
as a whole benefitted.
Views on the value of commercial arms to departments varied. Three HoDs (A' D' D) had no
commercial arm to their department. One of the departments in question had previously
had a commercial arm, which was eventually spun-off as a separate company, having
grown so large that departmental staff complained that "the tail was wagging the dog". In
another department an attempt had been made - on the initiative of one member of staff -
to establish a semi-commercial arm; the attempt had failed, partly due to the reluctance of
the academic concerned to accept either the business plan or a contract of employment
which made him responsible for generating his own salary. The HoD in question reported
that there was also a widespread belief in the department - based on experience of a self-
funding research unit which had evolved out of a conventional academic research group -
that the return would not justify the cost to the department in terms of space and
resources:
II
... /That unit] is commercially orientated. It [has] always seemed to be on the
edge of bringing in a contract which [will] bring in overheads and in a sense pay
back some of the investment of the Department. But this particular group has
never paid lp in overheads in 15 years ... because it has never had any
overheads. Most of fits Elm income] has been from public money, from the
University, from ... Charities don't pay overheads.
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"... It has occupied space and used the basic infrastructure of the Department. I
mean, you know, we got into arguments the other day about who telephones. The
charity who came round were not impressed when they found his telephone had
been cut off. But, I mean, he was running up a telephone bill. He is not on my
staff, basically, so I don't have a budget to pay for his telephones. But he didn't
have a budget to pay and he wanted to go round and round ... Well, I've agreed
to pick up so much until he gets this money in, which will then pay it back ..."
In the third department the issue of a commercial arm had been debated but no conclusion
had been reached. However, the HoD in question said he would be surprised if the
department did not have a genuinely commercial arm within two or three years, with its
own budget and dedicated staff.
The other two HoDs (e• reported that their departments had set up several successful
commercial arms - each operating on an idiosyncratic basis. One was underwritten by the
University for the sum of £50,000 - but had never called upon this; it had its own,
dedicated staff - including a salaried director, its own equipment and accommodation
within the department. Another - in the same department - was underwritten by the
University for the sum of £100,000 over a three-year period. Set up to exploit "soft" lP
from four departments, a professor ran it on a part-time basis; it had no dedicated staff,
relying instead on input from existing members of staff - who ploughed their fee income
back into the department to fund the cost of additional research personnel and equipment.
The HoD reported that some members of staff had initially seen this commercial arm as a
threat to their personal consultancy activities; in his view, this attitude was dying out:
"... I think the environmental culture is that if you have got a good idea, you can
market it, as it were, formulate it through [the commercial arm] in a more co-
ordinated way than you could if you were working on your own. It is the team
approach ..."
The second department had also persuaded the University to provide underwriting of
£50,000, to enable it to set up a commercial arm employing three or four dedicated staff
who were expected to generate their own salary. No charge was made for accommodation
or equipment - nor was an overhead charged, because the staff calibrated and serviced
departmental equipment as a quid pro quo. The department was obliged to call upon the
£50,000, however; in the HoD's view, this was because the staff had been given too long
a contract to have a sense of urgency when it came to generating their salaries; the staff
are now given a three-month rolling contract. The department itself underwrote its second
commercial arm, which functions in a similar manner, keeping software uptodate and
fixing computer breakdowns as a quid pro quo. The HoD remarked proudly: "We didn't
even tell anybody [about it]. We just did it!" He observed, though, that if pressure on
space continued to grow, it might not be possible to continue on this quid pro quo basis.
One of the Deans (1) felt that Strathclyde should establish a University-wide consultancy
service and outlaw personal consultancy, rather than rely on individual departments to
establish commercial arms. The other (2) was more concerned about the confusion which
different commercialisation mechanisms were likely to create from the perspective of
potential sponsors of research - particularly if a department had one or more commercial
arms and an associated spin-off company.
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Asked what they felt about the idea that academics who do a lot of consultancy tend
eventually to set up their own business, one HoD (A) remarked: "You know, I do subscribe
to the concept which used to be known as 'route 66' (sic) outside Glasgow, i f I can put it
that way". However, this particular HoD said later that if an academic spin-off company
grew to the point where it was employing consultants, with the result that the academic
concerned had managerial responsibilities, he would question whether he or she was able
to devote sufficient time and effort to the University. Another HoD ( B) said that academic
entrepreneurship raised the profile of the University in a very important way. However, a
third (c) thought it depended on who benefittal from the entrepreneurial activities:
"... If somebody is using their position in the community to be entrepreneurial for
self at the expense of the community, I do not regard that as positive. What I do
regard as positive is if somebody is doing that either on a fair shares basis or
directed more towards the community than the person ..."
A fourth (E) thought that the University's policy vis-a-vis "hard" IP should apply to "soft"
IP, too - ie. academics should be obliged to exploit this via a joint venture, rather than an
independent academic spin-off company. This view contrasted with one of the Deans' a),
who was against this exploitation mechanism, commenting that it was impossible to "serve
two masters", irrespective of whether the spin-off company in question was "hard" or
"soft". The other a) felt that a "soft" academic spin-off company was more acceptable than
a "hard" company, however.
8.6	 Support for Entrepreneurial Academics
(i)	 Time
Surprisingly, perhaps, given the diversity of their views on joint ventures, all five HoDs
and both Deans professed to agree in principle with Strathclyde's policy of supporting
academic entrepreneurs by allowing their company to buy out a percentage of their time
for two or three years. One HoD (Th observed ruefully that this was far better than an
alternative arrangement which his Department had negotiated with the University some
years earlier:
"... To some extent, we drove this. And we drove it because [the academic
concerned] was a cost on our resources. We weren't actually getting any academic
[return] ... He had lost his motivation and his academic direction. He wasn't
giving the academic leadership that was necessary. So, a rather special deal was
worked out which was highly beneficial to him personally and that was allowed to
run for a period of time ... It was for four years, but he ended up doing six ... It
won't be repeated ..."
He described the new arrangement as sensible, adding: "It concentrates the mind. It is
clear-cut for the HoD. People know what has to be done for a 2-year period". A fellow
HoD (A) also described this arrangement as "nice and clear-cut", while another (c)
commented that this was far better than trying to be creative with a member of staffs
normal workload. He added:
If
... you do get conflicts of interest then and I do think people ought to be free to
go away and devote themselves properly to something ..."
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Asked whether they thought that implementing this particular policy would present a
problem, the interviewees expressed a variety of views. One of the Deans (2) said it would
depend on whether the HoD concerned was supportive, observing that this was not always
the case:
"... One doesn't want to undermine the HoD, but I could foresee ... certain
circumstances in which a HoD might take an unreasonable ... unreasonably
obstructive line. I know of one case where it happened ... That HoD /has since]
retired ... Now [the academic in question] is being released, but I feel it might be
a little too late in that person's career ..."
Two HoDs (B. E) commented that their departments set their teaching schedules for the
following academic session in early summer, and that any academic planning to buy out a
percentage of their time would need to notify the HoD before then. Two (B.c) added that
their response would depend on the importance of the academic concerned to the
department's teaching portfolio and the likelihood of finding a replacement. Another HoD
(B) said that he would require only a couple of months' notice to implement this particular
policy; this would allow him time to consult his Dean about funding for a replacement. A
fellow HoD (E) claimed that he could implement this policy immediately: "Well, if it was
important enough, we'd do it today. You know". In his view, his department already
exhibited this kind of flexibility when accommodating members of staff who went on
sabbaticals or who were awarded funding for very ambitious research projects.
That particular HoD remarked that the department would simply use some of its funds to
hire part-time teaching cover. None of the other HoDs saw this as quite so straightforward
- because budgets at Strathclyde were not totally devolved to HoDs. One HoD ( E) said:
"... the philosophy is very plain. If you are making the money, then you can
normally spend it. But virement is not totally established, or indeed very well
established here. It would be very nice to think that virement would eventually be
total, along with devolution, so we could spend the money wherever we wanted
"...
In the meantime, as another HoD (A) explained, Strathclyde was operating a system
whereby Faculties were expected to balance their collective budget; thus, even if one
department was in surplus, that surplus might be earmarked to offset a deficit in another
department in the Faculty, rather than made available to spend.
Opinions were divided on the question of extending previously agreed periods of absence,
should the academic entrepreneur feel that being forced to return at that time was critical
to the success of the company. One of the Deans ( 1) felt that his particular Faculty was
likely to adopt a less generous approach than the University where this was concerned, to
ask what the Faculty would get out of granting an extension; he added that this need not
be measured in financial terms, however. Two HoDs (A. B) regarded extensions as
problematical; one (B) commented: "It is all a bit limiting and difficult to plan", but
conceded that retaining around 30 per cent of the academic's time would "sweeten the
pill". Another (12) felt that extensions should not present an unsurmountable problem,
provided the academic concerned gave six months' notice. The other two (E. E) foresaw no
real problem - ineed, one (E) was very much in favour of the idea of extensions,
commenting: "I think it is a very good thing. We should be flexible".
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(ii)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications,
Accommodation
Only two interviewees (C, 0 were aware that Strathclyde was prepared in principle to let
entrepreneurial academics have access to certain of these facilities. While another two (I''2)
guessed at some of these resources, the remaining three (A ' D. P admitted they had no idea.
Only one interviewee (c) knew that academic entrepreneurs were expected to pay the full,
market rate for all resources except communications, which were charged at cost. One
HoD (B) guessed they might be charged at cost, while another (E) commented: "The system
these days is very flexible. Most things seem to be negotiable". One of the Deans (2),
judging on the basis of academic entrepreneurs in his own department, thought that no
charge was made:
"... They didn't pay for a bloody thing, quite frankly ... There was a letter from
[the previous Principal] which they held over and [the current Principal] never had
the guts to retract that letter, which he should have done ..."
The other Dean (2) was equally surprised, saying: "Yes?! Does this operate most of the
time?" Upon being told what Strathclyde's policy was, one HoD (") questioned whether it
was appropriate for academic entrepreneurs to have access to such facilities at all:
"... What do you think this is, a sort of service area? ..."
He was sceptical about the real cost ever being recouped:
"... It seems to me to some extent that there should be a separate pot for
encouraging commercial spin-off And any expense incurred in this sort of activity
should come out of a separate pot rather than from a straight UFC training
activity. You know, philosophically I want to encourage this sort of activity but I
don't think education is funded strongly enough that we can afford to be decanting
money from the education fund into these activities. And one appreciates over the
years it is possible for very substantial amounts of money to move into these areas,
compared to what we've got in [academic] budgets ..."
In contrast, several interviewees (8.2 ' 2) felt that the University should "featherbed"
academic entrepreneurs, especially in the early stages. All three suggested that they should
be charged at a marginal rate initially, until their companies were well established -
especially where accommodation in the incubator unit was concerned. Another ( E) felt that
charges should be determined in the department concerned, rather than centrally:
"... I have a very ... you may think this is a narrow view, but I have a fairly clear
view of things in my area. (a) I want to encourage them, almost whatever they
are, provided they are sensible and (b) we should try and do that with as little
outside help as possible. In other words, if we can contain something within the
Department, if we can set up organisations like that and they can fly with our own
resources within our own boundary, then we don't need to get involved in the
arguments about who pays for the space or the rent or whatever. Now, it seems to
me, if you can encourage departments to do that within their own resources, then
they are doing rather well ..."
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Only two interviewees (A.0 agreed uncritically with the University's policy, while a third
(1)) agreed but added a caveat: "if you've got something that is full-blown commercial".
Neither Dean felt that departments in their Faculty were likely to experience difficulty
when it came to giving entrepreneurial members of staff access to such facilities in
practice. This was not the perception of the Hops, however. Four commented that it
would be difficult or impossible to give access to accommodation ( A. E, D),
equipment/instrumentation (p) , or secretarial/technical support staff (D. E). However, one of
these (c) commented that equipment/instrumentation presented no problem, since the
department was actively trying to market them in any case. Only one HoD ( E) foresaw no
problems at all in implementing this aspect of the University's policy.
(iii)	 Financial Support
All the interviewees at Strathclyde were aware that the University was prepared in
principle to provide financial support for entrepreneurial academics, though several were
uncertain as to the form which this support took. Upon hearing that Strathclyde had
moved from providing development grants and/or "soft" loans to taking equity stakes in
companies started on the initiative of academics, all of the interviewees agreed with this in
principle. One (E) said:
"... you have to take chances to progress. It is no different from taking over [a
famous city centre hotel] and making it into [a student residence]. You have to ...
what is the word? ... speculate to accumulate ... It is no different than saying -
let's create a new Chair in something that is important ..."
However, two (A. ') felt the extent of this support should be limited, though one (A) was
unsure how this could be achieved:
"... That, I think, is the nub of the problem, isn't it? Because at the end of the
day, the person we employ, in a sense, to be a financial overseer of these projects
is the person whose, in a sense, empire and career is promoted by developing
more and more [of these]. So, to some extent the director of R&D Services has a
career incentive to divert more University funds though his office into all sorts of
venture activities.
"... I don't want to talk about [this] in an accusing way. I'm just trying to sort of
... analyse the situation that I think to some extent the director of R&D Services is
in a position of being judge and jury at the present time ..."
Several interviewees emphasised that there should be more information about this kind of
activity:
"... The only worry I have about [this] is where the Business Venture Group's
money comes from originally ... I mean, essentially, I think this is the biggest
worry in this University, and that is whether money that is really intended for core
academic activities is finding its way into things [of this sort], or what money is
used ... The problem with the Business Ventures Group is that because of its
nature, it does not have a direct managerial contact with Court ..." (D)
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"... My difficulty is that ... as a member of the University Management Group,
we don't hear about that. And I think these things should all ... We get a report
once a year from the Business Venture Group, which doesn't tell us about any of
their negotiations or any of the deals they have done. It just gives us a global
[picture] ... I want to see ... I expect full documentation of the activities of the
Business Venture Group, which we don't get ...
"... 11 have suggested this] to the University Management Group ... Well, the
University Management Group agrees with me. But the University management -
being the Principal, the Registrar - doesn't. Who knows why people want to keep
stuff out of the public domain. I don't know. They don't give me any satisfactory
reason ..." ").
8.7	 Incentives and Disincentives
(i)	 Exploitation of "Soft" IP
All the interviewees but one (") knew that Strathclyde imposed no earnings limit on
academics who chose to exploit their expertise via personal consultancy. All but one
agreed with this policy, provided academics fulfilled their primary academic
responsibilities. One HoD said that he did not care how much someone earned, provided
this condition was met. Another (`'') observed:
"... If some firm is prepared to give you a phenomenal amount of money for half a
day's consultancy ... I mean, what is unreasonable, anyway? The rates for [some]
consultants would probably be between .£700 and .1200 a day, but if you are a
circuit judge, it is .£600 per day!"
The HoD who felt there should be an earnings limit (B) acknowledged that in practice it
would be difficult to impose one, partly because of wide differences in fee-earning
capability.
All the interviewees but one ( .1') knew that Strathclyde levied no "tax" on academics'
earnings from personal consultancy even though it provided insurance cover for those who
reported their activities to their HoD. One HoD (c) suggested that the University wanted to
levy some percentage "tax", however. The HoD who thought that the University already
levied a "tax" quoted a figure of 20 per cent. Opinions were divided as to whether the
University should levy some percentage "tax". Three HoDs (C.D. ') were against the idea.
One (E) pointed out that in the years since the University had stopped levying a "tax" of 30
per cent, all the "underground stuff' had been brought out into the open; this provided
valuable management information and enabled the University to advertise the breadth of
companies which its staff had assisted. Another (1'9 said:
"... Well, I think if the University has gone through the procedure of saying - we
are going to be covered by our costs for this and they have already said that you
are entitled to do upto 25 days' consultancy, then they have said you can do it.
They shouldn't expect to give with one hand and take with another. That's bad
policy ..."
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The third (e) took issue with the University's presumed justification for levying a "tax" -
ie. that it owned academics 365 days per year, 24 hours per day:
"... I think that [the University has] been trying to have [its] cake and eat it ...
Whose time is it, anyway? Whose man are you? Whose effort is it, anyway? ...
There's got to be some general understanding. As I say, I don't even know what
my vacations are. I've taken two weeks a year and statutory holidays while I've
been here, Easter and Christmas while the University is shut. But I've worked at
home. Who gives a damn about that? Who gives a damn about working till I
o'clock every morning when my wife goes to bed and, you know, you don't see her
for weeks, effectively? You go to work together in the morning. Who gives a damn
about that?
"So, I think all of that needs to be clarified and I am absolutely of the opinion that
someone can legitimately say - i f I am using my own home facilities, my own
brain, my own body, outside 9-5 and on Saturday and Sunday, whatever I get, I
get to keep. And I'll squirrel it away in Switzerland or Panama or wherever. I
think that is quite legitimate ..."
While one fellow HoD (") was undecided about this question, another HoD (1') and one of
the Deans (1) were completely against the idea of academics doing personal consultancy at
all. Both wanted all consultancy to be done through the University - either through the
department (11) or through a University-wide consultancy company (1) , with the University
taking the profit and the academics who did the work receiving at best a small percentage.
One (11) said:
" ... Supposing we were a company, not a University, you couldn't just have it that
folk are going out and doing things which bring them money. It all has to be done
through the company. And that would be the expected morality of the thing. I
mean, I am all for commercial exploitation, but ..."
Most interviewees were aware that Strathclyde's promotions criteria made no explicit
mention of consultancy; however, opinions were divided as to whether consultancy was
taken into account in practice. Three HoDs (c. D. E.) and one of the Deans (1) felt that it was
taken into account, both at Faculty and University level; the other Dean (2) felt that it was
only taken into account if the Dean lobbied effectively:
"... The Faculty review committee is an elected group, professorial and non-
professorial, chaired by the Dean. And they vet the proposals and advance those
that they think have merit ... Then it goes to a central review panel, which looks
across the Faculties and makes decisions. I have found that when you get from the
first stage to the second stage, there are problems in the University recognising the
value of industrial connections of the sort that you are talking about. Primarily
from the [..] Faculty. They don't regard this as really being research ... [They]
take a much more curious view of what we ought to count as research for
promotion. Now, the two years I carried this forward, all of the Faculty
nominations were accepted, but the debate was there and I could see that under
other circumstances ..."
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The remaining HoDs (A, l') felt that in practice, consultancy was not taken into account.
One (A) observed:
"... This has been totally killed by the selectivity exercise ... Universities have
been evaluated for research which is published and research income from charities
and Research Councils. Very little attention has been paid to industrial income,
patents or anything else ... As a Department, I've got to - if I want to raise the
rating of my Department - I've got to reward those things which UFC research
selectivity rewards. Which is publications, which is Research Council income ..."
Most interviewees felt that consultancy should count as one of the criteria for promotion,
though one a') had a caveat: it should only count where it was done as in-house rather than
personal consultancy, on the grounds that this enabled the department to objectively
evaluate its importance and worth.
(ii)	 Exploitation of "Hard" IP
Both Deans and four of the HoDs interviewed knew that Strathclyde had always had
financial incentives to encourage members of staff to "flag" potentially exploitable IP.
Despite having been in the University since the late 1960s, the fifth HoD (1') had only
discovered this "very recently", through a chance conversation with the Direcgtor of RDS;
as a result of no-one in his department appearing to know this, staff who had worked for
many years on a software tool which was very successful commercially had received no
personal share of the proceeds, which were ploughed back into the project instead.
When asked how the University divided income from the exploitation of "hard" IP, three
HoDs (A. '' , L.) said they had no idea, while two interviewees (1'1 ' 1) quoted the 50:50 split
between the University and the inventor(s) which had operated until April 1990. Only one
HoD (c) knew that a new sliding scale which also benefitted the department concerned had
been accepted by Court at that time and was able to quote it more or less verbatim. One
of the Deans a) knew that there was a sliding scale, but could not quote it. The other Dean
W claimed (as did a number of interviewees) to have been the person who initiated the
change; however, he was one of the six interviewees who was completely unaware that
this had been sanctioned by Court seven months earlier.
Most interviewees welcomed the fact that departments generating IP which was
successfully exploited would now share in the proceeds. Several volunteered the
information that the University's earlier intransigence on this matter had occasioned
widespread resentment and bitterness in the light of the many fmillions which the drug
"Atracurium" had yielded in royalties. One HoD (8) was very much in favour of the
department benefitting, but totally against the idea of the academic(s) concerned
benefitting personally. He spoke at length about the commercially successful software tool
developed in his department:
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"... the number of people who have worked in [this unit] over the years is about
forty. That is not including the secretaries and the technicians and the women who
come in and clean the ashtrays. I mean, you actually can't produce anything ... I
mean, I am caricaturing it somewhat, but who says somebody has one idea,
somebody has another. Somebody writes this bit of code, somebody debugs it.
Other people spent their time going out trying to earn the money to keep the team
going, while the next bit of development took place. How on earth can you
actually begin ... And everybody is coming out of the woodwork saying - look, I
want ... I belong to a bit of this. It is ridiculous!"
He also observed that the software tool in question could not have been refined to the
extent it had been if the proceeds from earlier versions had been divided among team
members instead of being ploughed back into the project.
Opinions were divided as to how effective an incentive the division of royalty income was
from the perspective of individual academics. One of the Deans a) said he had no way of
knowing, since this had not affected anyone in his Faculty. Two interviewees 0' 1) did not
think that this really acted as an incentive; one (1) characterised it as a reward rather than
an incentive; the other (6) said:
"... I think the University mustn't delude itself. Academics do what they do
because they are interested in that area of science. They are not there, at least
very few are there to make major personal gains out of invention. They will follow
that track, if it is open, but that is not the primary motivation. So, I don't think
[this] is going to have a major motivatory impact ..."
A similar view was expressed by another HoD ( E.), who nonetheless saw the division of
royalties as "a very real incentive" to encourage academics to "flag" potentially exploitable
IP if they happened to generate it. A fellow HoD (A) thought the division of royalties
would probably have a limited impact, acting as an incentive to academics already "in that
sort of area". Only one interviewee (E) said unequivocally that this would act as an
incentive to individual academics. Nonetheless, all interviewees but one (6) thought that
academics would be happy to keep their personal share of any income yielded by their IP,
rather than channel it back into the department or their own research group.
None of the interviewees had ever thought about the income made personally by
academics (eg. from dividends, director's fees) who tried to entrepreneurially exploit
"hard" IP arising from their research; as a result, none of them had any idea how the
University treated this income. Upon hearing that, unlike some universities, Strathclyde
did not attempt to levy a "tax" on it, five interviewees ( A.D. E. 1 ' 2) agreed with this policy,
though two (6. E.) felt that this policy should only apply to "clear-cut situations", not
impenetrable ones. One (6) said:
"... Where we get into situations which are difficult is where the ground rules have
not been laid down clearly at the outset, so that HoDs can check that somebody is
getting money that perhaps they feel they shouldn't because of the time they are
spending away from the department ..."
The other (E.) was concerned about members of staff who were associated with the
commercial arm of their department and an ostensibly independent spin-off company
located adjacent to the department:
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"... there are situations within the University where there are companies very close
to departments which seemed to be mixed up with research units and their
academic staff and their postgraduates ... The problem is, if you mix up funding
that is associated with students with hard funding that comes from industry, it is a
very difficult thing to separate ...I think [people] have asked but I mean, maybe
they asked the wrong people. But I don't think the numbers have been forthcoming
One HoD (c) felt that he would like more time to think about this issue; if large sums
accrued to someone who had been given time off by the University, maybe the University
community should share in the proceeds. The remaining HoD ( B) entertained no doubts:
the University should levy a "tax" on the income which accrued to academics from their
entrepreneurial activities: "I don't think there should be gain personally ... While they are
out doing that, other people are covering for them". In his view, the "tax" should be
levied even if the academics concerned devoted only evenings and weekends to their
entrepreneurial activities: "I don't know any senior academic who has weekends and
evenings free" .
Four interviewees (c• D, E, 2) were aware that the promotions criteria at Strathclyde made no
explicit reference to the protection or exploitation of IP. Three of these (C. D, E) said they
thought that in practice, this would - and should - be taken into account - as part of the
whole picture, rather than in some mechanistic way such as equating patents with
publications. The fourth (2) indicated that he had been lobbying for some time for the
promotions criteria to be made altogether more explicit, and that this should certainly be
included: "If we want to encourage this area of activity, it should be made explicit".
Asked whether they thought entrepreneurial exploitation of "hard" IP arising from
research was taken into account by the promotions committee, one interviewee (") thought
it would inevitably have a negative impact, while two (C.1) felt it would have no impact at
all and another two (LI)) believed (incorrectly) that it would have a positive impact, since
it inevitably entailed a joint venture with the University. The remaining HoD (E) thought
that entrepreneurial exploitation of "hard" IP would be taken into account, but the impact
would depend on the individual's performance against other criteria - ie. it could have a
positive or a negative impact. Opinions were divided as to whether or not this kind of
activity should be taken into account. Two (11.1) thought that it should not be taken into
account under any circumstances:
"... I think that is really another side to the career which has its own promotional
prospects, its own reward ..." (B)
"... the launching of companies and things like that is a commercial operation for
which they get well paid in general terms. And therefore I don't take that into
account, okay?" (1)
One HoD (4') said that he would be very unhappy about promoting somebody just because
of their entrepreneurial activities, but that he would be prepared to make a very special
case if there was "some reasonable academic activity going on alongside it" • Three HoDs(c, D,E) thought that it should be taken into account, if it was "all legal and above board" I))





Two abortive attempts to create a university at York were made in the 17th century,
followed by another abortive attempt in 1947. In 1959 a further, successful approach was
made to the UGC. York was the second of the new "plate-glass" universities created to
accommodate the expansion in the university sector which was required as a result of the
post-war "baby boom". It received its Royal Charter in 1964.
1.2	 Size
By the beginning of the 1980s York had become one of the larger of Britain's small
universities, measured in terms of student FTEs 0). York was one of only eight UK
universities which was not advised by the UGC that year to reduce its home student
intake, as Figure 2 revealed. At the same time, however, the UGC announced that York's
recurrent grant was to be reduced by 6 per cent between 1980/81 and 1983/84. This was
the lowest cut inflicted on any UK university; only one institution fared better than this -
uniquely, Manchester Business School was awarded an increase in its recurrent grant.
There is a school of thought which explains York's relatively lenient treatment at the
hands of the UGC as tacit recognition of the fact that the university had been consistently
under-resourced since its foundation (2) • There were nonetheless staff losses, principally in
the arts and in services, but the resulting savings were redistributed to other departments.
Structurally, York ended the decade much as it had begun, with 18 departments informally
grouped into three broad subject areas: sciences/engineering, social sciences and arts.
In 1986 the UGC indicated that York should increase its student numbers by nearly 7 per
cent over the next four sessions (5). In fact, by the end of 1980s York had managed to
increase its student numbers by 20 per cent over the decade (4)• Moreover, by 1988/89
York had not only recouped its staff losses; it had actually increased its full-time staff
numbers by 19 per cent over the decade and had more than trebled the number of part-
timers (5). Nevertheless, ranked by size, York's position relative to certain UK universities
fell slightly over this period.
1.3	 Science Base
Given the University's size and the balance which it seeks to maintain between the
sciences, social sciences and arts, York's science base is inevitably less comprehensive
than many of the universities participating in this study. For over a decade after its
foundation, York had only four science departments: Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics
and Physics. In the mid-1970s, however, the university opted to establish an Electronics
Department and to convert its computer unit from a service activity into a teaching
department. It also established a new Archaeology Department. Thus, each of the three
broad subject areas is now represented by six departments. However, by the end of the
1980s the science departments had come to account for a relatively high proportion of the
university's academic staff, with around 45 per cent of the posts funded by the UFC. This
is a significantly larger proportion than at the beginning of the decade, when only 32 per
cent of the UGC-funded staff were scientists (6):
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Figure 6a showed us that in the 1986 research selectivity exercise, one subject area in the
natural sciences, engineering and technology was rated as outstanding at York, two as
above average and the remaining three as average 6) • It was suggested at the time that if
the ABRC's recommendations were ever implemented, York would be assigned to the "X"
category of universities (g); accordingly, it would be able to offer teaching across a broad
range of fields and substantial research activity in particular fields, in some cases in
collaboration with others.
Figure 6b showed us that in the 1989 research selectivity exercise, no "units of
assessment" in the natural sciences, engineering and technology were awarded a "5"; four
were awarded a "4" and two a "3" 69 . National league tables published in the press at the
time ranked York's research effort as the eighth best in the country, after Oxford,
Cambridge and three major London colleges
1.4	 Research Grant and Contract Income
As we can see from Figure 41a, in 1984/85, York ranked 27th in terms of £ earned in
external research grants and contracts, but 10th in terms of the percentage of its total
recurrent income which this external revenue represented (")• The six science departments
generated close to £2.3m, accounting for 59 per cent of the University's total income
from research grants and contracts (12) . Figure 41b reveals that by 1988/89, the science
departments had increased their 1985 earnings by around 45 per cent, generating £3.3m;
this accounted for 56 per cent of the University's total income from research grants and
contracts (13).
As Figures 345-346 indicate, the pattern of sponsorship which York's science base
attracted changed somewhat over this period. The proportion of funding received from the
Research Councils and charities fell - not due to increased funding from
industry/commerce, for the proportion of funding from this sector was virtually
unchanged. Instead, York considerably increased the proportion of funding received from
central government, local government and various overseas organisations.
2	 HISTORY OF EXPLOITATION
2.1	 Background
Unlike the other Yorkshire universities, York is situated in an area which has no industrial
tradition and relatively few large companies ( 14)• In part, at least, this is said to explain the
university's long-standing disinterest in industrial liaison. Until the end of the 1970s this
disinterest was apparently reinforced by the perception that its four science departments
had little to offer in commercial terms 05). Moreover, if these departments were generating
IP, for the first decade and a half after the university opened, the administration was
certainly not aware of it. Given this situation, it is perhaps not surprising that the
university failed to respond to the CVCP's recommendation that universities should amend
their terms and conditions of appointment in the light of the 1977 Patent Act to
incorporate their (joint) rights to employee inventions.
This situation began to change when the electronics department was established in 1979.
York appointed a HoD from Southampton University, which had been pursuing
commercial activities for a number of years. Moreover, unlike most of York's academic
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staff, he had spent part of his career working in industry. In 1980 the new HoD obtained
a grant of £60,000 from the Wolfson Foundation to set up a centre which would act as the
commercial arm of the Department. This interest in things commercial found an echo in
the new computer science department, particularly after it developed the Ada compiler (16)•
This led to a number of potential products being identified, many of which have
subsequently been developed. In the view of one senior administrator, the activities of
these two departments began to exert an influence on the other science departments:
"... Academics are terribly competitive and as soon as electronics and
computer science started to do work that [brought] an income, the science
departments in particular saw that there was a need for them to do something as
well ..."
This was not a university-wide perception, however. In 1981, when the UGC announced a
the cut in York's recurrent exchequer grant, the university did not see greater contact with
industry as the best way of making up some of its lost revenue. Following a meeting of
the Court, at which a member of the academic staff suggested that the university should
try to raise money from external sources, it was decided to appoint someone to organise
an appeal, rather than appoint a dedicated industrial liaison officer. As a concession to
those wanting greater contact with industry, it was agreed that the appointee could devote
his spare time to industrial liaison, however. There was apparently no perception that
these two activities required different skills, nor that making one person responsible for
both could convey mixed messages.
2.2	 Structures
Upto that point, the IP which began to emerge from the two new science Departments had
been handled by the Finance Officer 07), if the individuals concerned approached the
administration. He saw his role as facilitating rather than taking charge of exploitation. He
was less concerned with getting the best financial deal than with exploiting the IP in a way
which allowed the researchers to pursue their particular interests. If an academic wanted to
cultivate a relationship with a particular firm and felt the IP would act as a sweetener, a
deal would probably be struck with that firm, without too much emphasis on the financial
return or, indeed, that company's ability to exploit the IP in question.
If the IP was not to be exploited by the BTG, the Finance Officer invariably assigned it to
a company, rather than retain ownership, seek patent protection and license it. Having
consulted the University's commercial solicitors and attended a number of seminars on
patenting, he was deterred from this course of action by the cost implications. There was,
in any case, no obligation for researchers to notify the Finance Officer if they had
exploitable IP, so a central budget to cover patenting was never set up. Sometimes, the
Department which generated the IP chose to retain ownership, patented the discovery on
behalf of the University and negotiated license deals.
In 1982 the University appointed a Cambridge science graduate who had just retired from
a career in a major British chemical company, ostensibly to co-ordinate the University's
appeal and look after industrial liaison in his spare time. In view of his industrial
experience, responsibility for IP passed from the Finance Officer to the new appointee but
he was not given a formal patent budget. Nor was he given a formal remit:
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"... The one person who might have done that, the Registrar at the time, [was
taking] a year off in Oman ..."
Despite his considerable efforts ", the appointment was not deemed to be a success. For
the first half of his 3-year contract, experience and inclination led him to concentrate on
industrial liaison, sowing a lot of seeds but generating little revenue. This irked the
Departments which were more in favour of raising money via appeal. The Departments
which were more in favour of raising money via industrial liaison were disgruntled that he
was not devoting all his time to it. After 18 months the Vice-Chancellor, the Finance
Officer and the Registrar decided he should drop all industrial liaison activities and work
only on the appeal. In 1985, however, he chose not to renew his contract and the
University did not replace him. Once again, the Finance Officer found himself handling IP
matters.
By this time, the Jarratt Report (CVCP, 1985) had been published and a lay industrialist
who sat on the Finance Committee saw the report's references to commercial spin-offs as
an opportunity which York should grasp. Accordingly, in April 1985 the Finance
Committee set up the Commercial Activities Sub-Committee. This ensured that
academics - a number of whom subsequently came forward with entrepreneurial
proposals - received encouragement and support from the administration. Prior to this,
academics had received encouragement and support - albeit for less entrepreneurial ways
in which to exploit their ideas - but very informally, with the Finance Officer playing the
key role:
"... If! went [to the Vice-Chancellor] and said - I think Dr. X has a good
idea, it would be worth putting a bit of money into it, [he would say] - if you think
so, you go ahead and do it ..."
2.3	 Regulations and Documentation
Handling IP was very much a part-time, sporadic activity for the Finance Officer, who
advertised his responsibility by means of a dual listing in the internal telephone directory,
and via very occasional items in the University's "News Sheet". There was no written
documentation which spelt out for the academic community the DOs and DON'Ts of
identifying, evaluating, protecting and exploiting IP: "Academics have had to find their
own way". There were no University regulations relating to the exploitation of IP and the
University did not amend its General Terms and Conditions of Service.
2.4	 Incentives
When the new Professor of Electronics arrived at the end of the 1970s, he became
concerned when he discovered that the University had no policy concerning the
distribution of income from the exploitation of IP. This led to the University deciding that
income of this ilk would be divided between the academic(s) concerned, their department
and the centre, a policy which was eventually incorporated into the staff handbook.
However, although the department's share was limited to a maximum of one-third for
sums upto £1,000 - or the first £1,000 of larger sums, and although both the department's
and the centre's share was limited to a maximum of one-third each where sums greater
than £1,000 were concerned, it was not at all clear what proportion the academic(s)
concerned could expect to receive or what criteria might be employed in negotiating the
requisite proportion.
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3	 THE KINGMAN LETTER
When Sir John Kingman's letter arrived, it was passed to the Finance Officer in his
capacity as secretary of the newly-formed Commercial Activities Sub-Committee. He
circulated a copy of the letter to all HoDs, inviting comments. Those who were interested
or had experience of IP - primarily members of the Electronics and Computer Science
Departments - were invited to attend meetings of the Commercial Activities Sub-
Committee, a small committee consisting of two lay members, a professor from the
Department of Economics and Related Studies and the Finance Officer.
No thought was given to rejecting the Research Councils' offer. By this time it was
recognised that the appeal had been less successful than expected and the offer was seen as
a means of increasing the University's revenues. The University also felt that having the
right to exploit IP might enable it to have a positive impact on the local community,
perhaps creating jobs at a time of high local unemployment. The prospect of the
University getting involved in commercial exploitation aroused no controversy in the
academic community, except when it was proposed that if a science Department earned a
lot from IP, the money could be used to appoint a lecturer in an arts or social sciences
Department:
"... The reaction was - I'm happy to earn money to appoint a lecturer in m
Department or a [related] Department, but I'm not going to earn money to put a
lecturer in [the Department of] Language! ..."
The Commercial Activities Sub-Committee drew up a reply which was duly dispatched to
the Exploitation Scrutiny Group. It was not accepted initially due to concern over how the
University proposed to handle the division of royalty income. The Finance Officer
contacted a number of industrial liaison officers from other universities, to see how the
successful ones had handled this point. He and the Vice-Chancellor then redrafted York's
reply:
"... It [was] done outside the [Sub-]Committee, because that's how you made
progress to a large extent on this innovative stuff..."
The second response was accepted by the Exploitation Scrutiny Group and York's letter of
authorisation was sent on 16 October 1987, nearly a year after the majority of Britain's
universities received theirs.
4	 CURRENT POLICY AND STRUCTURES
4.1	 Rationale
York's reply to the Exploitation Scrutiny Group was formulated without reference to other
universities or to organisations like UDIL and IACHEI, with the minor exception of
research into acceptable methods of sharing out royalty income. The University's reply
reflected custom and practice which had evolved over the years from grassroots activity
rather than from an initiative of the administration. This is a dynamic which has strong
parallels in other areas of York's academic life (1
	
1987, when it received its letter of
authorisation from the Research Councils, the University had an attitude - a laissez-faire
attitude - rather than a coherent policy.
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Over the following years, the administration made moves to develop a coherent policy. By
1988 the Commercial Activities Sub-Committee had been disbanded ( 2°), so an informal
working party was set up to advise on IP policy considerations (21)• Reporting to the Joint
Committee for Academic & Related Staff, in formulating the University's policy the
working party drew freely on a recent report by UDIL (22) and a talk given by a QC to the
Conference of University Registrars & Secretaries (23) . The resulting policy defined IP in
widest sense, as proposed by WIPO (24) . It asserted the University's rights to all such IP
except copyright in books, articles, lectures etc - and copyright in computer software
which is not widely applicable. It committed York to retaining ownership of all other II',
wherever possible, and to adjusting the costing of research contracts to take account of IP
ownership. The working party concluded by drawing up a set of regulations, to which
academic/academic-related staff should adhere. These incorporated a formula governing
the distribution of revenue generated by IP.
The draft policy was first put to the Joint Committee for Academic & Related Staff in
November 1989 (25) , but only the formula governing the distribution of revenue was
agreed. The local AUT felt that the draft policy had been "cobbled together" from various
documents. In their view, it displayed no cohesion and no evidence of having addressed
certain issues, most notably the fact that the University proposed to leave it to co-
researchers to determine how to apportion IP income between them. This was a problem
which the Computer Science Department had already tried to address on its own initiative
(26) . The local AUT was also unhappy about including all software in the IP over which the
University proposed to assert ownership. The revised policy and accompanying regulations
- encapsulated in a dedicated document - were accepted by the Joint Committee for
Academic & Related Staff in April 1990. They were subsequently ratified by the
Professorial Board, the General Academic Board (which, taken together, are roughly
equivalent to the Senate in other universities) and by the Council in July 1990 without any
amendments.
4.2	 Structures
Prior to this, the administration had recognised the need to institute some kind of structure
to promote and monitor industrial development. When the UGC instructed Britain's
universities in 1985 to plan for a 2 per cent cut in their recurrent grant over the next four
years and to submit proposals to meet this reduced level of support, York indicated it
intended to raise funds by developing five industrially-oriented research centres which
would bring in "considerable sums" (77) . The administration's expectations vis-a-vis the
academic community's potential for doing commercial work changed over the course of
the 1980s, especially after the Biology Department set up a series of commercially-
oriented, self-financing units to exploit its strengths in half a dozen areas. The success of
these units was instrumental in the decision to construct a purpose-built Institute for
Applied Biology (22). Moreover, increasing numbers of York's academics were generating
exploitable IP - and not only members of the Electronics and Computer Science
Departments. The Biology Department developed a number of devices which were
patentable and/or exploitable. The Chemistry Department won second prize in the 1988
Academic Enterprise Competition (section 2) for one of its inventions. The Language
Department developed a device to help deaf people and the Music Department developed a
computer-based musical instrument which was on the market in 1989/90. The Departments
of Sociology and History had developed commercially exploitable products in the shape of
archiving techniques and databases.
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Until 1988, responsibility for IP stayed with the Finance Officer but his impending
retirement acted as a trigger for new arrangements. Before it was wound up, the
Commercial Activities Sub-Committee decided in favour of an internal appointment to
handle industrial liaison and IP. Committee members reasoned that, unlike the man from
industry, the person selected would at least be familiar with the University's structure and
modus operandi. It was also felt that unless the University was prepared to pay a
considerably enhanced salary, it would be impossible to attract a person of the right
calibre from industry.
An entrepreneurial Professor in the Biology Department (") was invited to become
Director of a new Industrial Development Unit (IDU) on a half-time basis, retaining as a
certain number of academic commitments. He took up his post in October 1988 and
reported to both the Vice-Chancellor and the Policy & Resources Committee. A full-time
Assistant Director of Industrial Development was appointed soon afterwards. In 1989/90
the IDU was located in the new Institute for Applied Biology.
At the end of 1989, the IDU was very much in its infancy. It was also a relatively small-
scale operation. This was seen as an inevitable a consequence of the University's size:
"... The science base isn't going to lead to a Emulti-million turnover to underwrite
a large office ..."
4.3	 Incentives
(i)	 Financial
In keeping with the terms of the 1977 Patent Act, academics at York are not rewarded -
financially - or in any other way - simply for bringing potentially exploitable IP to the
University's attention. They are rewarded only if the IP is successfully commercialised -
but if they want to, they are likely to have a considerable say in how it is commercialised.
The extent to which inventors are financially reward has changed considerably during the
past few years.
At some point during the 1980s, the University introduced a formula to govern the
distribution of income from IP. It was publicised in the Academic & Related Staff
Handbook, which seems not to have kept upto date with events in preceding years. In the
1989 edition, for example, the section headed "Inventions" refers only to revenue-sharing
in income from inventions patented through the BTG. Although the University had
acquired the right to exploit IP arising out of Research Council-funded projects some two
years earlier, the Handbook makes no reference to income which might be derived from
other ways of exploiting IP. Moreover, it does not give a very clear message about the
way any income would be divided:
"(i)	 In respect of income upto .E1,000 or the first .£1,000 of larger sums, the
income should be divided between the inventor and his department
in a ratio determined by the Vice-Chancellor after consulting the Head of
Department concerned. The department should not receive a share
exceeding one-third.
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(II)	 In respect of remaining income in excess of .C1,000, the income
should be divided between the inventor, his department and the University
in ratios determined by the Vice-Chancellor after consulting the inventor
and his Head of Department. Neither the department nor the University
should receive a share exceeding one-third." (3°)
In November 1989 the Joint Committee for Academic & Related Staff accepted the idea
that an unambiguous sliding scale was more appropriate. Under the terms of the new
formula, "originators" will receive 100 per cent of the first £1,000 net, 80 per cent of the
next £5,000 net, 70 per cent of the next £24,000 net and 50 per cent of any income over
£30,000. The introduction of the sliding scale was backdated to the start of the financial
year (August 1989). It was York's intention to be extremely generous to inventors,
indeed, the local AUT was under the impression that terms agreed at York were more
generous than at any other UK university. However, although the IDU had to hand the
relevant extract of the minutes, it was not immediately circulated to the academic
community. This was finally done in summer 1990, once a comprehensive policy on IP
had been agreed.
The residue of the income is split evenly between the Department and the University's
central funds, yielding a minimum of 10 per cent and a maximum of 25 per cent each.
This is seen as a very positive incentive to HoDs to encourage their staff to transfer
technology:
"... .£10,000 or E20,000 a year coming in non-earmarked would be tremendous ...
For most Departments any new initiative is very difficult to fund, whether it's
research or teaching. So that is probably one of the most exciting things you can
hold out to a Department ..."
(ii)	 Career Progression
Promotions policies at York are decided by the Joint Committee for Academic & Related
Staff. At present candidates for promotion are considered on the basis of competitive merit
in:
* teaching, course preparation and examining;
* research and scholarship;
* Departmental and other management or administrative
responsibilities,
three areas which are of equal importance to the University. The Staff Handbook provides
examples of areas of work which fall into the various categories. Under the second
heading it mentions "consultancies and the provision of professional service"; under the
third heading it lists "industrial liaison". No mention is made of patents, something which
does not unduly concern the IDU:
" ... [A patent] in itself has absolutely no merit, in the sense that [one] can
write as many patents as [one] can whack in for .£15 a time. Its [like] an
unrefereed publication ..."
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Neither involvement in the exploitation process - unless that comes under the heading of
"provision of professional service", nor entrepreneurial activities are mentioned. It is
emphasised, however, that the examples listed are not exhaustive. In the Registrar's view,
there is no explicit reference because the value to be placed on such activities has not
become the subject of debate at York in the way that it has elsewhere. As a result, some
academics included their more entrepreneurialactivities in their applications for promotion,
some do not; some are promoted, some are not.
4.4	 Regulations and Documentation
The IDU did not feel that the University's laissez-faire attitude necessarily worked entirely
to its advantage where the identification, evaluation, protection and exploitation of IP was
concerned. The Director welcomed the new regulations:
" ... [We] have got to be more regulatory „lbw] we've got to show people that the
regulations are for their own benefit. They've got to be protected from themselves
II
York's policy is detailed in an 11-page document 00 which was circulated to all members
of the academic/academic-related staff in the summer of 1990. The document explains that
the policy has been formulated "to provide a framework for the successful accomplishment
of technology transfer" and that it is intended "to encourage researchers and other
innovators to identify and to develop commercial projects". It informs academics that the
University has been recognised by the Research Councils as "a competent body to arrange
for the exploitation of Research Council-funded IP". It gives the WIPO definition of 11P,
backs up its claim to ownership of inventions by reference to the 1977 Patent Act and
clearly states the types of IP over which the University has no interest in asserting its
rights. The document indicates that in all other cases, it is the University's policy to retain
ownership of IP, wherever possible. It discusses different categories of research, with a
view to ensuring that researchers do not inadvertently give away rights in IP. It also
discusses the relationship between IP ownership and the costing of research
grants/contracts.
It concludes by listing 14 regulations. These commit researchers (both staff and students)
to informing their HoD and the IDU if they have invented something exploitable. They
commit the IDU to keeping a central record of such inventions, together with the names of
inventors and the date. They also commit the IDU to deciding within three months
whether the University wishes to become involved in the exploitation process. If so, the
regulations outline a range of possible actions. They commit the inventor(s) to retaining
confidentiality, to providing "reasonable assistance in the exploitation process", ie.
"providing information promptly upon request, attending meetings with potential licensees
and advising on further developments". They commit the University to bearing, initially at
least, the costs of protecting, developing and exploiting IP and to distributing any net
revenue on the basis outlined above. They conclude by outlining arbitration procedures to
be employed in the event of a disagreement over ownership of IP or the distribution of
revenue which IP generates. If the University does not wish to become involved in the
exploitation process, the regulations commit it to offering to waive/assign its rights in the
IP to the inventor(s).
255
The document concludes with a comprehensive set of notes. These indicate that although
the General Terms and Conditions of Service of existing academic staff members make no
reference to IP, since 1977/78 they have imposed an obligation to undertake research; they
describe the nature of university research as "such that an invention may reasonably be
expect to result from the carrying out of such duties, so that the invention ... will belong
to the University by virtue of Section 39 of the 1977 Act". They also outline the position of
technicians. The notes draw academics' attention to the possibility of obtaining finance
from the Innovation & Research Priming Fund in order to develop inventions to a first
prototype stage. They stress the need to conduct talks with potential industrial partners
under the seal of confidentiality agreements. They discuss copyright and how to assert it,
how to register designs, trade marks and service marks and they describe the conditions
which must be fulfilled in order for a patent to be granted. Finally, they indicate the
various routes by which a patent might be exploited, including joint ventures and
independent academic spin-off companies.
The Intellectual Property Regulations will be incorporated in full in the next edition of the
Staff Handbook and reference to them will be explicitly made in the General Terms and
Conditions of Service of future academic and technical staff. It is also proposed to draw
students' attention to the new regulations.
4.5	 Sanctions
Because explicit regulations have only just been introduced, the University feels it would
previously have been difficult to impose any sanctions against academics who had decided
to exploit their discoveries clandestinely, to their sole advantage. There is a school of
thought which held that was by no means certain that the existence of explicit regulations
and the amendment of future Terms and Conditions of Service would make any
difference. Like the OECD, the CVCP and the AUT, the previous Finance Officer sought
legal advice concerning the applicability of the 1977 Patent Act to academic staff. He was
advised that the situation was not at all clear, since numerous examples could be cited in
which universities were anomalous or exceptional in law.
Some members of the administration are not unduly concerned; as a university, York has
a number of characteristics which make it unlikely that academics exploit their discoveries
clandestinely, to their sole advantage. These include its size, the opportunity for
networking - not to mention gossip - provided by college senior common rooms and the
fact that a large proportion of the staff have been there almost since the University opened
and know each other well. Moreover, the administration believes it enjoys an unusually
good relationship with the academic community:
"... At York the administration and the academics get on very well together. I
gather this is strange. I've spoken to academics from elsewhere and they find it
very odd!"
Academics are said not to perceive the administration as "out to get every penny it can
from their endeavours". This positive relationship has also encouraged an ethos of
openness in the University.
Cynics in the administration are less convinced:
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" ... anybody who's got a good idea isn't going to [involve] a third party if he can
go and sell it to someone direct ..."
However, given the advice it received, it is doubtful whether the University would seek
legal redress:
" ... the University would be reluctant to go to law unless they were certain that
[the IP involved] was a money-spinner, and to be certain is almost impossible ..."
5	 THE EXPLOITATION PROCESS
5.1	 Interpretation of Government Statements
In principle, the administration at York was in sympathy with Sir Keith Joseph's statement
to the effect that academics should become more actively involved with the exploitation of
the IP they generated. More by default than by plan, perhaps, York had a long-standing
tradition of allowing individual academics and Departments to protect their discoveries on
the University's behalf and to have a say - often the say - in how their discoveries were
exploited. The suggestion that exploitation might now be achieved via spin-off companies
was completely in keeping with the line adopted by the Commercial Activities Sub-
Committee only a month beforehand. This Committee did more than pay lip service to the
idea: it was not long before the University put its advice into practice by giving financial
support to campus companies and joint ventures which were "driven" by academics.
However, the administration also felt that the student:staff ratio at York was particularly
poor m . In its view, there were not enough hours in the day for many members of staff to
carry out their primary, academic commitments and get a commercial project off the
ground. For this reason, it did not go out of its way to promote activities like academic
entrepreneurship. Rather, it was supportive when individual academics showed they were
willing to shoulder the burden.
5.2	 Identification
In 1986 York made a brief reference in the University newsletter 03) to the removal of the
BTG's first right of refusal to exploit IP arising from Research Council-funded projects.
At the same time, the academic community was reminded of the Commercial Activities
Sub-Committee's interest in "marketing bright ideas". At the end of 1987, once the
Exploitation Scrutiny Group had accepted York's submission and granted authority to the
University, the administration sent a copy of the submission and the letter of authority to
all HoDs, asking them to circulate copies to all members of staff. There seems to have
been no written reminder after that until the summer of 1990, when mentioned obliquely
in the first paragraph of the new policy document and reiterated in the discussion of
different categories of research.
The policy document places the responsibility for flagging potentially exploitable research
discoveries firmly on the researcher(s) concerned. However, York has experienced the
difficulties entailed in trying to recoup what it can from situations where academics have
unwittingly disclosed their discoveries ( 34). As a result, it understands the need to be
proactive. However, unlike many of its counterparts, the IDU's Director is not
automatically informed when researchers have been successful in negotiating research
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grants or contracts. The paperwork is handled by the Finance Office, which scrutinises
proposals only to check their financial probity. The research grant and contract staff have
no connection with the IDU, either geographically or organisationally. The IDU's Director
does not believe that the solution necessarily lies in relocating the research grant and
contract section within his office. He believes the IDU needs to set up its own,
comprehensive information system. Copies of research grants/contracts form only a part of
this:
"... In the long term one would want to have complete sets of documentation on
every project, right back almost from the glimmer of an idea through to the
reporting. That's the only way [one] can follow it through ..."
The IDU's wish to be involved at the "glimmer of an idea" stage is motivated by concern
about the terms of research proposals - particularly those with industry. This is a
sufficiently complex area that the IDU's Director himself feels he is still on a learning
curve (35) . Academics are therefore encouraged to come and discuss their proposals at the
stage when they are still formulating their research objectives and strategies.
Encouragement is given both informally and formally. Because York is so small, the
IDU's Director expects to be able to make personal contact with every major researcher in
the University in the space of a year:
"... I reckon if I'm not lunching with somebody somewhere, then I'm not doing my
job properly ..." (3t5)
More formally, the IDU has instituted a local early warning system. Rather than use the
in-house research committees which some Departments had established, at the end of 1988
the IDU's Director asked every HoD to nominate a Departmental ILO who would act as a
gatekeeper. He preferred to institute a mechanism which would make commercial
activities its priority, rather than a subsidiary interest. In the science Departments, these
gatekeepers have tended to be relatively senior people with a good knowledge of their
Departments; in the arts Departments, this is less often the case. The decision to appoint
gatekeepers in every Department was taken advisedly:
" ... it would be an enormous mistake in this small a University to be seen to be
divisive. It would be very much easier to say - these are the clear commercial
areas, forget the rest, concentrate on these. We are a University [though], and ...
we have to carry the whole University with us ..."
The requirement that researchers should flag potentially exploitable IP before disclosing it
is outlined in the new policy document. The IDU tries to reinforce its message by means
of a 4-page commercial bulletin (Th . During 1989/90 the bulletin appeared four or five
times. In due course it it is intended to publish it every month, however, not only
reminding staff but giving feedback on what has been achieved commercially. In addition,
the IDU periodically arranges seminars to explain the workings of the patent system to the
academic community, but:
"... [Attendance] isn't mandatory, and even if it was, how they behave is
something else ..."
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This wry comment was occasioned by a "maverick" who "went off like a firework, doing
daft things", and no matter how tight a system he devises, the IDU's Director sees no way
of preventing that. Because of this, the IDU feels it needs to routinely acquire and
scrutinise copies of all research proposals and all successful grants/contracts. It should also
see all reports, before they are sent to sponsors, and it should vet scientific thesis titles
before they are finalised. The IDU draws the line at asking academics to submit drafts of
papers for scrutiny before sending them off for publication, however:
"... If you made a general edict, numerically you'd probably be creating ... a 100
per cent system to catch 5 per cent of the people ..."
Moreover, most academics are "pretty jealous about ... anybody interfering with his or
her academic prerogative".
New members of staff learn about the University's policy vis-a-vis IP from their General
Terms and Conditions of Service and the document containing the regulations - ie. in
writing. Although York runs an induction course for new members of staff, the IDU does
not see that as a useful forum. Firstly, it is voluntary, not mandatory, and secondly,
because of the size of the University, the induction course deals with matters which apply
to 111 members of staff, not just academic members. The IDU recognises that it may need
to organise a one-to-one talk with new academics about IP and commercial activities.
The University has chosen to rely primarily on in-house mechanisms for identifying IP. It
is "constantly pestered by consultants such as Ceres" wanting to conduct a technical audit
of the University. However, since the first ILO carried out a thorough audit in 1982-85
and a firm of management consultants was recently invited to do a follow-up audit, the
IDU has not taken up such offers.
5.3	 Evaluation
Once potentially exploitable IP has been identified, the IDU's Director asks researchers to
write a "mini-mini business plan", with particular emphasis on the scientific value of their
discovery. This is used to solicit peer review from within the Department and from
outside the University.
The scientific merit is fairly easy to evaluate, but the IDU's Director feels it is almost
impossible to obtain an independent market evaluation. Since York is not deemed to be
part of the "North East" og) , it gets no public sector grant aid. There are no local public
sector agencies which could provide an independent market evaluation. Nor can the IDU
readily employ private sector consultants to do it. That requires "significant money" and
the IDU's budget headings do not include market research. Increasing the budget to allow
for the costs of market research is no easy matter. The IDU has to compete for additional
funds against 18 Departments and a number of institutes and centres, in a University
which feels its traditional activities have been underfunded for decades. Unless it can
demonstrate a return from market research, preference is likely to be given to funding
new teaching posts rather than "the peripheral side" of the University's activities - a
"Catch 22" situation. This means that the IDU often has to rely on the BTG - or on
industry, which may provide an evaluation which is neither as objective nor as
comprehensive as it might be.
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Unless researchers have particularly intimate market knowledge, they are unlikely to
contribute a great deal to the process of evaluating their discovery. Unless they wish to
exploit the discovery via their own spin-off company or a joint venture with the
University, their contribution is likely to be limited to suggesting companies to approach.
5.4	 Protection
(i)	 Philosophy
It is York's explicit policy to try to retain ownership of IP generated by the academic
community, irrespective of whether the discovery was funded by the Research Councils,
government or industry. In practice, the IDU finds this policy difficult to implement. One
difficulty stems from the fact that until the early 1980s, like many of Britain's universities,
York's inventors and industrial partners were used to the University not asserting
ownership of IP generated by academics. This created a climate at York in which failing
to assert ownership in the first place or assigning it is seen by many as the norm. This is
compounded by the fact that even though the BTG's first right of refusal was removed in
1985, if the University elects to offer IP to the BTG to exploit, the BTG still insists on
being assigned ownership. This does not create a good role model for the IDU when it
comes to negotiating IP ownership in industrial contracts:
"... From the researcher's point of view ... BTG is not all that different from an
award-giving body like the SERC. They say - if this is what I have to give to get
the money, then I'm going to have to give it. End of story.
"When ICI or Unilever comes along and makes the same demand, I say to [the
researcher] - you are going to have to fight that. Then the company says - tough
cookie, and I've lost him his research money. Its a very delicate situation ..."
In this situation, the IDU has sometimes elected to assign rather than retain ownership.
Assigning has the advantage of removing worries about patent litigation, too:
"... In a large majority of cases, sooner or later [ownership] is going to be
assigned to an external organisation with the clout to defend it ..."
The IDU is also prepared to protect IP by treating it as secret know-how. This is perhaps
surprising in a University which allows only a one-year embargo on PhD theses and is
unhappy about academics delaying publication for more than six months. The IDU plans
to grasp this nettle when it gets around to publishing a loose-leaf "Enterprise Manual":
"... In the absence of a strong management-based directive on this, the way
we've got to go is to produce papers in the Enterprise Manual which will actually
[function as] discussion documents.
"We'll put them in, saying - this is what is going to be done - and wait to see the
reaction. That's the only way we're going to go forward. We can't keep discussing
this son of thing [at] every academic board in the University ..."
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It remains to be seen whether retaining ownership of IP arising out of projects funded by
the Research Councils or charities will become easier, as long as it is not offered to the
BTG. The new regulations obliging academics to notify the IDU if they had potentially
exploitable IP may start to counteract the old ethos, in which the Department which
generated the IP often protected and exploited the IP in whichever way it saw fit c").
However, the IDU is operating at a financial disadvantage which could leave the decision
to retain ownership of the IP, indeed, whether to protect it at all, to the Department which
generated it.
(ii)	 Finance
York still has no patent budget. If the Department concerned was unwilling to bear at least
the initial registration costs, the IDU would try to find the money from other budget
headings - in a budget which is already "modest for the size of University":
"... When the first person came, I would try to find the money. When the second
person came, I'd be scratching a bit and when the third person came, I'd say -
isn't this super? What a nice problem I've got to deal with now ..."
So far, the IDU has managed to avoid robbing Peter to pay Paul. In some cases, the
commercially-oriented institutes/centres have covered the costs. In the longer term, it
believes a central patenting fund is essential, but getting the administration to set up a fund
may not be easy, for the same sort of "catch 22" reasons that a market research budget
would be difficult to procure:
"... Coming from industry, [the Finance Officer's] attitude is very much going to
be - show me what you can achieve and I will put in the support you need ..."
As things stand, it will not be easy for the IDU to demonstrate even the direct financial
benefits of retaining ownership, patenting where possible and licensing IP. Firstly, there is
no central record of patents acquired by Departments/institutes/ centres, the manner of
their exploitation and the return, if any, which they have brought. Secondly, many patents
are believed to have been filed via the "do-it-yourself" route, whereby academics write the
patent specification themselves. The IDU is:
"... extremely nervous about that. A patent agent would say - well, obviously
anybody can drive a coach and horses through that. Its not really going to be
much use to you ..."
It would be hard at the best of times to establish whether such patents might have attracted
more licensees or better license deals if they had been stronger. However, in the absence
of a central record of patents, it is impossible even to compare the performance of "do-it-
yourself' patents with patents filed by a patent agent.
(iii)	 Practicalities
The IDU would like the University to bring in a patent agent as a matter of policy 0°) , at
least to draft the final specification. It tries to persuade Departments to do likewise, if they
are paying the costs in the first instance. However, until a formal patent budget is
established, or central funds are routinely made available, some academics may find
themselves being asked to draft a patent specification.
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The new policy document indicates that if the University is interested in having the IP in
question exploited, discussions between "interested parties" (41) will determine the
appropriate action to be taken. This might include:
"... retention of confidentiality and strict avoidance of prior disclosure (though
the University will as a general rule preserve the rights of individuals to publish
material arising from their research and scholarship as they think fit) ..."
Despite the fact that the University has asserted its ownership over the IPR, the IDU
believes that in practice, academics themselves have the final right of decision about
whether to delay disclosure in the interests of protection. The IDU feels it can only
advise, not insist, given the terms of the new policy document. Certainly, the arbitration
procedures outlined in the notes attached to the new policy document make no reference to
disputes over publishing versus protecting IP.
(iv)	 Ownership of Patents
In the past, York has not had a policy concerning the names in which patents relating to
IP generated by academics should be vested. As a result, some have been vested in the
University or the Department (42) alone, some in the names of the inventor(s) alone - after
which they were generally assigned to the University, and some have been vested jointly
in two or more of these parties. However, the new policy document states explicitly that
in future patents will be vested in the name of the University alone, with the originator as
named inventor.
The new policy document commits the University to deciding within three months (43) of a
researcher notifying the IDU of a discovery whether it wishes to become involved in the
exploitation process. If not, rights in the IP "shall promptly be assigned to the originator,
if the originator so wishes". The IDU itself wanted six months to make this decision, but
the local AUT negotiated the period down to half that time. The policy document does not
indicate whether the University would give up all its interest in the IP or would retain
some interest and the IDU has not yet had to consider this.
5.5	 Commercialisation
Where the University retains its rights to the IP, it has no principled objection to it being
exploited via licensing to a third party, a wholly-owned University company, a joint
venture (") or an independent spin-off company. IP can also be exploited by a
centre/institute which acts as the commercial arm of a Department; so far York has not
restricted its commercially-oriented centres/institutes to exploiting expertise or running
courses. The new policy document explicitly lists company start-up together with
identifying licensees and assigning IP to the BTG/the Research Corporation as a possible
way of exploiting IP. In practice, this is a route which has been pursued with
considerable success. The activities of such companies have been publicised through
detailed articles in various editions of the University newsletter.
(i)	 University Companies
York has had two University companies to date, both of which the University has
successfully sold on in under five years, giving a handsome return on its investment (45).
Both grew out of diverse activities of the Biology Department. One was registered as a
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campus-based company from the outset, since the research group concerned was alert to
its commercial potential. The other started life as a small-scale in-house contract research
unit which was created to exploit basic research discoveries into causes of cancer. The
unit generated a large surplus income. Due to concern about liability, it was then turned
into a wholly-owned University company limited by guarantee and subsequently, when
additional funding was required, a joint venture.
(ii) Joint Ventures
By the end of 1989, York had participated in two joint ventures, one with members of the
academic staff alone and one involving academics, company employees and the private
sector. In each case, the academics themselves took the initiative for the joint venture to
be formed.
(iii) Academic Spin-Off Companies
York's academics have founded a number of independent spin-off companies over the
years, starting in the 1970s with a group of physicists. These have tended to be "soft"
companies exploiting expertise rather than "hard" manufacturing companies but it is not
unknown for such companies to start making the transition. As yet, the University is not
aware of any which are exploiting patented IP. However, one company is known to have
exploited computer software written by an academic after leaving the University to set up
in business.
(iv) Licensing
The IDU has an ambivalent attitude to academics becoming actively involved in the
process of commercialising their discoveries. Academics who seek to do this via
involvement in University-owned companies or joint ventures are seen as occupying
themselves with a legitimate University activity. This is not the case where academics try
to become involved in the search for an industrial partner who will fund development
work and/or become a licensee. In the IDU Director's view, academics are welcome to
provide a list of companies which might be approached, but the contact should be made by
the IDU:
"... The academic resource is an enormously valuable one and we should do
everything to let the academic get on with his academic work. Contacting
companies to see whether we can exploit something should be something that we
do..."
Given its budgetary restrictions, the IDU relies principally on self-help of one sort or
another to identify industrial partners. It is unable to pay for private sector brokers and
there is a conspicuous dearth of public sector brokers in North Yorkshire. When it set
about forming the University's Enterprise Club, it constructed its own database of
industrial contacts. It also finds "Innovation" a useful way of attracting enquiries 06),
though this has not yet led to any license deals. The IDU's commercial bulletin will also
carry details of technology awaiting transfer, when needed; the bulletin is circulated to
Enterprise Club members and a number of other people outside the University. The IDU
also sends out its own press releases to the media.
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Once a promising contact has been established, the IDU arranges a meeting between the
researcher and company representatives. If the decision is made to license, the researcher
is free to negotiate the terms of the deal. The IDU does not insist on being present,
though it would expect the researcher to report on how negotiations were proceeding. In
due course, this will change: deals will be negotiated by the IDU. At the moment, neither
of the IDU's staff have the requisite skills, but contact has been made with the local
Licensing Executives Society, partly with a view to acquiring those skills (47).
Once a license deal has been negotiated, the researcher is unlikely to make a further
contribution to the commercialisation process, beyond a scientific/technical input on a
consultancy basis or further contract research.
6	 ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP
6.1	 Policy and Practice
Academic entrepreneurship has manifested itself in many different ways at York. Since the
late 1970s, academics have been instrumental in setting up units/centres/institutes which
function as a commercial arm of their Department. These academics chose to be
entrepreneurial within the University system, though several have since been asked to
convert the organisations they created into independent companies. Others have chosen to
pursue their entrepreneurial activities outside the conventional framework of the
University, but within companies wholly-owned by the University or in joint ventures with
the University. Since the 1970s, there have also been individuals who have chosen to go it
alone, founding completely independent spin-off companies. It would be stretching a
point, however, to suggest that York had a coherent policy vis-a-vis academic
entrepreneurs. At best, it is a custom and practice situation, which has evolved as a result
of the University turning a blind eye to or granting permission to individual academics (48)
or, indeed, practically supporting individual academics, on an ad hoc basis.
The fact that York has not formulated a specific policy with regard to academic
entrepreneurship is not surprising, given how recently the University formulated its policy
on IP. However, inertia may not entirely account for it. The IDU does not regard
academic entrepreneurship as a black and white issue which can easily be made the subject
of a policy statement. For the IDU, there are too many grey areas: if an academic uses his
expertise to invent an exploitable device, whether or not he has used University resources,
the University claims ownership of his IP and pays him a royalty. If he uses his expertise
to obtain consultancy work, he keeps the proceeds but pays for the University resources
used. If he uses his expertise to write a book on, say, electron microscopy, he has
probably gained that expertise as a result of using the University's electron microscope; he
may include in his book pictures obtained in the course of his work for the University,
and he may well have written his book on a microcomputer provided by the University. In
this instance, however, the University does not assert its rights in the IP, nor does it
expect a financial return.
Academics who have chosen to pursue entrepreneurial activities have inevitably had the
administration's explicit or tacit blessing. The administration has been pushed and pulled
into embracing academic entrepreneurship in its various manifestations. The opportunity to
generate additional revenue, the symbiosis which high-tech spin-off companies encourage
and the contribution which they should make to the local community are all pull factors.
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The primary push factor is the hope that academic entrepreneurship will act as a
mechanism for keeping staff who might otherwise be attracted to the "rich pickings of
industry"; having been founded only 25 years earlier, York has large numbers of staff at
the top of the various scales who are frustrated by the poor chance of promotion which
this situation engenders (49).
However, the activities of some entrepreneurial academics have not been universally
welcomed by their colleagues. It is difficult to gauge whether the dissenters object to
academic entrepreneurship per se, or to academic entrepreneurship as practised by the
particular individuals involved. It may be more a question of personalities than of
fundamental disagreement, since it is generally felt that some of the entrepreneurs have
had particularly abrasive personalities. It is also possible that negative reactions have been
engendered by jealousy. In one Department, when two academic entrepreneurs acquired
company cars, their colleagues felt they were being "overtaken by two people who weren't
even University-financed". Since there was no forum for critics to air their views, feelings
festered. Eventually the Vice-Chancellor suggested to the academics concerned that they
should consider a part-time contract of employment with the University. This was duly
arranged.
6.2	 Making Time
If would-be academic entrepreneurs decide to try and set up their company while still
employed full-time, in the absence of a central policy the amount of time they are allowed
to dedicate to it will depend very much on the attitude and circumstances of their
Department. The Department of Computer Science has taken the trouble to draft a set of
guidelines to cover such eventualities (5°) . In the other Departments, the situation is less
clear-cut. In theory, researchers can utilise the time they might otherwise be devoting to
consultancy activities. However, there is no formal entitlement to consultancy time at
York and therefore no stated limit. Permission to do outside work of any sort is not
normally withheld, "provided the member of staff has consulted properly with those to
whom responsibility is owed and that proper arrangements have been made for the
discharge of his/her duties" (5• If academics want to devote more time to company start-
up than they can take without impinging on their primary academic responsibilities, they
would have to ask their HoD if it was possible to reschedule or reduce their workload.
The decision would be made by the Departmental Board of Studies. In other words, every
full-time member of the Department's teaching staff would have the right to be consulted
about it, and possibly a number of outsiders (52) . The Board's decision could well be a
function of the staff:student ratio in the Department concerned at that particular time
and/or the availability of surplus funds. It may also depend on whether the academic
concerned is setting up an independent spin-off company, a joint venture or an in-house
commercial unit. The staff of the Biology Department, for instance, felt they were
prepared bear the cost of giving one of their members time to set up and run the new,
commercially-oriented Institute for Applied Biology, an in-house venture.
There is no central policy on the manner in which sabbaticals ("research terms") should be
spent; this is, at present, a matter for individual HoDs to decide. If academics with
entrepreneurial leanings wanted to create a short period of free time in this manner, it
would be very much a local decision. Alternatively, would-be academic entrepreneurs
could try and arrange to work part-time or request leave of absence. Part-time work is
viewed as partly-paid leave of absence at York and comes under the aegis of the Advisory
Committee on Leave of Absence (53). First, however, the HoD and the Board of Studies
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have to approve the proposed arrangement. Their agreement signifies that the Department
is prepared to forego any entitlement to a replacement appointment or funding. The
Advisory Committee generally grants only a year's partly-paid absence (54) , but this might
be extended in exceptional circumstances. It also gives priority to staff at the top of the
Lecturer scale. Partly-paid leave of absence was granted to two of the academics who
were instrumental in setting up the University's first wholly-owned company, who were
then able to devote one third of their time to the company. However, in this case the
suggestion was made by the Vice-Chancellor as a means of solving what was perceived as
a local, departmental problem.
Where complete leave of absence is concerned, there is provision for both unpaid and paid
leave, over and above the one term which would be allowed for a sabbatical. Applications
for leave of absence the following session have to be submitted by the end of the
preceding spring term and include "a definite statement about the period of leave
requested". In making its decision, the Advisory Committee takes into account whether
the person concerned has had leave of any sort before, their length of service, how the
leave would be used and "the likely value to himself/herself and, in the long tenn, to the
University" 05) . In other words, the would-be academic entrepreneur could find his request
turned down. To date, only one academic has knowingly been granted leave of absence to
set up a business - and he did not come back. The administration was not particularly
concerned when it learned this, since it had assumed that there was always a possibility
this might happen.
If academics feel they need to extend a previously agreed leave of absence, York generally
tries to be as flexible as possible in accommodating their request; academic entrepreneurs,
would probably benefit from this desire to be flexible, too, although the situation has
never arisen.
6.3	 Other Resources
(i)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications
The University is keen in principle that academics who are trying to exploit promising IP
should have access to University resources, where demand permits it. In practice, it
expects a return on the use of its resources. This applies equally to academics trying to set
up independent spin-off companies and those involved in joint ventures with the
University. The University does not necessarily look for an immediate return; it might
agree to a quid pro quo at some time in the future. Where equipment and instrumentation
are concerned, researchers could find themselves paying the full market rate or a marginal
rate: this is negotiable and depends on the circumstances. Alternatively, the University
might be happy to charge a peppercorn rent initially if researchers are prepared to give the
University a higher return later on.
There is likely to be less flexibility about the use of technical or secretarial support staff
and use of the telephone. Support staff are allocated to Departments on a ratio basis which
is kept under monthly review. Those who leave are not necessarily replaced and this has
led to considerable pressure on those who remain. Since the installation of the
University's new telephone system in July 1988, attitudes towards using the telephone for
private calls have changed. Departments are now allocated an annual telephone budget and
if they exceed it, the deficit has to be covered by Departmental funds. This is likely to
encourage many HoDs to charge would-be academic entrepreneurs at least the cost of the
266
calls relating to their business start-up activities - and the University has the technology to
identify them.
(ii)	 Accommodation
Despite pressure on accommodation, York tends to take a more relaxed attitude to would-
be academic entrepreneurs using University accommodation. If researchers were found to
be working towards company start-up in their own offices, the administration feels that
most HoDs would:
"... turn a blind eye to start with, just to get the thing going. By the time you've
got the seeds of an idea and you've worked through it, you've probably been using
your desk for six months or so anyway, unwittingly.
"After, say, one to two years, they might see it differently ..."
If the researcher wanted formal use of existing Departmental space over and above his
own office, the decision would rest with the HoD, but the administration believes that "the
goodwill is there if the facilities are available". Use of additional accommodation, over
and above the Department's allocation, would be decided by the Policy & Resources
Committee. In practice, Departments have not only allowed would-be academic
entrepreneurs to work towards company start-up. They have found the space for
established companies to operate within or attached to the Department which incubated
them, whether or not they are joint ventures with the University ( 50 . The rent has usually
been negotiable.
The University's flexibility regarding accommodation stems from its belief that there is a
great deal to be gained from high-tech R&D companies rubbing shoulders with the
academic community, both for its own benefit and the benefit of the surrounding
community. For some 10 years, it has been trying to establish a science park on 21 acres
of spare land. In 1989/90 the project was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1991
(57), at which point the University's entrepreneurs may be encouraged to move to one of
the purpose-built incubator units. Although the local council and private developers have
built a number of business villages and industrial parks in recent years, there has been a
dearth of suitable incubator units ( 58) to which they could otherwise go. The new science
park will be run according to the one (albeit unwritten) policy which the University has
regarding spin-off companies: there will be no large-scale manufacturing of widgets on
campus. The administration appears to be happy to endorse what amounts to a concensus
among the academic community.
(iii)	 Financial Support
York has an innovation fund, but in this context, "innovation" is given a considerably
wider interpretation. The Innovation and Research Priming Fund aims to support work
which is:
"... of academic merit and will bring benefit to the University in terms of
additional funds, students or prestige ..•" (59)
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Areas of work considered suitable for support range from pilot studies prior to seeking
Research Council for funding for a full-scale study to the development of innovatory
teaching methods and the launching of new academic courses. The "promotion or
development of patentable devices or systems" may also be supported. Although around 80
per cent of applications are granted, there is no guarantee that applications related to IP
will be assessed by the Committee as more meritworthy than those in any other area.
However, during the 1980s the Committee has supported several applications for help in
developing devices and techniques. At least two have been successfully commercialised.
The Committee has also funded research which has led to the identification of IP which
could be exploitable (6c9 .
York does not have a dedicated commercial fund. However, on the recommendation of the
Commercial Activities Sub-Committee - or, in practice, the former Finance Officer, the
University provided the initial capitalisation for its two wholly-owned companies and for
the equity stake which it bought in two joint ventures. The sums involved in the two joint
ventures varied from £25,000 to £25. The capital concerned was diverted from the
University's general funds in a fairly informal way.
6.4	 Business Start-Up Advice
The spin-off companies set up at the initiative of academics at York appear without
exception to have been successful, and in some cases, highly successful. The University
itself appears to have contributed very little to their success, beyond a capital injection and
some helpful advice from the former Finance Officer. There is little or no in-house
expertise on which entrepreneurially-inclined academics might draw: accountancy, law,
business/management studies and marketing are not taught at York. Nonetheless, most of
York's entrepreneurial academics have managed to combine their academic career with a
business career, often retaining for themselves the position of managing director (61) • Given
that none of York's spin-off companies has yet completed the transition from a "soft" to a
"hard" company, this may partly explain their success.
The IDU's remit does not include giving business start-up advice to members of the
academic community. However, the Assistant Director has considerable experience of
advising small businesses. If academics were involved in setting up a University company
or a joint venture, she would see it as a legitimate use of her time and skills to give
business start-up advice. Those attempting to set up independent spin-off companies she
would refer to the local enterprise agency (6•
7	 SCRUTINY GROUP ASSESSMENT
In September 1992 York was still waiting to learn the Exploitation Scrutiny Group's view
of its arrangements with regard to the exploitation of IP. As a result its initial 3-year
authorisation from the Research Councils had not yet been formally extended, though in
practice the University was behaving as though it had.
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8	 POLICY AND PRACTICE AS PERCEIVED BY HEADS OF
DEPARTMENT 
8.1	 Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and Response to the Kingman Letter
(i) Awareness of the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
Two of the four HoDs interviewed at York (A' I)) 	 that they had been aware of the
removal of the BTG's monopoly in 1985 - indeed, one ( A) volunteered the information that
he remembered the Prime Minister's advance announcement at Lancaster House in 1983.
However, both indicated that they had gleaned this information from the media; none of
the four had any recollection of the University circulating information about the removal
of the BTG's monopoly or the offer made by the Research Councils, as detailed in Sir
John Kingman's letter. On the other hand, all four commented spontaneously on the
excellent communication between the administration and HoDs. As one ( A) put it:
"... We've no wretched faculty stucture here, all cluttered up with bureaucrats.
It's just ourselves at the top. If the V-C wants to talk to me, he just picks up the
telephone and rings me up - and I stand up and talk to him ...I"
Accordingly, three attributed their inability to recall information being circulated by the
University to a failure of memory; all three were quite sure that the administration would
have circulated the relevant information to HoDs within a day or two of its arrival. The
fourth (c), who was not HoD at the time, was quite sure that, in turn, his HoD would have
circulated any information received to members of the department.
(ii) Attitudes to the Removal of the BTG's Monopoly and the Research
Councils' Offer
Questioned about their attitude at the time to the removal of the BTG's monopoly and the
Research Councils' offer, two HoDs (4 reported that they had been very much in favour
of the idea that universities should acquire rights to and responsibility for the exploitation
of IP, whereas the third (D) described his attitude as "neutral". One of those in favour (D)
indicated he had a very positive experience of the BTG's exploitation skills; however, he
felt that the University could only benefit from the fact that BTG would now be obliged to
compete for business, and that the University would be free to direct its business to other
technology transfer agents. The other (A) commented that the loss of ownership of and
royalties from penicillin had played a key role in the government's decision to establish
the NRDC, but added that his department tended to generate software rather than
"widgets". He expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the BTG's ability to exploit
software; it was his opinion that the academics who generated the software understood the
commodity better and thus were certain to exploit it more effectively. The third HoD (D)
explained his neutrality in terms of the 'fact' that IP did not loom large in his subject area,
since he and his colleagues were "not in the business of making things that can be
exploited". Nonetheless, he felt that the University was right to have accepted the
Research Councils' offer:
"... it has become clear that universities are [expected to be] much more masters
of their own fate, [so] they'd better become masters of their own fate and try to do
things themselves, rather than employing a crutch, or whatever ...".
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The fourth (c) said he had no opinion on whether or not the University should have
accepted the Research Councils' offer because he had no knowledge of "the small print";
he was not HoD at the time, and has not seen the relevant documentation since becoming
HoD.
(iii)	 Perceptions of the University's Motivation in Accepting the Research
Councils' Offer
There was no concensus where perceptions of the University's motivation in accepting the
Research Councils' offer were concerned. One HoD (1') had no idea what the University's
motivation was; another (1)) refuted the idea that "the University" could be said to have a
coherent motivation, since it was composed of individuals - "you, me, the Finance Officer
and the academics". The next suggested that, considering the parties involved (the
Research Councils who funded the research, the academic(s) who generated the IP and the
university in which both activities took place), making universities responsible had
probably seemed to the University like a reasonable solution to the problem. The last felt
that the University had been motivated by the desire to generate additional revenue - to the
extent that determining the response to the Research Councils' offer had been ...
"... muddled up with a lot of general wiffle-waffle ... about all sorts of issues like
royalty stakes and so forth, and ownership of IP and all that sort of thing, which
fit] could probably have come to later ..."
(iv)	 Awareness of and Views on the Process of Determining the University's
Response to the Research Councils' Offer
All four HoDs felt that consulting HoDs was the right way to begin the process of
determining the University's response to the Research Councils. However, one could not
recall having been consulted, even though he was HoD at the time; two recalled being
intermittently co-opted onto the Commercial Activities Sub-Committee; the fourth had no
involvement, since he was not HoD at the time. Views differed on the way in which the
decision-making process should have proceeded, once the views of HoDs had been
established. The two who were co-opted onto the Commercial Activities Sub-Committee
were basically happy with this modus operandi, seeing it as an issue to be decided by
those with insights into the resource implications and those with a particular interest in or
previous experience of exploiting IP. The respondent who was not HoD at the time felt
that there were issues of principle involved, as well as issues of resource; in his view, the
matter should therefore have been debated by the Professorial Board. He felt that
academics in the larger civic universities were probably more successful in lobbying for
this kind of principled debate than a small university like York.
8.2	 Identifying Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)	 Views on the Likelihood of Different Disciplines Generating Exploitable
IP
Asked whether they thought the particular spread of science and technology disciplines in
a university had an influence on the amount of exploitable IP which might be identified,
all four HoDs felt that some disciplines were currently more likely to generate exploitable
IP than others. All four mentioned engineering.disciplines (particularly electrical,
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electronic and biomedical engineering); three mentioned computer science and information
technology; one added biotechnology, and agricultural and food science to the list.
Physics, chemistry and other fields within the biological sciences were felt to be a little
less likely to generate exploitable IP at this time, though considerably more likely than
mathematics.
Where York itself was concerned, one HoD 0.0 felt that the research bias of his own
department was likely to generate more exploitable IP than similar departments in other
universities. He attributed this to the fact that he had deliberately recruited staff with
industrial experience or contacts, staff capable of bringing in contract research funded by
industry. Another (1') felt that the research bias of his department was likely to generate
lesa exploitable IP than similar departments in other universities, given the particular fields
in which his staff specialised. The other two felt their deparments were neither more nor
less likely to generate exploitable IP than similar departments elsewhere.
(ii) Awareness of the University's Wish to Identify IP
Asked how aware they thought staff in their department were about the University's wish
to identify potentially exploitable IP, the four HoDs responded quite differently. One ®
felt that very few of his staff were aware - in fact, only those who were "entrepreneurial"
by nature or who had participated in the local AUT's working party on IP issues. He
attributed this to the fact that his was a very "pure" department which had continued to
receive almost all its funding from traditional sources (ie. research councils and charities).
Another (c) felt that there was probably a fair degree of ignorance among staff in his
department, but that those who needed to know were reasonably aware. The other two
HoDs claimed that their staff were very aware of the need to identify IP. However, one (1')
felt his staff were currently Lesa aware than they had been a few years earlier; in his view,
their initial enthusiasm had been undermined by participation in programmes like Alvey,
which allowed the industrial partners to claim ownership of IP generated by academics -
which usually meant that it was never exploited. The other (p) qualified his answer,
suggesting that his staff were aware of the department's wish to identify potentially
exploitable IP, rather than the University's; in his view, the average academic has a better
concept of what a corporation is than what a university is - with the result that he/she has
little or no awareness of the wishes of "the University".
(iii) Responsibility for Identifying IP
None of the HoDs questioned felt that members of their department would take a negative
view of being asked to "flag" potentially exploitable research results - or certainly no
more than the odd "maverick". However, only one stated unequivocally that his staff
would take a positive view. This particular HoD (p) indicated that his staff would
undoubtedly notify the HoD or the manager of the department's commercial arm in
preference to notifying the ILO or any other representative of the University
administration. He indicated that he felt this was the correct response, given that his staff
sat in their offices while the ILO sat in his office and there was little or no interaction
between the two. Moreover, he saw no reason to encourage interaction, since the
department's commercial arm was allowed to exploit "hard" IP as well as "soft". Given
that the department's commercial arm was larger than the IL office, it had been operating
longer and therefore had a track record - and given that it probably had more resources at
its disposal than the entire IL office, he saw no reason for the HoD in turn to
communicate to the ILO IP opportunities notified to the HoD or the manager.
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This contrasted strongly with the views of the other three HoDs interviewed, who felt that
responsibility for identifying IP should rest equally - if not principally - with the ILO; all
three felt that the ILO should adopt a proactive rather than a reactive approach to the task.
Moreover, two (A' 0 perceived the recently-appointed ILO to be fairly proactive. One (A)
said:
"... There's no question about that. He is being a bloody nuisance now and again
... but constructively. I don't mean that in a disparaging way. He's being a mild
irritant from time to time in a constructive way ..."
" ... He is a sort of constructive irritant to the activities of this University, which
is not to say that I might not actually resent some phone calls occasionally, but he
is doing a good job, he's doing a proper job ..."
(iv)
	 Strategies for Identifying IP
None of the HoDs interviewed seemed to regard scrutinising research proposals for
potentially exploitable IP as a worthwhile activity. One (A) commented that for years the
BTG had sent a representative to sit on the grant-awarding committees of the Research
Councils; this had been a complete waste of time - as far as he could determine. Three of
the HoDs interviewed felt that scrutinising interim and/or final reports might be
worthwhile, though one (B) added the caveat that the scrutineer would need to accept that
there was only about a 5 per cent chance of discovering anything of any conceivable use -
and 4.5 per cent would probably be aware already of any potential for exploitation. The
fourth HoD (D) responded rather defensively to the suggestion, saying:
"... if you are suggesting or you are asking if there is some gap in our
management here, that we don't give a second thought to this, then that is ...!"
Three HoDs responded very negatively to the idea of scrutinising drafts of papers before
submitting them to journals, describing this variously as "a bureaucratic nightmare", "a
bureaucratic impediment" and voting it "a large raspberry" on the grounds that it would
act as yet another obstacle to getting papers published. The fourth (D) felt that in any case
this would be a superfluous strategy in the context of his department, where he would
expect members of staff to draw potentially exploitable IP to the attention of their research
group leader or HoD before submitting papers to journals.
8.3	 Ownership of IP Created by Academics
Asked whether they thought it was more appropriate for IP to belong to the University or
the academic(s) who created it, two HoDs (A. I)) said they felt it was right that the
University should own patentable IP and software. One (D) explained this view in terms of
the fact that the University created the environment and provided the resources which
enabled academics to generate potentially exploitable IP. The other justified his view in
three different ways - firstly that it would undoubtedly cost a great deal of money to
ensure that these types of IP were protected and exploited - and most academics could not
afford it; secondly, that the income from exploiting these types of IP could be
considerable; and thirdly, that these types of IP did not necessarily contribute to the
reputations of the academics who generated it. This particular HoD felt that though it
could doubtless be argued that the University should own the copyright in written
material, there were a number of reasons why it should not. Firstly, it cost the University
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nothing to protect and exploit this written material; secondly, it generated very little
income; and thirdly, the University benefitted from it in non-financial ways - ie. by
bathing in the reflected glory of members of staff who write well-received books.
Initially, a third HoD (B) also felt it was more appropriate for patentable IP and software to
belong to the University, since it was created in "company time". Upon further reflection,
he decided that the view of UK universities that "company time" extends to 365 days a
year, 24 hours a day was not justifiable. He added that he might well change his mind
about the ownership of these types of IP if the University ever tried to assert ownership of
copyright in books, journal articles etc, even though these were also created in "company
time". In the end he concluded that it did not matter whether the University or the
academic(s) concerned owned the IP, provided both got "a share of the action" if it
generated a reasonable income.
The fourth (c) felt that there was a distinction between the way that academics worked and
the way employees in industry work - a distinction based on the locus of initiative for
pursuing certain research topics/angles and the locus of direction of the resulting research
projects. He thought, therefore, that it might be more appropriate for academics, rather
than the University, to own any IP they create. He acknowledged, however, that very
often it is the University which makes it possible for that creativity to flourish, and that
this might be an argument for the University to have joint ownership. He did not feel that
the University's role in helping to protect and exploit IP should influence this question,
since very often academics themselves have greater insights and knowledge than the
University can bring to bear on this process.
8.4	 Protecting Intellectual Property Created by Academics
(i)	 Attitude to Protecting IP Created by Academics
Two HoDs (ii, °) agreed in principle with the concept of protecting IP generated by
academic research. Both explained this in terms of the opportunity which this might
provide for the IP to make money for the individual(s) concerned, the University - and, as
one said, the country. One (") felt that this kind of benefit should not be a fortunate by-
product of academic research, but the product of a conscious strategy:
"... If I invent something which I think is going to make a lot of money for me, the
University and the country, you know, I would jolly well ensure that I engineered
a situation which meant that came about, rather than giving it away ..."
The other (11) pointed out that there is an additional benefit for academics who adopt this
approach - namely the possibility of pursuing their research further than might be possible
if they relied solely on more traditional sources of funding.
Another HoD (B) agreed in principle with the concept of protecting IP generated by
academic research - provided this would not impinge for more than a year or so on
intellectually exploiting it; if it did, he felt that each case should be decided on an ad hoc
basis - on its merits. The fourth (c) demonstrated that he had a clear understanding of the
issues surrounding this question, but did not commit himself.
When asked to consider the fact that universities are not legally obliged to patent
patentable IP, that they have the right to protect it by treating it as secret know-how
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instead, two HoDs (A ' D) felt that this was acceptable, provided it did not entail an
indefinite ban on publishing the results in question. One ( A) argued that research results
should not be kept secret for more than six months - on the model of thesis embargo
rules; the other (Th felt that it was acceptable to keep research results secret for a year or
so, and that no rigid rule was required to regulate this. The other two HoDs felt it was
difficult to give an in-principle response to this question, since the situation probably
differed from one discipline to the next. One ( I') said:
"... I think one begins to get slightly impure about it (laughs) when others do it.
Let them do it over in electronics. That's what they are there for, anyhow. They
are only jumped-up technicians. That's the kind of attitude one can take ..."
The other (c) felt that certain disciplines might generate the kind of IP which conveys a
benefit only in certain, highly specific contexts, rather than a more general intellectual or
commercial benefit. In cases like this - which he regarded as the rule rather than the
exception, he felt it was probably acceptable to protect the IP in question by treating it as
secret know-how - provided there were safeguards in relation to IP arising out of student
dissertations.
Three HoDs concluded that if there was a choice, patenting IP was preferable to treating it
as secret know-how - though one recognised that cost would probably play a part in the
ultimate decision. All three explained their preference in terms of the fact that a patent is,
after all, a publication of sorts; one added that it made the research results readily
accessible to a huge network of potential users. The fourth (11) expressed no preference,
pointing out that 99.9 per cent of what a university does is not exploitable and that little
damage would be done if a university behaved just like industry for the 0.1 per cent which
was exploitable.
(ii) Who Decides Whether and How to Protect IP Created by Academics?
Three of the HoDs interviewed believed (correctly) that the University had no policy on
who should make the final decision about whether and how to protect IP created by
academics; characteristically, the fourth (p) did not see how the University could have a
policy on an issue like this, seeing it as a departmental matter.
Two of the four HoDs felt that the academic(s) concerned should have the final say when
it came to deciding whether and how to protect the IP they had generated. One ( c) saw this
as a matter of principle. The other (R) felt it would be impossible to police any other
approach, since academics could always find a way around a ruling that they should delay
publishing or not publish at all; equally, they could not be forced to publish. The other
two HoDs agreed that in the final analysis it should probably be the academic(s) concerned
who made these decisions. However, both felt that they should take into account the views
of fellow members of their research group, their HoD and even, should the ILO deem it
appropriate, the views of the Vice-Chancellor.
(iii) Attitude to the Logistics of Protecting IP By Patent
Two of the HoDs interviewed (''''') did not question the University's policy that
academic(s) who create IP should produce at least the first draft of a patent application,
where appropriate. A third (A) felt that academics did not have the requisite skills and the
University should bring in a patent agent from the very beginning. The fourth (I)) indicated
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that University policy did not apply in his department, since the department's commercial
arm would fund the cost of a patent agent, if the academic(s) concerned felt it was
necessary on grounds of skill or time.
The other three HoDs had widely differing views on how they would respond to a
member of staff who asked for a temporary adjustment to his/her workload in order to
draft a patent specification. One (") felt it would be impossible to formally reduce
someone's workload, even for a short period - partly because the teaching schedules are
established each May-June for the coming session, and partly because apportioning the
departmental workload is such a "hot potato" in any case. However, if the individual(s)
concerned were able to come to some informal arrangement with their colleagues - in the
same way that they might in order to go to a conference overseas, this would be
acceptable. Another (1') felt that he would be fairly cynical about a request to formally
reduce someone's workload on a temporary basis, but that he would be prepared to
consider the merits of the case and make an ad hoc decision. He indicated that assisting
inventors in this way would be sure to cause "a heap of resentment" in the department. In
contrast, the last (c' responded very positively, suggesting that if it was important to
submit a strong patent application fairly quickly, he would try to arrange a sabbatical for
the member of staff concerned. He considered this to be comparable to the sabbatical he
had arranged for a member of the department who was developing a revolutionary
instrument based on the work of two Nobel prizewinners. He conceded that this might
provoke "mild grouses" in the department, but made it clear that dealing with grouses was
all part of a day's work for a HoD.
8.5	 Entrepreneurially Exploiting Intellectual Property Created by
Academics
Exploiting "Hard" Intellectual Property
Asked to give their views on the idea of exploiting "hard" IP entrepreneurially, instead of
automatically licensing it to an existing company, all four HoDs signified their approval-
in-principle. One (1. ) spoke eloquently about the importance of the University incubating
spin-off companies, since it was located in an area virtually bereft of an industrial base.
He believed that if the University could help create a local industrial base - particularly on
a neighbouring science park, it would facilitate technology transfer and increase the
income the University received from external sources. He also spoke of the potential
benefit of this kind of entrepreneurial activity to the country as a whole:
"... I mean, one thing this country is very deficient in by comparison wih the
United States is generating successful entrepreneurial spin-off companies from
institutions like this. Large IT companies in the States - like DEC, Hewlett
Packard and Sun - by and large they have all been spun-off from depattments like
this. We have no track record in this country of doing it ..."
Another " talked in more general terms about spin-off companies from other
universities - both in the UK and abroad - which had created challenging work for their
employees, as well as wealth for the universities which incubated them. One HoD (c)
qualified his approval-in-principle, saying that spin-off companies should only be
considered where there appeared to be a sensible niche market; he was against the idea of
trying to compete against existing companies by founding a company to market a
modification to a well-established product or some add-on component. He also felt that a
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strong grip should be maintained on the proliferation of spin-off companies within the
University:
"... I think that the odd satellite company that emerges ... I think that's a
perturbation on the main thrust of the University. As long as you don't have more
than a modest fraction of the lecturers in any one department having an
involvement in such an activity, I think it is containable ..."
One HoD (A) viewed some types of spin-off company as more appropriate than others -
because they offered the University a greater chance to maximise the return it received
from the exploitation of its IP. In his opinion, exploiting IP via a joint venture between
members of the academic staff and the University would be preferable in principle to an
independent academic spin-off company, because the University might get dividends and
ultimately a profit on its equity share, as well as royalties. He recognised that in practice,
though, the relative benefit to the University would depend on the terms of individual
licences, and that the University might prefer sizeable royalties in the short-term to lower
royalties initially, complemented by longer-term equity growth. This particular HoD was
not in favour of the University maximising its return on "hard" IP to the extent of
exploiting it via a wholly-owned university company, however; he felt that universities
lack the requisite expertise, time and procedural capability to make such a company work
properly. For the same reason, he advocated that the University should not hold a
controlling stake in a joint venture.
Another HoD (c) saw this quite differently; he felt that in a joint venture the University
would be "getting behind the person and the idea", with the result that the company was
more likely to get off the ground than an independent academic spin-off company. He,
too, was less positive about the idea of a wholly-owned university company, however,
commenting that the academics associated with it would find it difficult to partition their
roles, since both could be viewed as a legitimate university activity.
Despite their approval-in-principle of the concept of exploiting "hard" IP via spin-off
companies, three of the HoDs interviewed spoke about the difficulties which they felt all
spin-off companies pose in practice for departments. One was speaking hypothetically,
since he felt he had no experience of spin-off companies; the other two made it clear that
their perceptions were coloured by "knowledge" of one particular spin-off company
incubated by the University. All three questioned whether academics involved in spin-off
companies would apportion their time fairly between departmental and company activities.
The HoD who claimed no experience of spin-off companies ( 13) suggested that full-time
academics should not take on line management responsibilities, since they could not
possibly give adequate attention to these and their academic commitments. One of the
HoDs who claimed "knowledge" of one particular spin-off company remarked that part-
time contracts did not solve this problem, since running a business exploiting "hard" IP
was undoubtedly a full-time activity; as a result, academics' business interests were certain
to lead to other members of the department having to shoulder more than their fair share
of the workload. He conceded that this might depend on the personality of the
entrepreneurial academics; one of the academics he had in mind had a particularly
abrasive personality, which had not helped matters.
Two HoDs (13 ' c.) spoke about the jealousies engendered by academics involved in spin-off
companies - both at a personal and a departmental level. Both mentioned that the only new
BMWs on campus belonged to the two academics involved in one particular spin-off
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company and that their colleagues had not responded well to this conspicuous sign of their
considerably greater earnings. One assumed that the company in question was still
competing for the use of scarce departmental resources and suggested that the HoD should
try to defuse the anger this engendered by keeping and publishing an account of the costs
and financial and non-financial benefits of the relationship between the department and the
spin-off company.
(ii)	 Exploiting "Soft" Intellectual Property
The four HoDs were asked for their views on three mechanisms by which academics
could exploit "soft" IP: personal consultancy and commercial arms of departments, as well
as various types of spin-off company.
As we have seen, York specifies no limit on the amount of time which academics spend
on personal consultancy, provided they satisfactorily fulfil their academic and
administrative commitments. Two HoDs 03. D) felt this was the right approach, because it
encouraged openness on the part of academics about what they were doing. One ( c) felt it
might be a good idea for the University to provide guidelines, but acknowledged that it
would be difficult to reach a concensus in view of widely differing views about the
purpose and value of consultancy. The fourth (") not only felt that there should be a limit,
but he had specified a local limit of twenty days per year within his department. This
particular HoD felt that one or two of his staff had devoted rather more time than was
appropriate to personal consultancy, a sentiment which was echoed by another HoD (B)
about one particular individual; the other two HoDs had not experienced this problem.
Asked what proportion of their staff actually did personal consultancy work, one HoD ®
had no idea; one (") estimated that probably around 15 per cent of all his staff (ie.
academics, researchers, scientific officers and laboratory technicians) had done so and
another (c) suggested it was probably about 20 per cent of his academic staff. The fourth
(D) made a distinction between personal consultancy - undertaken by some 16 per cent or
so of his staff - and in-house consultancy, undertaken by about 50 per cent of his staff on
behalf of/via the commercial arm of the department.
Most of the HoDs interviewed felt that there were advantages and disadvantages to their
staff doing consultancy. For instance, one (c) saw consultancy as the transfer of existing
technology, which conflicted with an academic's remit of creating new technology; on the
other hand, he felt that consultancy gave his staff access to expensive, state-of-the-art
instrumentation which the University could not afford. Two (1` , '') felt that consultancy
could impinge negatively on an academic's primary commitments, leading to a poorer
publication rate than they might otherwise have, or inadequate supervision of postgraduate
students - or simply not being around at coffee time when unforseen extra tasks are shared
out. However, one 64) added that allowing staff to do consultancy made it easier to recruit
to a discipline fraught with recruitment difficulties; it also allowed them to develop
industrial contacts which were useful to the department - contacts who sometimes
commissioned interesting and lucrative contract research from the department. Moreover,
he felt that if consultancy encouraged academics to be entrepreneurial, this could only be a
good thing. The fourth (I)) saw consultancy as an absolutely essential activity in his
particular discipline, to encourage staff to concentrate on real-world problem-solving as
well as basic research.
Views on the value of commercial arms to departments varied considerably. One HoD (D)
saw the commercial arm of his department as an essential and integral part of the
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department's activities and actively encouraged staff to exploit "soft" IP via this
mechanism. Another 4') talked at length about an unofficial semi-commercial arm
established in his department some years earlier by a "consortium of academics". He
expressed concern about the blurring he had perceived between the bona fide activities of
what had essentially been an academic research group and its more commercial activities.
At least part of his concern was occasioned by contractual difficulties created by the semi-
commercial arm, which employed short-term researchers on contracts issued by the
University; when the market was not buoyant, the academics in question put pressure on
the University to pay the salaries of these researchers until new clients could be found.
This particular HoD was ambivalent about the department's new, official commercial arm,
despite the fact that the University's and the department's position with regard to short-
term contract research staff had been clarified from the outset. It was clear that he was
weighing the resentment it had provoked among some members of staff and the financial
risk it entailed against its potential to exploit "soft" IP and generate revenue for the
department.
Two of the HoDs interviewed had no commercial arm to their department. Neither felt it
would be advantageous to create one, since their staff had no difficulty in marketing their
expertise - expertise which was often highly individual. One (") added that as far as he
could tell, he doubted whether the distinction was drawn clearly enough between the remit
of a department and the remit of its commercial arm. Moreover, it seemed to him that
insufficient attention was paid at the outset to reconciling the rewards which the
individuals concerned, the department and the University expected to get from the
activities of a commercial arm.
Asked what they felt about the idea that academics who do a lot of consultancy tend
eventually to set up their own business, all four said that they viewed this as a positive
side effect. One (1)) added that he saw it this way
"... because it means that the academic isn't just concentrating on his basic
research. He is actually more in touch with industrial problems and if he is more
in touch, he is more likely perhaps to become excited about some possibility and
realise it can be exploited and want to do it himself and not just leave it to [the
manager of the department's commercial arm] ..."
None of the HoDs interviewed had markedly different views on exploiting "soft" IP via
spin-off companies to those they expressed in relation to the exploitation of "hard" IP.
Only one (13) indicated that he regarded this as a more acceptable exploitation mechanism
for "soft" IP - on the grounds that it did not entail the establishment of companies
manufacturing "widgets" on-campus.
8.6	 Support for Entrepreneurial Academics
(i)	 Time
Where support in the form of time was concerned, all four HoDs agreed with the
University's view that decisions about whether or not to help academics trying to exploit
their IP entrepreneurially should be made at a departmental level rather than centrally.
One HoD (A) felt that his staff could certainly use the 20 days per year consultancy time he
allowed them, but that formally reducing someone's normal workload for a period while
continuing to pay their full salary - to allow them to get a company up and running - was
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out of the question unless the University was prepared to come to a special arrangement,
preferably an explicit arrangement. In his view, the University should not do this unless
there was a definite quid pro quo of some sort. Another HoD (I)) felt that it might be
possible to give someone a light teaching load for a year or so, on the explicit
understanding that they made up for it in another year. If any further reduction in the
would-be academic entrepreneur's workload was required, he felt that the department
should not only make this decision, but it should also benefit from a quid pro quo of some
sort, rather than the University. These two HoDs agreed that a share in the enterprise
would be an appropriate quid pro quo. One (1') was in favour of a formal equity stake,
while the other felt that the department could have some kind of informal share;
alternatively, the academic's company could buy out the time he/she required, with the
money going to the department rather than the centre, so that the department had the
means to appoint someone to provide the requisite cover.
The third HoD (c) felt that an academic wishing to devote time to trying to exploit IP
entrepreneurially was no different from an academic who concentrated for a period on,
say, developing a particular instrument or overcoming a crisis-point in their research. In
his view, these problems should be treated the same way - ie. the department as a whole
should respond flexibly to accommodate the individual's need, as it already did in the case
of colleagues going to overseas conferences or on sabbatical. He foresaw no great
difficulty in persuading other members of staff to take on parts of the would-be academic
entrepreneur's workload - provided it was clear what the benefit to the department might
be and how the individuals taking on the extra work would benefit, in particular. It was
clear that "benefit" could be interpreted fairly liberally, rather than in a strictly financial
sense. This particular HoD suggested that he could make this kind of decision very
quickly - and implement it quickly.
The question of a quid pro quo did not seem to occur to the fourth HoD (13), who felt that
he would only consider reducing a member of staff's workload if two conditions were
fulfilled. Firstly, he would need to believe that entrepreneurially exploiting the IP in
question was a worthwhile exercise. Secondly, and more importantly, he would have to be
able to "carry the department" with him; there would have to be a concensus in favour of
the academic concerned.
Only one HoD (Th indicated that switching would-be academic entrepreneurs to a part-time
contract for a period was preferable to temporarily reducing their workload but continuing
to pay them on a full-time basis. Two (IL e) remarked that York's resource allocation model
meant that they would not be able to keep the salary savings made and use them to
provide part-time cover - so members of the department would have to absorb all the extra
work. The first (Th had no sympathy with this view, saying that it was wrong to expect the
University to provide part-time cover; in his view, this was a problem for the department
to solve - and there must be a way around it. Another (") added that in his particular
discipline, it is hard enough to recruit full-time academics, let alone part-timers, and for
this reason, too, he did not necessarily see part-time contracts as the solution.
The suggestion that would-be academic entrepreneurs be granted temporary leave of
absence provoked much the same response, except that one HoD (c) felt that he was more
likely to be given the money to find a replacement for someone who was absent
altogether. This particular HoD commented that the University's approach to extending
previously agreed periods of leave of absence was now much more flexible: where
previously it had washed its hands of people who were absent for more than two years, it
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was now prepared to "keep the door open" for five years and more. He felt this was right
where people were spending their leave of absence in a internationally recognised research
facility, but he would not recommend this approach for academics who devoted their leave
of absence to company start-up. The other HoDs responded more pragmatically to the
question of extending leave of absence granted to entrepreneurial academics: it was simply
a question of whether they were allowed by the University to use the salary saved to
recruit a replacement - and what their chances were of recruiting one. One (Th indicated
that he would be prepared to go and argue with the P&R committee, if necessary, in order
to help the academic entrepreneur bring the company to the point where he could return to
the department.
(ii)	 Equipment/Instrumentation, Support Staff, Communications,
Accommodation
Two HoDs (A. ° were aware of the University's willingness to let entrepreneurial
academics have access to most - at a pinch, - all of these facilities, whereas the fourth (D)
remarked characteristically that he knew only his own department's approach to this
question, not the University's. In principle, the first three HoDs (A' B. C" agreed with the
University's approach, recognising that in practice, it was upto the HoD to grant or
withhold access to such facilities. The fourth ( D) felt it was entirely upto the HoD to
determine both policy and practice with regard to the use and cost of such facilities; in his
view, the University could not have a policy on this. His own policy was not at odds with
the University's; he indicated that he, too, would probably try to help academics who
wished to entrepreneurially exploit their IP.
Two HoDs (A. ° indicated that in practice they would find it difficult to provide certain
forms of support in their particular department. Neither felt that the use of
equipment/instrumentation was likely to present a problem, but both commented that
technical and secretarial support staff were already under considerable pressure as a result
of traditional departmental activities. Both added that it might be feasible to permit the use
of technical or secretarial support staff for a short period in the start-up phase, but not for
an extended period, once the company in question had begun to establish itself; at that
point, members of the department would have to provide their own technical and
secretarial support. Two HoDs (A. ° felt that they were so short of accommodation, they
would be unable to provide dedicated accommodation for would-be academic
entrepreneurs. However, both said that it was appropriate to let academics use their office
and their existing corner of the laboratory for entrepreneurial purposes without making a
charge until they reached the stage where they started to realise their ideas. One ( 0 added
that he would support any member of staff who approached the centre with a view to
getting the use of additional accommodation in which to pursue his business activities.
There was no indication that the fourth HoD (p) would find it particularly difficult to
provide any of these facilities for entrepreneurial members of his department.
Three HoDs (A. B ' o agreed with the University's flexible approach to payment for facilities
used by would-be academic entrepreneurs, though one ( A) felt that it was important to
define very carefully exactly which facilities were being offered, for how long and for
what cost - down to details about the cost of pages printed on a University printer. In his
view, this should be encapsulated in a formal, written document. One HoD ( B) remarked
that the method of payment had implications for the department, since some arrangements
might benefit the centre exclusively, whereas others might benefit the centre and the
department - or even the department alone. He added that in his department, everything
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possible was put into surplus rather than overheads, because the centre did not levy a
percentage charge on departmental surpluses. The fourth HoD (Th made it clear that if the
department was getting neither financial benefit nor kudos from the activities of would-be
academic entrepreneurs, they would have to pay the full, market rate for the facilities used
- from the point that they began to turn an idea on the back of an envelope into reality. He
would expect them to start paying not just for additional accommodation provided by the
University centrally or from within the department's own allocation, but even for use of a
portion of their office or their gstiig-i laboratory space. He felt that the district valuer
should recommend the charge to be made by the department. However, he was not averse
to an alternative arrangement, with some kind of quid pro quo, but he felt that the
department should determine whether the quid pro quo was acceptable or not - and the
department should benefit from the quid pro quo, not the University centrally.
(iii)	 Financial Support
Three of the HoDs interviewed were aware that, in principle, York was prepared to
provide financial support for entrepreneurial academics in the form of a grant from the
innovation fund or equity; only one (Th was unaware of this. In principle, all four HoDs
were in favour of the University's approach. One (Th commented that it was appropriate for
a university's investment portfolio to contain some speculative investments, while another
(A) approvingly described the new Finance Officer as more prepared to be speculative than
his predecessor.
However, all four added the same caveat: in practice the University should base its
decision on whether or not to acquire equity in an academic spin-off company on the same
objective criteria employed with regard to its conventional investment activities. None of
the HoDs felt that the University should take equity in academic spin-off companies for
sentimental reasons, or even because it perceived it to be "a good thing" to assist the
technology transfer process in this way. One (Th hoped that the University made good use
of lay members of Council and was prepared to employ well-qualified consultants, where
appropriate, to avoid "the blind leading the blind". Another (c) added that this kind of
financial support should be limited in scope, that it should amount to no more than "a
mild perturbation on the University's main activities".
8.7	 Incentives and Disincentives
(i)	 Exploitation of "Soft" IP
All four HoDs interviewed were aware that York imposed no earnings limit on academics
who choose to exploit their expertise via personal consultancy - and all four felt that this
was the right approach, but for different reasons. One (Th was not in favour of limits, as a
matter of principle, whereas two (`'' Th were motivated by pragmatism: the first (")
remarked that different people command different fees, whereas the second (Th suggested
that it would make people reticent about their activities, which would be counter-
productive. Similarly, all four knew that York did not levy a "tax" on academics' earnings
from personal consultancy. All four agreed with this, given that academics were supposed
to pay for the resources they used in the process of doing personal consultancy. However,
one HoD (") admitted he could see both sides of the argument. He felt that in an ideal
world, the University should get a percentage of academics' earnings from personal
consultancy; in reality, though, he acknowledged that this would act as a disincentive to
doing personal consultancy and that it could even affect the recruitment of staff. One (Th
281
suggested that "taxing" academics' income from personal consultancy would have the
same affect as imposing earnings limits: it would encourage secrecy.
There was less of a concensus over the University's policy that consultancy should be a
criterion for promotion. Two HoDs ('`.1') said that irrespective of the policy, in practice
consultancy was not taken into account by the Promotions Committee. The second ( B) felt
that this was as it should be, since academics had to make a choice between mammon and
academic excellence, while the first (") saw this as an unfortunate "catch 22" situation:
academics tended not to detail consultancy when applying for promotion - with the result
that the Promotions Committee never considered whether to take it into account. The other
two HoDs (c. I)) agreed with the University's policy, though one (° said that in practice,
taking account of consultancy posed a number of difficulties: consultancy reports could not
always be freely published, and even if an individual managed to submit them to the
Promotions Committee, it was impossible to use objective measures such as a citation
count to assess their relative worth. The other (1)) admitted to no such difficulties,
emphasising that in his discipline, it was essential for consultancy reports to be taken into
account when considering applications for promotion; he was confident that the force of
his argument would sway the Promotions Committee.
(ii)	 Exploitation of "Hard" IP
All four HoDs were aware that the University had instituted positive financial incentives to
encourage members of staff to "flag" potentially exploitable IP, though two (B. ° were
vague about the terms of these incentives, whereas the other two (it .D) were able to quote
the percentage split more or less verbatim and knew that it had recently been amended in
favour of inventive academics. However, it later emerged from discussion with the
manager of the department's commercial arm that one of these HoDs (I)) was unwittingly
operating a totally different reward system. Academics who entrust the exploitation of
their "hard" IP to the department's commercial arm do not share in the income generated
by their IP in the same manner as their colleagues in other departments: rather than
reward them financially in proportion to the royalties earned, as outlined in the
University's policy statement, the department's commercial arm simply pays them a
consultancy fee which bore no relation to the income.
However, all four HoDs appeared to approve of the University's policy; one ( A) remarked
that the University should be generous about rewarding academics who flagged potentially
exploitable IP. There were differing opinions about how members of staff in each
department would treat their personal share of the revenue from IP which had been
successfully exploited. Two (A. D) felt that their staff in would probably be happy to keep
their personal share of the revenue, whereas one (1') suggested that some people in his
department would say "oh, goody!", while others would "take a very pure attitude about
the whole thing". The fourth (0 said:
"... Scientists are extraordinarily unmercenary people, really, when it comes down
to it. Compared to lawyers, I mean, they are quite fantastic. I don't think on the
whole that people regard [money] as of nutnber one importance ..."
In his view, members of his department would follow the example of an older member of
staff and plough the gain they made personally from the exploitation of their IP back into
their work - perhaps by buying a computer or funding a research student, rather than
spend it on the ubiquitous BMW. He conceded, though, that if university pay levels
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continued to decline, this was a tradition which might die out.
Three HoDs were aware that York's promotions criteria make no reference to "hard" IP
which was successfully identified and exploited; only one ( D) believed (wrongly) that the
documentation circulated to HoDs each year listed manifestations of this, such as patents.
Of the three HoDs, one (A) felt that patents should certainly be equated with publications
when assessing applications for promotion; he remarked that he would "bang the table" if
the Promotions Committee showed signs of not treating them this way. In his view,
though, the issue of rewarding people in terms of promotion for generating IP which was
successfully exploited had "dropped off the table", due to concern over the assessment of
teaching - which affected far more people. Another ( D) was against the idea of successfully
exploited IP being taken into account by the Promotions Committee. In his view,
promotion should be conferred on those who could demonstrate ability and effort in
relation to research, scholarship, teaching and administration, not for making money for
the University; he saw the two as mutually incompatible, since the effort entailed in
making money would inevitably mean that the people concerned devoted less time to
research etc. He also felt that most academics had no possibility of earning significant
sums of money for the University in this way, and that rewarding the few who could was
liable to cause resentment. He conceded that people might see it differently by the end of
the 1990s.
Only two HoDs (''`.D) were aware that York did not levy a "tax" on the income which
academics made personally from exploiting their IP entrepreneurially. However, all four
felt that this was the right approach - but for different reasons. One (A) saw this as an exact
parallel with income earned from personal consultancy, while another (D) was motivated by
pragmatic considerations: it would not be easy or practical to try to levy a "tax" of this
kind. The third (c) was more concerned with principle: as long as academics did a full
week's work and contributed fully to the life of the department, he saw no justification for
levying a "tax" on any income which academics made personally from exploiting their IP
entrepreneurially.
Only one of the HoDs interviewed (D) made a categorical response when asked whether
successfully exploiting IP entrepreneurially would be taken into account when considering
applications for promotion: in his view, it was not a criterion for promotion. Another
HoD (c) said that this kind of activity should be included in the promotion criteria, as
should a number of other activities to which the University paid no more than lip service
(eg. continuing education); however, entrepreneurial activities should not entirely displace
the emphasis placed on research, and applicants should still be able to demonstrate ability
in teaching and administration, too. A third (D) suggested that activities which were "good
for the University" should be taken into account, and that there was a need to develop
different "paths of rewards". In his view, this was already happening to a limited extent:
promotion to Readerships or personal Chairs was given in recognition of excellence in
research or scholarship, whereas promotion to established Chairs took more diverse
criteria into account. The fourth (D) felt that in his particular discipline, it was appropriate
to take into account entrepreneurial efforts to exploit IP - because its raison d'etre was to
do things which would be successful industrially; however, he counselled against placing
too much emphasis on this.
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FORMULAE FOR DIVISION OF ROYALTIES
Case (a): where an external sponsor meets patent costs as specified in its
contract with the University:
Sponsor x
University (1 -x) x y
Inventor (1 -x) x z
Where x = 2/3 for Ministry of Defence contracts
x = 1/2 for British Technology Group contracts
x = is negotiable for other contracts and
y and z are determined as follows:






The first £40,000 of net annual
royalty income patent
0.50	 0.50	 Any additional income over £40,000
Where there are 4 or more





The first 00,000 of net annual
royalty income patent
0.50	 0.50	 Any additional income over E80,000
Case (b): where the invention is referred to the British Technology Group which
subseuently decides to exploit it as required for work carried out on
SERC grants and by SERC students, research assistants and fellows:
as in case (a)
Case (c):	 where the University is free to, and chooses to, exploit the invention
and pays all the costs invlvetl:
University	 (1-a)/2
Inventor	 (1-a)/2
where 'a' equals the external costs (e.g. patent agent, Patent Office
and legal fees) incurred by the Univesrity in patenting the invention.
Case (d): where the Univesity doeds not commit itself financially but gives
official support to and makes a substantial adminsitrative input into,





DIFFERENT FORMS OF PROTECTION
1	 Copyright
Copyright protects original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, published
editions of works, sound recordings, films (including videograms) and broadcasts
(including cable and satellite broacasts); in this context, computer software is deemed to
be a literary work. Copyright in literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work - including
computer software - lasts until 50 years after the death of the author; films, sound
recordings and broadcasts are protected for 50 years. Copyright confers upon its owners a
rental right in sound recordings, films and computer programmes; this rental right is given
in the form of a licence.
Copyright is a simple process which involves little or no cost. To conform with the
demands of other countries, copyright is most securely asserted by attaching the copyright
symbol and the name of the person/organisation asserting copyright, although this is not
necessary in the UK. In the case of computer software, there is the option of registering
the copyright on a central database.
2	 Registering a Trade Mark or Service Mark
This is a process which usually takes about two years from the initial application.
Application is made to the Trade Marks Registry, accompanied by an application fee of
£68. The trade mark/service mark is then examined to ensure that it is distinctive, not
deceptive and does not conflict with existing registered trade marks/service marks. If it is
accepted, a further fee of £95 must be paid. Initial registration lasts for 7 years and
renewal fees are payable for each subsequent period of 14 years; the renewal fee is
currently £125.
3	 Registering a Design
This is a process which usually takes six months, although a total of twelve months,
extendable to fifteen, is allowed for an application to be put in order. Application is made
to the Design Registry, accompanied by an application fee. The design is then examined to
ensure that it is new. If it is accepted, a further fee must be paid. Renewal fees, payable
for each subsequent period of 5 years.
4	 Acquiring Patent Protection
The process of obtaining a UK patent incorporates the following steps and costs:
1	 The first step is to file an initial registration, which gives the applicant his priority
date. This costs £15 and gives the applicant twelve months to consider his next move.
2	 If the applicants decides, after making the initial registration, that he wants to add
technical information or delay the schedule, he has the option of aborting the initial
registration and re-filing, hoping that nobody else has filed something equivalent in the
meantime.
• 3	 If, however, he decides to acquire full patent protection, on payment of £105 the
Patent Office will initiate a search for previous registrations which might reveal prior art.
4	 If no prior art is found, details of the initial registration are published 18 months
after the priority date. This is called the "A" publication; from this point, the applicant
cannot add technical information, though existing information may be amended. From this
point, the applicant may sue infringers.
5	 In order to be granted a full patent, the applicant must pay a fee of £120 so that a
full examination may be made.
6	 If the patent is granted, it is published in what is called the "B" publication, which
may contain amendments. The monopoly runs from this publication date.
7	 The total cost of £240 does not cover the Patent Office's costs; therefore, every
year from the 5th year onwards, upto and including year 20, to prevent the patent from
lapsing, the patent holder must pay renewal fees. These start low (currently £90) and
increase each year (currently upto £350).
These are the fees charged by the Patent Office; if the services of a chartered patent agent
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